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ABSTRACT 
This study provides a detailed, empirically based examination of the institutional 
dynamics of the new parties and political groupings that have emerged Poland, the 
largest country of the former Soviet bloc, since the collapse of communist rule in 
1989. It draws upon and utilises the models developed in the contemporary West 
European party literature as an analytical framework with which to examine the main 
parties from a structural and organisational perspective and considers how they 
approximate to these taxonomical ideals. It examines the six main parties and political 
groupings around which the Polish party system appeared to be consolidating in the 
run up to the 1997 parliamentary elections. The study considers: the internal 
distribution of power and modes of representation with the parties; the role of the 
party bureaucracy; the relationship between the parties and their electorates; the 
development of parties as membership organisations; and the relationship between 
parties and the state. It concludes that the new Polish parties are strong at the level of 
state institutions and appear capable of fulfilling their role in terms of structuring 
elections, institutions and recruiting elites. However, they are also likely to develop as 
remote and somewhat distant institutions that are weak at the societal level. Given that 
the nature of the links between parties and their electorates are likely to remain fairly 
shallow, the new parties are likely to prove less successful at aggregating societal 
interests and relatively ineffective in mobilising the citizenry and integrating them 
into the political process. The study, therefore, draws broader conclusions about the 
process of party development in post-communist Eastern Europe at the same time as 
augmenting the relatively undeveloped literature on internal party dynamics. 
2 
, 
CONTENTS 
List of Appendices and Tables .......................................................... 4 
Foreword ..................................................................................... 5 
Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................. 7 
Chapter Two: The distribution of power within parties .............................. 35 
Chapter Three: The party machine ...................................................... 74 
Chapter Four: Parties and their electorates ............................................ 113 
Chapter Five: Parties as membership organisations ................................... 156 
Chapter Six: Parties and the state ........................................................ 210 
a... 
Appendices and Tables .................................................................... 252 
Bibliography ................................................................................. 289 
3 
LIST OF APPENDICES AND TABLES 
Appendix 1: Parties and organisations in the Democratic Left Alliance, May 1997 
Appendix 2: Parties and organisations in Solidarity Electoral Action, March 1997 
Table 1.1: November/December 1990 Presidential election 
Table 1.2: October 1991 Parliamentary election to the Sejm 
Table 1.3: September 1993 Parliamentary election to the Sejm 
Table 1.4: November 1995 Presidential election 
Table 1.5: September 1997 Parliamentary election results for the Sejm 
Table 2.1: Proportion of parliamentarians in 'narrow' party leadership 
Table 2.2: Proportion of parliamentarians in party executives 
Table 2.3: Proportion of Parliamentary Club Presidium members on party executives, 
June 1997 
Table 2A Proportion of parliamentarians in party national Councils 
Table 3.1: Number of staff employed in party central offices and Parliamentary Club 
offices (full-time equivalent), June 1997 
Table 3.2: Local party organisational infrastructure in Gdansk, Jelenia G6ra, Plock 
and Rzesz6w, April 1997 
Table 3.3: Total number of Sejm deputies offices, 1995 
Table 3.4: Total number of Senators' offices, 1996 
Table 4.1: September 1997 Parliamentary election voting patterns 
Table 4.2: November 1995 Presidential election first round voting patterns 
Table 4.3: September 1993 Parliamentary election voting patterns 
Table 4.4: Parties and groupings best representing socio-economic groups, July 1997 
Table 4.5: Party supporters' ideological self-placement, November 1996 
Table 4.6: Voting intentions according to ideological self-placement, 
August/September 1997 
Table 4.7: Voting intentions according to Church attendance, August/September 1997 
Table 4.8: Party leader positive (and net approval) ratings, February-October 1997 
Table 5.1: Total number of party members claimed 
Table 5.2: Party membership and percentage of the electorate, 1989-1992 
Table 5.3: Party membership, basic organisational units and local implantation in 
Gdadisk, Jelenia G6ra, Plock and Rzesz6w, April 1997 
Table 5.4: Total number of local councillors, March 1997 
Table 5.5: Total number of local councillors in Gdafisk, Jelenia G6ra, Plock and 
RzeszOw, April 1997 
Table 5.6: Comparative levels of party identification 
Table 5.7: Comparative confidence in parties, 1994 
Table 5.8: Confidence in Polish institutions (1994) 
Table 6.1: 1993 State Election Refunds 
Table 6.2: 1995 Total State Funding of Parliamentary Clubs/Circles 
Table 6.3: 1997 Election Refunds and Donations 
Table 6.4: Labour Union Income, 1993-95 
Table 6.5: Party coverage on main evening news, May 1997 
4 
FOREWORD 
In addition to published sources, much of the data on which this study is based were 
obtained from documents collected and interviews undertaken by the author during 
four field trips to Poland between February-November 1997 together with one 
preliminary trip in June 1996. These included numerous visits to the main Polish 
parties' and groupings' headquarters and parliamentary offices which included twenty 
interviews with party officials, particularly: those responsible for developing party 
organisation and communication strategies; party central office and parliamentary 
fraction office directors; and the key officials responsible for organising the parties' 
September 1997 parliamentary election campaigns. They also included interviews 
with thirty four local party officials in four Polish provinces: Gdansk, Jelenia Gora, 
Plock and Rzesz6w. ' Each one of these provinces represented one of Poland's four 
'historic' regions2and, between them, formed a politically and demographically 
representative sample of the whole country. All of these officials are fully cited where 
I have quoted them directly and I would like to thank them all of them (some of 
whom provided me with two or three interviews) for their help and co-operation. 
These field visits also included a series of interviews with Polish academics and 
commentators working in the field, all of whom I would thank. These included: 
Professor Stanislaw Gebethner, Professor Konstanty Wojtaszczyk and Dr Radzislawa 
Gortat from Warsaw University's Institute of Political Science and Journalism; 
Professor Miroslawa Grabowska from Warsaw University's Institute of Sociology; 
Professor Tomasz Zukowski from Warsaw University's Institute of Social Studies; Dr 
Ewa Nalewajko and Dr Irena Jackiewicz from the Polish Academy of Sciences 
Institute of Political Studies; Ewa Czaczkowska, Marcin Dominik Mort, Eliza 
Olczyk and Malgorzata SubotiC' from the 'RzeczposAlita' daily newspaper; and 
Mariusz Janicki and Janina Paradowska from the 'Polityka' weekly magazine. 
' At the time that the fieldwork for this study was undertaken Poland was divided into 49 provincial 
administrative units, known as wojew6dztwa, which were generally co-terminus with the Polish 
parliamentary electoral districts (except for Katowice province which comprised three electoral 
districts and Warsaw province two). In January 1999 these were replaced by 16 larger provinces and, 
at the time of writing, a revision of the electoral law is under consideration with the objective of 
bringing the electoral constituencies into line with this new administrative structure. 
' See: H. Tworzecki. Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland. Oxford: Westview Press. 1996. pp83- 
89. 
Naturally, responsibility for the interpretation and analysis of all the interviewees' 
comments and observations lies solely with the author. 
I would like to thank the staff at SSEES Library, the Polish Library in Hammersmith, 
and at Warsaw University (particularly in the Department of Political Science where I 
was based during the first part of my fieldwork) together with Inka Sklodkowska 
from the Polish Academy of Science's Institute of Political Studies Political Parties 
Archive in Warsaw for all their help. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Polish 
Centre for the Research of Social Opinion (Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej: 
CBOS) and the Institute for the Research of Public of Opinion (Ogrodek Badania 
Opinii Publicznej: OBOP). 
I would also like to thank the ESRC for providing the funding which enabled me to 
undertake this research, particularly for their assistance with supporting my fieldwork 
in Poland. 
Finally, I would like to thank all those who have provided me with helpful comments 
and insights on various drafts of this study, particularly my colleagues at SSEES and 
especially my supervisors: Professor George Schopflin and Dr Kieran Williams. I 
would also like to thank my wife, Jacqueline, and the rest of my family for all their 
patience and support. 
A. . 
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CHAPTER ONE. - 
INTRODUCTION 
The existence of autonomous political parties is a central feature in the functioning of 
almost every contemporary democracy. It is difficult to conceive of a democratic 
political system in which parties do not play an important, if not decisive, role in the 
operation of democratic institutions and practices and as a guarantor of political 
pluralism. ' Although they have proved themselves to be highly flexible and adaptable 
structures, and some types of party emphasise certain roles more than others most 
commentators have had few difficulties in documenting a number of core functions 
which they are thought to perform in the operation of a modem democracy and 
society. 2 
Firstly, perhaps their most basic function is thought to be that of putting forward 
candidates for public office. Parties provide the main source of recruitment for 
political elites and, specifically, provide the personnel to staff the most important 
positions in government. By doing so, parties also help to structure the vote at 
election times and thereby shape citizens' participation in the electoral process. 
Secondly, parties help to sustain public institutions in both the parliamentary and 
governmental arena as well as providing political leaders with the discipline and 
logistical support essential to shape and control the machinery of government, enact 
legislation and, when appropriate, provide effective opposition. Thirdly, parties 
represent and aggregate the demands of various social interests and convert these into 
more manageable packages of public policy choices on the basis of their ideology or 
some other set of values or principles. More broadly, this process also involves 
influencing and structuring public opinion and the content of political discourse itself. 
Fourthly, as a consequence parties help to integrate citizens into the political system 
and mobilise both public support and civic participation in the political process, from 
the relatively straightforward act of voting to more active forms of engagement. 
Parties can thereby: transform privately-orientated individuals into publicly-orientated 
citizens, resolve conflicts through institutional, orderly and peaceful channels, and 
help to generate the political cohesion and stability which can be particularly 
1 See, for example: G. Bingham Powell. Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and 
Violence. Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press. 1982. pp75-80, for a summary of 
the conventional view of parties in the comparative literature. 
2 For a comprehensive list and interesting discussion of how parties perform these functions see: A. 
King, 'Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections', Polity. Vol 2 No 2. 
1969. pp II 1- 14 1. 
important for democratic regimes during times of crisis. ' Conversely, so-called 'anti- 
system' parties can, of course, exacerbate political instability and thereby undermine 
and de-legitimise the democratic process. 
All these functions are underpinned by the fact that normatively parties operate on the 
boundaries of, and mediate between, the formal structures of the state and civil 
society. Consequently, they are thought to provide the mechanism that links the 
formal structures of political power to the various components of civil society by 
placing their representatives in positions where they can exercise that power on their 
behalf. Parties thereby provide a two-way channel of communication which both 
informs citizens and allows their opinions to be expressed, and potential change to be 
affected, through institutional channels. As Lawson put it, the party is "the one 
agency that can claim to have as its very raison Ware the creation of an entire 
linkage chain, a chain of connections that runs from the voters through the candidates 
and the electoral process to the officials of government. N 
The development of parties and party systems is, therefore, rightly seen as both one of 
the most important tests of, and making a contribution to, the strength of an emerging 
democracy. Consequently, examining the role of the new parties and the shape of the 
new party systems is seen as one of the central themes in assessing the progress of 
post-communist East European democratisation. This is reflected in the growing and 
increasingly rich literature on East European party politics which has developed into 
one of the most active sub-fields within the study of the comparative politics of the 
region. The emergence of the new parties and party systems in the post-communist 
contexe - including the problematic legacies of the communist and pre-communist 
periods' - empirical studies of the popular attitudes towards the new parties that 
3 See, for example: S. P. Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 1968. pp397433. 
4 K. Lawson and P. Merkl, eds. When Parties Fail., Emerging Alternative Organisations. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 1988. p16. 
5 See: P. Lewis, 'Civil Society and the Development of Political Parties in East-Central Europe', 
Journal of Communist Studies. December 1993. Vol. 9. pp5-20; G. Wightman, ed. Party Formation 
in East-Central Europe: Post-communist politics in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 1995; G. Pridham and P. Lewis, eds. Stabilising Fragile Democracies: 
Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. 
1996; and P. Mair. "at is different about post-communist party systems? Glasgow: University of 
Strathclyde. 1996. 
6 See: M. Cotta, 'Building party systems after the dictatorship: the East European cases in a 
comparative perspective' in G. Pridharn and T. Vanhanen, eds. Democratisation in Eastern Europe; 
Domestic and International Perspectives. London: Routledge. 1994; and B. Geddes, 'A Comparative 
Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe', Comparative Political Studies, Vol 28 No 2, 
July 1995. pp239-274; and S. Werning Rivera, 'Historical Cleavages or Transition Mode? Influences 
on the Emergring Party Systems in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, " Party Politics. Vol 2 No 
2.1996. ppl77-208. 
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undergird these systems, ' together with attempts to identify and make predictions 
about the development of ideological dimensions and cleavage structureO have all 
received considerable scholarly attention. There have also been a number of important 
studies attempting to account for the re-emergence of former communist 'successor' 
parties as a permanent fixture of the East European political landscape and the 
implications for the process of democratisation. ' Although all the studies in these 
fields have proved useful, there have been considerably fewer major contributions to, 
and much weaker focus on, the empirically-grounded projection of how parties 
actually work; their institutional characteristics and, particularly, the question of what 
type of party structure and organisation is emerging. In spite of a number of recent, 
valuable attempts to redress the balance, the study of internal party dynamics remains 
one of the least well-explored areas of post-communist change and most promising 
territories for further exploration. " 
This neglect of the empirically-based study of party organisation and lack of interest 
in party structural development is also a feature of the much larger and more 
7 See: M. Wyman, S. White, B. Miller and P. Haywood. 'The Place of 'Party' in Post-Communist 
Europe', Party Politics. Vol I No 4.1995. pp535-548; R. Rose, 'Mobilising Demobilised Voters in 
POst-Communist Societies', Party Politics. Vol I No 4.1995. pp535-548; and R. Rose and W. 
Mishler, 'Negative and Positive Party Identification in Post-Communist Countries', Electoral Studies. 
Vol 17 No 2.1998. pp217-234. a See: H. Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, ' Politics and Society. Vol 20 No 1.1992. pp7-50; G. Evans and S. Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', British Journal ofPolitical Science. Vol 23 No 4.1993. pp521-548; H. Kitschelt; Party SYstems in East-Central Europe: Consolidation or Fluidity?, Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 1995; H. Kitschelt, 'Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions', Party Politics. Vol I No 4.1995. pp447-472; and 'Historical Cleavages or Transition Mode? Influences on the Emerging Party Systems in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. '. 
9 See: J. T. Ishiyama, 'Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratisation in Eastern Europe', Comparative Politics. January 1995. pp 147-166; M. Waller, 'Adaptation of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe: A Case of Social- democratisation? ', Party Politics. Vol I No 4.1995. pp473-490; A. Mahr and J. Nagle, 'Resurrection 
of the Successor Parties and Democratisation in East-Central Europe', Communist and Post- Communist Studies. Vol 28 No 4.1995. pp393409; J. T. Ishiyama, 'The Sickle or the Rose?: Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics', 
Comparative Political Studies. Vol 30 No 3. June 1997. pp299-330; and M. Orenstein, 'A Genealogy 
of Communist Successor Parties in East-Central Europe and the Determinants of their Success', East European Politics and Societies. Vol 12 No 3. Fall 1998. pp472499. 10 The two significant exceptions here are: P. Kopecky, 'Developing Party Organisations in East- 
Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Ernerge? ', Party Politics. Vol I No 4.1995. pp515- 
534; and P. G. Lewis. ed. Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 1996. Other articles which consider or touch on these specific issues include: P. G. 
Lewis, 'Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-communist Poland', Europe-Asia 
Studies. Vol 46 No 5.1994. pp779-799; P. G. Lewis, 'Poland and Eastern Europe: Perspectives on 
Party Factions and Factionalism', Democratization. Vol 2 No 1. Spring 1995. pp 102-124; and P. G. 
Lewis and R. Gortat, 'Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland', 
Party Politics. Vol I No 4.1995. pp599-608. One substantial contribution to this sub-field by a 
Polish scholar is: E. Nalewajko. Protopartie i Protosystem: Szkic do Obrazu Polskiej 
W1e1qpartyjnod4!. Warsaw: Instytut Nauk Politycznych PAN. 1997. 
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extensive literature on the longer-established Western party systems. With party 
studies now one of the largest sub-fields in comparative politics, increasingly 
sophisticated theories and research techniques have been developed to examine: the 
origins, stability and subsequent changes in parties' electoral support; " parties' 
shifting programmatic orientations and ideological dimensions; ` the role of parties in 
government and as public office holders; " the classification of different types of party 
systems; " and the relationship between parties and other societal structures. " 
In other words, party studies is a sub-discipline that has been dominated by an 
increasingly strong emphasis on what Lawson terms the "inter-active components" of 
party systems - why they take the form they do, endure, change and what they signify 
- rather than by attempts to examine internal party structure and dynamics. " This is 
not so much evident at the theoretical level were much of the pioneering ground work 
in the field of modem party studies, particularly Mchels and Ostrogorski's classic 
research, 17 was focused precisely on the activities of parties as organisations. Indeed, 
notwithstanding a discernible shift of emphasis in recent years, valuable theoretical 
projections and discussions on the changing models of party organisation have 
11 See: J. La Palombara and M. Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 1966; S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds. Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross National Perspectives. New York: Free Press. 1967; R. Rose, ed. Electoral 
Behaviour. New York: Free Press. 1974; 1. Crewe and D. Denver, eds. Electoral Change in Western 
Democracies: Patterns and Sources ofElectoral Volatility. London: Croom Helm. 1985; R. J. Dalton, 
S. C. Flanagan, PA. Beck, eds. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 1984; S. Bartolini and P. Mair. Identity, Competition and Electoral 
Availability: The Stabilisation ofEuropean Electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1990; and M. Franklin, T. Mackie and H. Valen, eds. Electoral Change. Responses 
to Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1991. 
12 See: I. Budge, D. Hearl and D. Robertson. eds. Ideology, Strategy and Pany Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1987; and K. von Beyme, Political Pat-ties in Western Democracies. 
Aldershot: Gower. 1985. 
13 See: F. Castles and R. Wildenmann. eds. The Impact ofParties. London: Sage. 1982; F. Castles 
and R. Wildenmann, eds. Visions and Realities qfParty Government. Berlin: de Gruyter. 1986; G. 
Pridham, ed. Coalitional Behaviour in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Modelfor Western Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1986; R. S. Katz, ed. Party Governments: European and 
American Experiences. Berlin: de Gruyter. 1987; 1. Budge and H. Keman, eds. Parties and 
Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1990; M. Laver and N. Schofield, Multiparty 
Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1990; and M. Laver and 1. Budge, eds. Party Policy 
and Government Coalitions. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1992. 
14 See: G. Sartori. Parties and Party Systems: A Frameworkfor Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1976. 
15 See: K. Lawson. Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 1980; A. Ware. Citizens, Parties and the State: A Re-appraisal. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 1988; and "en Parties Fail. 
16 See: K. Lawson. 'Political Parties Inside and Out, Comparative Politics. Vol 23.1990. pp 105-119 
(108). 
17 See: R. Michels. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies qfModem 
Democracies. New York: Free Press. 1962 (1915); and M. Ostrogorski. Democracy and the 
Organisation ofPcolitical Parties. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 1964 (1902). 
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continued to be produced. " Rather, the neglect has been primarily in the relatively 
sparse availability of empirical data about how party organisations work and, until 
recently, all but the most rudimentary information on comparative party development 
was unavailable. " 
Lawson has correctly identified the main reasons for this bias in favour of studying 
external rather than internal party behaviour as: visibility, methodological habits and 
the various motives which guide scholarship on parties. " Firstly, given that parties 
have an "existential ambiguity" and that their most important effects are achieved by 
their elected representatives there is a tendency for party scholars to treat all parties as 
"an ensemble" and, ideological questions and parties' levels of support 
notwithstanding, focus on the collective characteristics of composite party systems 
such as elections and parties' role in government. Secondly, it is difficult to study 
Party structure and organisation in the same way as collective party characteristics by 
using a research methodology which encourages the maintenance of a certain distance 
from the "hurly-burly of inner party life. " Moreover, not only is it extremely difficult 
to obtain relevant data on internal party life, there is also, as we shall see, the serious 
problem of separating out formal accounts of how Parties operate from what happens 
in practice. Tbirdly, given that the principal motives guiding the study of parties 
generally relate to questions of efficient government and political stability, the 
assumption has been that the study of any one single party's internal dynamics does 
not really tell us enough about the political system per se. In other words, the question 
of whether or not these objectives can be achieved is best examined in a wider 
perspective. Moreover, the general instability of the emerging post-communist East 
European parties and party systems and the concomitant immaturity of party 
organisational. structures, arising from the fact that many of the newly formed parties 
were often simply cliques of supporters clustered around individual personalities, 
18 See: M. Duverger. Political Parties: Yheir Organisation andActivity in the Modem State. London: 
Methuen. 1954 (195 1); S. Neumann, 'Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties' in S. 
Neumann, ed. Modern Political Parties: A Comparative Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1956 pp395421; 0. Kirchheimer, 'The Transformation of West European party systems' in J. 
La Palambora and M. Weiner, eds. Political Pat-ties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 1966. pp 177-200; and A. Panebianco. Political Parties: Organisation and Power. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1988. 
19 Although R. S. Katz and P. Mair, eds. Party Organization: A Data Handbook on Party 
Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960-90. London: Sage. 1992 and R. S. Katz and P. Mair, 
eds. How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. 
London: Sage. 1994 have been important contributions in helping to redress the balance, 
contemporary scholarship on party structure and organisation continues to be a relatively 
undeveloped area. For an excellent recent single party study see also: S. E. Scarrow, Parties and their 
Members: Organisingfor Victory in Britain and Germany. London: Oxford University Press. 1996. 
20 'Political Parties Inside and Out', pp 106-7. 
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provide an additional, region-specific factors likely to deter scholars from paying 
much too attention to parties' structural evolution. 
Models of contempoLa-U p 
Before considering why the evolution of party structure and organisation has 
important implications for the progress of post-communist democratisation, it is first 
necessary to consider some of the contemporary party models which have been 
developed in the Western literature. These provide us with a potentially useful 
analytical framework with which to consider what type of party structure and 
organisation is developing in post-communist Eastern Europe. While other models of 
the contemporary party have been developed and are available, this study 
concentrates on the four main West European party types: Duverger's cadre/elite and 
mass party, Kirchheimer and Panebianco's catch-all/electoral professional party and 
Katz and Mair's cartel party models. For sure, all of these models also touch on 
ideological and sociological questions at times. Moreover, the question ofjust how 
applicable theoretical models developed to explain party development in the context 
of more advanced West Euroon democracies are to the newly emerging democracies 
of post-communist Eastern Europe must remain an open one to which we will return 
later. Nevertheless, all four models focus primarily or to a large extent on changes in 
parties' organisational and structural characteristics and thereby represent a useftil 
typology based on a clear, logical and linear historical progression. " Moreover, while 
this typology of party development does not necessarily imply a universal process in 
which one type of party is challenged and axiomatically replaced by another, and 
although party organisational forms are constantly in flux, some party types are 
indeed characteristic for particular historical conjunctures. 
The first major attempt to develop a theory of party organisation based on a 
comprehensive account of the nature and development of parties was produced by 
Duverger in the early 1950s. " According to Duverger elitist cadre parties dominated 
the first stages of party development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, an cra that was characterised by restricted franchise requirements and other 
limitations on the political activities of the propertyless. There was little need for 
formal or highly structured organisation in such a context and such cadre parties, 
21 See: R. S. Katz and P. Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party, PaHy Politics. Vol I No 1.1995. pp5-28; and K. von Beyme. 'Party 
Leadership and Change in Party Systems: Towards a Postmodern Party State? ', Government and 
Opposition. Vol 31 No 2. Spring 1996. pp135-159. 
22 political parties. 
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consisting of little more than groupings of local notabilities, served purely 
instrumental, electoral purposes making little or no formal provision for mass 
membership. As Duverger put it, "if we define a member as one who signs an 
undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre 
parties have no members. "" 
As industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded, and the predominance of the old 
elites came under challenge, the concomitant relaxation of restrictions on working 
class organisation and the fi-anchise opened up the political system to previously 
excluded groups of citizens. The mass party, which arose out of the struggles by these 
elements of society to gain a voice in the ruling structures of the state, had a relatively 
complex structure but also sought to balance the aims of organisational efficiency 
with securing the democratic participation of party members. The distinction between 
mass and cadre parties was not, therefore, simply based on their size and structure, as 
their respective names implied. Mass parties were both more centralised and firmly 
knit than cadre parties but they also accorded with an organisational. response to a 
particular view of democracy and an electoral strategy based on the mobilisation and 
social integration of distinct socio-economic segments of the electorate. According to 
Duverger, mass parties corresponded to left-wing workers parties in terms of political 
and social substructure, promoted broad ideological programmes to mobilise the 
working class and provided it with an elite that could take over the government and 
administration of the State. Consequently, as the instruments of the newly 
enfranchised segments of society, mass parties were naturally dominated by their 
extra-parliamentary elements and their mass membership was "the very substance of 
the party. 9n4 Another important way in which this difference found organisational 
expression was in the field of party finances, which Duverger regarded as 
fundamental to the process of political change, as mass parties replaced the "capitalist 
financing of electioneering by democratic financing. n5 
Mass membership parties proved to be an effective means of canvassing, mobilising 
and organising supporters in newly enfranchised mass electorates and the most 
successful type of party organisation in electoral terms during this second phase of 
party development. In his conclusion Duverger confidently predicted that the mass 
party model would be widely imitated: that "vast, centralised and disciplined" mass 
membership organisations would increasingly dominate contemporary democratic 
societies, and in a process of 'contagion from the left', replace the cadre parties' 
23 Ibid. p39. 
24 Ibid, p63. 
25 Ibid. 
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informal networks as all ma or parties transformed themselves along these lines. 26 
However, although Duverger's analysis provides us with an important starting point, 
subsequent developments have questioned his conclusion about the pre-eminence of 
the mass party model. Other scholars soon began to argue that the mass party was 
losing its comparative advantage and simply represented a transitory and historically 
bounded phase in a continuing process of party adaptation and change. 
Writing in the 1960s, for example, Kirchheimer advanced the hypothesis that 
Duverger's mass party model was being undermined and transformed by a number of 
societal changes which had occurred since the Second World War and parties were, 
therefore, moving into a third stage of development which he termed the catch-all 
party model. "' In many respects, according to Kirchheimer's analysis, the mass party 
became a victim of its own success. The struggles for basic social and political rights 
which had united the newly enfi-anchised constituencies underpinning the mass parties 
had been won. The state began to provide many of the universal welfare and 
educational services which had previously been the prerogative of the mass party. 
Together with the concomitant increase in living standards and social mobility and 
expansion of the mass media, these developments all served to erode traditional social 
boundaries and thereby confronted mass parties with shrinking core electorates. The 
mass party's former strength, its direct organisational and political links with a 
distinctive socio-economic sub-group, not only no longer guaranteed success but 
actually became a weakness as the relevance of these sub-groups declined. The catch- 
all party was, therefore, characterised by: a drastic reduction in the party's 
"ideological baggage"; the strengthening of the party's leadership elites at the expense 
of the party membership; a reduced emphasis on the party's traditional social class or 
denominational clientele in favour of seeking to appeal to and recruit the widest 
possible range of supporters (while simultaneously attempting to maintain its core 
working class or denominational base); and an attempt to secure access to a wider 
range of interest groups. " Abandoning attempts at "intellectual and moral 
encadrement of the masses", the catch-all party was turning "more fully to the 
electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and 
more immediate electoral success. "" Shrinking, or at least increasingly open, core 
electorates meant that all mass parties came under increasing pressure to adapt their 
organisational forms and electoral strategies in this way. 
26 Ibid. p427. 
27 'The Transformation of West European party systems'. 
28 Ibid, p 190. 
29 Ibid, p 184. 
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However, Kirchheimees focus was primarily on questions of electoral strategy with 
the implications for internal party structure and organisation. being less explicit. More 
recently Panebianco developed Kirchheimer's catch-all model while directing greater 
attention to organisational and structural concerns and concentrating on the 
emergence of what he termed the electoral-professionalparty. " Like Kirchheimer, 
Panebianco, pointed to the electorate's increasing social and cultural heterogeneity as 
one of the main causes of party transformation and his electoral-professional model 
was also characterised by: weak vertical organisational ties; appeals to the 'opinion 
electorate' rather than the 'electorate of the belonging!; the pre-eminence of public 
representatives over the party's internal leaders; financing through interest groups and 
public funds rather than members; and a stress on issues and leadership rather than 
ideology, with a more important organisational role for 'careerists' rather than 
'believers'. " But while Kirchheimer only treated this issue implicitly, the key 
distinction between Panebianco's electoral-professional party and what he termed the 
& mass-bureaucratic' party was the increasing professionalisation of the party 
organisation and the central role played by professionalised party elites compared 
with that of the party bureaucracy, as the party's main focus of activity shifted from 
enrolling members to winning over the less segmented electorates. Panebianco also 
directed attention to the re-structuring of political communication systems under the 
impact of the withering away of the traditional party-owned media, and professional 
party elites' concomitant preference for obtaining coverage in private or state-owned 
mass outlets (particularly television), which he saw as one of the key factors driving 
this increasingly professionalised concept of party organisation, as well as leading to 
more personalised and "issue-oriented" campaigns. " 
More recently, Katz and Mair have hypothesised the emergence of a new cartelparty 
model by drawing attention to parties increasing dependence on the state as a major 
source of support and object of political reference, together with a pattern of inter- 
party collusion to share in these resources. " Following a reduction in party 
involvement and participation, membership levels have failed to keep pace with the 
escalating costs of party activity in the modem state. Parties have, therefore, sought to 
maintain themselves by securing the provision, and overseeing the regulation, of state 
subventions. The combination of the importance of the electronic media as a means of 
political communication, together with the fact that access to these media is 
controlled and regulated by the state (and hence by parties in the state) also offers the 
30 Political Pailies. 
31 Ibid, p264. 
32 lbid, p266. 
33 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'. 
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party another important resource. Moreover, the cartel party not only adapts in order 
to benefit from the privileges and remain a member of the cartel but (in collusion with 
the other, similarly privileged parties) actually influences the rules in order to 
privilege insiders and limit the scope for new entrants. Consequently, the links 
between parties and their electorates become even looser and more remote as the 
hypothesised cartel party both colonises and actually becomes an integral part of the 
state: 
"No longer simple brokers between civil society and the state, the parties now become 
absorbed by the state. From having first assumed the role of trustees, and then later of 
delegates, and then later again, in they hey-day of the catch-all party, of 
entrepreneurs, parties have now become semi-state agencies. v934 
With the emergence of the cartel party politics becomes a profession in itself Inter- 
party competition takes place on the basis of competing claims to efficient and 
effective management of the state machine and patterns of electoral competition are 
contained and managed. Organisationally, cartel parties are capital-intensive, 
professional and centralised relying increasingly on the subventions and other 
privileges afforded by the state for their resources and on the state controlled or 
regulated mass media as their principal means of direct communication with their 
electorates. Cartel parties are also based on a loose and atomistic conception of party 
members exercising rights as individuals rather than through delegates, together with 
a powerful and relatively autonomous party elite and a 'stratarchic' internal 
distribution of power between the central party leadership and local office-holders, 
with each exercising a relatively free hand in their own bailiwick. 
The organisational structuring of parties is not, therefore, merely an object of interest 
in itself and there is clearly an important relationship between: developments within 
the parties themselves, the kind of parties that emerge and their changing position 
within the overall party and political system. Variations in the type of party 
organisation will, therefore, obviously have a considerable impact on the role which a 
party can play in terms of shaping the broader political process and fostering a 
democratic political culture. While none of the party functions listed above is 
necessarily rendered obsolete by the changing position of parties within the political 
system, clearly their respective weight and how effectively they can perform 
particular functions will vary, with some party types clearly emphasising certain 
functions more than others. In particular, both the capacity of parties to link 
34 lbid, p 15. 
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individual citizens to the process of government and the institutions of the state and 
the nature of that linkage is likely to be affected by the character of their organisation. 
In other words, certain types of party organisation may be better than others as a 
means of sustaining and increasing the legitimacy and stability of democratic political 
systems. 
As a result of its development as the party best suited to meet the emergence of a 
mass electorate, the mass party both originated from and was deeply rooted within 
civil society and was, therefore, more than just a purely electoral organisation. The 
mass party sought to formally enrol its supporters, who were drawn from a similar 
and well-defined segment of the population, and organise them within a broad 
network of inter-connected organisations. Consequently, by offering its supporters a 
stable political identity, the mass party was particularly focused on, and successful at, 
mobilising and sometimes encapsulating major segments of the electorate and thereby 
integrating citizens into a stable political system. Moreover, as well as having strong 
links with, and a stable basis of support among, certain clearly defined sections of 
civil society, the mass party also played a critical role in the stabilisation and 
structural consolidation of Western party systems by narrowing down or completely 
closing off the electoral market for potential new entrants. In other words, by helping 
to structure and stabilise Western party systems mass parties were considered to have 
played a decisive role in the functioning of Western democracies. 
The increasingly top-down style of party organisational life and greater attention 
directed towards electoral competition depicted in both Kirchheimer's catch-all party 
and Panebianco's electoral-professional party implied an erosion of the strong party- 
civil society linkage which characterised the mass party model. By reducing its 
ideological baggage and the role of the party membership, strengthening the top 
leadership, and broadening out from its core electoral constituency in order secure 
access to a wider range of voters and interests, the catch-all party clearly became 
more electoral and less societally-rooted than the mass party. Similarly, by 
increasingly underpinning its organisations; with professionals rather than enrolled 
volunteers, the electoral-professional party was clearly based on much weaker ties 
with its supporters. Indeed, Kirchheimer expressed concern that the catch-all party 
was "too blunt an instrument to serve as a link with the functional powerholders in 
society, "' while Panebianco warned that the emergence of the electoral-professional 
party created a "vacuum at the level of collective identities, " leaving voters more 
35 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems', p200. 
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independent and autonomous but also more isolated and puzzled. "' Consequently, the 
representation, mobilisation and integration roles are of much less significance in the 
catch-all and electoral-professional party types which place much greater emphasis on 
the electoral and recruitment functions. 
With the emergence of Katz and Mair's cartel model, the party's relationship with 
civil society has weakened even finther and there is a corresponding intensification of 
the party-state linkage to the extent that parties no longer act as a bridge between the 
two but rather become part of the state apparatus itself. Mair has summed up this 
greater emphasis on the state and concomitant downgrading of the party-civil society 
linkage thus: 
'I ... parties (have) moved from an earlier, post-suffrage stage (the classic 'mass party' 
phase) in which they had represented the interests of civil society vis-a-vis the state, 
to a stage in which they acted almost as independent brokers between state and civil 
society (the classic 'catch-all party' phase), and in which, in Downsian and 
Schumpterian terms, they behaved more as competing teams of leaders, to a new and 
more recent stage, in which they actually move closer to becoming part of the state. 
The balance of linkage has therefore changed, as have the parties themselves. ""' 
As we have seen, this process is particularly evident in terms of the resources which 
are used by parties in order to secure their own legitimacy and survival. Moreover, as 
Party structures become increasingly 'stratarchical' in character, with each element of 
the party organisation becoming more autonomous and stressing its own freedom of 
manoeuvre, we can even see an erosion of a sense of linkage even inside the parties 
themselves. 
Consequently, by parties adapting and professionalising themselves in this way, the 
essence of democratic governance and, according to this model, even politics itself is 
increasingly characterised by elite groups presenting themselves to the electorate as 
competing teams of leaders and making little or no attempt to develop organic links 
with their supporters or to involve the public in the policy process. Elite recruitment, 
36 Political Parties. p273. In fact, Panebianco foresaw three possible lines of party development: the 
electoral-professional model proving to be an intrinsically unstable institution leading to parties 
losing their organisational identity and appearing only as "convenient tags for political 
entrepreneurs's ; an ideological backlash with existing parties resuming their former identities and 
expressive functions; and "real political innovation" through the creation of new kinds of political 
movements which transform the whole organisational framework of modem politics. 
37 p. Mair, 'Party Organisations: From Civil Society to the State' in R. S. Katz and P. Mair, eds. How 
Parties Organise. - Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. London: 
Sage. 1994. ppl-22 (8) 
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therefore, becomes by far the most important function in the cartel party model, while 
the relevance of 'representative' functions and those that stress civic participation 
such as articulation, aggregation, and particularly mobilisation. and integration, tend to 
be even less applicable than in other models. The evolution of party structure and 
organisation can, therefore, significantly erode the role that parties used to play as 
intermediate structures capable of both mobilising and integrating citizens as well as 
mediating support for and blunting, or even reversing, challenges to democracy. 
A number of commentators have argued that this particular combination of 
developments associated with the transformation of Western parties - parties 
becoming simultaneously stronger, more privileged and self-sufficient but also more 
remote and inward-looking - has led to a progressive widening of the gap between 
electorates and the political class and erosion of party attachment and legitimacy of 
established party elites. This development has, it is argued, been one of the key 
elements underpinning the increasingly widespread anti-party rhetoric and sentiment 
and the attacks targeted on established parties which has developed into a powerful 
tool for populist politicians, particularly on the far right, who claim to be uncorrupted 
by the existing party system and appear to have emerged as a new and potentially 
significant phenomenon in a number of contemporary Western democracies. " In 
other words, this process of party adaptation and change in traditional party roles and 
strategies has also made the democratic system itself vulnerable to a potential erosion 
of support and unable to develop a bank of goodwill and diffuse support which may 
be required during times of crisis. 
It is clearly important to bear in mind the difficulties of trying to fit East European 
cases to models designed for more advanced Western democracies. Nevertheless, 
given the close relationship between the various party models and the character of 
democracy, the different strategies pursued by the new parties and the type of party 
that is emerging will obviously have considerable implications for the nature of the 
links between parties and society and the functions that they are able to perform in the 
broader context of post-communist democratisation in Eastern Europe. A mass party 
with deep, extensive and well organised links with civil society will, for example, be 
much better placed to perform representative functions such as articulation, 
aggregation, integration and mobilisation than other types of party based on much 
weaker party-citizen linkages which will be confined to electoral and elite recruitment 
functions. 
39 See: T. Poguntke and S. E. Scarrow, eds. 'The politics of anti-party sentiment' Special issue of 
European Journal ofPolitical Research. Vol 29. April 1996. 
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In particular, if the new parties of post-communist Eastern Europe replicate 
contemporary Western models and evolve as remote, inward-looking bodies primarily 
oriented towards the state rather than society then this is likely to re-inforce the 
underlying distrust of all party-like structures which may already have extensive roots 
in the region having been fostered by a period of prolonged one-party rule. This, in 
turn, has important implications for whether the new parties and governing elites can 
perform an effective role in helping to secure legitimation for the new democracies. 
In this sense, even if, as some commentators have hypothesised, after the initial 
period of fragmentation in the immediate post-communist period the new East 
European party systems are stabilising and consolidating at the level of state 
institutions" this may not provide a guarantee that popular anti-party sentiment will 
subside in these countries. Consequently, it is, therefore, clearly important to pay 
much greater attention to parties' structure, organisation and the institutional 
dynamics of how parties organise, and not just to the external and more visible 
aspects of party development in post-communist Eastern Europe. 
Pgjy development in post-communist Poland 
However, in spite of its significance there have, as noted above, been little more than 
preliminary projections, together with some fairly rudimentary and general empirical 
surveys, about what type of party structure and organisation is emerging in post- 
communist Eastern Europe. Consequently, the time is ripe for, and this study focuses 
on, a detailed, in-depth, single country and empirically-based examination of the 
institutional dynamics of the new parties that have emerged in post-communist 
Poland - the largest country in the former Soviet bloc - which draws upon and utilises 
the theoretical models developed in the Western political science literature. 
Although it was the first East European state to slough off communist rule in 1989, 
the process of party development in post-communist Poland has been a tortuous one 
and has suffered from both extreme fragmentation and instability in the early stages 
of party development. ' Consequently, one of the most important methodological 
questions to tackle when approaching such a survey is how to determine a 
manageable number of relevant parties which can be the used as the basis of case 
'9 See, for example: J. Bielesiak, 'Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in 
East Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol 30 No 1.1997. pp23-44. 
40 See: F. Millard, 'The Shaping of the Polish Party System, 1989-93', East European Politics and 
Societies. Vol 8 No 3. Fall 1994. pp467-494; and P. G. Lewis, 'Poland's New Parties in the Post- 
communist Political System' in Pan: y Formation in East-Central Europe. pp2947. 
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I. 
studies? In order to explain how the sample of six parties and groupings included in 
this survey was determined it is necessary to briefly examine the historical context of 
party formation in post-1989 Poland. This process can be divided into six broad 
historical phases. 
Following the spring 1989 round table negotiations between the Solidarity opposition 
and the communist authorities, which pre-figured the partially-free elections to the so- 
called 'Contract Sejm' held in May-June, freedom of association was dramatically 
extended to permit the organisation of political parties and a de facto competitive 
party system began to emerge. " These elections saw Solidarity-backed candidates win 
all 161 openly contested seats in the Sejm, the more powerful lower house of 
parliament, and 99 out of the 100 seats in the less powerfid but completely freely 
elected upper house, the Senate, and thereby the effective end of communist rule in 
Poland. " A new government emerged in August 1989 led by Solidarity adviser 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland's fast non-communist premier since the Second World 
War and the fast in the region for over forty years. Nevertheless, the process of party 
formation was initially fairly slow, although it gathered pace somewhat when a new 
legal framework finally emerged with the passage of the 1990 Law on Political 
Parties which allowed any party that collected fifteen signatures to be formally 
registered . 
43 
Thisfirst phase saw the emergence into legality of a number of parties that had 
operated in a clandestine fashion during the communist period. The most notable of 
these was Leszek Moczulski's Confederation for an Independent Poland 
(Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej: KPN) which had a long opposition pedigree 
dating back to September 1979 before the emergence of the original Solidarity trade 
union, but they also included a number of smaller organisations such as the radical 
libertarian Union of Real Politics (Unia Polityki Realnej: UPR) established in 
November 1987 by a group of self-styled 'conservative liberals' led by the eccentric 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke- The period also saw a cluster of completely new parties 
emerging some of which - like the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia 
Socjalistyczna: PPS) and the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe: SN) - 
41 See: P. G. Lewis, 'Non-competitive elections and regime change: Poland 1989', Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol 40 No 1. January 1990. pp90-107. 
42 Solidarity's candidates contested these elections under the auspices of the so-called Citizens' 
Committees. For an interesting account of their emergence and demise see: T. Grabowski, 'The Party 
That Never Was: The Rise and Fall of the Solidarity Citizens' Committees in Poland', East European 
Politics and Societies. Vol 10 No 2. Spring 1996. pp214-254. 
43 For more on the changing legal status of Polish parties in the early post-communist period see: M. 
Chmaj and M. 2, migrodzki. Status prawny partii politycznhych w PoIsce. Torufi: Wydawnictwo 
Adam Mickiewicz. 1995. 
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represented attempts to reconstruct historic parties from the pre-war period. This 
period was also notable for the dissolution of the formerly ruling communist Polish 
United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza: PZPR) in January 
1990 and (at the same gathering) its re-birth as the Social Democracy of the Republic 
of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polski; SdRP) under the leadership of 
the young and charismatic Aleksander Kwagniewski. Similarly, in May 1990 the 
successor to the former communist satellite United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone 
Stronnictwo, Ludowe: ZSL) amalgamated with a much smaller groupings led by 
formerly exiled peasantists to form the new Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe: PSL). The new PSL attempted to draw on the traditions of the pre- 
communist peasant movement which had provided the main political opposition to 
the communists in the immediate post-war years and was initial led by a former 
Solidarity peasant leader, Roman Bartoszcze. 
7 
However, during this period both politics in general, and the process of party 
formation in particularwere dominated by developments within, and the subsequent 
decomposition of, the Solidarity movement. A number of small parties soon began to 
emerge from within the movement, some of which had parliamentary representation 
in the Solidarity Citizens' Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny: 
OKP) including: the Gdafisk-based Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno- 
Demokratyzne: KLD); the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrzekijan'sko- 
Narodowe: ZChN) Ihiking a number of groupings committed to re-building the Polish 
state on the Principles of the Catholic faith; the more liberal Poznan'-based Party of 
Christian Democrats (Partia Chrzes'cijan'skich DemokratOW: PChD); and the Polish 
Peasant Party-Solidarity (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Solidamogd: PSL-S), an 
offshoot from the Solidarity Individual Farmers' union. None of these new parties 
were of any real political significance and, initially at least, most Solidarity leaders 
were hostile to the separateness which party formation implied and chose to present 
themselves as a stabilising force and part of a broad movement representing the whole 
of civil society. Indeed, Solidarity, together with the other East European political 
conglomerates which oversaw the democratic transitions and dominated the first 
phase of post-communist politics, displayed little interest in transforming itself into a 
political party with some of its leaders questioning whether the formation of Western- 
style parties in the traditional form was even appropriate in the post-communist 
context. " The results of the first free Local Elections held in May 1990 appeared to 
confirm that it was the social movement formula rather than any of the formally 
44 See: E. Kiss, 'Democracy Without Parties?: Civil Society in Eastern Europe', Dissent. Spring 
1992. pp226-23 1. 
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constituted political parties or established patterns of party politics that appealed most 
to Polish citizens at this stage. 45 
Signs of growing dissatisfaction with the Solidarity-sponsored government's 
economic programme, centred on Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz's proposals 
for rapid liberalisation and marketisation, hastened the process of political division 
and put ideas of party formation more firmly on the political agenda during the spring 
and early summer of 1990. As Solidarity leaders began, with reluctance in many 
cases, to recognise the necessity of developing parties to structure and sustain their 
new democratic institutions, the simmering tensions within the Solidarity elite 
worsened. They finally burst into the open in April 1990 when Lech Walqsa, who 
remained leader of the now politically marginal trade union, launched a campaign for 
the presidency around the slogan of 'accelerating' political and economic change. 
Thus began the 'war at the top' which led to the decomposition of the Solidarity 
movement, initially into two broad camps, and the pluralisation of the Polish political 
landscape with new parties coming into being as the side-effect of this dispute over 
different strategies of reform and personal conflicts. The first major political grouping 
to emerge from the Solidarity movement was the Centre Agreement (Porozumienie 
Centrum: PC) formed in May 1990 by Jaroslaw Kaczyfiski as a broad coalition, 
including a number of existing small right-wing and centre-right parties, to spearhead 
support for Walqsa's presidential candidacy. As a direct response, two rival 
OrganisatiOns were in order to create a more coherent organisational infi-astructure 
capable of channelling support for the Mazowiecki's government (and subsequently 
for his rival presidential bid) with the inauguration of the Forum of the Democratic 
Right (Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej: FPD) and the larger Citizens' Movement- 
Democratic Action (Ruch Obywatelski-Akcja Demokratyczna: ROAD) in June and 
July 1990 respectively. 
However, the fact that post-communist Poland's first fully contested national 
elections held in November-December 1990 were presidential rather than 
parliamentary did not really provide the most appropriate backdrop for an orderly 
process of party development. Indeed, the presidential campaign was completely 
overshadowed by the extremely bitter and personalised conflict between Walqsa and 
Mazowiecki's respective supporters. Nevertheless, as Table 1.1 shows, although 
Walqsa finished (as expected) clearly ahead on the first ballot he fell well short of an 
overall majority (39.96%) and the previously unknown, and somewhat eccentric 
" See: A. Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'The Polish Local Election Results', RFEIRL Report on Eastern Europe. 
29 June 1990. pp35-38.23 
Polish-Canadian emigre businessman Stanislaw TymM'Ski, made a surprisingly strong 
showing (23.10%) and pushed Mazowiecki (18.08%) into third place. Walqsa was, 
however, comfortably elected to the presidency by a decisive majority winning 
74.75% in the second round and the TymM'Ski phenomenon rapidly faded into 
political oblivion. While former communist WIodzmierz Cimoszewicz, who stood as 
an independent left-wing candidate supported by SdRP and the former communist- 
sponsored trade union federation, the All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions 
(OgOlnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiqzk6w Zawodowych: OPZZ), did surprisingly well 
(9.2 1 %), the two overtly 'party' candidates, Roman Bartoszcze (PSL - 7.15%) and 
Leszek Moczulski (KPN - 2.5%) both achieved disappointing results. "' 
The process of party formation accelerated and the number of parties proliferated 
during the secondphase of party development in the run up to the first fully 
competitive parliamentary elections held in October 1991. In December 1990 the 
Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna: UD) was established under Mazowiecki's 
leadership by his supporters in ROAD, the FPD and his local election committees. 
Walqsa's appointment of KLD leader Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as the new premier 
following Mazowiecki's resignation suddenly brought the previously little-known 
Party into considerably greater prominence. The PC also transformed itself from a 
political conglomerate into a more traditional and structurally coherent individual 
member-based party at its first Congress in May 1991 - although it failed to gain 
Walqsa's hoped-for endorsement and its leader, Jaroslaw Kaczyn'ski, subsequently 
lost his job in the Presidential Chancellery and became one of his former mentor's 
bitterest critics. Following their failure to conclude an electoral alliance with the PSL, 
the two 'post-Solidarity, peasant groupings - the PSL-S and the Solidarity Individual 
Farmer's union - agreed (together with another smaller peasant party) to contest the 
elections on a common platform as the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Alliance (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe-Porozumienie Ludowe: PSL-PL). The PSL's decision to stand 
independently was one of the reasons for Roman Bartoszcze's replacement as leader 
by the 31 -year old former ZSL activist Waldemar Pawlak. 
The October 1991 parliamentary elections were contested by as many as III 'election 
committees' formed by parties and political groupings and provided the first real test 
of strength for the new parties. The increasingly divided Polish society and 
differentiated political culture together with the advanced state of party fragmentation 
and a highly proportional election law combined to produce an even more fragmented 
46 On the 1990 Presidential elections see: M. Grabowska and 1. Krzemifiski. eds. Bitwa o Belweder. 
Warsaw: Wydawmictwo Literackie Krak6w. 1991; and S. Gebethner and K. Jasiewicz, eds. Dlaczego 
tak glosowano: Wybory prezydenckie '90. Warsaw: ISP PAN/Instytut Nauk Politycznych UW. 1993. 
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and polarised parliament than had been feared. "' 29 different election committees 
secured parliamentary representation but, as Table 1.2 shows, it was the very even 
distribution of the vote which confounded all predictions with ten parties and 
groupings obtaining 16 or more seats in the 460-member Sejm, with the share of the 
vote for the seven largest ranging between 7.48% and 12.3 1 %. 
The largest of these, the UD, accomplished a bare plurality of the votes (12.3 1 %) and 
won only 62 SqJm seats. The Democratic Left Alliance (SqJusz; Lewicy 
(Demokratycznej: SLD), a specially assembled coalition based on SdRP and the 
OPZZ together with other unions, youth, women's and other social organisations that 
had enjoyed patronage during the communist era (discussed in greater detail in the 
chapter on parties as membership organisations), finished a close second (11.98% and 
60 seats). The other eight parties and groupings obtaining significant parliamentary 
representation were: the Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka: 
WAK) committee based on the ZChN, which did surprisingly well and finished third 
in spite of a modest institutional base (8.73% and 49 seats); the PC-based Citizens' 
Centre Agreement (Porozurnienie Obywatelskie Centrum: POC) (8.7 1% and 44 
seats); the PSL (8.67% and 48 seats); the KPN (7.50% and 46 seats); the KLD 
(7.48% and 37 seats); the PSL-PL (5.46% and 28 seats); the Solidarity trade union, 
which decided to stand as an independent grouping led by Walqsa's successor Marian 
Krzaklewski, rather than joining any party-led electoral coalition (5.05% and 27 
seats); and the Polish Beer Lovers' Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciol Piwa: PPPP), an 
environmentalist and pro-business grouping, somewhat less frivolous than its name 
suggested (3.27% and 16 seats). 
The thirdphase of Polish party development ran from October 1991 until the 
September 1993 parliamentary elections and was characterised by the continued 
disintegration and re-alignment of those parties that had emerged from the initial 
divisions within the Solidarity camp. The range of parties represented in, and 
extensive fiugmentation of, the 1991-93 parliament led to the formation of unstable 
coalition governments. Together with the deep antagonisms between the post- 
Solidarity party leaders and further divisions of the existing parties into various 
47 On the 1991 parliamentary elections see: F. Millard, 'The Polish Parliamentary Elections of 
October 199 P, Soviet Studies. Vol 44 No 5.1992. pp83 7-855; and T. Zukowski, 'Wybory 
parlamentarne 91', Studia Polityczne. Vol I No 1.1992. pp39-50; and S. Gebethner, ed. Polska scena 
polityczna a wybory. Warsaw: Fundacji Inicjatyw Spolecznych Polskich w Europie. 1993. Of the 460 
Sejm seats, 391 were elected in 37 districts proportionally (each containing between 7 and 17 seats) 
and with the number of seats calculated using the Hare-Niemayer system with no threshold applied. 
The remaining 69 seats were apportioned nationally on the basis of votes of the total votes cast in all 
constituencies to parties which had registered candidates in at least five districts and either gained 
more than 5% of the total vote or had their candidates elected in at least five districts. 
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factions which characterised this parliament, this provided little by way of example to 
encourage institutional consolidation. 
During the first six months of the new parliament the main focus of political attention 
and controversy was Jan Olszewski's radically anti-communist but unstable and short- 
lived, minority government based on a coalition comprising the PC, ZChN and the 
PSL-PL. The PSL-PL split almost immediately after the election: with one faction 
composed largely of Solidarity Individual Farmers' union activists led by Gabriel 
Janowski reconstituted as a formally-registered party but retaining the same name; 
and the PSL-S breaking away and eventually re-naming itself the Peasant-Christian 
Party (Stronnictwo Ludowo-Chrze6cian'skie: SLCh) in May 1992. The most 
significant haemorrhage of support, however, occurred in the PC following the 
collapse of Olszewski's government in June 1992. Although Olszewski was formally 
a PC member and the party's leader Jaroslaw KaczyAski both engineered his 
government's installation and supported the premier in his increasingly acrimonious 
battle with President WalQsa, in practice the party exerted little influence over him 
and frequently criticised and distanced itself from both his government and the 
premier himself. The divisions within the party came to a head over the so-called 
'lustration affair' in May-June 1992 when Olszewski's ZChN-nominated Minister of 
the Interior Antoni Macierewicz produced a list of alleged communist security service 
collaborators which included President WalQsa and several parliamentarians including 
a number representing parties which had emerged from the democratic opposition. 
After the ensuring no-confidence vote in his government, and amid mutual 
recrininations and charges of political disloyatly, Olszewski left the PC with a 
substantial group of deputies to form the Movement for the Republic (Ruch dla 
Rzeczpospolitej: RdR). The PC went on to suffer splits throughout the remainder of 
the 1991-93 parliament as more deputies and members left to join other parties and 
groupings or simply declared their political independence. 
Following an unsuccessftil attempt to create a new government around PSL leader 
and stop-gap premier Waldemar Pawlak, a broad and seemingly-incompatible seven- 
party coalition government was formed led by UD-nominee Hanna Suchocka, which 
included the UD, ZChN, KLD, PSL-PL, SLCh, PChD, PPPP and was brokered and 
supported by the Solidarity trade union. Nevertheless, although they managed to 
avoid a PC-style implosion, both the main coalition partners in the Suchocka 
government were also subject to damaging splits. The ZChN entered a period of crisis 
following the downfall of the Olszewski government and expulsion of Macierewicz 
(whose list of alleged collaborators included his own party leader Wieslaw 
26 
Chrzanowski) for his handling of the 'lustration affair' which led to the formation of 
the breakaway Christian-National Movement 'Polish Action' (Ruch Chrzes'cijafisko- 
Narodowy 'Akcja Polska': RChN 'AP'). Six UD deputies led by Aleksander Hall also 
defected in September 1992 to form a separate Conservative Party (Partia 
Konserwatywna: PK) and deprive the party of its status as the largest parliamentary 
club. 
The contrast between the instability of, and caprice among, the post-Solidarity parties 
and the SdRP/SLD and PSL`s relative cohesion was particularly striking and the two 
'successor' formations used this period to consolidate their position on the Polish 
political scene. SdRP/SLD worked patiently to refashion itself as a modem European 
social democratic formation of constructive reformers with a social conscience and 
benefited from the impressive performance of its new generation of leaders, 
particularly Aleksander Kw9niewski. The PSL also gained both credibility and 
political re-habilitation from Pawlak's short interlude as premier in June 1992. Both 
parties also benefited from increasing disillusion with successive Solidarity-based 
governments' perceived failures to deal with the social consequences of liberal 
economic reforms and the excessive clerical influence on public policy, while the 
shrill anti-communist fervour of elements of the Polish right seemed increasingly 
remote from most Poles' everyday concerns. Consequently, as Table 1.3 shows, the 
September 1993 parliamentary elections which followed the Suchocka government's 
defeat in a parliamentary no-confidence vote in May (ironically proposed by the 
Solidarity trade union) saw impressive performances by the SLD (20.4% and 171 
seats) and the PSL (15.4% and 132 seats). "' The UD failed to capitalise on 
Suchocka's personal popularity and was reduced to third place (10.59% and 74 seats) 
while the Labour Union (Unia Pracy: UP), a new party formed in 1992 by a number 
of small social democratic groupings emerging from the Solidarity movement and 
reformist ex-communists who chose not to join SdRP, also performed well and 
finished fourth (7.28% and 41 seats). 
A new electoral law explicitly designed to favour larger parties and avoid the extreme 
fragmentation of the 1991-93 parliamene' magnified the SLD and PSL's success as 
49 On the 1993 elections see: F. Millard, 'The Polish Parliamentary Election of September, 1993', 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol 27 No 3.1994. pp295-313; T. Zukowski, 'Wybory '93: 
Kto dla kogo glosowal', Przeglqd Spoleczny. Vol 20.1994. pp3-32; S. Gebethner, ed. Wybory 
parlamentarne 1991 i 1993 a polska scena polityczna. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1995. 
49 The most important difference lay in the introduction of a 5% threshold for individual parties and 
8% for electoral coalitions, but the new law also increased the number of electoral districts from 37 
to 52, changing the counting method to d'Hondt and increased the threshold for obtaining national 
list seats to 7%. 
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did the divisions within the post-Solidarity camp, particularly the Polish right's 
inability to unite around a common electoral platform. This meant that: only six 
electoral committees secured parliamentary representation (together with a small 
number of representatives from the German minority who were exempt from the 
threshold requirements); the two successor parties won nearly two thirds of the seats 
in the Sejm with only 36% of the vote; and 35% of the votes were cast for parties, 
mainly on the right, which failed to cross the new thresholds. Of the unambiguously 
right-wing parties only the KPN (5.77% and 22 seats) and a new, WalQsa-inspired 
formation, the Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (Bezpartyjny Blok na 
Wspierania Reform: BBWR) (5.4 1% and 16 seats) were able to secure minimal 
parliamentary representation. Apart from that the remainder of the Polish right and 
centre-right - the Catholic Electoral Committee 'Fatherland' (Katolicki Komitet 
Wyborczy 'Ojczyzna': KKW'O') comprising the ZChN, KP, SLCh and PChD 
(6.37%), the Solidarity trade union (4.90%), PC (4.42%), KLD (3.99%), UPR 
(3.18%), and the Coalition for the Republic (Koalicja dla Rzeczpospolitej: KdR) 
comprising, among others, Olszewski's RdR and Macierewiczs RChN 'AP' (2.70%), 
and the PSL-PL (2.37%) - failed to cross the new thresholds and found themselves 
excluded from the new parliament. 
Thefourth phase of Polish party development ran from the September 1993 
parliamentary elections through to the November 1995 presidential elections. The new 
SLD-PSL coalition government which emerged under PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak 
was the ffist since 1989 to enjoy a stable majority in the new legislature, although 
Pawlak was actually replaced as premier by SdRP/SLD-nominee J6zef Oleksy in 
March 1995 (following a budget crisis precipitated by President Walqsa). However, 
the only 'post-Solidarity' parties which drew the logical conclusion from their 1993 
election defeat were the UD and KLD who amalgamated in April 1994 to form a new 
party, the Freedom Union (Unia Wolno9ci: UW): initially under Mazowiecki's 
leadership until he was replaced by his former Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz 
in April 1995. 
There was also a flurry of unity initiatives on the Polish right in the aftermath of their 
election defeat, the most significant of which where: the Secretariat of Centre-right 
Groupings (SekTetariat Ugrupowan' Centroprawicowych: SUC) comprising a number 
of small parties associated with Jan Olszewski (who had been ousted as leader of, and 
subsequently resigned from, the RdR in December 1993); the November II th 
Agreement (Porozumiene II Listopada: PII L) formed mainly by 'liberal 
conservative' parties such as the KP, SLCh PChl) and UPR; and the Contract for 
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Poland (Przymierze dla Polski: PdP) involving a number of parties and groupings 
centred on the ZChN and PC but also including other right-wing parties of a more 
Catholic-nationalist hue such as the PSL-PL and RdFL However, in spite of these and 
countless other unity initiatives and attempts to put aside personal and ideological 
animosities this period did not really see any consolidation on the Polish right. None 
of these blocs succeeded in making much of an impact beyond the narrow circles of 
committed activists and all of them gradually disintegrated leaving the Polish right 
hopelessly divided. Even its qualified successes in the June 1994 local elections, when 
the right managed to win seats in a large number of towns and villages, were achieved 
as a result of coalitions that were brokered locally and often in spite, rather than 
because, of national leaders' efforts. " 
The Polish right reached its nadir in November 1995 when its inability to present a 
united front and agree on a single, common candidate in the presidential elections 
paved the way for SdRP/SLD leader Aleksander Kwaniewski's victory. " The most 
significant attempt to select a common right-wing candidate - the St Catherine's 
Convention, a 'primary' involving 14 parties and the Solidarity trade union as an 
observer - ended in fiasco and the four right-wing candidates that eventually contested 
the first round expended as much energy on attacking one another as they did on 
Kwagniewski. As Table 1.4 shows, having ignored the Convention and been snubbed 
by all the main right-wing parties, it was actually Lech Walqsa who unexpectedly 
emerged as the right's standard-bearer, winning 33.11% in the first round (to 
Kwagniewski's 35.11%), although with the post-Solidarity formations unable or 
simply unwilling to rally their supporters behind him he lost narrowly in the second 
round by 48.28% to 51.72%. More generally, the 1995 presidential election results 
highlighted the organisational. weakness of even the apparently stronger Polish parties 
and, with the exception of Kwagniewski, all the party-sponsored candidates - Jacek 
Kuron' (UW - 9.22%), Waldemar Pawlak (PSL - 4.3 1 %), Tadeusz Zielinski (UP - 
3.53%), Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz (ZChN - 2.76%) and Janusz Korwin-Mikke 
(UPR - 2.4%) - achieved disappointing results. " 
50 See: A. Sabbat-Swidlicka, 'Local Elections Redress Political Imbalance in Poland', RFEIRL 
Research Report. Vol. 3 No. 27. ppl-8. 51 On the 1995 presidential elections see F. Millard, 'The 1995 Polish Presidential Election', Journal 
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. Vol 12 No 1. March 1996. pp 10 1- 109. 
52 For an interesting overview on the impact of the 1995 presidential elections on the emerging party 
system see: R. Gortat, 'Trudny egzamin: partie polityczne w wyborach prezydenckich '95', Przeglqd 
Spoleczny. Vol. 32-33.1996. pp6-107; and K. Jasiewicz, 'Wybory Prezydenckie 1995 roku a 
kszaltowanie siq polskiego systemu partyjnego', Studia Polityczne. Vol. 5.1996. p7-16. 
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Kwa§niewski's triumph was, however, to prove the SdRP/SLD's high water mark. 
Thefifth phase of Polish party development, from the November 1995 presidential 
elections until the September 1997 parliamentary elections, began with the SLD-PSL 
coalition government immediately embroiled in crisis when premier J6zef Olcksy was 
forced to resign in January 1996 following (unproven) allegations by Walqsa's 
outgoing Minister of the Interior that he had collaborated with Russian security 
services. Oleksy was replaced by a non-party SLD nominee, Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, although as a mistaken act of solidarity, SdRP elected the discredited 
and increasingly unpopular former premier to replace KwaAniewski as party leader. 
Initially, however, it appeared that the previous pattern of right-wing inertia 
punctuated by doomed unity initiatives would repeat itself Walqsa failed to capitalise 
on his election result and even the two right-wing groupings represented in 
parliament, the KPN and BBWR, proceeded to split. The exception to this general 
pattern on the Polish right was the formation of the Movement for Poland's 
Reconstruction (Ruch Odbudowy Polski: ROP) in November 1995, an attempt to 
capitalise on Jan Olszewski's relatively good showing in the presidential elections 
(6.86%). Initially at least, the ROP was able to take advantage of the increasing 
polarisation of the Polish political scene around attitudes towards the past and 
garnered significant support. However, the more significant development proved to 
be the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidamok: AWS) 
in June 1996 by 22 parties and other groupings (including the ZChN, PC, both KPNs, 
one of the BBWRs, the PK, PChl) and RdR) spearheaded by the Solidarity trade 
union. The key difference between AWS and other previous right-wing unity 
initiatives was that it was not a partnership of equals; the Solidarity trade union acted 
as the clear hegemon and thereby provided the new grouping with an unprecedented 
organisational cohesion. " 
AWS made an immediate impact on the Polish political scene and was soon running 
neck and neck with the SLD in the opinion polls. Indeed, in the run up to the 
September 1997 parliamentary elections, when most of the research on which this 
project is based was conducted, it was possible to identify six main parties and 
groupings - AWS, the SdRP/SLD, UW, PSL, ROP and UP - around which the Polish 
party system appeared to be consolidating. As Table 1.5 shows, these parties and 
groupings emerged at the front of the pack in the September 1997 parliamentary 
elections with AWS the clear winner (33.83% and 201 seats) ahead of the SLD who, 
53 See: A. Szczerbiak, 'Harmonising the Discordant Right', Transition. Vol. 3 No. 6.1997. pp44-47; 
and M. Wenzel, 'Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza Solidarno9d. An Attempt At Reviving the Legend', 
Communist andPost-communist Studies. Vol 31 No 2.1998. pp139-156. 
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in spite of increasing its share of the vote to 27.13%, saw its Sejm representation 
reduced to 164 seats. " The UW was able to pull ahead of the chasing pack winning 
13.3 7% of the vote and emerge as the new parliamentary 'kingmaker' with 60 seats, 
while the PSL saw its share of the vote halved to 7.3 1% and number of seats slashed 
to 27. The ROP won just enough support enough to secure parliamentary 
representation (5.56%) but this only translated into 6 seats, while the UP narrowly 
failed to cross the threshold (4.74%). 
The only other significant developments during this phase were: the defection of a 
number of right-wing deputies and activists from the UW and their amalgamation 
with the PK and SLCh into a new Conservative-People's Party (Stronnictwo 
Konserwatywno-Ludowe: SKL), in January 1997; and the brief emergence of the 
National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (Krajowa Partia Emeryt6w i Rencist6w: 
KPEiR), which at one stage in mid- 1997 appeared that the might join the leading 
group. However, as Table 1.5 shows, the KPEiR, failed to live up to its earlier 
promise and finished well behind the top six - partly because of the confusion caused 
by the emergence of a rival pensioners' party (an AWS-inspired spoiler with a similar 
name and acronym), although even these two groupings' combined votes fell well 
short of 5%. The SKL, on the other hand, contested the September 1997 election as 
part of the AWS coalition (of which, as noted above, the PK and SLCh had already 
been members anyway). In other words, neither of these developments affected the 
essential dynamics of the party system during this phase nor its consolidation around 
the six main Political groupings that form the core sample on which this research is 
based. 
Although the sixth phase of party development, which runs from September 1997 to 
the October 1998 local elections, falls outside the scope of this research it is worth 
noting that, broadly speaking, it was characterised by the further consolidation of the 
Polish party system around four out of these six groupings - AWS, the SdRP/SLD, 
PSL and UW - with the ROP and UP falling behind and in steady, but seemingly 
inexorable, decline. " 
Modelling pagy structure and organisation in post-communist Poland 
"' See: A. Szczerbiak, 'Electoral Politics in Poland: The Parliamentary Elections of 1997', Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics. Vol. 14 No. 3. September 1998. pp58-83. 
55 See: A. Szczerbiak, 'The Impact of the October 1998 Local Elections on the Emerging Polish Party 
System, ' Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. September 1999. forthcoming. 
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The overall objective of this research is, therefore, to examine the six main parties 
and political groupings that have emerged in post-communist Poland from a structural 
and organisational perspective by utilising the models set out in Western party theory 
and to consider how the new parties approximate to these taxonomical ideals. As the 
fast in-depth, single-country study of party structure and organisation in post- 
communist Eastern Europe, it will help us to draw broader conclusions about the 
process of party development and thereby shed light on an important aspect of the 
more general process of post-communist democratisation in the region. At the same 
time it will augment the relatively undeveloped body of material on internal party 
affairs in the more general political science literature and make an empirical 
contribution on which to make broader judgements about the applicability and 
usefulness of the theoretical models that have been developed on the future of the 
contemporary party. 
Chapter two examines the internal distribution ofpower and modes of representation 
within the new Polish parties both in terms of formal power structures and actual 
practices. In doing so it considers: the relationship between the parties' parliamentary 
and non-parliamentary leaderships, the party leaders' power and autonomy vis-a-vis 
their rank-and-file members, and whether power is concentrated nationally, dispersed 
locally or follows a stratarchic model. 
Chapter three considers the role of the party bureaucracy: the size of, and relationship 
between, the bureaucracies attached to the party central offices and the parliamentary 
parties, the party bureaucracy at the local level and its relationship with local 
parliamentarians, and the extent to which the new Polish parties utilise external 
professional advisers and consultants. 
Chapter four looks at the relationship between parties and their electorates, 
particularly: whether the new parties focus their electoral appeals on specific and 
clearly defined socio-economic; groups or whether they attempt to attract broader and 
looser constituencies, and whether or not these electoral strategies are reflected in 
their voting profiles. 'Me September 1997 parliamentary election is examined as a 
specific case study both of how the parties operationalised these strategies and the 
degree of 'leader-orientation' and personalisation in Polish party politics. 
Chapter five considers the development ofparties as membership organisations: how 
many members the new Polish parties have, their levels of local implantation, what 
extent they are attempting to encapsulate their electorates in party structures and 
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ancillary organisations, and the role of local party branches. This chapter also 
examines the related issues of. what priority membership recruitment and local party 
development are assigned in the parties' organisational strategies, and the incentives 
and impediments tp citizens joining parties in post-communist Poland. 
Chapter six examines the relationship between parties and the state, particularly: 
what kind of state financial and material support the new parties receive and what 
provisions are made for state-guaranteed party access to the mass media. In both cases 
the broader question of whether or not there is evidence of a pattern of inter-party 
collusion to create a cartel of privileged insiders is considered. 
A final, concluding section considers the overall similarities and differences between 
the new Polish parties and the contemporary Western party models, together with the 
broader implications of the type of party structure and organisation that is developing 
in post-communist Poland for the process of democratisation. More fundamentally, 
there is an assessment ofjust how useful these models really are in helping us to 
understand the kind of party structure and organisation that is emerging in post- 
communist Poland in particular and Eastern Europe in general. 
The question of how each of these Western models corresponds to each of the various 
aspects of party structure and organisation under consideration, together with 
hypotheses about why we might expect to see the new parties' to develop in a 
particular way, is explored in greater detail at the beginning of each chapter. 
However, as an overall preliminary hypothesis I would broadly agree with those 
commentators who have attempted to make structured projections about the way party 
organisation is likely to develop in post-communist Eastern Europe and have argued 
that the new parties are likely to develop as: centralised bodies in which elite 
leadership groups supported by small, professionalised party staffs play a 
predominant role; with loose electoral constituencies, a low membership base, 
relatively weak local organisational. structures and social implantation; and a 
concomitant high level of orientation towards, and dependence upon, the state. For 
example, in a critical examination of the prospects for party development with a 
primary emphasis on the Czech Republic, Kopecky has argued that the new East 
European parties are likely to develop as formations with "loose electoral 
constituencies, in which a relatively unimportant role is played by party membership 
and the dominant role by party leaders. ""' Similarly, Lewis and Gortat have suggested 
that the new parties are "not only lacking anything like a mass membership, but they 
"Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe', p517- 
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are generally devoid of any developed organisation at all. ""' In other words, drawing 
on Western party models, there seems to be general agreement that the new parties 
are, in general terms, more likely to resemble the'post-moderif catch-all, electoral- 
professional and cartel party rather than the traditional mass party model. 
However, as a caveat to this overall hypothesis we might draw a distinction between 
the organisational 'successors' to the ruling communist parties and their allies (the 
SdRP/SLD and PSL in the case of our sample) and those newly established parties 
which have had to develop without the benefit of an organisational legacy from the 
communist period (AWS, the UW, ROP and UP). Hypothetically, the 'successor' 
parties are more likely to retain, at least in relative terms and in a post-communist 
context, some of the former strengths of the traditional mass party model, such as: 
relatively high levels of membership and structural development; healthy finances and 
good material resources; and some pre-existing levels of party identification among 
ýarticular segments of the electorate. 
a 
571 Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland', p603. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHINPARTIES 
This chapter examines the new Polish parties' internal decision-making structures and 
the distribution of power between their different elements. Following Katz and Mair, 
rather than simply analysing them according to a simple 'parliamentary-extra- 
parliamentary' or 'leader-member' dichotomy the parties are disaggregated into three, 
analytically distinct 'faces': the 'party in public office' (the party organisation in 
parliament and government); the 'party central office' (the national leadership of the 
party organisation); and the 'party on the ground' (party members and activists 
throughout the country). ' 
Historically, each successive model of party organisation was characterised by a 
different distribution of power between these 'faces'. ' In the cadre party model, the 
6party' was limited to parliamentarians so that: the party on the ground and the party 
in public office were almost inter-changeable, there was little need or desire for a 
party central office and, consequently, the question of the internal distribution of 
power did not arise. In the classic mass party model the relationship between the three 
faces was essentially a hierarchical one with the parliamentary party accountable to 
the extra-parliamentary elite and party membership in whose name it acted. In other 
words, the party in public office were the agents of, and were controlled by, both the 
party on the ground, manifested organisationally in the party Congress and other 
intermediary bodies, and the party central office, embodied in a national executive 
which was elected by the party on ground to articulate and elaborate the party 
programme and scrutinise and direct the party in public office on a continuous basis? 
With the development of the catch-all/electoral professional party models the pattern 
of authority remained a hierarchical one but in reve7 flow - top-down rather than 
bottom-up - and these parties were characterised by a centralisation of power and 
strengthening of the party leadership segment, particularly the party in public office. 
As the party in public office increasingly dominated the party in central office, the 
1 See R. S. Katz and P. Mair, 'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe: the Three Faces of 
Party Organisation', The American Review ofPolitics. Vol. 14. Winter 1993. pp593-617. Katz and 
Mair also included the bureaucracy attached to the national leadership of party organisation as part of 
the party central office, but I have separated these two elements analytically and consider the party 
bureaucracy in a separate chapter. 
2 See: 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy. 
3 See: Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modem State. 
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role of rank-and-file intermediary bodies was downgraded and the party on the 
ground marginalised .4 
In the most recent cartel party model power the party in public office remains the 
dominant of the three 'faces' and continues to assert its autonomy from the party 
central office (and thereby the party on the ground) or even to straightforwardly 
control it by increasing the ex-officio representation of parliamentarians on the party 
executive at the expense of the party on the ground. However, while the party on the 
ground's input into national party policy and strategy is further reduced, the 
distribution of power also becomes more stratified, as the party in public office does 
not interfere in its day-to-day running and it becomes far more autonomous as far as 
local politics is concerned. The cartel party model is also characterised by an 
increasing tendency for the party in public office to make a more careful distinction 
between different elements within the party on the ground and employ 
circumventio t strategies of ignoring the traditionally more troublesome layer of 
whdL might be termed the 'organised party on the ground' (the middle-level activists 
who occupy local party offices and serve as delegates to intermediary bodies) by 
appealing directly to the more passive and disaggregated membership at large. The 
latter are felt to be more likely to endorse the policies and candidates supported by the 
party leadership, thereby providing a further disincentive for intermediary bodies to 
challenge the party leadership. ' 
So what kind of internal distribution of power might we expect to see developing in 
the new parties in post-communist Poland? 
Firstly, as Panebianco points out, "charismatic components" are always evident in the 
early stages of party formation and organisational consolidation and parties are often 
characterised by a pattern of leader-domination during their "genetic phase. "' 
Moreover, most of the new Polish parties were top-down organisations, with their 
origins at an elite level - often formed on the basis of personal relationships or around 
specific personalities. If not actually 'internally-created' within parliament, then they 
certainly acquired parliamentary representation at a very early stage in their 
4 See: 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems'; and Political Parties: Organisation 
andPower. 
5 See 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Dernocracy'; 'Party Organisations: From 
Civil Society to the State. For more on the disparity of views between party leaders, middle-level 
activists and passive members see: I D. May. 'Opinion Structure of Political Parties: The Special 
Law of Curvilinear Disparity'. Political Studies. Vol. XXI, No. 2.1973. pp 135-15 1; cf. P. Norris. 
'May's Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited: Leaders, Members and Voters in British Political 
Parties'. Party Politics. Vol. 1, No. 1.1995. pp29-47. 
6 political parties: Organisation and Power. p52 
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development rather than being built up on the basis of an extra-parliamentary 
organisational structure. This - together with the fact that, as van Biezen points out, 
the new parties in post-communist Eastern Europe had an "institutional rather than a 
societal origin" and were likely to "primarily focus on their role as institution builders 
and policy-makers, manifesting themselves as parliamentary (and governmental) 
actors"' - will further enhance the bias towards party leaders, especially the leaders of 
the party in public office (but also possibly some kind of subordinate party central 
office) and produce a weak party on the ground. Consequently, in relation to the 
internal distribution of power between the three faces, the new Polish parties are 
likely to conform to the more recent catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel 
models of party organisation with the party in public office enjoying a high degree of 
power and autonomy over a subordinate party central office, and the organisationally 
weak party on the ground also playing a relatively unimportant role. Incidentally, the 
fact that, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, the new parties have developed with 
access to public funding, and are consequently more dependent on the state, together 
with the key role played by the public mass media in the new parties' 
communications strategies further enhances the power of the party leadership, 
particularly the party in public office. 
Secondly, as stronger institutions which inherited at least some of their predecessors' 
membership and organisational networks, the two 'successor' parties - SdRP and the 
PSL - may display more of the characteristics of the mass party model with a more 
significant role played by the party central office which may, in turn, be subject to a 
greater degree of control by intermediary bodies representing the party on the ground. 
However, as Kopecky points out, as parties which have also undergone a process of 
organisational and ideological transformation associated with building a new identity 
in response to systemic pressures, the leaders of the 'successor' parties also played an 
important role in the emergence and consolidation of what were, in many respects, 
also 'new' parties. " Consequently, the 'successor' parties may also, although perhaps 
not to the same extent as in the wholly 'new' parties, be subject to the same logic of 
party leaders securing an important role within the party structure. 
Thirdly, given their overall organisational weakness most Polish parties are unlikely 
to have a strong enough bureaucracy attached to their party central office to be able to 
7 See: 1. van Biezen. 'The Relationship between the Party in Public Office and the Extra- 
Parliamentary Party in New Democracies. ' Paper prepared for the workshop on 'Change and 
Continuity in the Roles of Parties in Democratisation', ECPR Joint Sessions, University of Warwick, 
23-28 March 1998. p3. 
8 'Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe', p 521. 
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effectively monitor and intervene in the activities of their local branches other than on 
a sporadic basis. ' Consequently, in line with the cartel party model, the new Polish 
parties are, therefore, likely to vest their territorial structures with a relatively high 
level of autonomy when it comes to local politics and day-to-day party management. 
Fourthly, the new parties are, however, unlikely to correspond to the other key 
characteristic of the cartel party model of consulting individual party members over 
the heads of the organised party on the ground. This is partly because of the probable 
lack of certain necessary organisational resources, such as centralised membership 
lists, but also, more significantly, because party leaders' lack of knowledge about 
their own members' ideological profiles will create uncertainty as to whether or not 
such strategies are likely to produce the desired results in terms of legitimating the 
position of the party leadership. 
So how does one test the above hypotheses and locate where power lies within the 
new Polish parties' organisational structures? An assessment of the distribution of 
power between the three party 'faces' requires an analysis of three particular sets of 
intra-party power relationships. Firstly, the relationship between the party in public 
office and the extra-parliamentary 'faces', which is examined by focusing on the 
formal position of the parliamentary fractions within the party rules and the role of 
the 'faces' in the development of key elements of party policy and strategy. 
Secondly, the power and autonomy of the party central office in relation to 
intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground focusing on: the 
mechanisms for the election and dismissal of party leaders and executive committees; 
the extent to which one of these 'faces' enjoys an authoritative say on the selection of 
party candidates for public office and the formulation of the party programme and 
strategy; and whether or not there is any evidence of party leaders using referenda or 
membership ballots to circumvent the organised party on the ground. Thirdly, the 
pattern of local-national relations examining: how much autonomy local party 
organisations enjoy; whether or not national leaders attempt to influence local 
politics; and the party central office's powers to suspend local branches and overturn 
their decisions - particularly in relation to the party leadership's powers to intervene 
in the selection of, and formally approve, local parliamentary candidates lists. " 
9 The party bureaucracy is, as noted above, examined in more detail in a separate chapter. 
10 While obviously extremely important in terms of intra-party democracy, the question ofjust how 
'democratic' local parliamentary selection procedures themselves actually were, and whether they 
were simply confined to local elites or involved all party members, is not considered in detail here as 
it is not of direct relevance to the particular inter-relationship being examined: whether certain 
decisions are taken at local or national level. 
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The basis for much of this analysis is what Katz and Mair term the 'official story: the 
formal organisational models and structures as they are set out in party rules and 
Statutes - supplemented, where appropriate, by explanatory statements derived from 
party documents or interviews with key party officials. " Katz and Mair make a strong 
case for using official party rules and statements as at least a useful starting point for 
analysing the relationship between the party 'faces' and the party's own conceptions 
of power, authority and legitimacy. Like written constitutions, for example, party 
Statutes formally enshrine certain procedures and rights which leaders cannot change 
without recourse to the relatively complicated procedure of amending the Statute 
itself 
However, it is important to bear in mind that there are a number of important 
limitations to an approach based solely on the examination of power structures as set 
out in the 'official story. ' Statutes are often silent on important matters - such as the 
process for nominating election candidates - or ambiguous on those which are 
discussed in detail. More importantly, power relationships exist outside the formally 
documented procedures and if a party body lacks real power and authority in practice 
then an analysis confined to its formal, statutory position will actually reveal very 
little about the distribution of power within a given party. Similarly, new non- 
Statutory organisational structures can often develop, during election campaigns for 
example, which modify the formal power relationships within the party. Moreover, in 
practice the three 'faces' may overlap, particularly at leadership level, to an extent 
that the real power of one of the 'faces' is greater that than the official story would 
indicate. The national organs of the party central office or the party on the ground 
may, for example, formally enjoy the exclusive right to determine party policy and 
strategy - and the number of formal, ex-officio representatives of the party in public 
office may be relatively small - but the actual persons who are elected to them may, 
in practice, be drawn mainly or exclusively from the parliamentary leadership elite. It 
is also important to note that intra-party power relationships are part of a dynamic 
process and if, for example, the party central office leadership initially comprising 
non-parliamentarians enter parliament then this could shift the locus of power without 
any formal modifications to the party rules. 
Consequently, it is important, as far as possible, to balance the 'official story' with an 
analysis of the 'real" story of how the parties' decision-making structures operate in 
practice by focusing, where possible, on actual cases of political conflicts which 
11 See: R. S. Katz and P. Mair, 'Introduction: The Cross-National Study of Party Organizations' in 
Party Organization. pp6-1 0. 
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emerge in the course of policy-making and candidate selection, and the degree to 
which the individual representatives and senior personnel comprising each of the key 
bodies of the party 'faces' are distinct or overlap. Although elements of the 'real' 
story are introduced into the argument where possible and relevant, this account is, of 
necessity, heavily skewed towards the 'official story'. Quite simply, power relations 
within these parties are only just taking shape and insufficient time has elapsed since 
their formation (or transformation in the case of SdRP and the PSL) to properly 
supplement the formal, official sources with anything other than preliminary 
judgments about how they may operate in practice. 
Although this chapter focuses primarily on identifying the locus of power by 
analysing the party decision-making structures, there are, of course, a number of other 
dimensions which need to be considered in order to make a full assessment of the 
inter-relationships between the party 'faces. These include: the number of party staff 
attached to bureaucracies supporting each of the 'faces'; the distribution of state 
funding between them; and the possibilities of party access to the public mass media. 
All of these issues are considered at various points in other chapters and their impact 
on the internal distribution of power within the parties is incorporated into the general 
conclusion to this thesis. 
Pmjy decision-making structures 
Before examining each of these three inter-relationships in detail, it is worth briefly 
outlining briefly the internal decision-making structures of the six parties and 
groupings surveyed. " In addition to government ministers, the 'party in public office' 
consisted of parliamentary fractions - known as Parliamentary Clubs or Circles" - 
each of which elected a Chairman and Presidium. Four out of the six parties surveyed 
(SdRP, PSL, UW and UP) enjoyed parliamentary representation during the 1993-97 
12 Unless otherwise stated all references to and citations from party Statues are taken Erom: 'Statut 
Socjaldemokracji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej' in SdRP. Dokumenty i materialy IIIKongresu 
SoqjaIdemokraqji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Warsaw. 1998. pp5l-63; PSL. Stalut. Warsaw. 1996; UW. 
Statut Unii Wolnici. Warsaw. 1998; 'Statut Unii Pracy' in UP. UProgu ýM Wteku. Warsaw. 1996. 
pp35-44; ROP. Statut Ruchu Odbudbuy Polski. Warsaw. 1998; and 'Karta Krajowa Akcji Wyborczej 
Solidarnog' in AWS. Akcja Wyborcza Solidarno. M. NSZZ 'Solidamogd': Gdafisk. 1997. pp 10- 13. All 
references to and citations from parliamentary fraction Procedural Rules are taken from: PSL/Klub 
Parliamentary PSL. Regulamin Klubu Parlamentamego PSL. Warsaw. 1994; 'Regulamin Klubu 
Parlamentarnego Unii Wolno6ci' in Unia Wolnoick Klub Parlamentarny UW. Informator Klubu 
Parlamentarnego. Warsaw. 1995. ppl27-130; Unia Pracy-Klub Parlamentarny. Regulamin Klubu: 
Unia Pracy-Klub Parlamentamy. Warsaw. undated; Kolo Parlamentarne ROP. Regulamin Kola 
Parlamentarnego Ruchu Odbudowy Polski. Warsaw. undated; and Klub, Parlamcntarny AWS. 
Regulamin Klub6w Poselskich i Senatorskich Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnoil. Warsaw. undated. 
13 Parties with more than 15 Sejm deputies and Senators formed Parliamentary Clubs and those with 
3-15 parliamentarians formed Circles. 
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parliament. It was estimated that approximately 40% of the 171 Sejm deputies and 37 
Senators elected as part of the SLD coalition in 1993 were SdRP members, and a 
number of others subsequently joined to swell the party's ranks in parliament to 107 
by the end of the parliament. " SdRP's hegemony within with the SLD Parliamentary 
Club was further underlined by the fact that, in June 1997,15 out of the 29 Presidium 
members, including the Chairman and five out of the seven Vice-Chairmen, were 
party members. The PSL and UP Parliamentary Clubs numbered 132 deputies and 35 
Senators and 41 deputies and I Senator respectively in 1993 - although the UP 
suffered a large number of defections during the course of the parliament and by the 
end its Sejm representation was reduced by one sixth to 33.1' The UW Parliamentary 
Club was formed at the same time as the party in April 1994 and encompassed the 74 
deputies and 6 Senators elected as UD candidates together with one KLD Senator - 
although a number of UW parliamentarians also defected during the course of the 
parliament reducing its final tally to 65 Sejm deputies and 7 Senators. " 
As groupings that were 'externally-created' after the 1993 elections neither the ROP 
nor AWS had formally constituted Parliamentary Clubs or Circles during the 1993-97 
parliament. 17 In September 1997, however, 201 AWS Sejrn deputies and 51 Senators 
were elected to parliament and formed an AWS Parliamentary Club, while 9 of the II 
parliamentarians elected on the ROP ticket (6 Sejrn deputies and 5 Senators) went on 
to form a Parliamentary Circle. The SLD (164 Sejm deputies and 28 Senators) and 
UW (60 Sejrn deputies and 8 Senators) both returned Parliamentary Clubs of a similar 
size, while the PSL's parliamentary representation was slashed to only 27 Sejm 
deputies and 3 Senators and the UP failed to cross the required threshold of 5% of the 
votes and lost all of its seats. It was estimated that SdRP members comprised 
approximately 60% of the new SLD Parliamentary Club. " 
Although they used slightly different terminology to refer to them, the party central 
office leadership structure was broadly similar in all of the parties and groupings 
14 'SdRP parti4 wyborczq', Rzeczpospolita. 6th May 1994.1997 figure supplied to author by Maciej 
Porqba, SdRP head of party organisation, author interview, 28 February 1997. 
15 See: Stanislaw Gebethner. ed. Wybory '97. - Pallie i Programy Wyborcze. Warsaw: Dom 
Wydawniczy ELIPSA. 1997. p4O. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Although 38 Sejm deputies and 12 Senators were elected in 1993 from the parties and groupings 
that went on to form AWS, and there were various attempts to organise proto-AWS Parliamentary 
Clubs and Circles, there was no formal link between these structures and the AWS extra- 
parliamentary organisation. One Senator elected on the Solidarity trade union ticket in 1993 also 
subsequently joined the ROP. 
18 SdRP's December 1997 Congress also passed a resolution stating that the offices of SdRP party 
leader and SLD Parliamentary Club Chairman should be combined. See: E. Olczyk, Teszek Miller 
nowym przewodniczqcym', Rzeczpospolita. 8 December 1997. 
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surveyed. The party leader was referred to as the Chairman (SdRP, UW, UP, ROP 
and AWS) or President (PSL) who together with other party officers (Vice- 
Chairmen/Presidents, General Secretaries, Treasurers) comprised the party's 'narrow' 
leadership. The parties' national executive committees were known as: the Presidium 
(SdRP and UP), Supreme Executive Committee (PSL), Board (UW), " Main Board 
(ROP) or, in the case of AWS, fastly as the Co-ordinating Group and then since April 
1998 as the Presidium. Additionally, and confusingly, SdRP and UP also had a 
separate Central Executive Committee and Executive Committee respectively which 
were nominally responsible for party organisation as distinct from policy-making, 
although these fimctions tended to become blurred in practice, with the party Presidia, 
in both cases, defacto responsible for all aspects of party management. " 
The territorial structure of the organised 'party on the ground' was, in most cases, 
based primarily on Poland's 49 administrative provinces (wqjew6dztwq)` - although 
these provincial organisations were known as districts (okrVgi) in the UP and ROP 
and regions (regiony) in the UW - which encompassed the parties' basic 
organisational units. " The parties' 'intermediary' bodies generally consisted of a 
national party Congress - which met once every two (PSL, UW and UP), three (ROP) 
or four (SdRP) years - and a national party Council - known either as the Supreme 
Council (SdRP, PSL and ROP) or the National Council (UW and UP). In addition, 
SdRP organised a broader annual party Convention, while the PSL held special 
National Electoral Conventions to select the party's candidates for national 
parliamentary and presidential elections. 
As a coalition of parties and organisations based on a trade union rather than an 
individual member-based organisation, AWS's territorial structure and 'intermediary 
bodies' - and their respective relationships with the party central office - were all 
somewhat different from those of the other groupings surveyed. At the national level, 
the AWS National Council comprised representatives from all the grouping's national 
affiliates rather than from AWS territorial structures. " AWS's organised party on the 
ground comprised Regions which corresponded to the Solidarity trade union's 
19 Before January 1997 also known as the Presidium. 
20 The UP actually consolidated its party central office leadership into a single National Executive 
Committee following a change to its statute approved by the February-March 1998 party Congress. 
The UW also attempted to achieve such a functional separation by establishing a General Secretariat 
(UW) - although this was a much looser, less formal and unelected body and, therefore, not strictly 
analogous. 
21 Following local government reforms these were replaced by 16 larger provinces in January 1999. 
22 Sub-provincial party organisation is examined in greater detail in a separate chapter. 
23 Decisions were taken on the basis of voting through shares with the Solidarity trade union having a 
guaranteed 50% share, but all decisions required a 75% majority. 
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organisational structures (some of which encompassed more than one province) and 
were made up of representatives from the AWS affiliates' own territorial structures in 
that region together with other purely local organisations (such as local groupings of 
right-wing councillors). 
Parliamen! M-extra-parliamen! M pgly relations 
An examination of the relationship between the parties' parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary faces, revealed that the party in public office played a much less 
dominant role than hypothesised. There was a clear, formal division between the 
party central office leadership and the leadership of the party in public office and, 
although the status of the parliamentary fraction party was often unclear, varied from 
party to party and was sometimes not even mentioned directly in the party Statute, it 
was invariably considered to be in a clearly subordinate relationship to the party's 
extra-parliamentary organs. " 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given our hypothesis that its inheritance of a relatively robust 
extra-parliamentary organisational network from the communist era would mean that 
its internal distribution of power would bear a closer resemblance to that of the mass 
party model, it was the PSL parliamentary fraction which was formally the most 
subservient to, and whose activities were most precisely regulated by, the party's 
extra-parliamentary bodies. Firstly, the PSL was the only party whose Parliamentary 
Club's Procedural Rules had to be approved by, and could not be amended without 
the consent of, the national party Council. Secondly, both the party Statute and the 
Club's Procedural Rules explicitly stated that the parliamentary fraction "implements 
the PSL programme and policies on the territory of the Sejm and Senate, acting in 
accordance with the PSL programme together with the Congress, Supreme Council 
and Supreme Executive Committee resolutions" while the Club Presidium "remains 
in permanent contact with the Supreme Executive Committee in matters of current 
PSL policy" and members of the party's governing bodies "can participate in sittings 
of the PSL Parliamentary Club with an advisory voice. " Thirdly, the party executive 
24 This was confirmed by research undertaken by van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and de 
Muyzenburg which found that 66% of Polish parliamentarians surveyed felt that the party national 
executive had the greatest say in determining party policy compared with 27.2% who cited the 
parliamentary fraction. Interestingly, however, 43.2% of them felt that the parliamentary fraction 
should have the final say in the event of a difference of opinion, compared with 36.1% who said that 
it should be the national executive. See: A. van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and M. van den 
Muyzenburg. 'Orientation to the State? Parliamentary Parties in Hungary and Poland and their 
relations with Party in Central Office'. Paper prepared for the International Conference on 'The New 
Democratic Parliaments: The First Years', 24-25 June 1996, Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
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had the right to present local parties "with an opinion on the parliamentary work of 
the candidates in the given area" when they sought a renewed mandate. 
In formal terms, therefore, the PSL parliamentary fraction was simply responsible for 
organising the party's work in parliament rather than developing either party policy or 
strategy or taking key personnel decisionsP and there were also numerous cases of 
how, in practice, such decisions were often taken by extra-parliamentary body. The 
most striking example of this was the systematic way in which the party central office 
and intermediary bodies assessed the activities of PSL-appointed government 
Ministers during the course of the 1993-97 parliament. According to the PSL Statute 
the party Council "assesses the activity of PSL members in state, local self- 
government and other social organisations of an all-national reach" while the party 
executive's tasks included "determining the principles of and managing the PSL's 
personnel policy. " In February 1997, this clause was interpreted to mean that the 
party executive could remove the PSL-appointed Deputy Premier and Agriculture 
Minister Roman JageIM'Ski. Interestingly, although Jagielm'ski's supporters challenged 
his removal they did so on the basis that this decision should have been taken by the 
party Council and not the party executive - no one argued that it lay within the 
parliamentary fraction' competencies. " 
Although they afforded their parliamentary fi-actions slightly greater autonomy, the 
UW and UP party rules also both posited a clearly subordinate relationship for the 
party in public office to their respective parties' extra-parliamentary organs. Firstly, 
both party Statutes described the Parliamentary Clubs as their parties' "representation 
in parliament. " Secondly, according to the UP Statute and the UW Parliamentary 
Club's Procedural Rules their parliamentary fraction's fimction was to "implement 
the programme and policies" of their respective parties within the parliamentary 
forum - although the formulation contained in UP Parliamentary Club's Procedural 
Rules that the fraction should be "guided in its work by the UP Congress and 
National Council resolutions" which "represent the basis for the elaboration of the 
Club's position" was somewhat weaker. Thirdly, both party Statutes obliged their 
parliamentary fractions to maintain close contact and consult with their party 
executives (or, in the case of the UW, with the party leader and deputy leader if this 
was impossible) "on relevant questions" in the case of the UW and "current policies" 
25 For a useful summary of the official position on the role of PSL parliamentarians see the interview 
with the then party Council Chairman J6zef Zych in: 'Wybory potwiedzily nasze wplywy', 
Rzeczpospolita. I July 1994. 
26 See: ' Kalinowski zamiast Jagielin'skiego: 'PSL wycofala rekomendacjq dla wicepremiera', 
Rzeczpospolita. 13 February 1997. 
44 
in the case of the UP. Moreover, the UW party leader was also automatically a full, 
voting member of the Parliamentary Club Presidium. His deputy and the party 
General Secretary had the right to participate in its meetings and the convenors of the 
UW's policy commissions, known as the National Secretariats, could also "present 
the Union's position at meetings of the Parliamentary Club and its organs. "" 
Fourthly, while the UP Statute envisaged the party Council "adopting resolutions 
which are binding on SqJm deputies who are Labour Union members", the UW 
Statute actually set out the precise areas in which party Council or national executive 
decisions were binding on the parliamentary fraction: changes in the constitution, 
electoral law and local government structure; budgetary and taxation policy, the 
appointment and dismissal of members of state bodies; concluding parliamentary 
coalitions; and state security and foreign policy. A good example of how one of these 
parties' key strategic decisions was taken by an extra-parliamentary body and not the 
party in public office was the UP national executive's controversial and historic 
decision (by 7 votes to 6 with two abstentions) not to join the SLD-PSL coalition 
government in September 1993. " 
As another 'successor' party inheriting a sizable grassroots organisational network, 
we might also have expected SdRP to be characterised by a similar pattern of 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary relations to that of the PSL. However, the 
distribution of power within this party was, in fact, somewhat more complicated with 
the party in public office in a relatively more autonomous and less subservient 
position. Firstly, the SdRP Statute contained a much more ambiguous formula in 
terms of the formal relationship between the party's parliamentarians and its extra- 
parliamentary organs. Although, as in the case of the PSL, UW and UP, "the 
appropriate (SdRP party) councils or their presidia decide which matters require a 
common position and uniform voting" by SdRP parliamentarians, the latter were only 
expected to "present" their party's policies (rather than "represent or "implemene, 
them, or act as the "party's representation in parliamene) and they were simply 
bound by "the general principles of party loyalty, links and discipline" rather than 
being expected to liaise with extra-parliamentary bodies on a regular basis. 
Secondly, SdRP's party in public office operated within the framework of a broader 
SLD Parliamentary Club which - given that the linkage between the decisions of the 
27 Until January 1997, the UW Statute also required relevant party Ministers and Deputy Ministers to 
take part in the work of the party's policy commissions, the National Secretariats, if the party was in 
government. 
29 In retrospect, probably the single most important strategic decision in the party's history. See: 
'Definitywne "nie" Unii Pracy', Rzeczpospolita. 29 September 1993. 
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party and Club was an indirect one - meant, theoretically at least, a significant 
reduction in the SdRP's extra-parliamentary bodies' influence on its parliamentary 
fraction. For sure, given that it was the most politically coherent element comprising 
the SLD alliance and, as noted above, both the Club and its Presidium were 
dominated by the SdRP members, the party's parliamentarians clearly played a 
hegemonic role in terms of determining Club policy - with many crucial SLD Club 
decisions taken defacto at meetings of the SdRP governing bodies. " Nonetheless, this 
defacto pattern of submission of SLD Club to party governing bodies was not 
formalised and, therefore, had to involve at least some element of consultation with 
the party's coalition partners, thereby acting as a filter between SdRP 
parliamentarians and extra-parliamentary bodies. 
As noted above, the ROP and AWS only obtained formal parliamentary 
representation after the September 1997 election and, consequently, did not really 
address the issue of the balance of power between their parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary 'faces' in the party rules. Neither the AWS Charter nor the amended 
ROP Statute adopted after the election by the party's February 1998 Congress 
contained any mention of how their parliamentary fractions should be organised and 
what their relationship should be with their parties' extra-parliamentary decision- 
making organs. Moreover, the actual relationship between their parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary faces was clearly only at an embryonic stage and there was too 
little data to make anything other than very tentative judgments about how it would 
develop in practice. However, in so far as they did attempt to define this relationship, 
both the ROP and AWS parliamentary fractions' Procedural Rules contained the 
somewhat weaker formula that they (or, rather, "the Sejm deputies and Senators 
elected from the Solidarity Electoral Action Election Committee lists" in the case of 
AWS) were their parties' "representation" in parliament, and implemented their 
party's "programme" and "co-operate" with - rather than implementing all the 
decisions, and following the directives, of - their parties' extra-parliamentary organs. 
Uniquely, the AWS Parliamentary Club was also vested with the power to "confirm 
candidates to constitutional state bodies put forward by the Club Chairman" in stark 
contrast to, for example, the PSL national executive committee's powers of 
"managing the party's cadre policy" which, as noted above, included the power to 
sack a Deputy Premier. " Indeed, some commentators noted how the centre of 
29 SdRP parliamentary 'caucuses' effectively took place at meetings of the party's national Council, 
which all the party's parliamentarians were automatically members of. Information supplied by 
Maciej Porqba, author interview, 28 February 1998. 
30 According to one commentator, for example, AWS members of the new coalition government were 
determined "not by representatives of parties making up AWS but by the very narrow AWS 
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decision making shifted to the Parliamentary Club and its Presidium, while the AWS 
party Council and executive committee were increasingly marginalised, after the 
September 1997 election. " 
Nevertheless, while the AWS and, to some extent, SdRP/SLD party rules envisaged 
slightly greater autonomy for their parliamentary 'faces', the general pattern revealed 
in the 'official story' appeared to be that of a much less dominant role for the party in 
public office than hypothesised. There were, however, two important caveats to this 
general finding which emerged from an examination of the 'real story' of how these 
organisational models operated in practice. 
Firstly, even if in theory (and sometimes in practice) there were many examples of 
key elements of party strategy and policy being determined by extra-parliamentary 
bodies, it was simply not feasible for them to determine, or even significantly 
influence, every proposed piece of legislation being debated and voted on in a given 
session of parliament, never mind the countless decisions taken by party 
representatives in government. In practice, most of these were considered and 
determined autonomously by the party in public office. This was partly because, 
while extra-parliamentary organs could not be in permanent session, parliamentary 
fractions and their governing bodies could meet before, and even during the course 
of, every parliamentary sitting. Moreover, parliamentarians and government ministers 
were simply much better informed than non-parliamentarians and, therefore, as UW 
General Secretary Miroslaw Czech put it, on many occasions they "take responsibility 
for the entire party. "' This factor was not, of course, unique to post-communist 
Poland but common to all parties, governments and legislatures operating in modem, 
complex democratic states. 
Secondly, and perhaps even more significantly, every party with significant 
parliamentary representation was characterised by a substantial overlap between their 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary leaderships. Although, for example, the 
leadership, in fact, Marian Krzaklewski (the AWS leader) and his closest collaborators. " See: J. 
Paradowska, 'Bez skrzydel: Rodzi siq rzqd'. Polityka. 25 October 1997. 
31 The AWS party Council only met twice in the four months following the election, while the re- 
constitution of the Co-ordinating Group as the 'AWS Presidium' in April 1998 (to include the leaders 
of all the main parties represented in the AWS Parliamentary Club) was an explicit attempt by the 
AWS party central office to regain the policy-making and strategic decision making initiative from 
the party in public office. See: 'Decyzje potem', Rzezpospolita. 3 February 1998; and 'Prezydium na 
czele Akcji', Rzeczpospolita. 16 April 1998. 
32 Author interview with Miroslaw Czech, UW Secretary-General, 19 February 1997. For an 
interesting account on how SdRP extra-parliamentary bodies found it increasingly difficult to hold 
SdRP-nominated Ministers to account after the 1993 parliamentary elections see: E. Kaszuba, 
'Pozorny spok6j lewicy', Rzeczpospolita. II January 1994. 
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positions of party and parliamentary fi-action leader were formally separated, in 
practice, they were often occupied by the same person. The PSL's Waldemar Pawlak 
and the UP's Ryszard Bugaj, for example, combined the leadership of their respective 
parties and parliamentary fractions throughout the 1993-97 parliament. " Similarly, 
SdRP leader Alekansder Kwagniewski was also SLD Parliamentary Club Chairman 
until he resigned both positions following his election as President at the end of 1995 
- although he was succeeded by SdRP General Secretary Jerzy Szmajdzm'ski, and not 
the new party leader J6zef Oleksy, as SLD Club Chairman. Following the September 
1997 election, the UP lost all of its parliamentary representation and the PSL divided 
the party and parliamentary fraction leadership between Jaroslaw Kalinowski and 
Janusz Dobrosz respectively, although Leszek Miller once again combined the SdRP 
and SLD Icaderships"' and the AWS and ROP leaders, Marian Krzaklewski and Jan 
Olszewski, were also leaders of their respective parties' parliamentary fi-actions. An 
important exception was the UW which has ensured that these two positions remained 
separate since the party's formation in April 1994, with Tadeusz Mazowiecki the first 
party leader and Bronislaw Geremek parliamentary fraction leader. Indeed, 
Mazowiecki was actually replaced as party leader in April 1995 by a non- 
parliamentarian, Leszek Balcerowicz, and, although Balcerowicz was subsequently 
elected a Sejm deputy in September 1997, the UW retained a divided leadership, with 
party deputy leader Tadeusz Syryjczyk assuming the Parliamentary Club 
Chairmanship. 
Moreover, As Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show, in February 1997 83%-100% of the 'narrow' 
leaderships and 75%-92% of the national executives of the four main parties 
represented in parliament comprised Sejm deputies or Senators. Indeed, as Table 2.3 
shows, there was also a large overlap between party and parliamentary leaderships 
with 36%-75% of party executive members in these four parties also Parliamentary 
Club Presidium members. Ironically, the fact that for a period of time the UW leader 
was not even a parliamentarian actually encouraged this party to increase the overlap 
the membership of the two bodies in order to create a 'strategic leadership' that would 
avoid the fragmentation of party management. " Following the September 1997 
election, while the proportion of parliamentarians within individual parties' extra- 
parliamentary governing bodies changed - with, for example, a significant reduction 
in the case in the PSL reflecting the substantial reduction in its parliamentary 
33 Pawlak also combined both of these positions with the premiership between October 1993- 
February 1995. 
34 See Note 18. 
35 See interviews with Leszek Balcerowicz in: 'Nowy plan Balcerowicza', PoU4, ka. 15th April 1995; 
and 'Plan Balcerowicza', Wprost. 15 May 1995. 
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representation - the general pattern remained unchanged with Sejm deputies and 
Senators comprising 80- 100% of the 'narrow' leadership and 86-90% of the national 
executives of the three main parliamentary parties. Indeed, the domination of party 
bodies by parliamentarians even extended, although not quite to the same extent, to 
the party's 'rank-and-file' intermediary bodies. As Table 2.4 shows, in February 1997 
Sejm deputies and Senators comprised 28-52% of the membership of the four main 
parliamentary parties, and, in the new parliament, the figures remained broadly the 
same in the case of SdRP and the UW and fell in the case of the PSL and the UP only 
as a result of their reduced parliamentary representation. " 
PSL and UW parliamentarians were also automatically full voting delegates to their 
party Congresses and, for example, comprised one quarter of the delegates to the 
1995 PSL Congress and 15% of the 1998 UW Congress delegates. " SdRP and PSL 
parliamentarians were also automatically delegates to the party's annual Convention 
and National Electoral Convention for selecting the party's presidential candidates 
(although not the Convention for parliamentary candidate selection) respectively. 
Even where parliamentarians did not enjoy formal, automatic representation, in 
practical terms they often dominated party Congresses and Conventions through their 
election as 'rank-and-file' delegates and their ability to set the tone of and domMate 
the key debates through their greater knowledge and political experience. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that, generally speaking, the ex-officio representation 
of parliamentary fractions on party national executives was minimal. Apart from the 
UW - where the Parliamentary Club Chairman and his two deputies constituted three 
out of the twelve party executive members - only the AWS and UP parliamentary 
fi-actions had one ex-officio representative each on their respective party executives 
(the Club Chairman in the case of the latter) while the PSL parliamentary leader was 
a non-voting member and ROP parliamentarians could attend executive meetings with 
that body's consent. " The fact that there was high defacto rather than ex-officio level 
of parliamentary representation on extra-parliamentary bodies meant, of course, that 
36 As noted above, SdRP parliamentarians and, until January 1997, UW ministers were automatically 
party Council members. 
37 E. Czaczkowska, Tzas Pawlaka siq nie skoAczyl', Rzeczpospolita. 17 February 1995; and M. 
Subotid and F. Gawryg, Tzas dla partii rzqdz4cej', Rzeczpospolita. 2 March 1998. However, UW 
parliamentarians, together with members of the party's outgoing governing bodies, could not 
comprise more than 30% of the total Congress delegates and the proportion of parliamentarians to the 
1996 PSL Congress was somewhat reduced following an increase in the total number of delegates 
from 700 to 1200 and will be further reduced at future Congresses due to the reduction in the size of 
the parliamentary fraction. Until October 1996, UP parliamentarians were also automatically (and 
could comprise up to 30% of) Congress delegates and before March 1994 they had unlimited and 
automatic representation. 
38 For AWS see: 'Prezydium na czele Akcji'. 
parliamentarians were members of these bodies as individuals and not collective 
representatives of their party's parliamentary fi-actions, and did not, therefore, 
automatically denote that the extra-parliamentary 'faces' were controlled by the party 
in public office. Nevertheless, the fact that the parties' parliamentary fractions and 
their extra-parliamentary decision-making organs were, in many cases, composed of 
essentially the same individuals must lead one to seriously question the posited formal 
subordination of the party in public office and made the relationship between the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party 'faces' an extremely difficult one to 
unravel for analytical purposes. 
Interestingly, most party leaders saw this enormous overlap of party and 
parliamentary elites as a completely normal and unproblematic feature of Polish 
politics. The PSL, for example, rejected an attempt to prevent party-appointed 
Ministers from simultaneously holding party positions" and according to the party's 
programmatic director Jan Wypych, "even if we had more parliamentarians on our 
governing bodies then I don't think we'd think anything of it. "' Although admitting 
concern that too many parliamentarians should not occupy key positions at local 
level, such as provincial party Chairman, UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech 
also justified this overlap of elites on the grounds that, "the most active politicians are 
parliamentarians. "' Indeed, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech 
Borowik argued that functional specialisation was a luxury for more established 
parties while, "in a party that is still developing ... such a rivalry between 
parliamentary and party leadership could be very damaging ... We are too young a 
party ... This issue 
does not arise when you are only at the start of developing 
democratic mechanisms. "42 Similarly, his party colleague and fellow national 
executive member Artur Siedlarek argued that "removing the possibility of uniting 
party and Parliamentary Club functions ... is quite simply suicide in an organisationally 
weak party. "4' 
Leaders and members 
In addition to the party in public office being, in formal terms at least, much less 
dominant than hypothesised, an analysis of the relationship between the party central 
39 See: E. Czaczkowska, 'Kto chce, niech rezygnuje', Rzeczpospolita. 17 January 1994. 
40 Author interview with Jan Wypych, Head of PSL Programmatic Departmentý 20 February 1997 
41 Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
42 Author interview with Wojciech Borowik, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs, 19 
February 1997. 
43 Author interview with Artur Siedlarek, UP Presidium member and Parliamentary Club Secretary, 
II June 1997. 
50 
office and the organised party on the ground also revealed a much greater than 
anticipated role assigned to intermediary bodies representing the party rank-and-file. 
Given that the relationship between AWS affiliates' rank-and-file members and the 
AWS national leadership was organised through their own party or organisational 
structures, the relationship between AWS 'leaders' and 'members' was not analogous 
to that of the five parties surveyed. In other words, the AWS National Council was an 
'intermediary' between the AWS party central office and its national affiliates rather 
than with its territorial structures and this section, therefore, confines itself to 
analysing the relationship between the party central office and the intermediary 
bodies representing the organised party on the ground in the five individual member- 
based parties. 
Although the pattem varied across the parties, the powers of rank and file 
intermediary bodies to appoint, hold to account and dismiss party leaders and play a 
decisive role in the selection of party candidates for national public office was quite 
considemble. The leaders of all five parties surveyed were directly elected by their 
party Congresses, and - with one or two exceptions - party national executive 
committees were elected by party Councils, for two (UW and UP), three (ROP) and 
four year terms of office (SdRP and PSL). Except for the small number of national 
executive members elected directly by their party Congress or parliamentary 
fractions, "" party Councils had the power to dismiss any or all of their party 
executives at any point and, in most cases, have actually exercised this power. In 
December 1995, for example, the PSL's national Council dismissed seven of the 
party's fifteen national executive members following its defeat in the recent 
presidential elections, " while the UP and UW national Councils also removed party 
executive members, Jan Maria Rokita and Wojciech Lamentowicz respectively, for 
failing to support their parties' position during this campaign. " In October 1997 the 
UP Council also dismissed ten out of its seventeen executive members following the 
party's parliamentary election defeat. " 
44 The five SdRP Vice-Chairmen and General Secretary were elected by the party Congress and three 
UW national executive members were appointed and dismissed by the party's parliamentary fraction. 
Until January 1997 the U`W deputy leader was also elected by the party Congress, as was the entire 
ROP national executive until February 1998. Prospective ROP national executive members, however, 
still required the party leader's nomination. 
45 See: E. Czaczkowska, 'Prezes bez zaufania', Rzeczpospolita. 18 December 1995. Their dismissal 
was confirmed by the party Council in January 1996, see: 'Negocjowad do skutku', Rzeczpospolita. 
29 January 1996. 
46 See: 6 Rokita usuniqty', Rzeczpospolita. 4 December 1995; and 'Sqd nad Lamentowiczem', 
Rzeczpospolita. 4 December 1995. Admittedly both of these moves were instigated by the party 
leaderships rather than the rank and file. 
47 See: 'Rozlicza spokojnie', Gazeta Wyborcza. 6 October 1997. 
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Although generally more difficult to initiatc, procedures also existed in most of the 
parties for intermediary bodies to remove party leaders themselves before their term 
of office expired. The PSL party Council was the most powerful in this respect and 
could remove the party leader "if at least 50% plus one of the Supreme Council's 
statutory members declares this" and was the only one of the five surveyed where an 
intermediary body had actually removed two leaders during their terms of office: in 
June 1991 the Council suspended, and convened a special Congress to dismiss, 
Roman Bartoszcze"I and in October 1997 the party Council removed Waldemar 
Pawlak by 64 votes to 42 (63 votes being required). " The UP party Council also had 
the power suspend the party leader "for activity contrary to the provisions of the law 
or the provisions of the Statute" and transfer his competencies to another Council 
member by a two-thirds majority, or to shorten his term of office on other grounds 
either by a three-quarters majority vote or by convening a special Congress - which it 
did in October 1998 when it shortened Ryszard BugaJ's term of office by eight 
months. " SdRP leaders could also be removed between Congresses if they failed to 
secure a vote of confidence at the annual party Convention - although, to date, none 
of them had done so. " The UW and ROP leaders, on the other hand, could only be 
removed by special party Congresses which could be convened by either their party 
Councils, one third of the UW provincial councils or one quarter of the entire ROP 
membership. 
The power to select the parties' presidential candidates was also formally vested in 
intermediary bodies: the PSL's Electoral Convention and SdRP, UW and UP party 
Councils - although, in practice, these three parties actually devolved this decision to 
the more even more broadly representative party Convention (SdRP) or Congress 
(UW and UP) during the 1995 presidential election. The ROP, which was formed 
immediately after the 1995 election, made no mention of the procedure for 
presidential candidate selection either in its original or, more surprisingly, in its 
48 The same Congress also lowered the threshold required for the party Council to remove an 
incumbent leader from a two-thirds majority to a simple majority. Information supplied by Janusz 
Gmitruk, Director, PSL Institute of Peasant Movement History, 17 June 1997. 
49 See: E. Czaczkowska and M. Janowski, 'Zapowiedi zmian'. Rzeczpospolita, 13 October 1997; and 
M. Janicki, 'Pawlak bez glosu', Polityka. 18 October 1997. In December 1995, the party Council had 
also defeated a vote of confidence in Pawlak by 57 votes to 56 - but fell short of the 63 votes required 
and a subsequent attempt to remove him in January 1996 was defeated by 61 votes to 46. See: 'Prezes 
bcz zaufania'; 'Negocjowad do skutku'; and D. Wielowicjska, 'Swary tylko z rz4dem'. Gazeta 
Wyborcza . 18-19 May 1996. 50 See: 'Rozlicza spokojnie'. Bugaj resigned the party leadership before the subsequent Congress. 
51 In fact, all party officers and national executive members had to automatically face an annual vote 
of confidence at the party Convention although the only example of a member of the party leadership 
failing to win such a vote was the party Treasurer in February 1992, who had previously been 
suspended from his position anyway. See: 'Ani rewolucja, ani rewelacja', Rzec2pospolita. 17 
February 1992. 
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amended 1998 Statute - although, by implication, this power also lay with the party 
Council which "confirms the principles for preparing electoral lists prepared by the 
Main Board. " Similarly, the power to determine the composition of the parties' 
national lists of Scjm deputy candidates also lay with either with the party Council 
(SdRP, UW, UP and ROP) or, in the case of the PSL, the party's Electoral 
Convention (excluding parliamentarians) with the party Council detcm-tining the 
order of candidates. " 
Intermediary bodies were also vested with considerable formal powers to determine 
party policy and strategy. In all five cases the party Congress was formally the 
"supreme" (SdRP) or "highest" (UW, UP, ROP) governing body with ultimate 
responsibility for "approving the party programme. " Party Councils (and also the 
annual party Convention in the case of SdRP) were responsible for determining the 
main directions of party policy, strategy and tactics between Congresses such as, for 
example, with whom to conclude electoral pacts or governmental coalitions; although 
the ROP Statute contained a slightly weaker and more ambiguous formulation that the 
party Council "assesses the political situation and, in relation to this, takes day-to-day 
decisions together with communicating appropriate recommendations to the Board. "" 
Interestingly, the UP party Council was even vested with the explicit right to suspend 
party executive decisions if they were "contrary to the provisions of the Statute or 
collide with the provisions of the law or resolutions of governing bodies of a higher 
level", while the ROP Council could also "annul the decisions of other Movement 
governing bodies which are contrary to the Movement's Statute and progranune. " In 
every party except the PSL, the party Councils also appointed and supervised the 
work of the expert commissions responsible for policy development and drafting the 
party's programmatic documents. ' 
One key element of the organised party on the ground that performed a particularly 
significant role within the parties' overall power structures was the provincial party 
Chainnan. Firstly, provincial Chairrncn were strongly represented in party 
52 Polish Sejm deputies are elected in two tranches. The first tranche of 391 deputies are elected from 
52 local electoral constituencies (one constituency being co-terminus with a province except for 
Warsaw which was had two and Katowice which had three) by proportional representation among 
those parties which secure 5% or more of the vote nationally. The second tranche of 69 deputies are 
also elected by proportional representation from a national list of candidates among those parties 
securing 7% or more of the vote nationally. 
53 Until February 1998 the ROP party Council also "elaborated the basis for co-operation with other 
PI tical organisations" which it presented to the party executive for acceptance. 4ý This was previously also the responsibility of the ROP party executive, but since February 1998 
this body could only convene commissions and working groups to deal with "defined organisational 
problems. " 
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intermediary bodies. They were automatically delegates to the SdRP party 
Convention and PSL National Electoral Convention and played a particularly 
influential role within the national party Councils were of which they were ex-offi-cio 
members in the case of the ROP and (since January 1997) the UW and most of them 
were defacto members even in those parties which did not make provision for their 
automatic representation. In February 1997, for example, 35 out of the 49 PSL and 
SdRP and 14 out of the 33 UP provincial chairman were also party Council 
members. " Secondly, most of the parties held regular, non-Statutory consultations 
with their provincial Chairmen as a means of two-way communication with the party 
on the ground. These consultations were particularly influential, and semi-formalised, 
in the case of the PSL where, for example, the provincial Presidents played a crucial 
role in propping up the beleaguered party leader Pawlak at the beginning of 19961 
but also prepared the ground for his subsequent removal by the party Council in 
October 1997.1' Similarly, two consultations of SdRP provincial chairmen held prior 
to the party's 1998 Congress convinced the then party leader J6zef Oleksy not to 
stand for re-election. " The ROP also organised monthly national meetings of 
provincial Chairmen and, following his election as UW leader, Leszek Balccrowicz 
introduced the Practice of holding separate meetings for them on the day prior to 
party Council meetings. " Thirdly, in many cases provincial Chairmen were also local 
parliamentarians which further increased their influence within both the local and 
national party power structures - although this also made it difficult to identify them 
unambiguously as the representatives of the party on the ground and provided further 
evidence of the blurring of distinctions between the three party 'faces'. Incidentally, 
although (as noted above) the relationship was not strictly analogous, it is worth 
mentioning that, as Chairman of the local Solidarity trade union's territorial structure 
- and, thereby, an influential figure within that grouping's largest 'shareholder - the 
AWS regional Chairman was also an extremely influential figure within that 
organisation's power structures. 
55 Every PSL province had the right to automatically nominate two party Council members while the 
UP provinces had the right to send a representative (often the Chairman) to participate in an advisory 
capacity. After the 1997 elections and in the run up to the SdRP's December 1998 Congress the 
number of provincial Chairman on the party Council actually increased to 43 out of 49. 
56 See: E. Czaczkowska, 'Konkurenci Pawlaka', Rzeczpospolita. 9 April 1996; and E. Czaczkowska, 
'W PSL stan podwy±szonej aktywnogci prezesa', Rzeczpospolita. 17 May 1996. 
57 See: 'Narada przcd Rad4', Rzec2pospolita. 6 October 1997. 
58 See: A. Nowakowska, 'Olcksy Odchodzi', Ga-zeta Wyborcza. 8 December 1997; and M. Janicki, 
'Miller wszytkich socjaidemokrat6w', Polityka. 13 December 1997. 
59 Infomation supplied by: Wojciech Wlodarczyk, ROP National Secretary, author interview, 14 
February 1997; and Wieslaw R&ycki, Rzesz6w UW Provincial Council Vice-Chairman, author 
interview, 22 April 1997. 
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However, in a number of cases the formal powers vested in party intermediary bodies 
were matched, or even exceeded, by the powerful prerogatives which were assigned 
to the party central office. In particular, the PSL, UW and ROP Statutes in some 
respects defined the powers of the party leadership in some respects more broadly 
than those of the bodies which elected them and to which they were theoretically 
accountable. The PSL leader, for example, "implements and accounts for the PSL's 
day-to-day policies", "chairs the Supreme Executive Committee and directs its work7 
and is, as the party's Executive Office Director Marian Zalewski pointed out, "a 
statutory organ, with very wide, independent decision-making powers and 
competencies. " Similarly, the UW Chairman "leads the party, "' was "accountable 
for his activities before the National Congress" not the party Council, nominated the 
other party officers and spokesmen (Vice-Chairman, General Secretary, Press 
Spokesman and National Secretaries) and had the power to independently convene a 
special party Congress. The fact that the ROP leader Jan Olszewski played such a 
significant role in that party's formation was also reflected in its Statute, according to 
which the party leader "directs the work of the Main Board", "represents the 
Movement externally and delegates powers of plenipotentiary in this area", nominated 
and proposed the removal of the members of the party executive committee and the 
party Qualification Commission responsible parliamentary candidate selection, could 
nominate a large number of party Council members for co-option and also had the 
power to convene special Congresses and party Council meetings. As noted above, 
both the UW and ROP leaders could also only be removed by a special party 
Congress during their term of office. 
The ROP Statute also contained an important 'enabling' clause which specifically 
empowered the party leader to "allocate all essential dispositions and take decisions 
not confined to the competency of other governing bodies, for the efficient 
functioning of the Movement. ""' Similarly, the PSL national executive was vested 
with the power to take "decisions and considerations in all matters not regulated in 
this Statute", while the UW executive possessed only slightly less sweeping powers in 
respect of "undeft-aldng decisions on Union matters which are not restricted to the 
competencies of other governing bodies. "" Moreover, as well as being the only 
60 Author interview with Marian Zalewski, PSL Executive Office Director, II March 1997. 
61 Until January 1997 the party Statute stated that he simply "acts in its name. " 
62 Until February 1998 the ROP Statute also vested the party executive with the power to "interpret 
the provisions of the Statute" and "decide on matters not expressed in this Statute" which was, in 
effect, simply transferred to the party leader. 
63 The decision to change the name of the UW's national executive from the 'National Council 
Presidium' to the 'Board' was also supposed to reflect that it was not simply a body representing the 
party Council but was also endowed with independent functions in relation to the day-to-day political 
management of party affairs. 
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example of a party executive that formally nominated the members of the party's 
expert policy commissions, the PSL national executive also "establishes the basis, and 
directs, the PSL's cadre policy" - which, for example, it interpreted to mean that it, 
and not the party Council, had the power to appoint and dismiss PSL-nominated 
Ministers, as in the aforementioned JagieliAski case. " 
Since January 1997 the UW party executive has also had the power to suspend a party 
member in the event of a serious "violation of a Union member's obligation which 
causes the party serious harm" which was defined as: being a member of another 
party or grouping competing with the UW or a rival parliamentary fraction; publicly 
adopting a position opposed to the Union's policy outside the meetings of the party's 
governing bodies or discussion fora; failing to join the party's fraction in 
representative bodies; circulating confidential party information or betraying the party 
to its political opponents; or embezzling the party's assets. Similarly, the 1998 
February ROP Congress expanded the party executive's powers to expel party 
members for "repeatedly acting to the detriment of the Movement or also acting 
contrary to the Movement's ideological principles" and suspend them for "conduct 
not harmonious with the honour of a member of the Movement" as well as being 
empowered to make "pronouncements in membership matters not restricted to other 
governing bodies. "' 
Moreover, as in the case of the relationship between the parliamentary and extra- 
parliamentary 'faces', an examination of the 'real story' - particularly the practical 
constraints within which party intermediary bodies operated - revealed that many of 
the competencies formally attributed to the organised party on the ground were more 
apparent than real and that the party central office leadership's defacto powers were 
even greater than an analysis based solely on the 'official' story suggested. 
Firstly, the fact that party Congresses met at two, three or four yearly intervals and 
that even party Councils only met monthly in the case of the SdRP and "not less than" 
64 Given that a compromise was reached on this issue before the party Council had an opportunity to 
discuss it, we have no experience of how, in practice, a clash between the two bodies on this issue 
would have been resolved. See: 'Jagielifiski zlo-+yl dymisjq', Rzeczpospolita. 3 March 1997. 
65 Perhaps "clarified" would be a more accurate description than "expanded" given that in October 
1997 the party executive expelled a number of Jan Olszewski's opponents in the party Council - 
including one of the party Vice-Chairmen, Antoni Macierewicz - in spite of the fact that the then 
Statute vested the power of expulsion or suspension exclusively in the party Court, and only 
empowered the party executive to delete someone from the membership list "for non-payment of 
subscriptions for more than one year. " See: M. D. Zdort, 'ROP coraz bli±ej roziamu', Rzeczpospolita. 
415 October 1997. 
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once a quarter in the case of the other parties surveyed, ", meant that these bodies were 
practically incapable of influencing party policy and strategy and holding the party 
leadership to account on a regular, day-to-day basis. In other words, many of their 
powers and competencies were defacto inevitably assumed by the party executives, 
which generally met at least once a week. Indeed, only the PSL and ROP party 
Councils had separate chairmen and presidia responsible for organising and planning 
their activities, while the UP and UW Councils could only be convened by the party 
leadership and the SdRP Statute, while not explicit, stated that the party executive 
"plans the Supreme Council meetings. "" 
Secondly, although they may have formally controlled the policy-making and 
candidate selection processes, given that they were large and unwieldy bodies which 
met comparatively rarely they often delegated key decisions to - or simply confirmed 
or made minor corrections to proposals presented to them by - leadership bodies or 
expert policy commissions. Although, for example, coalition agreements or electoral 
pacts may have been concluded within the broad parameters set by, and subject to 
formal approval by, party Councils the actual detailed negotiations were inevitably 
confined to much smaller groups of party leaders and experts. " While, as noted 
above, intermediary bodies were formally responsible for approving the parties' 
national lists of SqJrn candidates, at the 1997 elections the SdRP, PSL and UW party 
executives presented them with proposed lists to which few changes were generally 
made, while the UP party Council delegated this decision to its National Election 
Committee comprising the 'narrow leadership' and the ROP's list was drawn up by 
the party leader himself. " Similarly, while party intermediary bodies may have 
formally controlled the process of policy and programmatic development, debates 
were based on drafts prepared by expert policy commissions which undertook much 
of the detailed work and which they generally simply confirmed or made minor 
corrections to. Although these commissions were, as noted above, generally appointed 
66 According to former ROP Vice-Chairman Jan Parys there were no meetings of the party Council 
held between June-September 1997. See interview in: 'Nienawigd do m4drych' in Gazeta Wyborcza. 
25 September 1997. 
67 Since February 1998 a ROP party Council meeting could also be convened by one third of its 
members. 
" Indeed, in October 1993 the UP Council even left thefinal decision on whether or not the party 
should participate in the SLD-PSL coalition government coalition to the discretion of the party 
executive after it had provisionally voted to join. See: E. Olczyk, 'UP chyba chce wej9d do rz4du', 
Rzeczpospolita. 14 October 1993. 
69 Author interviews with Dariusz Klimaszewski, SLD National Election Campaign Staffs National 
Spokesman, 21 November 1997; Jan Wypych, PSL Programmatic Director, 26 November 1997; 
Pawel Piskorski, UW Election Campaign Staffs Organiser, 25 November 1997; Piotr Marciniak, UP 
Election Campaign Staffs Organiser, 19 November 1997; and Wojciech Wlodarczyk, ROP Election 
Campaign Committee Secretary, 27 November 1997. 
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by party Councils and their drafts were sometimes subject to broader consultation, 
they operated under the day-to-day supervision of the party central office leadership. 
The preparation of party programmes for the 1997 parliamentary elections is a good 
example of how a key programmatic decision was, in practice, taken by a fairly 
narrow group of leaders. According to UW Election Campaign Staffs Organiser 
Pawel Piskorski, for example, the main decisions on the contents of the party's 1997 
election programme were "taken under the supervision of (party leader) Balcerowicz 
himself .. and it was written by a group of experts ... by a right of presumptive 
empowerment granted to the Election Staffs to formulate such a document and 
develop it electorally. "" Similarly, according to the party's Election Staffs Organiser 
Piotr Marciniak the UP election programme was prepared by "a group of leaders ... it 
wasn't a formally approved programme ... (it was) a summary ... a sort of 
brochure ... drawn from a lengthier programme adopted by the Congress. 
"" The ROP 
election programme was also drafted by a group of experts convened by the party's 
main economic policy adviser Dariusz Grabowski and confirmed by the national 
executive not the party Council. " The PSL did not even produce a separate election 
programme but party functionaries simply, as its programmatic director Jan Wypych 
put it, "translated the party's general programme into the language of leaflets. "" 
This tendency for detailed party policy, strategy and lists of national election 
candidates to be determined defacto by the party leadership had an additional 
dimension in the case of SdRP, which had to engage in consultations with its partners 
in the SLD alliance on all these matters. So, for example, although SdRP candidates 
on the Sejm national list were formally determined by the party Council, their 
position on the SLD national list was confirmed by a non-party body, the SLD 
National Electoral Committee. Similarly, while the SdRP's 1997 party programme 
was preceded by a lengthy period of rank-and-file consultation and finally approved 
by a special party Convention and party Council (and eventually, although this took 
place after the election, the party Congress), the actual SLD election programme was 
prepared by a group of experts and party leaders following negotiations with other 
alliance members. Given, as noted above in the case of the relationship between SdRP 
extra-parliamentary organs and the SLD Parliamentary Club, SdRP's pivotal 
influence within the SLD this dilution of the party's influence should not be 
exaggerated. In 1997, for example, the SLD National Election Committee comprised 
70 Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
71 Author interview, 19 November 1997. 
72 Author interview, 27 November 1997. 
73 Author interview, 26 November 1997. 
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two SdRP representatives - party leader J6zef Oleksy and General Secretary Jerzy 
Szmajdzifiski - together with the non-party SLD premier Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
and the leader of the OPZZ trade union federation, J6zef Wiaderny. Similarly, the 
chairman and secretary of the SLD programmatic group were both SdRP leaders 
(Marek Borowski and Leszek Nikolski) and another key member was the chairman of 
the SdRP programmatic commission, Izabella Sierakowska. " Nevertheless, by 
creating an additional and informal negotiating and decision-making tier outwith the 
party structures - and, therefore, beyond the direct control of party intermediary 
bodies the SdRP party leadership's autonomy was inevitably increased. " 
Thirdly, not only were many of the key party policy documents, inevitably drafted by 
small groups of experts under the supervision of the party leadership, but there also 
appeared to be little interest among the party rank-and-file in taking advantage of the 
opportimities which did exist for participation, particularly when it came to 
programmatic and policy questions. Party Congresses, for example, tended to be 
dominated by internal party elections and personnel matters rather than policy 
debates, while research on provincial party officials undertaken by this author 
revealed a general lack of interest in programmatic issues at the local level. When 
asked to outline which decisions taken by national party officials were problematical 
or had aroused controversies among local activists, local officials invariably cited 
internal organisational matters or those relating to personalities such as leadership or 
candidate selection rather than programmatic or national policy decisions. SdRP 
officials cited the leadership's handling of the issue of debts arising from the former 
PZPR's assets; " some PSL officials criticised the party leadership's decision to 
withdraw their support from Roman Jagelm'ski; " UP officials pointed to disputes over 
whom should be the party's candidate in the 1995 presidential elections" and the 
imposition of local parliamentary candidates by the leadership; " while ROP officials 
criticised the party's decision to collect half-a-million signatures for a petition 
74 Information supplied by Dariusz Klimaszewski, author interview, 21 November 1997. 
75 Incidentally, the rank-and-file of the parties and groupings which comprised the AWS electoral 
coalition inevitably faced a similar problem in terms of the dilution of their influence on their parties' 
policy making and candidate selection procedures. 
76 Author interviews with: Leszek Majewski, SdRP Plock Provincial Council Secretary, 29 April 
1997; and Stanislaw Gwizda, SdRP Jelenia G6ra Provincial Council Secretary, 5 May 1997. 
77 Author interviews with: Adam Smolifiski, PSL Jelenia G6ra Provincial Board President, 3 May 
1997; and Slawomir Szatkowski, PSL GdaAsk Provincial Board President, 12 May 1997. 
78 Author interviews with: Zdislaw Dumowksi, ROP Plock Provincial Board Chairman, 28 April 
1997; and Janusz Burysz, ROP Jelenia G6ra Provincial Board Chairman, 7 May 1997. 
79 Author interview with Boguslaw Kaczmarek, UP Gdafisk Provincial Board Chairman, 14 May 
1997. 
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unrealistically calling for the party's proposals to be included in the forthcoming 
national constitutional referendum as a waste of time and resources. "' 
In the case of SdRP this reluctance to engage in vigorous and public programmatic 
debate was rooted in an organisational culture based on self-discipline and collegiate 
decision-making in which internal agreement was highly valued. "' An excellent 
example of this was that, in spite of the fact that SdRP was the only party whose 
Statute openly declared that "it is possible to form factions within the party" and that 
the party members forming them could "present their conceptions in the party press, 
putting forward candidates to all governing bodies" and "set up their own 
publications, " the only factions operating within the party were those set up to 
organise specific milieu - young people, ecologists, women - rather than to advance 
specific ideological options. Similarly, while the UP Statute also allowed party 
members to form "thematic and milieu sections" which "independently determine 
their organisational structure and tasks", elected representatives to party commissions 
and could include non-party members in their ranks, no ideologically-based sections 
were formed on the grounds that, as the party Vice-Chairman for Organisational 
Affairs Wojciech Borowik put it, "we don't have such great programmatic 
differences. "' Indeed, given that the lack of opportunities to independent party 
factions and platforms limits the opportunities for the party rank-and-file to make a 
serious input into the party policy-making process, it is noteworthy that neither the 
PSL nor ROP Statutes acknowledged the possibility of factional organisation 
although differences of opinion on policy and strategy existed and were openly 
expressed in both of these parties. 
Moreover, the only attempt to establish an 'ideological' factional grouping in one of 
the parties surveyed occurred in the UW whose Statute gave its members the right to 
"form intra-party programmatic platforms in the form of Clubs, fora or groups, whose 
formation and procedural rules are dependent on confm-nation by the Union Council 
at the appropriate tier. " Although Ecological, Local Government and Business Fora 
were established and operated as informal networks without any impediment, the 
party's national Council prevented UW left-wingers from establishing an 
ideologically-based Democratic Forum in October 1994 by 45 votes to 32. " The 
80 Author interviews with: Zdislaw Dumowksi, 28 April 1997; and Danuta Makowska, ROP Gdafisk 
Provincial Board Spokesman, 14 May 1997. 
81 See: Protopartie 1 Protosystem? p 186. 
82 Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
83 See: J. B. Lipszyc, leby nie odeszla od zasad', Rzeczpospolita. 14 October 1994; M. Suboti6, 
'Mazowiecki przestrzega przed rozbiciem', Rzeczpospolita. 28 November 1994; and M. Suboti6 and 
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UW's decision was no doubt strongly influenced by the experiences of its progenitor 
party, the UD, which not only allowed organised factions to exist but, at one stage, 
accorded them formal rights of representation on the party's governing bodies, " 
which created suspicions of ideological factions as bodies which, as the party's 
General Secretary Miroslaw Czech put it, "disturb the normal functioning of the 
party ... The majority of people's time is spent on matters relating to the party's wings 
and not on the functioning of normal politics. "' Indeed, the SdRP Statute also 
contained a proviso that the formation of party factions was subject to acceptance by 
the party Council that they were "not guided in their activities by principles contrary 
to this Statute" and an attempt to set up an 'ideological' faction by SdRP members 
may also have received equally short shrift. 
Fourthly, many of the 'rank-and-file' intermediary bodies which were supposed to 
represent the organised party on the ground were, in fact, dominated by party 
leadership elites. The leadership of the party central office - together with, as noted 
above, parliamentarians - were automatically delegates to the PSL and UW 
Congresses, the SdRP party Convention and Council, the PSL National Electoral 
Convention and their defacto representation and influence in these bodies was 
substantial in every party. "' The ROP Statute contained provisions for the party leader 
to potentially nominate a larger number of his own nominees as co-opted party 
Council members with full voting rights than those elected by the party rank-and- 
file. " Only the UP's intermediary bodies were comprised almost exclusively of 
delegates and members elected by the party rank-and-file following an amendment to 
the party Statute in October 1996 removing automatic Congress representation for 
parliamentarians and party leaders - although, as with the other parties surveyed, there 
was still a very substantial defacto representation of parliamentarians in these bodies 
before the UP's defeat in the September 1997 elections. 
K Olszewski, 'Unia Wolno9ci zakazala dzialalnoki Forum Demokratycznego', Rzeczpospolita. 12 
December 1994. 
84 See: M. Debnel-Szyc and J. Strachura. Grypolitymne: Orientacje na dzU. Warsaw: Volumen. 
1991. p62 
85 Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
86 Until the ROP Statute was amended in February 1998, an unspecified number of party leaders and 
"founder members's were also automatically party Congress delegates. 
87 The only proviso was that the party Council's total membership should not exceed 120 so if the 50 
members elected directly by the party Congress, included a large number of the 49 provincial 
chairman who were automatically Council members then, hypothetically, a majority of Council 
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Finally, it is worth noting that only the SdRP Statute made any formal provisions for 
the party Council to organise all-party polls and referenda, although the UW was, in 
fact, the only party to directly consult its members by means of a ballot - on the 
question of whom the party should support in the 1995 presidential elections and even 
the UW was reconsidering the value of using such mechanisms in future selection 
processes. " As hypothesised, then, there was virtually no evidence of Polish party 
leaders being attracted to circumventionist strategies such as referenda or membership 
ballots as a means of appealing to passive individual members over the heads of the 
organised party on the ground. This was partly because for organisational and tactical 
reasons: no party central office, for example, held a national central register of 
members, while a drawn out and cumbersome process of consultations and primaries 
made the formation of coalitions and pacts - an important feature of Polish electoral 
politics - more difficult. More significantly, party leaders simply did not know their 
own party members' ideological profiles very well which meant that there was no 
guarantee that direct membership ballots would necessarily provide them with the 
desired result and meant that they were reluctant to risk opening up party decision- 
making processes in this way. Although the UW ballot was, for example, only an 
advisory one, it did have a very significant influence in helping the party's eventual 
presidential candidate Jacek Kuron' to secure a narrow victory in the selection at the 
subsequent party Congress - against the wishes of the then party leader, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki. 
Local-national relations 
Although the actual distribution of power between leaders and members was, 
therefore, more weighted towards the party central office than an analysis based 
solely on the 'official story' would suggest, there was also, as hypothesised, evidence 
that the parties' territorial structures enjoyed a fairly high level of sectoral local 
autonomy. Firstly, the PSL, UW, UP and ROP provincial councils were all formally 
responsible for determining and implementing their party's day-to-day policies and 
activities in the given province; and the UW and UP councils were also vested with 
the power to develop detailed provincial party programmes of activity. Although the 
SdRP Statute did not specify its provincial structures spheres of competency, 
according to the party's head of organisation Maciej Porqba, "the autonomy of the 
local units ... is very considerable ... the national structures only deal with the strategic 
matters. "' Secondly, the PSL, UW and UP provincial bodies were also assigned 
88 See: M. Subotid, 'KuroA zebral polowq glos6w', Rzeczpospofita. 17 March 1995 and infonnation 
supplied by Miroslaw Czech, author interview, 19 February 1997. 
89 Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
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specific responsibility for monitoring the work of, and maintaining day-to-day 
contacts with, their parties' parliamentarians, councillors and local representatives in 
government administration. The UP provincial councils decisions were "binding upon 
UP councillors" while the PSL provincial executive committee "implements the cadre 
policy on the territory of the province. " Thirdly, in terms of financing and staffing 
matters: the UP provincial council approved the party's local budget, while the PSL 
provincial executive "carries out independent business activity and the PSL provincial 
organisation's financial business on the basis of the Supreme Executive Committee's 
powers of plenipotentiary" and "organises and employs staff in the PSL provincial 
organisation's Executive Office. " The SdRP Statute also empowered all party cells to 
undertake trading activity without the right to obtain special powers of plenipotentiary 
from the party central office. Fourthly, the UW provincial committee was even 
specifically empowered to take "decisions in regional matters which are not confined 
to the competencies of other governing bodies. " 
This formal autonomy posited in the party Statutes was confirmed by a survey of 
provincial party leaders which revealed that officials from all six parties and 
groupings discerned very little, if any, interference from the national leadership in 
their day-to-day decisions and activities. An SdRP official, for example, said that, "as 
a provincial Council ... we deal with the 
issues according to our feelings, according to 
our view of these matters. I don't see some kind of centralism here, as there was once 
was democratic centralism in the PZPR when - in many matters - you had to pick up 
the 'phone and square everything with Warsaw. "" One UW official felt that his 
party's national leadership, "trusts us and believes that there are many responsible 
people here who know better in Plock what is better for the Plock area than the 
national leadership, "91 while an UP official said that although Warsaw tried to 
"convince us to do certain things and undertake various kinds of activities, there were 
never any directives that you have to do it like this and not differently. "' As an 
example of such local autonomy, one AWS official cited the case of how the 
grouping's local leadership was able to refuse admission to the local branches of 
certain parties whom they felt to be a disruptive influence, in spite of the fact that 
90 Author interview with Kazimierz W6jcik, SdRP Rzesz6w Provincial Council Secretary, 22 April 
1997. 
91 Author interview-with Eugeniusz Aleksandrowicz, UW Plock Regional Council Chairman, 29 
April 1997. 
92 Author interview with Ryszard Nowak, UP Jelenia G6ra Provincial Council Chairman, 5 May 
1997. 
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these organisations were national AWS affiliates and their local representatives had 
been approved by their own parties' national leadership. " 
An excellent example of how such local autonomy operated in practice was the fact 
that none of the parties surveyed issued guidelines or instructions about how or with 
whom their local councillors should form coalitions, leaving this decision to the 
discretion of its provincial organisations. According to SdRP's head of organisation 
Maciej Porqba, for example, the party's local councillors "simply come to the 
conclusion that there is a group of people that they can reach an agreement with and 
they form a coalition. "" Similarly, PSL party Council Chairman J6zef Zych argued 
that these decisions depended "on the specific situation in a local milieu" and that the 
PSL "will enter into coalitions with everybody who is guided by pragmatism and the 
interests of their milieu, "" while the party's Executive Office Director Marian 
Zalewski noted "if .. there are couple of partners with whom we work well (at the 
provincial tier) then it doesn't have to the same (coalition) as it is at the central tier. ""' 
In February 1997, for example, a number of PSL provincial organisations 
independently broke off their local coalition agreements with the party's national 
coalition partner, the SLD. 9' ROP's National Secretary Wojciech Wlodarczyk 
justified this kind of local autonomy on the grounds that "the situation is different in 
local self-government bodies so it is not possible to regulate this through one 
decision ... National policies are a matter 
for national governing bodies and local 
matters are for local bodies. "91' The only party which had even considered issuing such 
a directive was the UW when, in June 1994, the party's national executive committee 
instructed its local councillors to either form coalitions with other 'post-Solidarity' 
parties or to give prior notification to, and receive the consent of, the party central 
office for local coalitions with the SLD. Even this directive was, however, rescinded 
by the party Council which gave UW councillors the defacto right to conclude 
agreements with any party or grouping as long as they were "guided by the good of 
the local and national community"' and an amendment to the UW Statute at the 
93 Author interview with Wojciech Buczak, AWS Rzesz6w Regional Council Plenipotentiary, 21 
April 1997. 
94 Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
95 'Wybory potwiedzily nasze wply"' 
96 Author interview, 6 March 1997. 
97 See: 'PSL wypowiedzialo koalicjq SLD', Rzeczpospofita. 15/16 February 1997; 'Chwieje siq 
koalicja', Rzeczpospolita. 21 February 1997; 'Polityczna fikcja', Rzeczpospolita. 25 February 1997; 
and M. Lizut, 'Koalicja trzeszcy w terenie', Gazeta Wyborcza. 17 February 1997. 
98 Author interview, 14 February 1997. 
99 See: K. Groblewski, 'Kiopotliwe wytyczne', Rzeczpospolita. 30 June 1994; and 'Wolno9d 
Koalicji', Gazela Wyborcza. 30 June 1994. One UW party Council member argued that "local 
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party's February 1998 Congress confirmed that UW provincial organisations were 
autonomous "in matters of concluding political coalitions in self-government organs. " 
However, it is perhaps an exaggeration to compare this pattern of local-national 
relations to the "mutual autonomy" or "stratarchy" posited in Katz and Mair's cartel 
party model. While territorial party structures may, indeed, have enjoyed considerable 
formal and real autonomy in terms of purely local issues, most local officials added 
the important caveat that they functioned within the general parameters of their 
national party's programme and Statute. This was reflected in the fact that most party 
Statutes contained clauses which empowered the party central office to intervene in 
the activities of any local party when it was felt that the party programme or Statute 
were being violated or where the party nationally was being brought into disrepute. 
The formal scope for intervention in local matters was most limited in the case of 
AWS and SdRP. The AWS Charter simply stated that its territorial structures 
functioned "on the basis of principles determined at the national level" and that "the 
AWS programme and principles of fimctioning are binding on Action members at all 
levels, " while the SdRP Statute specifically prevented the party leadership from 
overturning "the decisions of a (local) circle or governing body of a lower tier if they 
are not contrary to the decisions of the Congress, Conventions or the Statute"' with 
disputed matters determined by an independent party Court. 
The other four party's Statutes, however, contained more explicit provisions for the 
national leadership to intervene in local affairs. As noted above in relation to the 
constraints on the powers of rank-and-file intermediary bodies, the PSL, UW and 
ROP Statutes all contained clauses empowering their party central office leadership to 
take decisions in all matters not assigned to other bodies or not regulated by the 
Statute which was, of course, equally applicable in the context of local-national 
relations. In addition, the PSL, UW and UP Statutes also formally stated that party 
central office decisions were binding on territorial governing bodies, which could not 
pass resolutions that contradicted them or violated the provisions of the party Statute. 
Moreover, the UW, UP and ROP Statutes also explicitly empowered their national 
party governing bodies to intervene and annul certain local decisions or suspend the 
activities of territorial structures under certain circumstances. The UW party Council, 
for example, could "annul the decisions of Union regional governing bodies which 
are in conflict with the law", while its national executive committee could "in 
justified circumstances, halt the implementation of decisions, suspend the activities of 
given bodies of the realisation of specified functions" and establish provisional local 
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bodies, subject to a right of appeal to the party Council. Similarly, the UP party 
Council could "annul and suspend the decisions of UP territorial governing bodies" 
and, by an absolute majority of votes, shorten their term of office if their "activities 
violate the Statute or are conflict with the programmatic resolution, " while the party 
executive Committee could also request that the party Council or Court suspended a 
territorial governing body. " Following amendment by the party's February 1998 
Congress, the ROP Statute also incorporated specific provisions for the party Council 
to annul "the decisions of other Movement governing bodies contrary to the 
Movement's Statute and programme" and, on the basis of a proposal from the party 
leader or executive committee, to suspend provincial governing bodies. 
A good illustration of this pattern of broad sectoral autonomy in terms of purely local 
issues combined with the party leadership retaining certain reserve powers to 
intervene in relation to matters affecting the party nationally was the issue of local 
parliamentary candidate selection. The main focus here is on the procedure for 
selecting the candidates for the first tranche of SeJm deputies elected from the local 
constituency electoral lists (okrfgowe listy wyborcze)"' for the September 1997 
parliamentary elections and, specifically, whether candidates lists were determined 
locally in the first instance and whether they were subject to subsequent approval or 
amendment by the national party leaderships? In one sense, this was specifically a 
basic question of how much autonomy territorial party structures enjoyed. However, 
given that it did not simply involve the selection of candidates for a local electoral 
contest but also took place within the context of an election to a national legislature in 
which a local party's choice could have a significant impact on the prospects of the 
party as a whole, local parliamentary candidate selection was clearly also an issue 
with a national dimension. As an issue, therefore, it highlights one of problems with 
this particular feature of the 'cartel party' model: that of defining what precisely is a 
purely local issue when any decision taken by a local party branch could, potentially, 
have wider implications for the party nationally. 
In all the parties and groupings surveyed the fust stage of the selection process was 
almost completely decentralised and, although some of the parties such as SdRP 
issued general national guidelines suggesting the type of qualities which local parties 
might look for, the initial local candidates lists were drawn up with virtually no 
interference or specific recommendations from the party central office. The only 
exception here was the PSL whose national leadership, as noted above, presented 
100 Before 1994 UP local branches and their decisions were simply "subject to suspension or 
annulment by the appropriate governing body of a higher tier. " 
101 See Note 5 1. 
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local 'electoral conventions' with an assessment of the activities of existing 
parliamentarians representing that province. These assessments, however, only 
applied to sitting parliamentarians and, although a very negative assessment could 
obviously have an influence, the party leadership's recommendations were not in any 
way binding on local parties which could choose to ignore them. "' Indeed, the PSL 
and (as far as the first stage of the selection process was concerned) SdRP were the 
only parties whose local parties' parliamentary selection rights were actually 
enshrined in their party Statutes rather than the procedure being left to party 
governing bodies to determine. 
However, in most cases local parliamentary candidates had to be centrally approved 
and the final decision on the composition of local lists was taken by the party 
leadership - although the extent to which the party central office intervened varied 
considerably between the parties. At one extreme was the ROP where it was made 
clear to local parties from the outset that they were only selecting provisional lists of 
'candidates-for-candidates' and, as one local official put it, their local selections "had 
more the character of a survey. "101 All local ROP nominees had to be interviewed and 
approved by the party central office, and specifically by the party leader, who could 
change the composition and order of candidates lists in a procedure which one ROP 
official acknowledged was "heavily centralised and sometimes plainly arbitrary. "101 
This centralised local parliamentary selection process was subsequently enshrined in 
the party Statute which, from February 1998, made provision for the establishment of 
a specially-appointed Qualification Commission for preparing candidates lists, 
although the power of final confirmation was taken away from the party central office 
and vested with an intermediary body, the party Council. Similarly UP local 
candidates had to both approved by a national, non-Statutory 'Group for the 
Formulation of Sejm Deputies' Lists' - which assessed the competence of local 
nominees on the basis of lengthy questionnaires and interviews and had powers to 
intervene in, and recommend changes to, the lists drawn up by local party branches - 
and (and on the basis of this Group's recommendations) subsequently confirmed by 
the party's National Election Committee comprising the party's 'narrow' leadership. 
It was estimated that the ROP and UP party central offices intervened in 
approximately one sixth and one third of the provincial selections respectively (in the 
102 Opponents of the then PSL leader, Waldemar Pawlak, accused him of attempting to use this 
assessment procedure to purge his parliamentary opponents in the run up to the 1997 elections. See, 
for example: 'Jak zdoby6 mandat', Rzeczpospolita. 13 June 1997. 
103 Author interview with Zdislaw Durnowski, 28 April 1998. 
104 Quoted in M. Janicki, 'Kurs; na Wiejsk4', Polityka. 31 May 1997. 
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ma ority of the larger electoral districts in the UP's case). "' Both parties justified 
such a relatively centralised selection process on the basis of fear that their local party 
structures were infiltrated by irresponsible elements. In the UP's case, in particular, 
the high level of national involvement in local selections was primarily a reaction to 
the party's negative experiences during the 1993 parliamentary election when a 
completely decentralised selection process resulted in the adoption of candidates who 
proved to extremely embarrassing, or with a shallow commitment, to the party, 
exemplified by the fact that, as noted above, the party lost almost one sixth of its 
parliamentary fraction between 1993-97. "' 
Local UW and SdRP candidates lists also had to be centrally approved. UW local lists 
were subject to review by the party's national executive and final confirmation by the 
party Council. Meanwhile, as well being subject to negotiations with their SLD 
coalition partners at the provincial level, candidates selected by SdRP's territorial 
structures also had to pass through three additional stages: eight regional consultations 
involving representatives from the party central office and the leadership of the OPZZ 
trade union federation; approval by the party Council; and final confirmation by the 
SLD National Election Committee. Although opinions among local officials varied as 
to how much interference there was by the UW and SdRP national leaderships in 
local selections, approval of locally nominated candidates was generally felt to be a 
formality, and changes tended to involve the order of candidates rather than the actual 
composition of the lists. "" Interventions by the party leaderships also tended to much 
less systematic than in the cases of the ROP and the UP and were generally confined 
to cases where: the party central office discovered compromising information about a 
particular candidate; local parties were asked to leave reserved places on local lists for 
candidates selected by the national leadership (known colloquially as 'parachutists'), 
particularly nationally-known leaders to act as 'locomotives' in provinces were the 
head of the list was relatively unknown; or where a sitting local parliamentarian 
enjoyed the support of the party leadership but was given a low position on the local 
lists. In addition, the UW party central office also intervened in local selection 
105 Author interviews with: Wojciech Wlodarczyk, 27 November 1998; and Piotr Maricniak, 19 
November 1997. 
106 See: E. Olczyk, 'Sezon na Uniq Pracy', Rzeczpospolita. 6 December 1993; and E. Olczyk, 
'Ryszard Bugaj - przyw6dca kwestionowany', Rzeczpospofita. 8 November 1996. 107 In Polish parliamentary elections votes are cast for individual candidates within a local list as well 
for the party list as a whole. Parties, therefore, present their candidates in order of preference and the 
names that appear highest on the list - particularly the first and second places - are generally 
(although not always) those who receive the most votes. 
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processes when there was a dispute between the local party's 'Electoral Convent' and 
its provincial Council. 101 
Of the parties and groupings surveyed, AWS and PSL territorial structures appeared 
to enjoy the greatest local autonomy in terms of local parliamentary selection. AWS 
territorial structures could, but were not obliged to, request that a specially-appointed 
National Electoral Group, as one local AWS official put it, "put our candidates under 
the spotlight and draw our attention to any prospective candidates who could damage 
the grouping as a whole"'" and they generally left one position on their local lists 
vacant for which the party central office could nominate its own candidate. Although 
the National Electoral Group also attempted to exert pressure on a number of local 
branches to change the order of candidates - particularly in order to satisfy national 
AWS leaders who felt that their party or grouping had been inadequately represented 
- it only had the power to make recommendations and final decisions were always 
taken at the local level. "' PSL local lists, on the other hand, were not formally subject 
to any subsequent screening or confirmation by the party leadership - although a 
certain number of seats were also, by mutual agreement, left for the national 
leadership to fill with their own nominees in some provinces. 
Overall, therefore, local parliamentary selection procedures involved a high level of 
local autonomy in their early stages although, in most cases, national leaders retained 
certain reserve powers to intervene in, alter the composition of and confmn local lists 
when it was felt that local decisions could damage the interests of the party as a 
whole. Even then, these interventions generally tended to be rare and involved minor 
corrections relating to: screening local candidates' biographies for compromising 
information, instructing or encouraging local parties to implement the terms of 
national electoral agreements, resolving local disputes or - particularly in larger 
electoral districts - occasionally imposing a national 'parachutist' on a local list. This 
was broadly consistent with the hypothesised pattern of local party structures enjoying 
high levels of autonomy on matters of an exclusively local character combined with 
the national party leadership retaining certain, sparingly exercised, reserve powers of 
intervention and, therefore, resembling - although, except perhaps in the cases of the 
log Electoral Convents were local selection committees appointed by UW provincial Councils but 
functioning independently of them and supposedly comprising local 'worthies' with the objective of 
'objectifying' the candidate selection process by drawing up candidates' lists solely on the basis of 
their electability. 
109 Author interview with Lukasz Tuszyfiski, AWS Jelenia G6ra Regional Council Plenipotentiary, 6 
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district list. See: W. Zaluska and W. Dug, 'Domek z kart? ', Gazeta Wyborcza. 7 July 1997. 
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PSL and AWS, falling a slightly short of -a 'stratarchic' distribution of power. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that Polish electoral law stipulates that local parliamentary 
candidates lists can only be submitted by a nationally-approved plenipotentiary, 
thereby ensuring that all national party leaders had a defacto power of intervention 
in, and final confirmation of, local parliamentary candidates lists - even in those 
parties such as the PSL were there was no formal requirement for local lists to be 
nationally approved. Such a 'semi-stratarchic' pattern of local-national relations, of 
course, also re-inforced the power and autonomy of both local parliamentarians (who, 
as we shall see, plays a key role in local politics because of their access to financial 
resources and organisational infi-astructure) and provincial party Chairmen. 
Conclusion 
An analysis based on the 'official' story, therefore, revealed less concentration of 
power in the party in public office, a more significant role for parties" extra- 
parliamentary decision-making organs and, consequently, a greater conformity to the 
mass party model in terms of the internal distribution of power than hypothesised. 
Indeed, the responsibility for many key policy and strategic decisions was formally 
vested in extra-parliamentary bodies rather than in parliamentary fractions. Similarly, 
intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground also appeared to 
play a greater role within the new Polish parties than hypothesised; particularly in 
relation to their formal powers of electing and dismissing party leaders, selecting 
candidates for public office and approving party programmes and key elements of 
party strategy. In particular, the leaders of the provincial party organisations emerged 
as important actors in all the parties' formal and informal power structures, although 
the fact that many of these supposedly 'middle-ranking' leaders were also 
parliamentarians made it difficult to unambiguously identify them as a factor 
strengthening the influence of the party on the ground. 
However, there were also considerable variations between the parties, although the 
hypothesised distinction between 'successor' and 'new' parties was not really a 
helpful one in terms of identifying them. While the PSL, for example, certainly 
appeared to display some mass party characteristics - in the sense that the 
parliamentary fraction was perceived as simply a vehicle for organising the party's 
work within the parliamentary forum and implementing party decisions taken by the 
party's extra-parliamentary organs - parliamentarians representing SdRP, the other 
f successor' party, appeared to enjoy a much more autonomous role. This was partly 
due to the less subordinate position of the SdRP party in public office posited in that 
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party's Statute but also, perhaps more significantly, to the fact that SdRP 
parliamentarians had to operate within framework of a broader SLD parliamentary 
fraction. Indeed, this requirement to negotiate with, and secure the co-operation of, 
coalition partners within both the SLD Parliamentary Club and National Election 
Committee also increased the power of the SdRP party central office in relation to the 
party on the ground in terms of both the candidate selection process and key 
programmatic and strategic decisions. Interestingly, the decisions of the parties and 
groupings comprising AWS also had to pass through this additional 'filter' and 
AWS's parliamentary fraction also appeared to be developing as a relatively 
autonomous party 'face'. On the other hand, both the PSL and two 'new' parties, the 
UW and ROP, vested their party leaders or national executives with considerably 
greater formal power and autonomy than did SdRP and the UP, which even attempted 
to formally separate policy-making and organisational functions into two distinct 
party central office leadership bodies. There was, however, virtually no evidence of 
party leaders employing 'circumventionist' strategies of appealing to individual party 
members in order to by-pass intermediary bodies representing the organised party on 
the ground. 
Moreover, an examination of the 'real' story of how party institutions and power 
relations operated in practice revealed that the new Polish parties' parliamentary and 
leadership elites played a more dominant role than suggested by an analysis based 
solely on the 'official' story as set out in party Statutes and rules. This pattern of de 
facto leader or parliamentary domination was partly rooted in the fact that the fact 
that, in common with many of the new parties in other parts of post-communist 
Eastern Europe, the incumbents of many formally separate party offices frequently 
overlapped. In parties with parliamentary fractions, for example, extra-parliamentary 
organs were invariably dominated by representatives of the party in public office who 
- together with other members of the party elite - were also strongly represented in 
'rank-and-file' intermediary bodies. Given that they were generally elected as 
individuals and not as collective ex-officio representatives of the party in public 
office, the substantial representation of parliamentarians among the party central 
office leadership or on intermediate bodies did not, of course, automatically denote 
that these 'faces' were somehow 'controlled' by the party's parliamentary fraction. 
Indeed, the very fact that key parliamentarians attempted to combine the leadership of 
the party's parliamentary fraction with that of the party central office and with 
membership of intermediary bodies, in some senses actually underlined the 
importance of the latter within their parties' internal power structures. Nevertheless, 
this overlap of elites did make it much more difficult to determine the locus of power 
a. 
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within the new Polish parties and implied that the 'official story' set out in the party 
rules was somewhat misleading. 
This pattern of defacto leader-domination also functioned in a more subtle way 
related to phenomena which are increasingly common to all political parties 
functioning in modem, complex democracies. Virtually all of the issues relating to 
ongoing parliamentary business or tactics on a particular piece of legislation - which, 
obviously, often had much broader programmatic and strategic implications - were, 
for example, inevitably taken by the parties' parliamentary fractions. Similarly, 'rank- 
and-file' intermediary bodies were simply too cumbersome and did not meet 
frequently enough to exercise effective day-to-day control over the party central 
office and, particularly when it came to policy details, often simply rubber-stamped 
the recommendations of, or delegated responsibility for key decisions to, party leaders 
or expert commissions. More generally, this was often a reflection of much greater 
rank-and-file interest in personnel or internal organisational issues than in matters of 
policy and programmatic development - or, as in the case of SdRP, a culture of 
organisational self-restraint - which mean that the party members did not even take 
full advantage of those opportunities which did exist for influencing party policy and 
strategy. 
It is also worth noting that most of the main 'fault lines' within the parties surveyed 
have, to date, cut across the party faces and not between them. Supporters of PSL 
leader Waldemar Pawlak and Roman Jagielm'ski, for example, were to be found 
within all three party faces and were not particularly concentrated in one or another. 
Consequently, it was impossible to definitively identify the real locus of power within 
any of the parties until there was a situation when a clear conflict emerged directly 
between two party 'faces' - such as a major dispute between the leader of a party's 
parliamentary fraction and the party central office leadership over, say, a government 
appointment or how to vote in a crucial parliamentary division such as a budget vote. 
As hypothesised, generally speaking the parties' local territorial structures were 
granted a relatively high degree of autonomy in terms of local politics. Indeed, as we 
shall see, quite apart from any genuine motivation to de-centralise power and foster 
intra-party democracy, the sheer weakness of the party central office bureaucracies 
made it very difficult for any of these parties to effectively monitor and intervene in 
their local branches day-to-day activities, even if they had the time or inclination. 
However, to describe this pattern of local-national relations as 'stratarchic' or based 
on 'mutual autonomy' would probably be an exaggeration given that, also as 
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hypothesised, all party central offices retained (to a greater or lesser extent) certain 
reserve powers to intervene in local party affairs when these bodies actions were felt 
to be in conflict with the party programme or Statute -a proviso which party leaders 
could interpret to mean whenever such activities were felt to have a negative impact 
on the party as a whole. One of the best examples of this was the process of local 
parliamentary candidate selection where, although the precise pattern varied from 
party to party, the initial proposals were formulated at local level but national leaders 
retained the power of subsequent intervention and final confirmation which they 
generally exercised sparingly. This relatively de-centralised system of local 
parliamentary candidate selection also further enhanced the key role of the provincial 
party leader within the national party power structure. 
I. 
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CHAPTER THPXE. - 
. 
THEPAR7TMACHINE 
This chapter is concerned with what might be termed 'the party machine': party 
technical and orgnisational infrastructure and, specifically, the size and functions of 
the party bureaucracy. The 'party machine' has been one of the most neglected 
themes in party research even in the more developed literature on Western political 
parties. until Katz and Mair's recent studies, there has been no comparative research 
on this subject with even the number of paid officials attached to most parties 
remaining a mystery. ' In an earlier stage of developing their ideas of parties as being 
composed of different elements, or 'faces, Katz and Mair aggregated the 'party as 
bureaucracy' into an independent element. 2 Subsequently, however, they placed 
greater emphasis on the fact that parties often had several separate bureaucracies and, 
thus, disaggregated this element into the parts associated with what they termed: the 
6party in central office', the 'party in public office' and the 'party on the ground'? 
Moreover, Katz and Mair identified the central role played by the bureaucracy 
attached to the 'party in central office' as one of the defining characteristic of the 
mass party; as, even more explicitly, did Panebianco in his 'mass-bureaucratic' 
4 
model. According to Katz and Mair, while elite and cadre parties paid little attention 
to the need for campaigning, mass parties built up highly labour-intensitve 
organisations; financed by membership contributions - which ensured that the 
bureaucracy attached to the 'party in central office' played a crucial role as the 
controller and co-ordinator of the party membership while the 'party in public office' 
was relatively weak. The shift towards what Katz and Mair describe as a more 
"capital intensive, professional and centralised75 type of party work and campaigning 
in the more recent models of party organisation was to have profound implications for 
the number, character and disposition of the party staff attached to the 'party in 
central office' and 'party in public office' respectively. Consequently, in their later 
'cartel' and 'electoral-professional' models Katz and Mair and Panebianco identified 
two important shifts in the organisation of the party bureaucracy. 
' See: Party Organisations; 'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe'; How Parties Organise; 
and 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'. 
2 See: Party Organisations, pp5-6 
3 See: 'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe', pp594-601 
' See: Political Pat-ties: Organisation and Power. 
"Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p20 
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Firstly, in the cartel party model, the 'party machine' attached to the 'party in central 
office' assumed much less importance with an increasing number of party employees 
linked to the 'party in public office' and party bureaucrats seeing their role much 
more as servants of the parliamentary leadership than representatives of the party's 
two extra-parliamentary party faces. As parties began to shift towards a more capital- 
intensive approach to campaigning, they came to rely increasingly on subventions, and 
other benefits and privileges afforded to them by the state and the 'party in public 
office' began to acquire its own staff and financial resources. Consequently, it was 
possible to identify a dramatic reduction in the number of party central office staff 
compared with growth of parliamentary staff attached to the 'party in public office' 
paid largely, if not exclusively, from state funds. Admittedly, Katz and Mair found a 
continuing bias towards party central office staff in absolute terms, and the overall 
numbers employed in the parties parliamentary offices actually exceeded those 
employed in the central offices in only a minority of West European counties. 
However, even this growth in central office staff was itself partially explained by the 
greater availability of state resources to political parties in the form of direct 
subventions, for party central offices and, therefore, underestimated the real bias in 
organisational resources in favour of the 'party in public office'. Indeed, Katz and 
Mair also found that, in practice, in countries where parliamentary subventions 
remained the only source of state funding, and the 'party in central office' lacked the 
resources to employ its own independent staff, many of the staff who were funded 
through state subventions actually ended up working for the party central office. 
Moreover, the 'party in public office's' organisational superiority in staffing terms 
was further underestimated by the fact that not all of its staff resources were visible 
and quantifiable purely through analyses of party structures alone - especially when 
the party in question was in government and could, therefore, appoint partisan 
advisers and consultants to, often senior, positions in the public bureaucracy. In the 
cartel party, therefore, according to Katz and Mair, "much of the organisational 
capacity available to the parties in staffing terms can be traced to resources which are 
increasingly provided, either directly or indirectly, by the state. " 
Secondly, in both Katz and Mair's cartel and Panebianco's electoral-professional 
models there was, more generally, a shift away from paid party officials and 
bureaucrats towards professionals and other consultants with a much looser 
relationship with the party organisation. According to Panebianco, Kirchheimer's 
catch-all party model (which was the first to identify a shift in the party's 
gravitational centre from party members to the electorate) only treated implicitly an 
' How Parties Organise, p9 
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issue which he considered to be the distinguishing feature of the organisational 
change which political parties were undergoing, namely: the increasing 
'professionalisation' of party organisations. This process of 'professionalisation' 
implied both a decrease in the importance of traditional party 'bureaucrats' - in the 
Weberian sense of ftill-time administrators dedicated the maintenance of the 
organisation - and a concomitant increase in the role of professionals, experts and 
consultants. It was this distinction, between bureaucrats and professionals, which, 
according to Panebianco, distinguished the contemporary electoral-professional party 
from the earlier mass-bureaucratic party model. ' 
Katz and Mair identified a similar shift of emphasis in terms of the increasing 
importance of professionals and consultants in their later cartel party model, which 
they also felt arose from a change in the style of campaigning. The services provided 
by bureaucrats attached to the party central office may have been indispensable when 
many of its activities were directed towards the organisation of the party membership 
and greater emphasis was placed on the party's own independent channels of 
communication. But as parties' efforts became increasingly directed towards the 
mobilisation of support in the electorate at large, and their concerns shifted towards 
competing for access to non-partisan communication networks, many of the services 
required from the party central office machine could now be secured through 
alternative means, such as professional publicists and communications specialists. In 
other words, the party central office bureaucracy may have remained useftil in terms 
of organising and co-ordinating the 'party on the ground' but it was no longer 
indispensable. But while for Panebianco the shift from 'bureaucrats' to 
'professionals' was taking place within the staffs employed by party organisations, 
Katz and Mair were more explicit that the relationship between parties and 
professionals was a much looser one (although, Panebianco acknowledged that some 
of the latter were recruited on a short-term basis). Communication services, for 
example, could be bought on the open market, "perhaps at a higher price but without 
the added costs of subservience to a party organisation whose goal priorities may be 
quite different. " 
So what kind of party 'machine' might we expect to see developing in the political 
parties of post-communist Poland? To recap, given that we expect those 'new' parties 
that have emerged since 1989 to conform more to the later catch-all/electoral- 
professional and cartel models, we can hypothesise that they will have: a weak 
Political Parties, p231 
'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe', p615 
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bureaucracy attached to the 'party in central office' which acts as the servant of the 
party's parliamentary leadership; and a larger proportion of the parties' staff linked to 
the 'party in public office'. Given their hypothesised 'organisational inheritance', the 
two 'successor' parties should display more of the characteristics of the mass party 
and mass-bureaucratic party model. We might, therefore, expect these parties to have 
a stronger party 'machine' and technical infi-astructure, together with a comparatively 
larger proportion of their staff employees attached to the 'party in central office'. 
However, given the extremely modest resources which are likely to be available to all 
the parties in post-communist Poland, it is likely that Polish parties will only conform 
to an extremely limited extent to the later models in the second respect of the 
increased 'professionalisation' of the party machine and greater utilisation of external 
experts, advisers and consultants. 
In order to test these hypotheses this chapter, therefore, examines three crucial aspects 
relating to the development of the 'party machine' in post-communist Poland. Firstly, 
the respective size, structure, role of and relationship between the bureaucracies 
attached to the 'party in central office' and the 'party in public office. Secondly, the 
party 'machine' at local level, in order to the determine the extent to which the 'party 
on the ground' is dependent on parliamentary financial, material and staffing 
resources! Although this relationship is not really considered in the Western party 
models, which tend to focus on the changing relationships between the party 'faces' at 
national level, it is nonetheless a crucial one in terms of the balance of resources 
between Polish parties' extra-parliamentary and 'public office' faces. Thirdly, the 
extent to which the new Polish parties have utilised external professional policy 
experts, public opinion specialists and communications advisers and consultants. As 
in the previous chapter, the focus is almost exclusively on the five individual 
member-based parties included in our survey: SdRP, the PSL, UW, UP and ROP - 
with reference made to AWS only when it is relevant to the general line of argument. 
The pagy central office bureaucrac 
The most striking feature of the Polish 'party machine' was the extremely modest 
facilities and tiny number of paid staff attached to the various party central offices. As 
hypothesised, most parties conformed to the later models of party organisation in this 
respect. Indeed, in some senses, the parties in this survey could be compared to 
demobilised military units which generally lay dormant and only activated themselves 
' Based on interviews conducted with local party officials in Gdafisk, Jelenia G6ra, Plock and 
Rzesz6w provinces, April-June 1997. 
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for 'battle' at election times, with the ftinction of the party bureaucracy being simply 
to keep the national organisations on a care-and-maintenance basis until their next 
6engagement'. 
Of the five individual member-based parties examined only the PSL had anything 
which might with any degree of accuracy be termed a 'party bureaucracy' attached to 
its central office, with the full-time equivalent of approximately twenty paid 
employees working in the so-called Executive Office of the Supreme Executive 
Committee. The PSL was able to retain most of the assets of the communist-satellite 
ZSL, including its large headquarters building", although most of this was rented out 
to the Bank of Foodstuff Trading and, as one Polish commentator noted, the 
conditions in which the PSL's staff operated were "far from luxurious. "' I The party's 
Executive Office was managed on a day-to-day basis by a full-time director and 
organised into five departments - the Organisational Information Department 
(responsible for co-ordinating and Raising with the party's provincial organisations), 
Programmatic Department, Press Office, Institute of Peasant Movement History, and 
Administrative-Business Department - each of which contained four or five staff at 
any given time. " Significantly, the PSL was the only party with paid central office 
staff specifically responsible for policy and programmatic development. However, it 
is worth noting that about one third of PSL central office employees were purely 
administrative or clerical, rather than so-called 'meritocratic', staff I and, as the 
party's programmatic director put it, "our office is not some kind of decision-making 
organ but an executive organ which runs the technical-service side for the party's 
governing bodies... It is not a large outpost or cell, it is modest ... It is (run) at the basic 
level so that the party's main organisational tasks can be fulfilled. "14 
With the full-time equivalent of ten staff employed in its National Office, the UW had 
the second largest party central office 'bureaucracy' and largest of any of the 'new' 
parties; although still extremely modest for what was then the main parliamentary 
opposition party with nearly 70 Sejm deputies and Senators. The UW National Office 
was also managed by a full-time director and organised into three departments - with 
two employees working in the Regional Liaison Department (responsible for co- 
ordinating the party's provincial structures), three in the Press Office and four in the 
Service Department (comprising technical, administrative and secretarial support 
" P. G. Lewis, 'Party Funding in post-communist east-central Europe' in P. Burnell and A. Ware, 
eds. Funding Democratization. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1998. ppl 37-157 (156). 
See: J. Paradowska, 'Oswajanie ludowc6w', Polityka, 5 March 1994 
Information supplied by PSL headquarters, June 1997. 
See: J. Paradowska and M. Janicki, 'Plywanic w mqtncj wodzie', Polityka, 3 December 1994 
Author interview, 12 June 1997. 
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staff) - together with two or three student volunteers who worked full-time with the 
party leader. " The main reason why the UW developed such a relatively large party 
central office staffs - and was, for example, the only party other than the PSL with 
paid full-time press officers - was the fact that party leader Leszek Balcerowicz was 
not, unlike his predecessor Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a parliamentarian at the time of his 
election and, therefore, re-organised the party central office and increased its staff 
compliment from three" to ten in order to provide him with a separate extra- 
parliamentary support service. " 
Most surprising, perhaps, was the small number of paid employees attached to the 
central office of the communist-successor party, SdRP, given its hypothesized 
'organisational inheritance' together with the fact that it was the second largest party 
after the PSL in terms of membership and the largest component of the Democratic 
Left Alliance (SLD) Parliamentary Club (with over 100 Sejm deputies and Senators). 
SdRP was, in fact, able to hang on to much fewer of its predecessor party's assets 
than the PSL and, although much controversy surrounds their fate, the party was 
legally required to divest themselves of them. "' While the party central office, known 
as the Central Executive Committee, was located in a large headquarters building, at 
least three quarters of the space was rented out to various companies and 
organisations. As one commentator put, "entering the (SdRP) party headquarters you 
get the impression that it is abandoned. Politics take place somewhere else. "" In fact, 
SdRP only employed the full-time equivalent of four full-time paid staff who worked 
in the CKW Secretariat and Organisational-Information Section (again responsible for 
co-ordination of and liaison with provincial party organisations) together with one 
employee who worked directly for the party the then Chairman, J6zef Oleksy. 1' It is 
worth noting, however, that an (unspecified) number of staff also worked in the party 
central office 'voluntarily' but full-time, including the 13 members of party 
Presidium (most of whom were Sejm deputies) and the seven-member Supreme 
Executive Committee (which included, for example, the party's National Press 
Spokesman and the head of party organisation). Nonetheless, perhaps more than any 
other grouping, SdRP most closely corresponded to the idea of Polish parties as 
'sleeping armies'; with an extremely modest central office bureaucracy - arising from 
the fact that, as the party's head of organisation Maciej Porqba put it, "we simply 
" Information supplied by UW party headquarters, June 1997. 
"'Plywanie w mqtnej wodzie' 
" Balcerowicz was subsequently elected to parliament as a Sejm deputy in the September 1997 
parliamentary election. 
" 'Party Funding in post-communist east-central Europe', p 151-153. 
Protopanie i Protosystem? p 184 
Information supplied by SdRP party headquarters, June 1997. 
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don't have that kind of money"' - which could transform itself into the organisational. 
backbone for extremely professional (and expensive) parliamentary and presidential 
election campaigns. 
The UP and ROP - the other two 'new' parties included in the sample - ran tiny, 
absolutely minimal party central office staffs which barely wan-anted the title 
'bureaucracies'. Although it was the fourth largest parliamentary party with over 30 
Sejm deputies, the UP ran a very small National Office which consisted of a couple of 
rooms and employed the full-time equivalent of one-and-a-half administrative staff 
responsible for Raising with provincial party organisations and providing secretarial 
support for the party's national governing bodies. " The ROP central office, known as 
the Main Board Secretariat, was located in equally tight and modest accommodation, 
and employed the full-time equivalent of three staff who were also responsible for 
providing the party's governing bodies with secretarial and administrative support and 
Raising with provincial party organisations. Otherwise, a loose and fluid group of 
around twenty volunteers assisted ROP central office staff with various organisational 
tasks. 23 
Interestingly, in all four 'parliamentary' parties control of the party headquarters 
bureaucracy was formally vested in the leadership of the 'party in central office' and, 
as hypothesised, did not act as the 'servants' of the parliamentary leadership. In the 
PSL, for example, the party central office bureaucracy was under the direct control of 
the party President and the party's Supreme Executive Committee, who appointed, 
and oversaw the work of, the Executive Office director. "' As noted in chapter two, in 
the other three 'parliamentary' parties there were even separate party central office 
leaders and conintittees formally responsible organisational affairs, which included 
supervising the party central office bureaucracy: the SdRP Secretary-General and 
Central Executive Committee, the UW General Secretary and General Secretariat and 
the UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs and party Executive Committee, 
respectively. Although most of key organisational decisions in these parties were, also 
as noted in chapter two, taken by their 'policy-making' leadership, these were also 
officials elected by, and accountable to, the 'party on the ground, rather than the 
4party in public office'. 11 
Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
Information supplied by UP party headquarters, June 1997. 
Information supplied by ROP party headquarters, June 1997. 
" See: Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: Stalut. 
25 See: Statut Socialdemokracji Rzeczpospolitej Polski; Statut Unii Wolnoici; and Statut Unii Pracy. 
80 
In fact, this formal distinction and separation of powers between the 'party in central 
office' and parliamentary party leaderships in relation to control of the party 
headquarters - and formal correspondence with the mass party rather than the later 
models of party organisation - was not as significant as it might at first appear. 
Firstly, as discussed it greater length in chapter two, the fact that a large proportion of 
the 'party in central office' leadership were themselves parliamentarians meant that 
the two leaderships were, in most cases, interchangeable. Secondly, although 'control' 
of the party headquarters bureaucracy may have been of some intra-party significance 
in relation to co-ordination of the party's voluntary wing and the, party on the 
ground', given the tiny number of staff involved, it was - with the partial exception 
of the PSL -a virtually meaningless concept in terms of providing the party 
leadership with a significant organisational resource. Describing Polish parties central 
party office 'machines' two Polish commentators accurately remarked that: 
"What generally strikes one is a kind of aesthetic disproportion between the 
significance of these people and these parties, which are deciding ... our future ... and 
the environment in which they officially function. You frequently come across the 
liquidators' labels (Case No Km 413/92) on the furniture in the SdRP headquarters. 
The PSL's headquarters on Grzybowska Street has the appearance of time having 
stood still since around 1970 and not moved on. The UW's office is completely clean 
but, on the basis of its appearance, its difficult to believe that this party numbers three 
former premiers among its members. "" 
The parliamentary pg! y bureaucmgLcy 
In addition to the election refunds paid to the 'party in central office' (discussed at 
greater length in chapter six), the state also provided Polish parties and groupings 
which secured parliamentary representation with two additional kinds of subventions: 
firstly, those paid directly to each Sejm deputy or Senator in order to assist them with 
setting up and running their local parliamentary offices; and, secondly, those paid to a 
party or grouping's Parliamentary Club or Circle, depending on its size, in order to 
run central support facilities in parliament itse If . 27 In 1996, 
for example, 
Parliamentary Clubs with more than 100 Sejm deputies (SLD and PSQ received 480 
z1oties per head, those with 50- 100 deputies (UW) 530 zloties and those with fewer 
than 50 deputies (UP) 580 zloties; plus 600 z1oties for each Senator regardless of their 
Club's size. In addition, each Club received an allocation of funds specifically in 
'Plywanie w mqtnej wodzie' 
In order to be formally recognised as such, Parliamentary Clubs had to have fifteen and Circles 
three members respectively. 
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order to commission experts' reports and analyses either from the Sejm Office of 
Studies and Experts' Reports, the Senate Office of Studies and Analyses, or from 
outside experts and specialists. " 
Consequently, there were two kinds of employees funded by the subventions paid to 
the 'party in public office': those employed directly by Sejin deputies or Senators and 
working in their local parliamentary offices (discussed below) and those staff working 
in the actual Parliamentary Club offices supporting their party or grouping in the 
legislature. As Table 3.1 shows, the number of staff working in the parliamentary 
offices of all four parties with Sejm representation - SdRP (as part of the SLD 
Parliamentary Club), the PSL, UW and UP - although still relatively modest, 
outnumbered the number of employees working in the bureaucracies attached to their 
party central offices - with the notable exception of the PSL were the two figures 
were broadly comparable. 
SdRP, for example, was, to some extent, able to compensate for its meagre party 
central office bureaucracy by the fact that the SLD Parliamentary Club Office 
employed twenty five members of staff. These included: an Office director, seven 
secretarial and administrative staff and seventeen 'mcritocratic' staff responsible for 
providing research and analytical support for SLD Parliamentarians, with each 
employee taking responsibility for a number of parliamentary commissions and/or 
policy areas together with one employee who assisted the Club's Press Spokesman. 
The SLD Club Office director was accountable to the Club Secretary-Disciplinary 
Spokesman (effectively its Chief Whip) who was responsible, more generally, for co- 
ordinating all of the Club's internal organisational activitieS. 29 As one Polish 
commentator put it, the relative importance of the party central office and 
Parliamentary Club Office to the SdRP was symbolised by the fact that SdRP General 
Secretary and SLD Parliamentary Club Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzm'ski's parliamentary 
office was three times the size of his office in the party headquarters building ! 30 
Although not quite as large as the its party central office bureaucracy, the PSL 
Parliamentary Club Office Club still employed the full-time equivalent of seventeen 
members of staff including: a director, deputy director, Senate Club Office director, 
six secretarial and administrative staff and eight 'meritocratic' staff. Of the latter, one 
worked in the Senate, four in the Sejm Expert Advisers' Group - which, according to 
the Club's deputy director Jan Odorczuk, "prepares communications before Sejm 
See: F. Frydrykiewicz, 'Senator droiszy od posla', Rzeczpospolita, 21 December 1995 
Author interview with Jerzy Paprota, Director, SLD Parliamentary Club Office, 10 June 1997. 
Author interview with Mariusz Janicki, Polityka magazine, 18 June 1997. 
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sessions on the subject of specific laws which are going to be introduced and 
discussed ... and work with SqJm deputies in various commissions" - and three in the 
Information Department which assisted with the Parliamentary Club Spokesman by 
"distributing all the information which comes out of the Club and gathering 
information of interest to SqJm deputies. "" The PSL Club Office director was 
accountable to the Club Chairman, Waldemar Pawlak, who "employs and dismisses 
Club employees from their duties in agreement with the Presidium and often 
receiving the opinions of the Club Convent"' and who, at the time the research was 
undertaken, was also the PSL party leader and, therefore, also in control of the party's 
central office staff. 
On the other hand, the UW Parliamentary Club office, known as the Club Secretariat, 
employed the full-time equivalent of fifteen staff, nearly 50% more than the number 
attached to its party central office. In addition to the Club Secretariat director, these 
included nine administrative and secretarial staff, two staff working respectively in 
the Press and International Offices, and three staff in the Expert Advisers Office 
which, according to the Club Secretariat director Witold Krajewski, "provides Seim 
deputies with additional, rather than 'meritocratic', help. The workers know where to 
find experts' reports, rather than prepare them themselves. "31 The Club Secretariat 
director was accountable to the Club Secretary, who was also responsible for the 
Club's organisation and financial affairs more generally. 34 
The greatest disparity between the numbers of paid staff attached to the party central 
office and the parliamentary party could be seen in the case of the UP Parliamentary 
Club Office which employed the full-time equivalent of ten staff. These included: 
four secretarial and administrative staff, one member of staff who was responsible for 
international contacts, one press officer and three additional staff who, according to 
Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek, "don't actually work directly for the Club but are 
responsible for contacts with the party. "" The UP Club Office did not employ any 
staff specifically responsible for providing parliamentarians with 'meritocratic' 
support and the Club Office was managed by a Sejm deputy, the Club Secretary, 
rather than a separate Office director. " 
" Author interview with Jan Odorczuk, Deputy Director, PSL Parliamentary Club Office, 6 June 
1997. 
Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego PSL. 
Author interview with Witold Krajewski, Director, UW Parliamentary Club Secretariat, 4 June 
1997. 
Regulamin Klubu Parlamentarnego UW. 
Author interview, II June 1997. 
16 Regulamin Klubu: Unia Pracy-Klub Parlamentamy. 
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However, although, as hypothesised, a large proportion of party employees were 
linked to the Parliamentary Club offices (a majority in three cases) it was not 
necessarily accurate to view these staffs as, in some way, directly substituting for the 
ftirictions which would otherwise have been fulfilled by the party central offices 
bureaucracies. Indeed, the staff attached to the Parliamentary Club Offices appeared 
to be orientated primarily towards activities taking place within parliament itself - 
providing support and back up facilities for SqJm deputies and Senators in relation to 
their role as legislators rather than 'party' politicians - and saw themselves as, at best, 
complementary or supplementapy to the party central office bureaucracies in the 
functional sense. 
According to SLD Parliamentary Club Office director Jerzy Paprota, for example, his 
Office's responsibilities were, "in practice, inevitably focused on the Sejrn because 
this is where everything happens. "" Moreover, the fact that SdRP parliamentary 
deputies and Senators comprised only one (albeit by far the largest and most 
important) element within this parliamentary grouping, inevitably meant that there 
could be no direct formal relationship between the SdRP party central office and the 
SLD Parliamentary Club Office. As Jerzy Paprota put it, "(although) there are 
obviously occasions when the leaderships of these elements (which comprise the 
SLD) are also invited for consultations on a given matter.. it is above all here (in 
parliament) that the Office's tasks are focused. "" 
Indeed, while at one point immediately after the 1993 parliamentary election, the PSL 
attempted, for example, to "shift the political-organisational back-up support for the 
party and the Parliamentary Club into one political-organisational section 
encompassed within the PSL Parliamentary Club Office, " it was subsequently decided 
at the beginning of 1994 to "return a certain separateness for the PSL NKW 
Executive Office from the PSL Parliamentary Club Office in this sphere. "" Another 
important indication that the Parliamentary Club Office was to play a role 
supplementary to, rather than attempt to substitute for, the party central office was the 
decision to keep the PSL programmatic department located within the party 
headquarters. As Club Office deputy director Jan Odorczuk put it, "the party's basic 
programmatic work is carried out in the PSL head office. Here (in parliament) you 
"Author interview, 10 June 1997. 
" lbid 
3' PSL. Sprawozdanie z dzialalnoyci Naczelnego Komitetut Wykonawczego Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowego w okresie od III Kongresu PSL (XI 1992 r. ) do A7 1996r. Warsaw. 1996. p36. 
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simply work on specific things that are happening in the Sejm ... everything relating to 
the programme is prepared in Grzybowska Street. "' 
Similarly, according to its director Witold Krajewski, the UW Club Secretariat 
ftinctioned quite separately from the party's National Office and co-operation, "takes 
place within a relatively small field ... Given that the Secretariat mainly services Sejm 
deputies ... we operate in different spheres. 
" In the case of the UW, specifically, 
Krajewski felt that this fairly sharp separation of functions between party and 
parliamentary bureaucracies originated in the fact that "the Secretariat developed 
independently from the party structures" and "there was a period when the Club (and) 
specific organisational cells within the Parliamentary Club ... fairly clearly underlined 
their distinctiveness from the party structures and, as a result, the level of co- 
operation was poor. " This was exacerbated by the fact that, whereas previously "all 
the party leaders were also Sejm deputies ... the Secretariat serviced them and the 
National Office was less important, " since the election of a non-parliamentarian as 
party Chairman in March 1995 the role of the National Office was significantly 
enhanced because it created, "a situation where he (the party Chairman) demanded a 
separate service. "' This was a view shared the party's National Press Spokesman 
Andrzej Potocki who also argued that, "under Balcerowicz there has been opposition: 
parliament here, the party there ... close, but operating a little on separate tracks. 
" 42 
Moreover, according to Krajewski, the type of work undertaken by Club Secretariat, 
which primarily involved providing Scjm deputies and Senators with fairly basic 
administrative and clerical support, meant that there was a "shortage of people 
capable of undertakffig more conceptual, meritocratic work7 of use to the party more 
generally. " 
Nonetheless, because of the previously noted overlap between the leadership of the 
4party in central office' and the 'party in public office' it was impossible to draw a 
clear and simple functional dividing line between the two party bureaucracies. In 
other words, many of the staff working for key Parliamentary Club leaders were also 
defacto working for party central office leaders. A secretary working for a 
Parliamentary Club Chairman who was simultaneously a party leader was, for 
example, also clearly providing some kind of a service for the party in central office. 
'0 Author interview, 6 June 1997. 
Author interview, 4 June 1997. 
Author interview with Andrzej Potocki, UW National Press Spokesman, 26 November 1997. 
"Author interview, 4 June 1997. 
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One of the best examples of this functional blurring between party and Parliamentary 
Club functions was the way in which many parliamentarians were also key members 
of their party's policy-making or programmatic commissions. SdRP National Press 
Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, argued that "there are extremely 
close links between the SLD Parliamentary Club and the SdRP but these are not 
formalised" and emerge from the fact that "many key members of the SLD 
Parliamentary Club in various commissions are also on key party commissions ... Co- 
operation and joint work, therefore, flows naturally from the fact that SdRPs 
programmatic documents, or sections of them, are often written by SLD 
parliamentarians who are SdRP members. "" According to PSL programmatic director 
Jan Wypych, the party's seventeen Supreme Executive Committee programmatic 
commissions "co-operate and often overlap with the PSL members of the (relevant) 
SeJrn commissions" and, in spite of the fact that the PSL made a conscious decision to 
keep its programmatic department in the party in central office, "in recent years you 
can see that a large section of this meritocratic consideration (of the programme) is 
really implemented in the SqJrn deputies' sphere of activity. "" Similarly, according to 
UW National Office Director Jaroslaw Robak co-operation between the Parliamentary 
Club and party central office on programmatic matters "tends to arise from the fact 
that nearly all of the party's National Secretaries (its national spokesmen and policy 
co-ordinators, on a given issue) are SeJrn deputies" and, therefore, "flows naturally 
from the fact that there is an overlap in terms of membership ... rather than any 
formal 
mechanisms. "' UP Parliamentary Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek, who was 
personally involved in the drafting of the party's most recent programme, also argued 
that, "the intellectual life of the party is, in all certainty ... concentrated here (in 
parliament)" and that, "defacto this took place here in the SqJrn because the basis of 
the group that worked on it (the programme) were SqJm deputies ... (and) it was 
chaired by a SqJrn deputy. "' The parliamentarians involved in these policy-making 
and programmatic groups, in turn, naturally drew on SqJm and Senate facilities in 
their role of parliamentarians, or even utlised Parliamentary Club funds, in order to 
obtain experts' reports and analyses either from parliamentary sources or from 
sympathetic external advisers and specialists. 
Moreover, there was also some evidence of a trend towards greater co-ordination (if 
not substitution) between the party and parliamentary bureaucracies and even some 
tentative moves toward the creation joint party-parliamentary office structures. The 
"'Author interview with Dariusz Klimaszewski, SdRP National Press Spokesman, 16 June 1997. 
"'Author interview, 12 June 1997 
"Author interview with Jaroslaw Robak, UW National Office Director, 9 June 1997. 
17 Author interview, II June 1997. 
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clearest example of this was in the sphere of media relations and the close co- 
ordination between the party central office and Parliamentary Club press offices. 
According to SdRP National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, 
there was "fairly close co-ordinatibn" involving almost daily phone contact "between 
the various elements communicating our messages - the Government Press 
Spokesman's Group, the SLD Parliamentary Club and the SdRP - in which we co- 
ordinate our activities ... Certain elements overlap, are common ... (particularly) 
between the SLD Club and the SdRP. "' The director of the PSL party press office 
Piotr Przybysz worked "federally" running the party and Parliamentary Club press 
offices "in tandem"' and there was also close co-ordination between the UW 
parliamentary and party press offices, by dint of the fact that there was one joint party 
and Parliamentary Club Press Spokesman, Andrzej Potocki. 
Moreover, according to UW National Office Director Jaroslaw Robak "although there 
were initial difficulties in terms of co-operation between the National Office and the 
Parliamentary Club Secretariat, with the latter tending to operate independently of the 
former ... the situation 
is improving 99 and he forecast that closer links would be forged 
after the 1997 election when he expected the party Chairman to become a 
parliamentarian. Indeed, according to Robak, this could even have included the 
creation of a single joint National Party Secretary (combining the party General 
Secretary and Parliamentary Club Secretary roles) together with a joint Director of 
the National Office and Parliamentary Club Secretariat (with deputies responsible for 
the day-to-day running of each individual office). 10 Indeed, speaking after the 
election, UW National Press Spokesman Andrzej Potcocki predicted that rather than 
going down the road of closer co-operation the "centre of party managemene' would 
undertake a "wholesale shift to parliament" with the party central office staff playing 
a much less important role and the "main (organisational burden) being shifted to 
parliament. "" 
The party where this process of co-ordination and co-operation between party and 
parliamentary bureaucracies had advanced the furthest, and even bordered on 
straightforward substitution in some cases, was the UP. According to UP 
Parliamentary Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek any attempt to "separate out 
parliamentary and party (organisational) structures... is, quite simply, a fiction" and 
that, in reality, "everything is sorted out here in the parliamentary buildings" even "if, 
Author interview with Dariusz Klimaszewski, SdRP National Press Spokesman, 27 February 1997. 
Author interview with Jan Odorczuk, 6 June 1997. 
'0 Author interview, 9 June 1997. 
Author interview, 26 November 1997. 
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as a result of this, it creates certain problems in the actual party itself. " Only rich 
parties could allow themselves the luxury of ftinctional specialisation while the UP, 
"with our modest possibilities ... don't have any choice ... these cells have to mutually 
assist each other. "' The entire UP press office function was, for example, run from 
parliament; with the party's National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz a 
parliamentarian and his press assistant on the parliamentary rather than party payroll. 
Similarly, the three-man Parliamentary Club Office cell responsible for "contacts 
between the Club and party organisation" were "defacto working more for the party 
than the Club. "" 
The local pagy machine 
Data obtained by the author from a survey of the party 'machine' in four provinces, 
set out in Table 3.2, revealed that the same pattern of a skeletal party bureaucracy and 
generally modest level of technical and support facilities was also evident at local 
level. Indeed, most local party 'offices' did not really function as such in the 
bureaucratic sense. They were generally single rooms which fulfilled the basic 
function of a meeting place, often without a telephone and hardly ever having a fax, 
computer or photocopying facilities, particularly those located outside the main 
provincial town. Very few of the offices were staffed by paid employees and 
practically all party activity at this level was based on volunteers. This pattern of a 
weak party 'machine' at local level was also confirmed by separate research 
undertaken by Siellawa-Kolbowska on "the organisational. conditions for the 
functioning" of four political parties (including SdRP, the UW and UP) in four small 
towns and by Pankowski on nine political groupings (including the five political 
parties in our sample) in five main provincial towns. " Siellawa-Kolbowska, for 
example, found that while twelve out of the fourteen local party organisations she 
surveyed had their own local party headquarters, half of them did not have their own 
telephone, only four were in possession of a fax and only two employed a paid 
secretary; and concluded that, even after five years of party-building, most of these 
local organisations "remained plainly in the pre-organisational stage. "" 
Author interview, II June 1997. 
lbid 
See: K. Pankowski. Polityka 1 parde polityczne w oczach dzialaczypartyjnych szczebla lokalnego. 
Warsaw. mimeo. 1996; E. Siellawa-Kolbowska, 'Partie polityczne w terenie' in M. E. Grabowska, K. 
E. Siellawa-Kolbowska and T. Szawiel, eds. Polskiepartiepolitycme, ich elity, elektoraty i 
zakorzenie w spoleczen'stwie. Warsaw: Instytut Badaii nad Podstawarni Demokracji. 1996. 
" 'Partie politycznc w tcrenie', p 12. 
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Moreover, whereas at the national level it was only the PSL which had anything 
approaching a properly functioning party central office bureaucracy which at least 
bore a passing resemblance to the mass party model, the hypothesised pattern of 
('successor' party superiority was much more evident in the case of both SdRP and the 
PSL at the local level. However, as Pankowski points, this was less a fimction of their 
'orgnisational inheritance' (although this was a factor, particularly in the case of the 
PSL) but rather that "these parties have the largest number of Sejm deputies" and that 
this factor "currently has a decisive influence on the financial conditions, together 
"56 
with the material base, in the functioning of local party structures. 
This high level of dependence on the staff and technical facilities made available to 
them by local parliamentarians arose from the local parties' weak financial bases, 
together with the minimal level of financial and material support which they received 
from their national party organisations. As Pankowski put it, "respondents began 
every reply relating to the difficulties of the functioning of political parties with 
reference to financial matters - they talked, above all, about their grouping's material 
base. Insufficient financial resources to conduct their activities emerged as the 
dominant subject in nearly every conversation. "" 
Polish political parties were generally very secretive about their funding sources at 
both national and local level. However, from the evidence obtained in local research 
by this author, and confirmed by other studies, local party organisations appeared to 
have three main sources of income. Firstly, membership subscriptions which, in most 
cases, provided local parties with their primary (or exclusive) source of regular 
income. Secondly, larger donations from wealthy local members or sponsors (such as 
sympathetic local businessmen) particularly 'donations-in-kind', such as second-hand 
fax machines or photocopiers. These tended be one-offs - either to finance a specific 
local event (such as a visit from a national party leader) or in the form of election 
campaign donations (known as 'bricks') - rather than providing a regular, ongoing 
source of income. Thirdly, particularly in the case of the 'new' parties where 
subscription income was so modest that it was often felt to have a purely' symbolic' 
meaning, local party activities were often financed by party officials themselves 
making additional donations to, for example, cover the costs associated with running 
a local office or foregoing travel and accommodation expenses to national party 
conferences and meetings. Indeed, Pankowski even found that in a few "sporadic 
cases", particularly in smaller towns, "(party) leadership positions were held by a 
Polityka i partie polityczne w oczach dzialaczy partyjnych szczebla lokalnego. p7. 
lbid, p6. 
89 
person completely unprepared for this kind of activity, whose competence to fulfill 
this post was determined by ... above all, their financial generosity in the cause of party 
funds" and, in this sense, certain positions in local parties were, effectively, "for 
sale. ""' The only exception to this general pattern was the PSL which, in most 
provinces, had other substantial sources of income either from trading activities or 
from renting out parts of its party headquarters. Indeed, more than half of the PSL's 
provincial party organisations (and also a few sub-provincial organisations) owned 
the buildings in which their local party headquarters was located, including those in 
all four provinces included in this author's survey. " 
Moreover, other than the occasional training session for party activists, local party 
organisations generally received little direct organisational help and no financial or 
material assistance from their national party central offices. While local UP officials 
in two of the provinces surveyed (Plock and Rzesz6w) spoke of some financial 
assistance made available to them in the early stages of party formation, " and one 
local SdRP official (RzeszOw) mentioned a 'subvention', " the general principle 
appeared to be that local party organisations were expected to be self-financing. Once 
again, the only real exception to this was the PSL whose national party leadership 
established a 'Party Fund' in January 1993 to help local party organisations, "regulate 
the ownership relations of local offices and buildings, essential to the PSL's political 
and organisational activities. "' Moreover, in January 1994, the PSL leadership also 
agreed to direct most of the party's 1993 parliamentary election refund to assist local 
party organisations with the purchase of their local party headquarters buildings 
which would allow them to, as PSL Treasurer Alfred Domagalski put it, to "run 
political activities independently of external conditions. "61 In all four provinces 
surveyed by this author, for example, the PSL central office had made interest-free 
loans available to the local party organisations to help them purchase the real estate 
for their provincial headquarters building and, in one case (Gdansk), a second 
building in another large provincial town. Interestingly, together with SdRP, the PSL 
also allowed their local party organisations to retain all membership subscription 
income, while all of the 'new' parties provincial organisations were required to pass 
Ibid4 p8. 
See: 'Plywanie w mqtnej wodzie' and Sprawozdanie z dzialalnodci Naczelnego Komitetut 
Wykonawczego Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowego w okresie od III Kongresu PSL W 1992 r. ) do X7 
1996r. p44 
" Author interviews with Wlodzmierz Stec, Secretary, UP District Council, Rzesz6w, 21 April 1997 
and Ryszard Wajszczak, Chairman, UP District Council, Plock, 28 April 1997. 
" Author interview with Leszek Majewski, 29 April 1997. 
62 Sprawozdanie z dzialalnos'ci Naczelnego Komitetut Wykonawczego Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowego 
w okresie od III Kongresu PSL (A7 1992 r. ) do X7 1996r. p44 
Quoted in F. Frydrykiewicz, To w partyjnych kasach', Rzeczpospofita. 21 November 1996 
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on a proportion to the party central office: 25% in the case of the UW and UP and 
one-third in the case of the 
ROP. 64 
Consequently, given their weak financial bases and minimal or non-existent financial 
and material support which they received from their national party organisations, it 
was at this local level that there was much more striking evidence of substitution of 
'parliamentary' for party staff and technical facilities. Indeed, most local party 
activity tended to revolve around, and much of their organisational infrastructure was 
directly linked to, local parliamentary offices. 
In addition to a general personal expense allowance (dicta) and a stipend (ryczalt) 
paid to so-called 'professional' parliamentarians, every Sejm deputy and Senator 
received two kinds of subventions from their resepctive parliamentary Chancelleries 
to pay for the finictioning of their local offices. Firstly, assistance with renovation, 
furniture and equipment costs. After the 1993 parliamentary elections, for example, 
each newly elected Sejm deputy received the equivalent of 4000 new zloties, an 
incumbent Sejm deputy 3000 zloties and a Senator up to 2500 to renovate and furnish 
their local offices; together with a supply of essential office equipment such as a 
photocopier, typewriter, fax machine and a computer with a printer. " Secondly, a 
monthly allowance to cover staff and local parliamentary office running costs (also, 
confusingly, sometimes to as the ryczatt). In 1997, for example, each Sejm deputy 
and Senator received 4250 new z1oties per month"' which could be spent on: rent; 
telephone, gas, electricity and water bills; office workers salaries'; paper and office 
materials; repairing office equipment; translation and typing services; insuring the 
parliamentarian against civil liability; newspapers and publications; and ordering 
experts' reports. 61 
These local parliamentary offices were invariably located in or alongside the local 
party headquarters building. An analysis of the addresses and telephone numbers of 
the 49 provincial party headquarters revealed that virtually all of them were located in 
the same building as a local parliamentary office in the cases of- the PSL (46 with 
another two sharing the same phone and fax numbers), UW (45 again with a fin-ther 
Information supplied by national party headquarters, February-March 1997. 
See: 'Parlamentarne pieniqdze', Rzeczpospolita. 4 November 1993; and 'Plywanie w mqtnej 
wodzie'. Each Senator also received a television, radio and, if a Parliamentary Club had more than 15 
Senators, an additional computer with printer and funds for furniture. 
" See: E. Wilk, '60 groszy na demokracjq', Polityka. 8 February 1997. 
17 See: K. Groblewski, 'Pieniqdze przez biura do partii, ' Rzeczpospolita. I February 1995. 
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two sharing phone and fax lines) and UP (47). " Unfortunately, SdRP central office 
did not provide the addresses of its provincial party headquarters, although one 
commentator estimated that around half of all SLD Sejm deputies had their 
parliamentary offices located in the same building as a party office which, given that 
approximately 40% of them were not SdRP members, this probably included virtually 
all of those who were. " This was re-inforced by the fact that the overlap between 
'party' and 'parliamentary' leaderships at national level was reflected at local level 
where local parliamentarians often simultaneously held prominent leadership 
positions in their provincial and sub-provincial party organisations. In 1997, for 
example, 63% (31 out of 49) of PSL provincial party presidents were 
parliamentarians as were 51% (25) of SdRP, 21% (7 out of 34) of UP, 16% (8) of 
UW provincial chairmen. " 
Consequently, these parliamentary office facilities and expense allowances invariably 
provided local party organisations with additional funds and material support by 
providing them with access to the parliamentarians' equipment and technical facilities 
and subsidising local party bills and running costs. Moreover, each Sejm deputy and 
Senator employed at least one full-time employee from their office allowance who 
was generally a member of their party, often simultaneously serviced the local party 
office and was, therefore, defacto, on the party payroll. The 'union of addresses' 
between party headquarters and parliamentary offices also meant that local party 
organisations, who often rented their accommodation from their local councils at 
preferential rates, could sub-let part of their offices to local parliamentarians for a 
substantially higher rent and, thereby, receive additional income for party ftmds (or 
make a clear profit in the case of the PSL which, as noted above, actually owned 
many of its local headquarters outright) directly from parliamentary office 
allowances. " As one commentator put it, "it can't be ruled out that there are places in 
which the costs are divided, for example, 'party' telephone conversations are paid for 
from party funds and Sejrn deputies' conversations from the same telephone arc paid 
for from the Sejm deputies ryczatt. You can imagine that party ftmds contribute to 
" Information supplied by PSL party headquarters, February 1996 and UW party headquarters, 
February 1996; U Progu XXI Wieku. pp59-6 1; Kancelaria Sejmu. Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, II 
Kadencja: Biura Poselskie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1995; and Kancelaria Senatu. Lista 
Senator6w III Kadenc/i z Adresami Biur Senatorskich. Warsaw. 1996. 
See: 'Pieniqdze przez biura do partii'. 
Information supplied by the Sejm and Senate Chancelleries, December 1996 and the SdRP, PSL, 
UW and UP party headquarters, February-March 1997; UW. Freedom Union: Documents. Warsaw. 
1995; and UProguW Wieku. 
See: 'Plywanie w mqtnej wodzie'. 
92 
(parliamentary office) workers' salaries, and that rent, energy costs etc. are paid for 
joinfly. These places, if there are any, are not common. "' 
These parliamentary office expense allowances were, of course, provided to assist 
Sejm deputies and Senators in their fulfilling their duties as parliamentarians and not 
party politicians and their utilisation for subsidising local party activities was, at best, 
a grey area. According to the Sejm Presidium's resolution of December 23rd 1994, 
for example, parliamentary office allowances "may not be utilised for financing the 
activities of political parties, social organisations, charitable foundations and activities 
or the activities of the Parliamentary Clubs. "" But, although parliamentarians had to 
account for the way they spent their office allowances to the appropriate Chancellery, 
there were no rules which explicitly prohibited them from locating their local offices 
in or alongside local party headquarters. In practice, therefore, it was extremely 
difficult to distinguish expenditure which related to fulfilling parliamentary duties and 
that which corresponded to stricte party political activities. As one national party 
Treasurer put it, "if for every ten phone calls which are made from a Sejm deputies' 
office, five are related to voters with urgent matters, and the remaining five fall 
within the realms of their party work, then who is in a position to audit this? "" 
Moreover, national party officials made little attempt to conceal the fact that these 
parliamentary allowances were often used specifically for 'party' purposes and 
recognised that, in many cases, parliamentary offices played a crucial role in 
underpinning their party's local organisational infrastructure. SdRP's head of party 
organisation MacieJ Porqba, for example, acknowledged that his party tried to "take 
advantage of this by ensuring that the local SdRP headquarters is the also the location 
of the SeJm deputies' office" which he described as an "essential link. "" The PSL 
was even more explicit and instructed all its SeJm deputies and Senators to "employ a 
person connected with the PSL in the position of office secretary ... submit information 
on how they spent the sums assigned to them by the SeJm Chancellery to maintain 
their offices to the PSL provincial Board Presidium" and consult with provincial 
Board President on "all expenditure. "" Indeed, PSL Supreme Council Chairman J6zef 
Zych justified this on the grounds that "sometimes it is not possible to precisely 
separate their (local party and parliamentary) activities"" while the party's 
'Pieniqdze przez biura do partii'. 
Ibid. 
'Plywanie w mqtnej wodzie'. 
Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
PSL. Sprawozdanie Naczelnego Komitetu Wykonawczego Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego za 
okres )UI 1992-11 1995r. Warsaw. 1995. pp2-3. 
'Wybory potwierzily nasze wplywy', Rzeczpospolita, I July 1994. 
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programmatic director Jan Wypych argued that "there is a part of their activity as a 
parliamentarian which you can see falls within the sphere of party activity given that 
they were elected as a Sejm deputy or Senator on a PSL party ticket. "" UP Vice- 
Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik also recognised this linkage 
and the fact that his party's, "possibilities are greater in those places where we have 
strong Sejm deputies' offices with assistants and funding for running an office. The 
possibilities are very modest in those places where we don't have these kind of 
resources. We're talking about private houses, private telephones. "" 
The fact that every parliamentarian received the same office expense allowance 
regardless of how many local offices they had meant that local SqJm deputies and 
Senators from the same party often pooled their income and expenditure in joint 
offices and/or opened several local offices. In the case of parliamentarians with 
several offices, one of these was designated a 'basic' office through which all their 
income and expenditure had to be accounted for, and in which the full-time paid staff 
and full range of back-up facilities were usually located. The remainder, referred to as 
'branch offices', were genemlly unstaffed and often consisted of little more than a 
single room. As Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show, in 1995 these local parliamentary offices 
provided the four largest parties and groupings with parliamentary representation with 
a formidable local network of 402 'basic' offices, 789 'branch' offices and 1065 
staff. "' Unfortunately, party central offices did not collect (or were unwilling to 
reveal) data on exactly how many staff were employed directly by local party 
organisations as opposed to local parliamentary offices, although - on basis of this 
author's local research together with interviews with national party officials - it would 
appear that there were virtually none in the case of the UW and UP, no more than one 
per province in the case of the SdRP (that is, less than 50) and at least one but no 
more than five per province in the case of the PSL (between 50-250). 
Moreover, the fact that parliamentarians could open several offices, which did not 
necessarily have to be located in their own electoral district, encouraged parties to 
deploy these resources to maximum strategic effect by, for example, opening local 
'branch' offices either in provinces where had no parliamentary representation or in 
smaller towns and villages in those where they did. The UW Parliamentary Club 
Presidium was, for example, responsible (in consultation with the party Board) for 
'a Author interview, 12 June 12 1997. 
'9 Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
'0 Not all these staff were ftill-time (or even paid) employees, although many of them were. in 1997 
the UP party headquarters, in figures supplied to the author, for example, estimated that the party 
only employed the full-time equivalent of around 60 staff in its local parliamentary offices rather 
than the 127 listed as parliamentary office staff in the Sejm Chancellery records. 
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"establishing Sejm deputies and Senators' offices those provinces where the party had 
no Parliamentary representation. "' Although it was not as well organised and 
encountered some resistance from Sejm deputies unwilling to pool their resources, the 
UP, according to the party's Parliamentary Club Secretary Artur Siedlarek, also, 
"tried to assign every Sejm deputy with a second electoral district, a second province 
where he ought to set up something much more modest, a 'branch office' but still an 
office, so that we could somehow cover the whole country with this network... (and) 
open branch offices in those provinces where there wasn't anything in the main 
town. "82 
The key role which these parliamentary offices, and the staff and technical facilities 
attached to them, played in the functioning of the local party 'machine' was 
confirmed both by this author's and earlier local research previously cited. Given that 
party membership - which, as previously noted, represented the local parties main 
source of income - was generally low and that most local parties (except for the PSL) 
received virtually no financial assistance from their national party headquarters, it was 
not surprising that all four 'parliamentary' parties in the provinces surveyed were, to a 
greater or lesser extent, dependent on the facilities provided by local Sejm deputies 
and Senators. Those local party offices that had access to any kind of proper technical 
facilities (fax, computer, photocopier) or were staffed by a paid employee were 
invariably linked in some way to local parliamentarians' 'basic" offices. All four 
SdRP local party headquarters, for example, were located in the same building as 
local parliamentary offices and they all, to some extent, utilised these facilities; with a 
similar arrangement at sub-provincial level where local party offices often doubled up 
as, or operated alongside, local parliamentarians' 'branch' offices. There was a 
similar overlap between the PSL parliamentary and party facilities, with one local 
PSL official acknowledging that "there is no way of separating out the local Sejm 
deputy's support facilities and the functioning of the party. "' In the cases of the two 
r new' parties with access to parliamentary facilities, the UW and UP, the degree of 
overlap, and straightforward dependence in some cases, was even greater. In one of 
the provinces (Jelenia Gora), for example, all three local UP offices and their 
facilities were funded by the local UP parliamentarian and his paid local assistant 
was, simultaneously, the UP's local party secretary; 84 while in another two where the 
party did not have any local parliamentary representatives (RzesZOw and Plock) it was 
" Regulamin Klubu Parliamentarnego Unii Wolnodd. 
92 Author interview, II June 1997. 
Author interview with Slawomir Szatkowski, 12 May 1997. 
Author interview with Ryszard Nowak, 5 May 1997. 
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only able to open up offices at all because other UP Sejm deputies opened up 'branch 
offices' there and, thereby, provided them with some basic facilities. " 
The importance of these local parliamentary offices and facilities was graphically 
illustrated when local officials were asked what, hypothetically, would be the impact 
of their party losing its parliamentary representation. The impact might be felt in two 
ways. If a party failed to cross the 5% threshold nationally and failed to secure any 
parliamentary representation at all then, obviously, it lost access to all parliamentary 
resources. However, even if its national party crossed the 5% threshold but party lost 
its local Sejm deputy then it would still lose the facilities associated with a 'basic' 
office. While local SdRP and PSL officials did not feel that the effects would be 
catastrophic, they all recognized that their local party organisation would suffer to 
some extent particularly in terms of maintaining a sub-provincial network of offices 
outside of the main provincial town. According to one local SdRP official, for 
example, the party's other sources of income would only allow it to exist at a "much 
lower level of activity" and it would have to replace its current network of local 
offices with much more modest "points of contact. "" In the case of the 'new' parties, 
however, it was felt that the impact would be much more serious and possibly even 
terminal. Most local UW officials felt that they could probably only maintain some 
kind of minimal office in the main provincial town but no other local offices, while 
local UP officials felt that they would have to revert to the practice of operating out of 
private houses. One local UP official, for example, said that the party's "chances of 
remaining on the political scene and winning seats in such an enfeebled state would 
be minimal, "" while another, putting it even more bluntly, felt that, "without 
parliamentary representation, the UP will die. "" Indeed, speaking after the 1997 
election - when the party did, indeed, narrowly fail to cross the 5% threshold - UP 
National Presidium member Piotr Marciniak, although not as pessimistic as the 
aforementioned local party official, acknowledged that, "from the point of view of 
maintaining some kind of elementary organisational infrastructure ... we'll have to re- 
model this structure ... (and) position ourselves on maintaining offices in large regions, 
rather than in every province. "' 
Moreover, the importance of access to parliamentary offices (or rather lack of it) 
could also be seen when examining the staff and technical facilities available to 
Author interviews with Wlodzmierz Stec, 21 April 1997; and Ryszard Wajszczak, 28 April 1997. 
Author interview with Stanislaw Kosznik, 12 May 1997. 
Author interview with Wlodzimierz Stec, 21 April 1997. 
Author interview with Boguslaw Kaczmarek, 14 May 1997. 
Author interview with Piotr Marciniak, UP National Presidium member, 19 November 1997. 
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parties without parliamentary representation. This factor was, for example, clearly 
evident in the case of the ROP which, as Table 3.2 shows, lacked all but the most 
basic organisational infrastructure in three out of the four provinces examined by this 
author. In the one exceptional case (RzeszOW) the unusually high level of party 
membership (as noted in the previous chapter) clearly gave the local party a more 
substantial financial base with which to develop a network of offices and some basic 
technical facilities. However, given that membership subscriptions only comprised 
about 20% of the Rzeszow party's total income, the most important factor was its 
unusually large number of wealthy local benefactors; including, for example, the 
provincial party chairman whose company owned the building in which the local 
party headquarters was located and supplied it with a fax, telephone and computer 
facilities. 90 This dependence on wealthy local sponsors could, as noted above, create 
its own set of difficulties and sources of instability. 
By way of an interesting contrast, AWS - the other 'externally-created' grouping - 
had, as Table 2 also shows, a relatively well developed local machine' comparable 
(in some cases even superior) to that of the 'successor' parties. However, unlike the 
ROP which had to build up its party organisation from scratch, AWS managed to fill 
its 'organisational deficit' by the utilizing the technical and organisational facilities 
of its main 'shareholder', the Solidarity trade union. In all four provinces the union 
provided AWS with its core facilities: the AWS headquarters was located in the 
Solidarity provincial headquarters and all the AWS local groups were based in 
union's local offices with the possibility, in many cases, of access to the telephone, 
fax, computer and photocopying facilities. The AWS regional organizer 
(pelnomocnik) was always a Solidarity union official, as were most of its local 
organizers. In one province (GdaAsk), for example, AWS had six full-time staff 
working for the organisation on secondment from Solidarity. " The contrasting 
fortunes of the ROP and AWS clearly illustrated the extent to which it was virtually 
impossible for an 'externally-created' party in Poland with no access to parliamentary 
facilities to overcome its resource limitations and develop an effective party 
'machine' without recourse to an existing external sponsor or agency with an already- 
developed organisational infrastructure. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there were some benefits which accrued directly to 
parties at the national level - both the 'party in central office' and the 'party in public 
"' Author interview with Andrzej Kucharski, Chairman, ROP Provincial Board, Rzesz6w, 20 April 
1997. 
" Author interview with Edward Sciubidlo, Plenipotentiary, AWS Regional Council, Gdafisk, 13 
May 1997. 
97 
office' - from Sejm deputies and Senators local parliamentary office allowances. 
Some parties, for example, required (or requested) parliamentarians to pay 
contributions from either their stipend, personal expense allowances or office expense 
allowances into a central fund which was used either to provide additional staff and 
facilities for the Parliamentary Club or sometimes utilised directly for party central 
office purposes. In 1997, for example, UW parliamentarians were required to pay 5% 
of their parliamentary stipends directly to the party central office and a further 5% 
into the party's parliamentary election fund; ` while the 120 SdRP Sejm deputies and 
Senators voluntarily paid 200 zloties per month into party central office funds. " The 
UW and UP Parliamentary Clubs also required their Sejm deputies and Senators to 
pay 10% and 5% respectively of their office expense allowances into a central firrid to 
provide additional parliamentary support facilities which, in the case of the UP for 
example, allowed their Club Office to employ two additional members of staff. " The 
most systematic and extreme case of a party utilising parliamentary funds for national 
party purposes was the AWS-affiliated Confederation for an Independent Parliament 
(KPN) whose Sejm deputies were, at one stage, required to hand over their entire 
office expenses allowance to their Parliamentary Club leadership, which then 
distributed these ftinds as it deemed appropriate. 91 
Moreover, most of 'parliamentary' parties also located 'local' parliamentary offices in 
the same building as, or adjacent to, their party's national central office in Warsaw. 
There were, for example, three 'basic' Sejm deputies' offices and eight 'branch 
offices' located in the SdRP party headquarters building on Rozbrat Street (with f ive 
of the latter clustered together with one basic office) with nine telephone lines, three 
fax lines and fourteen staff between them; and three 'basic' Sejm deputies offices 
with six telephone lines, three fax lines and six staff in the PSL party headquarters on 
Grzybowska Street. There were also four 'basic' Sejm deputies' offices with six 
telephone lines, three fax lines and six staff occupying essentially the same building 
(although at a different postal address) as the UP party headquarters on Nowogradzka 
Street. Of the 'parliamentary' parties, only the UW did not have any parliamentary 
offices located in its national party headquarters on Aleje Jerozolimskie Street, 
although there were seven 'basic' SeJm deputies offices and one 'basic' Senator's 
Author interview with Miroslaw Czech, 19 February 1997. 
See: A. Nowakowska, 'Ujawnid maj4tek ale jaki? ', Gazeta Wyborcza. 21 February 1997. 
Regulamin Klubu Parliamentarnego Unii Wolnodci and author interview with Artur Siedlarek, II 
June 1997. 
"See: 'Pieni4dze przez biura do partii'. A system which led, according to some commentators, to the 
defection of several KPN deputies and, eventually, to the disintegration of both party and Club. See: 
'60 groszy na demokracjq'. 
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office with three telephone lines, two fax lines and ten staff in the party's Warsaw 
provincial headquarters. 9' 
Although all these party central offices could clearly have derived some rental income 
from the presence of these 'local' parliamentary offices, it is more difficult to judge 
how much they also benefited from the staff (not all whom were either paid or 
worked ftill-time) and technical facilities attached to them. Given that the Sejm 
deputies' offices located in the SdRP and UP headquarters included those of a number 
of senior party leadders and officials - such as the SdRP Chairman JOzef Oleksy and 
Secretary-General Jerzy Szmajdzm'ski and the UP Chairman Ryszard BugaJ, Vice- 
Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik and National Press 
Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz - it would appear that the degree of overlap between 
'local' parliamentary office and party central office facilities was greater in these two 
parties than in the more bureaucratically-developed PSL party central office. If these 
(ostensibly parliamentary) staff were to be factored in then, for example, the SdRP 
party central office bureaucracy was not as modest as it originally appeared solely on 
the basis of an analysis of the number of stficte party employees - although, given 
that these additional staff were linked to the parliamentary party rather than 'party in 
central office', SdRP still broadly conformed more to the contemporary models of 
party organisations than the mass party in terms of its the profile of the party 
bureaucracy and the respective importance of the parliamentary and party central 
office bureaucracies. 
The 'professionalisation' of partie 
So, broadly speaking, in line with the hypothesised characteristics ascribed to the 
more contemporary models of party organisation, there was clear evidence of both: a 
weak central party office 'machine' together with a large proportion of party 
employees attached to the parliamentary party; and a high level of dependence on the 
staff and facilities attached to local parliamentary offices for parties' technical and 
organisational infi-astructure. Evidence of the replacement of salaried party 
bureaucrats by external advisers and consultants with a looser contractual relationship 
with parties, identified by both Panebianco and Katz and Mair in their 'electoral- 
professional' and 'cartel' party models, was, however, much more limited. 
"' Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, II Kadencja: Biura Poselskie and Lista Senalor6w III Kadencji z 
Adresami Biur Senatorskich. With no parliamentary representation at the time that this research was 
undertaken the ROP was obviously not included in this analysis. However, it is noteworthy that after 
the 1997 election when the party narrowly crossed the 5% threshold, a number of parliamentary 
offices, including the party Chairman Jan Olszewski's, were subsequently located in the party's 
headquarters on Chmielna Street. 
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There were clearly some indicators of the 'professionalisation' of Polish politics, with 
party leaders increasingly recognising the importance, and utilising the services, of 
external experts, advisers and specialists in a number of fields. 
Firstly, policy and programmatic experts. SdRP party Chairman J6zef Oleksy, for 
example, was assisted by a group of party members and sympathisers from the 
academic community and regularly organised meetings with academics based in the 
Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) to discuss key issues such as the development of 
the party programme. " According to PSL programmatic director Jan Wypych the 
party had "a wide range of contacts and specialists in various areas and intellectual 
milieu ... organised in seventeen ... Supreme Executive Committee commissions which 
are comprised ... of specific specialists in the appropriate subject. ""' The PSL also had 
a separate thirty-strong experts' group chaired by party member and economic experts 
Professor Wladyslaw Szymafiski and, if the party did not have an appropriate policy 
specialist in a given field, then it ordered a specially prepared external experts' report 
from a non-party member. " With its origins in two parties (the Democratic Union and 
Liberal Democratic Congress) with strong support in the in the academic and 
intellectual communities, the UW could also draw upon a large number of policy 
specialists among both party members and sympathisers, organised in twenty 
'National Secretariats' responsible for developing the party's detailed policies in the 
main policy fields such as: the economy, foreign affairs, health, social policy, the 
environment, rural affairs, national security and education. Moreover, two academic 
research institutes were also closely aligned with the party: the Gdafisk-based Institute 
for the Research of the Market Economy established by two former liberals (Jan 
Szomburg and UW economics spokesman Janusz Lewandowski) and the prestigious 
Institute for Public Affairs whose governing bodies included the then-UW 
Parliamentary Club Chairman and foreign affairs spokesman Bronislaw Geremek. " 
The UP and ROP also recognised the importance of utilising 'professional' external 
policy specialists but encountered much greater difficulties in developing such 
networks. UP Presidium member Piotr Marciniak, for example, acknowledged that, 
46a party that wants to survive in the Polish reality has to be built on an intellectual 
base of support ... it has to have foundations, associations ... a whole milieu that is its 
essential to its ftmctioning ... as well as an important source of cadres, and a certain 
See: 'Partyjni eksperci', Rzeczpospolita, 17 July 1996. 
Author interview, 12 June 1997. 
'Partyjni eksperci'. 
Ibid. 
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flow of ideas. " However, although the party had "some contacts with the Warsaw- 
based intelligentsia" it was not, in comparison with the UW, able to systematically 
develop a base of support among policy specialists and, by 1997, the party had wound 
up its policy commissions. "' The ROP encountered similar difficulties in developing 
support in intellectual and academic circles. Given its image as an extreme and 
populist party, particularly among the influential Warsaw-based cosmopolitan media, 
even sympathetic intellectuals and academics were careful about becoming too 
closely associated with the ROP. Although, according to party leaders, a larger 
number of sympathetic academics began to co-operate with the ROP as its opinion 
poll ratings improved during the first half of 1996, "' the party's National Secretary 
Wojciech WIodarczyk acknowledged that assistance from most of these external 
policy experts was sporadic, informal and did "not have a structured character. 9"103 
Secondly, Polish commentators have also noted a shift in party attitudes towards 
sociological and public opinion research. Polish parties came to pay much greater 
attention to both analysing generally-available, published opinion poll findings and 
ordering their own, specially-commissioned research; with parties' election campaign 
staffs often "creating specialist cells within their (organisational) structures to analyse 
even the smallest change in the dynamic of their rankings. ""' A defining moment mi 
terms of utilisation of public opinion specialists (and Polish political campaigning 
more generally) was SLD leader and SdRP party Chairman Aleksander 
Kwagniewski's 1995 presidential election campaign. Kwaniewski's election 
campaign staff, which included the sociologist and director of the Polish branch of the 
Gallup Institute polling company Slawomir Wiatr, "analysed public opinion research 
scrupulously and ordered it systematically. ""' More generally, according to SdRP 
Central Executive Committee member Krzysztof Janik, the party carried out its own 
polling researching and sometimes paid for market research companies to attach "one 
or two questions" to their general surveys"" - although, according to some 
commentators, the Gallup Institute's polling in the run up to the 1997 election was 
much more intensive and the company, "asked (questions) about the tiniest details of 
how the SLD is regarded. """ 
"' Author interviews with: Piotr Marciniak, 19 November 1997; and Wojciech Borowik, 19 February 
1997. 
'0' 'Partyjni eksperci'. 
'0' Author interview with Wojciech Wlodarczyk, 14 February 1997. 
"" M. Janicki and M. Pqczak, "'Wojna na miny": Czyli polityk jako towar', Polityka, 14 October 
1995. 
'0' Ibid. 
'0' R. Wr6bel, 'Zasada ograniczonego zaufania', Rzeczpospofita. 25 April 1997. 
J. S. Mac and Z. Stachura, 'Kampania reklamowa', Wprost. 15 June 1997 
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Similarly, the UW also utilised the services of sympathetic polling organisations such 
as the Social Research Workshop (associated with the Gdansk liberal milieu)"' and 
academic sociologists - such as the director of the Polish Academy of Sciences 
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Professor Andrzej Rychard who assisted the 
party's 1995 presidential campaign. '" Indeed, in the 1997 parliamentary election 
campaign the party prided itself on the fact that had undertaken detailed opinion 
research before determining how much exposure to give its leader Leszek 
Balcerowicz. "' Even the cash-strapped UP found the resources to fund polling 
research on the profile of its electorate and potential electorate in the run up to the 
1997 election. "' Meanwhile, the PSL - which, according to their Parliamentary Club 
Vice-Chairman Janusz Piechocin'ski, felt the mainstream polling organisations didn't 
take into account the specific characteristics of their predominantly rurally-based, 
electorate - established its own Peasant Institute for Public Opinion Research which 
comprised sympathetic sociologists and opinion polling specialists and was convened 
specifically for election campaigns. "' The ROP, which shared the PSL's mistrust of 
polling companies but for more ideological reasons, also established a semi- 
permanent unofficial polling workshop called the Centre for Public Opinion 
Research. "' 
Thirdly, although this was still very much at an experimental stage, there was also 
some evidence that Polish parties were becoming increasingly interested in utilising 
specialist media professionals and communications consultants. In the 1995 
presidential election campaign, for example, two commentators noted that "even 
those campaign staffs which seemed to rely on their candidate's natural assets, 
utilised (communications) specialists"' " and by the 1997 parliamentary elections 
Polish advertising and media specialists were welcoming the fact that "politicians are 
starting to increasingly use the services of professionals in order to carve out their 
own image. "' " 
The process was furthest advanced in the cases of the SLD/SdRP and the UW and, 
once again, Kwas'niewski's 1995 presidential campaign was a watershed. According 
to most Polish advertising specialists Kwaýniewski's was "the first really, modem 
... Ibid. 
'" 'Wojna na miny. 
"' Author interviews with Andrzej Potocki, 27 February and 26 November 26th 1997; and Pawel 
Piskorski, 25 November 1997. 
... Author interview with Piotr Marciniak, 19 November 1997. 
"' See: 'Zasada ograniczonego zaufania'. 
113 See: 'Kampania reklamowa'. 
"' 'Wojna na miny'. 
'Wiqcej zawodowstwa', Rzeczpospolita. I October 1997. 
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election campaign in Poland" where the candidate subordinated himself to his 
advisers, which included Robert Kwiatkowski, the co-owner of the EBD advertising 
agency, and the French Socialist Party and Francois Mitterand's campaign consultant, 
Jacques Seguella. 11' Media specialists and consultants - including Kwiatkowski and, 
according to some accounts, the French socialists - were also involved in the SLD's 
1997 parliamentary campaign - although to a much lesser extent. "' As SdRP's head 
of party organisation, and SLD Election Staffs organiser in both 1995 and 1997, 
Maciej Porqba put it, "the time of voluntary activity is ending ... there are now several 
dozen various types of marketing firms in Poland who do this as professionals taking 
advantage of the very great expertise that is available in the West ... If we can find 
people among these who want to work with us, then we will. ""' Similarly, according 
to the UW's National Press Spokesman Andrzej Potocki, the party "always uses paid 
professional media experts and communications consultants. ""' Both the UW's 
progenitor parties used external media relations experts in their election campaigns, as 
did the UW itself in the 1995 presidential elections when it employed a Polish- 
Belgian firm Corporate Profiles"' together with a number of TV specialists who 
offered their services voluntarily. "' According to Potocki, during the 1997 
parliamentary campaign the party also "hired firms that were involved TV 
production, billboards, the visual side of the campaign" as well as using a Polish- 
American company of media relations experts as strategic campaign advisers. "' 
Professional media and communications specialists were also utlised by the PSL, UP 
and ROP, although to a much lesser extent. PSL Executive Office director Marian 
Zalewski, for example, felt that "when it comes to TV you have to use experts and we 
will use them, there is no doubt about this. ""' During the 1993 parliamentary 
elections the party hired a Polish advertising company, JOzef Wqgrzyn, to produce 
their TV election broadcasts; and in 1997 once again employed specialists to produce 
their TV and radio programmes, together with a well-known graphic artist, Waldemar 
ýweiiy, to design their posters. "' In the 1997 campaign the UP hired the Polish- 
"' See: J. Paradowska, 'A kolor jego jest niebieski', Polityka. 9 December 1995; A. Nivat, 
'Convincing voters that Kwagniewski is "the choice of the future"', Transition. Vol. 2 No. 8.19 April 
1996. pp32-35. 
"' See: K. Olszewski, 'Kampania doradc6w', Rzeczpospolita. I July 1997 and author interview with 
Dariusz YJimaszewski, 21 November 1997. 
... Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
"' Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
120 Ibid. 
"' See: 'Wojna na miny'. 
Author interviews, February 27 1997 and 26 November 1997. 
Author interview, II March 1997. 
Author interviews with Ewa Czaczkowska, Rzeczpospolita daily, 26 June 1997 and 21 November 
1997. 
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Swedish advertising firm Marketpoint to design their posters and leaflets"' and the 
ROP also employed media specialists to prepare "specific segments" of their election 
campaign such as their TV and radio slots, together with a group of sympathetic 
media specialists who voluntarily undertook specialist analyses of the party's 
campaign. "' 
Nevertheless, although there was evidence of parties increasingly recognising the 
value of external policy experts, public opinion specialists and (to a much lesser 
extent) media and communications consultants - and attempting to develop networks 
of sympathisers in these fields - there was also contrary evidence which revealed clear 
limits to the extent to which such 'professionals' were being utilised. 
Firstly, it was questionable to what extent most of this activity could really be 
described as 'professionalisation' given that much of it was motivated by political (if 
not personal) sympathies and supplied to the parties on a voluntary rather than a paid, 
contractual basis. SdRP Chairman Jozef Oleksy's group of academic advisers, for 
example, worked voluntarily"' and the party's head of organisation Maciej Porqba 
pointed out that, "if we ask for (professional polling or media) help from outside then 
they are aware that they are working voluntarily... we operate on the basis of 
sympathisers who take responsibility for these matters ... but not on the basis of 
payment. This is simply co-operation within the parameters of common, left-wing 
interests. We are all on the left and feel we should work together. ""' PSL Executive 
Office director Marian Zalewski also pointed out that, although there were some 
media specialists "with whom we work on the usual (commercial) basis", generally 
external media advice was provided by "journalists who are party members and help 
us in view of the fact that they are party members"119; while it was also claimed that 
the party's expert policy advisers provided their services voluntarily and without 
seeking payment. "' 
Similarly, according to UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational. Affairs Wojciech 
Borowik his party's use of specialist advisers was "a voluntary activity and, therefore, 
not very effective""' a view confirmed by leader Ryszard Bugaj who said that the 
party "don't hire professionals" to analyse the results of opinion polling and (until the 
Author interview with Piotr Marciniak, 19 November 1998. 
Author interview, 27th November 1997 
1-17 See: 'Partyjni eksperci'. 
Author interview, 28 February 1998. 
Author interview, II March 1998. 
"0 See: 'Partyjni eksperci'. 
... Author interview, 19 February 1998. 
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1997 election campaign) "don't order our own research. ""' The party's National 
Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also pointed out that even the paid work undertaken 
by the party's professional communications specialists in the 1997 campaign would 
be "to some degree, voluntazy' with "the payments of a kind that will involve a 
certain degree of sympathy from people ... it will not be ... an occasion for these people 
to make the large amounts of money that they would if they worked for industry or in 
some other non-political role. ""' According to ROP National Press Spokesman Jacek 
Kurski, the party's policy advisers also worked for the party voluntarily and were not 
paid to prepare experts' reports"' while, in terms of media and communications 
specialists, he felt that "unpaid people will offer themselves" and "we will be in a 
position to carry the main burden of the (1997 election) campaign. ""' 
An example of how Polish parties utilised the advice of external advisers and 
specialists on an unpaid basis was the support provided to them by their Western 
&sister' party organisations or foundations and from the American Democratic and 
Republican parties. In terms of the former, in addition to the aforementioned 
assistance which SdRP and Kwagniewski received from the French Socialist Party, 
UP National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz acknowledged that his party benefited 
from training schools on campaign skills organised by "the British Labour Party and 
the foundations connected with the European social democratic parties. ""' Indeed, 
according UP's 1997 election organiser Piotr Marciniak, it was campaign specialists 
supplied by the Swedish social democratic party who analysed the party's polling 
research during that campaign and, "to a large extent, we formulated the concept of 
our election campaign in contact with them. Intellectually, that is, only in the 
programmatic sense ... they didn't help us organisationally. ""' In terms of the latter, 
the Polish office of the International Republican Institute, for example, provided 
unpaid advice to AWS and organised training schools for ROP and UW activists, 
while the National Democratic Institute's Polish branch adopted an even more 
catholic approach and organised training sessions for representatives from the UW, 
UP, ROP, SdRP youth sections and a number of AWS affiliates, on subjects such as 
organising local party structures and targeting women voters in election campaigns. "' 
'Zasada ograniczonego zaufania'. 
Author interview with Tomasz Nalqcz, UP National Press Spokesman, 3 March 1997. 
'Partyjni eksperci' 
Author interview with Jacek Kurski, ROP National Press Spokesman, 4 March 1997. 
Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
Author interview, 19 November 1997. 
See: 'Kampania doradc6w'. 
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Secondly, the use of paid external consultants and advisers was generally (and, in the 
case of opinion polling and communications specialists, almost exclusively) confined 
to the periods running up to national elections. Speaking six months before the 1997 
parliamentary election UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech, for example, pointed 
that while, "these kind of consultants who relate to everyday matters - experts, 
professionals, sociologists - we are using them all them all the time... only now will 
we be hiring paid consultants who will be working with us on the question of 
determining an election strategy. ""' Similarly, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational 
Affairs Wojciech Borowik drew attention to the fact that, "we are trying to get 
together the resources so that in the last six months in the run-up to the election 
campaign we can have professional groups supporting us. "110 In one sense, of course, 
this conformed with the notion of parties as primarily election-orientated 
organisations posited in the 'electoral-professional' and 'cartel' party models. On the 
other hand, it also made it difficult to see these parties as somehow 'contracting out' 
large portions of their central office organisational and campaigning functions; and 
'professional' consultants increasingly replacing and acting as a direct substitute for 
weaker party bureaucracies. 
By far the most important impediment towards the more regular utilisation of 
professional consultants by Polish parties was the sheer cost involved in hiring them; 
particularly given that many of the best consultants in the marketing, advertising and 
communications fields were American or West European and, therefore, very 
expensive. According to SdRP's head of organisation, Maciej Porqba, for example, 
"we have this financial situation and it is difficult for us ... at this present time to 
guarantee people decent working conditions and pay. ""' The PSL's programmatic 
director Jan Wypych pointed out that while the party had been approached by a 
number of companies involved in media and communications strategy during the 
1997 election campaign "the costs involved were of a different level to that which we 
could put into the campaign-this was the main reason, they were too expensive"' a 
view shared by the party's National Press Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski who 
argued that "the large costs associated with this are the most important factor ... I don't 
think we can afford this. ""' ROP's head of information Andrzej Kierylo also argued 
that "if someone agrees to work with us for nothing then we will happily utilise their 
advice" but that the party "simply cannot afford ... to hire 
foreign specialists. ""' 
Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
Author interview, 26 November 1997. 
Author interview with Aleksander Bentkowski, PSL National Press Spokesman, 4 March 1997. 
'Kampania doradc6w'. 
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Similarly, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs Wo ciech Borowik pointed 
out that while, "we want to begin professional ... activities-professionalism depends 
on ... money ... (and)... on the basis of our meagre resources most our activity has to be 
voluntary. ""' The party's National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also felt that, "if 
we had the money then, of course, we would take advantage of them, there's no doubt 
about it ... (but) it costs a lot ... and it is as a result of this impediment, above all, that we 
will not use Western experts. " Indeed, Nalecz also pointed that it was not simply a 
question of the cost of actually hiring the consultants but also of implementing their 
proposals, "because there is no sense in hiring experts in order to get their ideas on 
the specific means for implementing a campaign and not take advantage of these ideas 
on the grounds of poverty... So in order to hire consultants you have to have certain 
material capabilities to implement their plans, at least in some meaningful way if not 
in full. ""' Ironically, the parties with could draw on the largest number of 
sympathisers with an appropriate level of professional campaigning skills to assist 
their parties voluntarily were generally those with the strongest financial bases, while 
the parties with the smallest networks of potential volunteer 'professional' 
sympathisers were, like the UP, also those who could least afford to hire paid 
advisers. 
A secondary factor constraining the 'professionalisation' of Polish parties was a 
residual suspicion of external experts and advisers, particularly advertising agencies 
and marketing firms, real value. An extremely important factor here was the folklore 
associated with the disastrous experience of the UW's progenitor, the Liberal- 
Democratic Congress (KLD), during the 1993 parliamentary elections. The KLD ran 
the first truly 'Westernised' Polish election campaign under the direction of the well- 
known British advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi and, in spite of the large sums 
of money invested in the campaign, produced a derisory result well below the 5% 
threshold. Although this mistrust was, to some extent evident in all Polish parties, it 
was particularly striking in the PSL and right-wing parties such as ROP. One 
authoratitaive commentator on PSL affairs, for example, explained the party's 
reluctance to utilise external communication and media advisers on the existence of 
"a lot of phobias ... the consultant would be suspected that they were dishonest and not 
working for the benefit of the party"'although, according to party's programmatic 
director Jan Wypych the "supporters of more traditional methods of mobilising the 
rural electorate ... are not just reactionaries and have a point that there is a large 
"' Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
14' Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
14' Author interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, June 26 1997. 
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element of the PSL electorate that would be put off by too slick a campaign ... indeed, 
the evidence of the KLD's 1993 campaign suggests that such a campaign can easily 
backfire and not just among the rural electorate. ""' The ROP also shared many of the 
Polish right's traditional suspicions 'professional' campaigning techniques, 
exemplified by two Polish commentators' quip that, in his 1995 presidential election 
campaign, the party's future founder and Chairman Jan Olszewski took "strong 
support in the 'Ursus' (tractor factory -a stronghold of the Polish radical right) as an 
indicator of his popularity in the country as a whole" rather than rely on more 
sophisticated and scientific sources, such as opinion pollS. 149 
However, not only was this factor very much a secondary one to that of cost in all the 
parties' considerations, the greatest hostilities tended to be directed towards 'Western' 
media and communications advisers on the grounds that did not properly understand 
Polish political culture; and, more generally, in relation to the exportability of 
Western campaigning models to Polish conditions. Not surprisingly the greatest 
unease on this score was evident in the PSL and ROP. Although generally a supporter 
of his party utilising modem campaigning techniques, PSL National Press Spokesman 
Aleksander Bentkowski, for example, also expressed anxieties about the KLD's 
experience in 1993 which he saw as "an example of taking advantage of a means of 
campaigning which is transferred to our conditions from the West without due 
regard" for Polish conditions where "for obvious reasons ... people see a style of 
campaigning with big business behind it and subconsciously reject this. ""' Similarly, 
the ROP's National Press Spokesman Jacek Kurski said that his party was, "not 
convinced about ... these experts ... from Western firms who are paid large sums of 
money and have already led one Polish political party to the grave ... because here 
in 
Poland you have to have your own original scenario! '", 
Such anxieties could also be found in parties who were generally more enthusiastic 
about professional media and communications advisers. As one commentator noted 
"although it was often described as American in style and compared to (Bill) 
Clinton's (1992 American presidential) campaign" Kwas'niewski's 1995 campaign 
was, in terms of " translating general objectives and specific principles into campaign 
"152 language, into specific elements ... implemented exclusively 
by Polish forces. 
Indeed, SdRP National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski argued that while 
"' Author interview, 20 February 1997. 
'Wojna na miny'. 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
'A kolor jego jest niebieski'. 
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"there are certain ... experiences ... that you can take advantage of" he was "fairly 
sceptical about hiring an American PR firm ... because you have to know the Polish 
reality, the methods of getting to people and I know that a couple of political parties 
lost out as a result of doing this... organised its activities in an American style and 
simply transplanted them here. ""' Similarly, SdRP's head of organisation and one of 
Kwagniewski's campaign organisers Maciej Porqba argued that, "certain (campaign) 
elements are typically Polish and you can't get round that. ""' UP National Press 
Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also expressed a preference for using Polish specialists on 
the grounds that "there aren't always good results from consulting experts used to 
operating in countries with a different experience from that in Poland .... not all these 
things are transferable" and cited the 1993 KLD campaign which "ended in 
catastrophe precisely through trying to transfer certain Western models" as an 
example of the dangers of non-Polish campaign specialists and the fact "every idea 
transferred from a different country, different culture or different cultures should be 
modified in a natural way. ""' Even Andrzej Potocki, National Press Spokesman for 
the UW, a party explicitly committed to using professional Western campaign 
specialists, admitted that there were "advantages and disadvantages" to "dealing with 
people who are new to the Polish scene" such as the American firm which the party 
hired to assist the party in preparing its 1997 election campaign. While, on the one 
hand, their lack of direct involvement in Polish politics meant they could allow to 
make more dispassionate and objective political assessments, "the danger, of course, 
is that it is possible that they won't know a lot of things about Poland that are worth 
knowing. ""' 
Moreover, the greatest anxieties also appeared to be related to fears of losing 
6political control' to 'strategic' campaign advisers rather than hiring individual 
professional advisers and specialists or specific organisations with particular skills 
such as TV and radio production, artistic design and copy writing. SdRP head of 
organisation Maciej Porqba, for example, said that the SLD "aren't going to make the 
mistake the KLD made ... of hiring special firms ... and having a campaign precisely 
programmed by Saatchi and Saatchi ... with no idea of what was required""' while the 
party's National Press Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski pointed that the SLD's co- 
operation with media specialists in the 1997 election campaign "did not have an 
institutional rank, it was more a case of co-operation with specific people. ""' 
Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
Author interview, 21 November 1997. 
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Similarly, according to the PSL's programmatic director Jan Wypych his party 
"didn't go in the direction of hiring a firm" but rather turned to "experts, directors, 
artists... hired on an individual basis ... whether it was for photos, film, radio, posters or 
graphics. "I" ROP National Secretary and 1997 election campaign organiser Wojciech 
WIodarczyk also pointed out that, "there wasn't a firm which determined the whole of 
our campaign ... we didn't turn to advertising firms ... apart from those who prepared 
specific segments .... according to the principles that we laid down for them. ""' 
Even the UW, the only party which actually hired a firm of strategic election 
campaign advisers in 1997, expressed anxieties about the possible consequences for 
maintaining clear lines of political accountability and control. According to UW 
National Press Spokesman Andrzqj Potocki the party was determined not to repeat the 
KLD's "basic error ofjust approaching Saatchi and Saatchi and saying: 'Run our 
campaign for us please. See you after the election. """ Indeed, according to the 
party's 1997 election organiser PawcI Piskorski (who was also involved in the 1993 
KLD campaign), "it wasn't a case of handing over our campaign to one firm and it 
'ran' the campaign for us ... we 
didn't depend on any one firm or expert ... We 
had 
experience of such models from earlier years ... and it did not turn out as we had 
expected. " Rather, according to Piskorski, "this time ... we decided the whole strategy, 
the method of implementation must be in the hands of politicians ... 
it was the Election 
Staffs that decided on all important matters and we used consultants for help and 
experts for specific elements - TV, graphics etc - they were the 'undcr-cxccutivcs' of 
tasks determined by the Staffs. "162 
There was also some evidence of a slow but steady decline in hostility to utilising 
professional (and even Western) media and communication advisers even in those 
parties previously most uneasy about political marketing and modem campaigning 
techniques. At the beginning of 1997, for example, PSL National Press Spokesman 
Aleksander Bentkowski argued that he did not feel that "there will be any opposition 
to" to using "domestic organisations which are involved in public relations to promote 
the PSL during the election campaign""' and his party even toyed with the idea of 
hiring Jose Maria Aznar's Spanish Popular Party's campaign advisers (although 
nothing, ultimately, came of this). "" Right-wing parties also appeared to be 
increasingly aware of the need to run more sophisticated and professional campaigns, 
"" Author interview, 26 November 1997. 
"0 Author interview, 27 November 1997. 
Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
164 See: 'Kampania doradcOw'. 
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as the experience of AWS's 1997 election campaign (discussed in more detail in a 
separate chapter) illustrated. Even the ROP's head of information Andrzej Kierylo 
acknowledged that his party, for example, took "seriously the indicators provided to 
us by the (American) International Republican Institute. ""' 
Finally, it is also worth noting a third factor constraining the 'professionalisation' of 
Polish parties, namely the fact that most Polish professional media and 
communications consultants were, themselves, reluctant to become too closely 
involved or identified with either a particular party or politics in general. "' Firstly, 
working for a political party campaign generally involved an unrealistically high set 
of expectations on the part of the 'client' together with such a small potential 
campaign budget that such success could be guaranteed (which, thereby, also 
rebounded on the firm's reputation). Secondly, most Polish advertising companies 
and marketing firms were afi-aid of the potential stigma and damage to their longer 
term commercial interests which could follow from working for (and, thereby, 
becoming too identified with) a particular party. Thirdly, political parties were a 
particularly difficult 'product' for a, still nascent, advertising and marketing industry 
to promote given, as director-general of marketing company ITI McCann Erickson 
Marek Janicki Put it "every other product doesn't speak7"' and the fact that, given 
their lingering suspicions, Polish politicians did not always willingly accept advice 
from political marketing consultants on how they should present themselves. Lech 
Walqsa, who refused to accept his consultants' advice on changing his appearance 
during the 1995 presidential campaign, was a classic example of this. 
Conclusion 
As hyothesized, all the parties surveyed conformed to the later models of party 
organisation with: generally weak party central office bureaucracies employing only a 
small number of paid staff and a modest local party 'machine'; together with a large 
proportion, or even a majority, of the party's employees attached to the party 
organisation in parliament. This pattern was particularly evident at the local level 
where there was substantial overlap in terms of 'parliamentary' and 'party' offices, 
staff and technical facilities. As one Polish commentator accurately put it, "the main 
organisational unit of Polish politics is the Sejm deputy ... political parties are officially 
poor as church mice .... In the meantime party life carries on somewhere else, 
in other 
words, in the local offices, cars, hotels which the state provides for the political 
Ibid. 
See: 'Wojna na miny' and 'Kampania reklamowa'. 
"'Kampania reklamowa'. 
parties. """' Although the party headquarters bureaucracy was formally under the 
control of the 'party in central office' and not the parliamentary leadership, the two 
sets of leaders were, in reality, often indistinguishable and, given the tiny number of 
staff and modest technical facilities attached to the party central office anyway, this 
$control' was a largely meaningless concept anyway. 
Of the two 'successor' parties, only the PSL displayed significantly more 
characteristics of the mass party in the sense of having a stronger party 'machine' 
attached to the party in central office. The hypothesised superiority of the both the 
PSL and SdRP was much more evident in terms of local organisational infrastructure 
and technical facilities. However, although 'organisational inheritance' was a 
secondary factor - particularly in the case of the PSL which was able to retain more of 
its predecessor's assets - this relative superiority was more a function of the fact that 
these were the two parties with the largest parliamentary representation, and 
concomitant access to local parliamentary office facilities. 
Moreover, while there was also some evidence of the increasing utilisation of external 
experts, advisers and consultants, much of this was was on a voluntary rather than 
contractual basis and Polish parties conformed much less to the electoral-professional 
and cartel models in this respect. This was partly due to suspicion and a residual 
hostility towards, particularly Western, professional communication advisers, largely 
based on one party's extremely bad experience; together with a reluctance on the part 
of advertising and marketing firms themselves to become too closely associated with 
political parties. However, the main obstacle to the greater 'professionalisation' of 
Polish parties was, as hypothesised, lack of resources and the parties' extremely weak 
financial bases. Generally, therefore, there was no realistic prospect for the 
foreseeable future that such external 'professionals' as the parties did utilise would 
somehow develop as a substitute for the weak party central office bureaucracies as 
envisaged in the electoral-professional and cartel models. 
M. Janicki, Tewe pien4dze', Polityka, 16 November 1996. 
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CIMPTER FOUR: 
PARTIES AND THEIR ELECTORA TES 
Before considering whether or not the new Polish parties seek to organise and 
encapsulate their supporters within party structures it is necessary, as a first step 
towards determining what type of party model is developing in post-communist 
Poland to determine precisely what kind of electorates they are attracting and seeking 
to attract. As Katz and Mair point out, the mass party attempted to segment the 
electorate into a series of pre-defiiied and exclusive socio-economic constituencies 
and, rather than seeking to represent the 'national interest', directed its appeal at, 
derived the bulk of their support from, and sought to articulate and represent the 
interests of 'their' segment of the electorate. ' Subsequently, with the emergence of 
the catch-all and electoral-professional models, the notion of parties as the 
representatives of pre-defiiied socio-economic classes was modified as parties made 
broader appeals and competed to secure a wider range of support from all segments of 
society. ' In other words, as parties began defting their bases of support, as Katz and 
Mair put it, "electorally rather than socially and culturallY"3 defensive electoral 
strategies based on retaining and mobilising limited electoral constituencies were 
replaced with more offensive ones which involved competing for voters across the 
board, and thereby "exchanging effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more 
immediate electoral success. "4 
Moreover, in order to attract as wide an electorate as possible, catch-all/electoral- 
professional parties appealed to what Panebianco termed the "opinion electorate", by 
concentrating on policy effectiveness and "valence" issues which transcended narrow 
group interests, rather than to the "electorate of belonging" on a narrowly ideological 
basis; with a concomitant focus on the competence of party leaders as potential 
national statesmen rather than representatives of a specific socio-economic class or 
segment of the electorate. ' The result was, as Katz and Mair put it, a process which 
some commentators described as the "Americanisation" of European politics with 
elections "seen to revolve around the choice of leaders rather than the choice of 
policies or programmes. " 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', pp6-7. 
'The Transformation of Western European Party', p 190; and Political Parties: Organisation and 
Power. p263. 
'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe' p605. 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy' p 13. 
Political Parties: Organisation and Power. p263. 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy' p8. 
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This process of party change was, as noted in chapter one, rooted in the emergence of 
less socially integrated and culturally homogeneous electorates in the 1950s and 
1960s which made it more difficult for parties to identify distinct segments of the 
electorate with collective identities and long-term interests and, consequently, led to a 
decline in party identification as electorates became more open, unstable and 
politically independent. At the same time, economic growth and the development of 
the welfare state facilitated the development of less partisan and divisive party 
programmes which could be claimed to serve a general rather than particular interest; 
while the development of the mass media as the primary mode of political 
communication allowed party leaders to appeal directly to an electorate at large who 
were learning to behave "more like consumers than active participants. "' 
Consequently, with electoral behaviour "no longer believed to ýe moulded by 
predisposition rather than choice" voters were believed to have become "free floating 
and uncommitted, available to, and also susceptible to, any of the competing parties. "' 
Interestingly, in Katz and Mair's more recent cartel party model, the wheel appears to 
have turned full-circle with a return to the idea of competition as more "contained and 
manage&' and parties more clearly defining 'their' segments of the electorate. While 
parties still compete for voters the posited existence of a party 'cartel' means that they 
do so "in the knowledge that they share with their competitors a mutual interest in 
collective organisational survival" and "in some cases, even the limited incentive to 
compete has actually been replaced by a positive incentive not to compete. "9 
So what kind of electoral strategies and voter profiles might we expect to see 
developing among the new Polish parties? Commentators such as Kopecky have 
hypothcsised that parties in post-communist Eastern Europe are more likely to 
resemble the catch-all/electoral-professionaI models and develop as formations with 
very loose electoral constituencies which approach "a wider clientele of voters ... rather 
than opt for the representation of well-defined segments of society. "O The main 
reason for this is the lack of a strong cleavage structure underpinning the post- 
communist electorates which, according to Mair, makes them "almost by definition, 
more open and available than those of the established democracies. "" This openness 
is, in turn, rooted not just in the volatility which we might expect in any newly 
lbid, p7. 
lbid, p8. 
lbid, p19. 
'Developing Party Organizations in East-Central Europe', p518. 
"at is different about post-communist party systems? p9. 
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democratised electorates but also, it is argued, in the homoegenising communist social 
legacy which is likely to produce undifferentiated societies largely lacking in 
distinctive and easily identifiable social bases and dimensions. This 'Missing Middle' 
approach is based on the political sociology of the communist period most of which, 
as Evans and Whitefield point out, focused on the way that communist societies were 
atomised by "the combination of repressive and highly centralised state activities and 
by a reward system which facilitated individual rather than collective action ... the 
operation of egalitarian economic policies and disaggregation of social resources" 
which led to an absence of stable social cleavages or any intermediate, meso- 
structures based upon them. 12 Polish sociologist Miroslawa Grabowska exemplifies 
this approach when she argues that the, "totalitarian system destroys organisations and 
associations: parties, trade unions, business organisations, religious organisations, - the 
post-totalitarian civil society is 'flat'. This 'flat' society causes problems in politics 
because it is hard to represent amorphous groups. "11 
The 'Missing Middle' approach has been challenged both by 'Modernisation, 
theorists - who argue that the impact of industrialistion on communist societies 
created well-developed occupational and other interest-based cleavages which 
provided a basis for stable Western-style, party competition - and by Evans and 
Whitefield's own preferred 'Comparative Communist' approach which focuses on the 
role of country-specific factors - such as cultural differences, the varying patterns of 
modernisation across the region and variations in the extent of intermediate social 
organisations - to explain what they see as varied patterns of interest formation and 
articulation which are developing within post-communist societies. " Clearly, as Mair 
points out, the new electorates of post-communist Eastern Europe are not wholly 
homogeneous nor do they "lack any differentiation based on social stratification, 
occupation, ethnicity, religion" and "in some instances it is clear that divisions along 
some or all of these lines are at least as important as the equivalent division in the 
established democracies. "" In post-communist Poland, for example, it is possible to 
identify a number of distinct societal cleavages - or, perhaps, less definitively, 'points 
of reference' - which have their roots in the communist (or even pre-communist) 
period, need to be 'factored in' to qualify the 'Missing Middle' approach and may 
provide the putative parties with potential bases of support. These include: former 
members of the communist party or other organisations linked to the previous regime 
` 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', pp528-53 1. 
" M. Grabowska, 'Partie polityczne: reprezentant spoleczefistwa czy tw6rca nowego ladu. ' in 
Grabowska, M. and S. Mocka. cds. Pierwsza Szeiciolatka 1989-1995: Pr6ba Bilansu Polityki. 
Warsaw: Instytut StudiOw Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk. 1997. pp29-52 (32). 
'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe', pp531-534. 
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such as the OPZZ trade union federation; the large peasantry and private farming 
sector which survived as an independent economic sphere of the economy during the 
communist period; the Catholic Church to which 90% of Poles owe their allegiance 
and which also retained a measure of organisational autonomy under communism; 
and the independent Solidarity trade union which enjoyed a brief but spectacular 
period of legality in 1980-81 and continued to ftmction as a 'mobilsing myth' for 
much of the Polish democratic opposition during the remainder of the 1980s. 
However, not only are those societal 'points of reference' - with the exception of the 
urban-rural cleavage - rooted in ideological or cultural identities rather than socio- 
economic interests but, as Mair points out, cleavage structures only act to stabilise the 
electorate slowly over a number of years. " Moreover, the existence of a social 
cleavage also involves a subjective sense of collective identity and not simply the 
mere existence of distinctive social segments based on a number of objective and 
observable characteristics. Apart from the obvious point that the long period of one- 
party communist rule precluded the development of any lasting social loyalties to any 
of the new Polish parties, given the enormous societal changes which have 
accompanied the political and economic transitions, post-communist social structures 
remain extremely fluid. Consequently, it is likely to be simply too early for any of the 
new, emerging socio-economic interests and identities to have properly crystallised in 
such a way as to provide a sufficient basis for a stable pattern of party alignments. 
We might, therefore, hypothesise, that such an amorphous and uncrystallised set of 
socio-economic interests and identities, and concomitant pattern of electoral 
volatility, almost certainly preclude the development of either mass party- !T 
electoral strategies based on appealing to, seeking to represent and maintammg stable 
links with clearly defined socio-economic segments of the electorate, or the more 
recent cartel party strategy based on "contained and managed" electoral competition. 
Consequently, following Kopecky, we might expect the new Polish parties to develop 
their electoral strategies on the basis of a broad appeal to the widest possible set of 
potential voters in line with the catch-all/electoral professional party models. 
However, given that, at least until socio-economic interests become more crystallised, 
the main political cleavages are likely to develop around ideological or moral-cultural 
issues - such as attitudes towards the communist past or the Catholic Church, the new 
Polish parties are - unlike Western catch-all/electoral-professionaI parties - not 
necessarily likely to downplay ideology and concentrate solely (or even primarily) on 
issues relating to competence and policy effectiveness. We might also expect the one 
"' Ibid. 
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exception here to be the PSL, for whom the large private peasantry provides a 
substantial segment of the Polish electorate with a reasonably well-defined and 
crystallised socio-economic interest and collective identity; and which will, 
consequently, pursue something closer to a mass party electoral strategy focusing its 
appeal primarily on this segment of the electorate. 
Moreover, a number of commentators have identified leader-orientation and, as 
Schopflin put it, a tendency for citizens "to believe in persons rather than institutions 
and to accept them as the true target of political attitudes"' as one of the key feature of 
post-communist politics. " In other words, voters in post-communist Eastern Europe 
are, to a large extent, likely to develop their attitudes to the new parties in relation to 
the key personalities that are associated with them; or, as one Polish party strategist 
put it, "given that Polish political culture is not too advanced politically ... people look 
at who the leader is" and "if the leader is in order you pull people along to an 
enormous degree. "Is Consequently, again in line with the catch-all/electoral 
professional - but also the cartel - party models, we might expect broad electoral 
appeals to be accompanied by a high degree of personalisation, or "Americanisation", 
with party leaders playing a key role in Polish electoral politics - and for this role to 
be reflected in party electoral strategies. 
In order to test these hypotheses - and, thereby, make a preliminary assessment as to 
what type of party model is emerging in post-communist Poland - this chapter, 
therefore, examines four aspects relating to the nature of party links with their 
electorates. Firstly, based on interviews with party strategists and officials 
programmes and other written sources, the six parties and groupings overall electoral 
strategies are considered, particularly the question of whether they focused their 
appeals on specific and clearly defined socio-economic segments of the electorate as 
implied in the mass party and (although in a rather different sense) cartel party 
models or whether, as hypothesised, they attempted to attract the broader and looser 
electoral constituencies implied in the catch-all/electoral-professionaI models. 
Secondly, the September 1997 parliamentary election campaign is considered as a 
specific case study of how the parties sought to 'operationalise' these electoral 
strategies. Thirdly, based primarily on an analysis of the 1997 election results - but 
supplemented, where appropriate, with previous parliamentary and presidential 
election results and other survey evidence - party electoral profiles are examined in 
order to assess: whether the actual distribution of party support among particular 
a. 
" G. Schopflin. Politics in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Blackwell. 1993. p268. See also: L. Holmes. 
Post-Communism: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1997. p 17. 
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segments of the electorate reflect these electoral strategies; and, if voting patterns are 
not rooted in socio-economic interests, then what specific factors account for each of 
the party's or grouping's bases of support. Fourthly, the particular role which each 
party leader played in their 1997 election campaign is examined in order to assess the 
level of 'leader-orientation' in and personalisation. of Polish electoral politics. 
Pgjy electoral strategie 
As hypothesised, most party electoral strategies were based on winning over as broad 
a swathe of the electorate as possible rather than appealing to specific and clearly 
defined socio-economic constituencies. " In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP - 
which contested elections as the main component of the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD) - stressed that, "we are not a party of one class or social stratum, "'O while its 
1997 programme was directed at, "all citizens, employees and employers, owners of 
family businesses and farming enterprises, retirees and pensioners, who, like us, want 
higher principles to be better achieved and appropriated in public life. "" The party 
was particularly keen to stress the fact that it did not look for support only in classical 
social democratic socio-economic constituencies but also actively sought the backing 
of the emerging Polish 'middle class'. SLD Parliamentary Club Press Spokesman 
Zbigniew Siemiqtkowski, for example, argued that, "we don't deny our support for 
the middle class that is forming Poland. Indeed, it is this milieu which we perceive to 
be a part of our social democratic electorate. The left's position cannot be built on 
"2 groups that are pauperised, embittered and permanent losers. " Similarly, SdRP 
National Spokesman Dariusz; Klimaszewski argued that, "we don't just have to look 
after people who can't cope with the transformation, who lose out ... We also have to 
take care of the development of the middle class. This is the natural social motor in 
the process of the changes ... which, through its active individualism, is able to direct 
and modernise the economy. "21 
"A finding confirmed by research undertaken by Polish sociologist Miroslawa Grabowska on 
delegates to the 1995 SdRP, UW, UP and Christian National Union (ZChN - one of the main parties 
comprising the AWS coalition) conferences which found that that "party elites are unable (or 
unwilling) to ... turn their attentions to specific groups having specific interests with an appeal to 
represent them" (emphasis in original) and that the majority of delegates at every party conference 
regarded their party as "the representative of the whole of society" ranging from 81% of ZChN 
delegates (compared with 15% who mentioned a specific group), 66% of SdRP delegates (25%), 57% 
of UW delegates (36%) and 50% of UP delegates (41%). See: 'Partie polityczne', pp35-38. 
'0 SdRP. Socjaldemokratyczna Alternatywa: Polska Demokratyczna, Sprawiedliwa, Bezpieczna. 
Warsaw. 1993. 
SdRP. Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej. Warsaw. 1997. 
Z. Siemiqtkowski. 'Przeciw magicznemu mygleniu'. Polityka. 7 May 1994. 
Author interview with Dariusz Klimaszewski, 27 February 1997. 
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Similarly - and, perhaps, equally surprisingly, given that it was an electoral formation 
primarily based on the Solidarity trade union - AWS's electoral strategy was also not 
aimed specifically at attracting workers but rather, according to its National 
Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek, on winning over "a very, very broad electorate ... We 
are not a party of the kind of, for example, the PSL which, in a traditional way, tries 
to attract the rural peasant electorate. "' Tywonek justified this strategy on the grounds 
that "this is a moment of economic transformation, systemic transformation, 
transformation of social consciousness" and that, consequently, it was "difficult here 
to close off some kind of narrow circles" and "to address your programmatic 
proposals exclusively to the peasants, forgetting about the intelligentsia ... young 
people ... or working people. 
"' Using similar arguments, the UW National Spokesman 
Andrzej Potocki argued that his party had to be "at least in some way, attractive to 
every potential elector" given that in Poland, "elections are obviously not as closely 
connected with group interests as they are in countries were democracy has been 
functioning longer and ... an enormous number of votes cast ... are not necessarily 
connected with the interests of that particular voter or member of that social groUp. "25 
UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also argued that, apart from agricultural 
workers, "when it comes to other social groups then, in fact, our appeal is very 
broad"" and the UP's 1995 programme stressed that the party felt itself to be the "heir 
to the traditions of the Polish socialist movement which, on many occasions in its 
history, has succeeded like no other in hartnonising the interests of the nation and the 
state with the interests of workingpeople. "I (emphasis added) Similarly, according to 
its ideological declaration, the ROP was a party which brought together people from 
f (every social and occupational milieu" who were "ready to act in the cause of the 
reconstruction of the Republic. "" 
In so far as party strategists did attempt to define more specifically whom their target 
electorates were, they invariably did so in terms of ideological, cultural or even moral 
rather than socio-economic categories. Polish sociologist Tomasz Zukowski, for 
example, has argued that the SdRP/SLD's electoral strategy was based on attracting 
an electorate that was "as much a community of cultural interests invoking a different 
set of values as a community of economic interests" and that this was particularly 
evident in this grouping's attitude to the role of the Catholic Church and religion in 
Author interview with Tomasz Tywonek, AWS National Press Spokesman, 4 June 1997. 
Author interview with Andrzej Potocki, 27 February 1997. 
Author interview with Tomasz Nalqcz, 3 March 1997. 
27 LTp. U Progu M Wieku: Program Unii Pracy. Warsaw. 1996. 
ROP. Deklaraqja Ideowa. Warsaw. undated. 
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public life. " In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP argued that, "we regard 
separating the Church from the state as a fundamental principle of a democratic state 
of law" and that the state "should also guarantee the rights of non-believers who are 
increasingly threatened with intolerance. "" The SLD's 1993 election programme also 
warned that, "the achievements of democratic theory, the principle of separating the 
state from the Church, are being broken, (by those) stubbornly advancing the concept 
of a confessional state in which Catholic doctrine has a monopoly on the truth, 
justice, morality and ethics, and where the law is brought into line with the 
requirements of the clergy and religious norms. ""' Meanwhile, although in its most 
recent programme SdRP adopted a slightly gentler tone and argued that it was "not a 
party doctrinally opposed to religion and the Churches" and "in favour of the co- 
operation of the state with the Churches in dealing with important social problems, " 
the party nonetheless re-affirmed its support for the "separation of Churches and 
confessional unions from the state" and the "impartiality of the state towards various 
'worldview' orientations, Churches and confessional unions, treating them equally 
favourably without any kind of preferences and without the involvement of the state 
in the case of any of these orientations. "32 
Moreover, an important element of SdRP/SLD's electoral appeal was directed at that 
segment of the electorate which tended to view the communist period more 
sympathetically - or, as one 1993 SLD election pamphlet put it shared "a just and 
balanced assessment of People's Poland"' - although, for obvious reasons, this appeal 
was generally couched in fairly subtle and nuanced terms. In its 1993 programme, for 
example, SdRP argued that while the party supported "the just trial and punishment of 
the guilty, at the same, however, we decidedly oppose attempts to punish and 
discriminate against innocent people who were politically active during the PRL 
(Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa: Polish People's Republic) period ... Poland must be a 
home to all its citizens. ""' Similarly, in its 1997 programme, SdRP said that it had 
"respect and recognition for all those who reconstructed our country after the wartime 
wreckage ... (and) worked honestly for Poland when it was called People's Poland. We 
defend the biographies of these millions of people, their rights to retain their dignity 
today and their good name in the future. "" 
" Author interview with Professor Tornasz Zukowski, Institute of Social Studies, Warsaw University, 
24 June 1997. 
10 Sbqja1demokratyczna Alternatywa 
SLD. Tak Dalej ByJ Nie Musk Niech Reformy Stu2q Ludziom. Warsaw. 1993. 
Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej 
SLD. Wybory '93: 0 Czym Wyborca Powinien Wiedziec4. Warsaw. 1993. 
34 Socjaldemokratyczna A Iternatywa 
35 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej 
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AWS strategists also tended to defme its target electorate in ideological and moral- 
cultural terms although, in contrast to the SLD's overt secularity, AWS was, as 
National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek put it, "a grouping which draws on Christian 
traditions. " Moreover, AWS represented a "contestation of the Poland before 1989 
and the last four years (of SLD government)" and the grouping's electoral strategy 
was based overtly on appealing to "the broadly understood electorate which, both in 
1989 and in later years, voted for groupings emerging from Solidarity roots ... anti- 
SLD, anti-communist ... in one measure an ideological, political electorate ... an 
electorate, very broadly defmed, from the right side of the political spectrum to the 
very deep centre ... a centre-right electorate. 
"' Similarly, according to its National 
Spokesman Jacek Kurski, the ROP's electoral strategy was built upon appealing to 
"right-wing, traditional Catholic ... ordinary Poles who never had any 
dealings with 
communists, "" or, as he once described it, "the so-called ulaniski patriotic electorate" 
for whom "the main motivation is patriotism ... there aren't any motivations other than 
emotional, patriotic ones ... There aren't some sort of interests such as occupational 
ones ... its quite simply ... across all groups. 
"" 
An important aspect of the UP's electoral strategy was its appeal to the 'ideological 
centre' of the Polish political spectrum or those, as its leader Ryszard Bugaj put it, 
who "are neither supporters of sharp de-communisation, nor ... agree with 
forgetting 
history. "39 Similarly, although couched in programmatic rather than ideological or 
mOral-cultural terms, the UW also appeared to base its electoral strategy on appealing 
to an 'opinion electorate' rather than an 'electorate of belonging' or, as its leader 
Leszek Balcerowicz put it, "the sizable and growing group of people - currently in 
every social category - who believe that the changes implemented after 1989 were 
sensible and positive for them. "' (emphasis added) 
t 
However, nearly all of the parties and groupings surveyed were also making some 
provisional attempts to define their core electorates in terms of socio-economic 
'interests' and nuance their electoral strategies accordingly - or, at the very least, try 
to ensure that broader messages did not alienate these 'core' supporters. This was 
particularly evident in the case of UW and reflected in the party's enthusiasm for 
undertaking detailed research into its socio-economic electoral profile. (See Chapter 
" Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
Cited in interview with M. D. Zdort. 'My idziemy po, w1adzq', Rzeczpospolita, 10 June 1996. 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. An ulan was a Polish cavalryman. 
'9 Cited in interview with E. 01czyk. 'Efekt Kozy', Rzczeczpospolita. 26 March 1997. 
'0 Cited in 'Nowy plan Balccrowicza'. 
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on 'The Party Machine'). According to the UW's National Spokesman Andrzej 
Potocki the party felt that "in line with the old electoral truism 'in the first place, 
don't lose what you've already got"', the party had to define its core electorate and 
"look after these groups and then these groups will form a base on which we can 
build. " In other words, rather than making a blanket appeal to all sections of the 
electorate the UW had undertaken a "preliminary attempt to define our 
electorate ... our basic groups which we are trying to attract" and discover "natural 
partners" which could form the basis of a putative 'pro-reform alliance'. These 
groups were, according to Potocki: the traditional urban intelligentsia C'whose efforts 
provided the basis for Solidarity ... and (although) it hasn't benefited fmancially from 
the changes is involved in the process); the emerging Polish middle class 
("'yuppies'... young people who are entering into the professional world of business 
and commerce'); the business community ("those people who have decided to work 
for themselves ... and live from their own investments, from their own success in 
trading activities and handicrafts'); and young people in general and students in 
particular. " 
The SdRP/SLD, on the other hand, self-consciously attempted to define itself as a 
party which particularly expressed the "the aspirations of those social groups and 
citizens who - for various reasons - don't have the same opportunities to take 
advantage from the effects of economic growth. "' In the context of post-communist 
economic transition this meant, according to SdRP National Spokesman Dariusz 
Klimaszewski, protecting those "social groups who find themselves in the most 
difficult situation in this transformation" particularly what the party saw as its core 
electorate based on traditional social democratic constituencies such as: government 
employees in the so-called 'budgetary sphere' of education and the health service, the 
low paid and welfare benefits claimants, particularly pensioners and retirees and 
single mothers. " In the run up to the 1993 parliamentary elections, for example, SLD 
Election Committee Chairman Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz argued that his formation 
would, "to a large extent, address our individual appeals to the retired and pensioner 
milieu, the 'budgetary sphere' - particularly those deprived of the rights to benefit - or 
tenants who can't afford to pay their housing rent, than to other, more satisfied 
groups. "' The other self-declared 'left-wing' party surveyed, the UP, defined itself 
even more unambiguously as "a social democratic party representing the interests of 
those milieu who through their labour determine the advance of society's 
Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej 
Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
Cited in interview with E. Olczyk. 'Bqdziemy nudni', Rzczeczpospolita. 14-15 August 1993. 
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civilisation"I and its 1995 programme spoke of the necessity of "building up the UP's 
support among the weakest economic groups on whose support we particularly 
depend. "" 
Interestingly, the SdRP/SLD was also attempting to carve out an electoral niche for 
itself among constituencies more associated with the Western post-materialist left, 
exemplified by its attempts to focus on issues such as sex equality and reproductive 
rights in order to win over women voters. In its 1993 programme, for example, SdRP 
declared its opposition to "all forms of social, occupational, customary and political 
discrimination" and support for the expansion of childcare facilities; ` and, in its 1993 
election programme, the SLD re-affirmed its strong opposition to "legislation denying 
women the right to make decisions on the issue of their becoming mothers. ""' 
Similarly the 1997 SdRP programme called for the education system and the media to 
"show greater determination in eliminating the established stereotypes of women's 
and men's roles" and supported the promotion of "modem standards of equality in 
the occupational and social field. "' 
There was also some evidence that the ROP was attempting to modify its electoral 
strategy and define its electorate more clearly in terms of specific socio-economic 
groups. The first of these was small and medium-sized business people and their 
families who, according to ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, were "threatened 
by ... the hegemony of the post-communist economic nomenklatura and post- 
communist order in the economic administration ... and ... by the dishonest and 
privileged competition from speculative Western capital ... buying up our access to 
supermarkets. "" A second, considerably more amorphous, socio-economic segment 
were those voters who, as Kurski put it, "have suffered as a result of the changes"' and 
"allowed themselves to be taken in by the social promises of the UP and the 
SLD ... (and) always orientates towards parties of change"' which the ROP was 
thought to be able to attract because the party could "present the effects of right-wing 
reform in a manner which is pleasant to the ears of the left-wing clientele. "" 
45 Up. 'Polska demokratyczna, sprawiedliwa i nowoczesna' in Uchwala Programowa i Statut 
Przyjfrte przez Pierwszy Kongres Unii Pracy, 23-24 Stycznia 1993. Warsaw. 1993. 
UPrqgu. Uk7 Wiek. 
SoqjaIdemokratyczna Altematywa. 
" Tak Dalej Bye Nie Musi. 
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Author interview, 4 March 1997. See also: M. D. Zdort, 'Partia ulan6w i przedsiqbiorcOw' 
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As hypothesised, the only one of the six parties and groupings surveyed whose 
electoral strategy bore a resemblance to the mass party model - in the sense of being 
directed primarily at winning the support of a single, distinct and clearly-deflined 
socio-economic constituency - was the PSL. According to the PSL's ideological 
declaration, the party's "neo-agrarian" ideology drew upon the "centuries-long 
endevaours of the peasantry to live in freedom and participate equally in the life of 
the state"' and particularly emphasised the key role of "agriculture as one of the main 
areas of production and the basis for national existence" with "family farms 
constituting the foundation for the harmonious development of villages and the 
countryside" and "the basis of the agricultural system. "" The party also argued that 
the "the peasant and rural community is presently the main source of Nation's 
biological revival, the source of its material affluence resulting from the tilling of the 
soil" and "through its connection with the land, binding the Nation with our territory" 
was also the "source of precious moral values. "' At the same time as recognising "the 
ideas of solidarity of working people" and "the need to forrn... political and 
parliamentary alliances", the PSL gave "priority to the necessity of maintaining the 
political unity of the rural community. "' (emphasis added) According to party leader 
Waldemar Pawlak, therefore, the PSL was "above all, the representative of Polish 
peasants and the interests of this social group are the most important for us. "" 
However, there was also evidence that a number of PSL strategists increasingly 
shared the view that, as one party leader put it, the party's "history as a peculiar trade 
union for rural residents is ending"' and that it was making at least some efforts to 
modify its electoral strategy and broaden the basis of its electoral appeal beyond its 
core of small peasant farmers. Firstly, at its most modest, this involved various 
attempts to transform the PSL into a kind of 'rural catch-all party' directing the 
party's appeal to, as the 1996 PSL programme put it, "that portion of Polish society 
which lives in the countryside and the small towns, far-removed from the urban 
centres. " In other words, "the electorate to which we appeal is not just peasants, but 
also that section of society of peasant origins which hasn't forgotten its roots. We 
appeal to the whole of rural society. The countryside in spite of diversified social and 
occupational status, is united by common economic, social and cultural interests. "" 
" PSL. 'Deklaracja Ideowa Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego' in 0 Ksztaltowanie Szans Rozwoju dla 
Polski. Warsaw. 1997. pp5-16 (5). 
Ibid. p 11. 
Ibid. p 13. 
Ibid. p 13. 
'Naszym celem dobro Polski', Dziennik Ludowy, 22 November 1996. 
" J. Piechocifiski, 'Dlaczego warto, glosowad na PSL' in Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 August 1997. 
" PSL. 'Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe wobcc wyzwaii stojqcych przed Polsk4' in 0 Ksztaltowania 
R6wnych szans dla Polski. Warsaw. pp49-101 (59). 
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According to PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak, this made the PSL the natural party of 
those "people who live beyond the large agglomerations, because for these people the 
values represented by the peasant movement are more meaningftil. "60 
Secondly, and more ambitiously, this process involved attempts to develop an 
electoral strategy capable of attracting "a meaningful part of the urban electorate and 
not just to those people of peasant origin. "' Admittedly, a large element of this 
simply involved highlighting the PSL's argument that a strong agricultural sector and 
prosperous rural communities were in the national interest by, for example, arguing 
against importing food on the basis that, as PSL National Spokesman Aleksander 
Bentkowski put it, "in today's world a country's self-sufficiency in terms of 
foodstuffs is the basis of political sovereignty. "' However, the process of developing 
a broader appeal also involved highlighting other aspects of the PSL programme 
which, as Bentkowski put it, "strongly underline ... the protection of our land" and 
"placing maximum limits on the possible purchase of Polish land by foreigners" and 
other 'patriotic' themes emphasising the fact that, as another PSL leader put it, the 
party "has stubbornly defended and will defend Polish interests understood most 
literally ... Polish land, Polish capital and Polish enterprise. When it comes to 
privatisation with the participation of foreign capital then we always pose more 
questions and have more doubts than others. "61 
Thirdly, as well as highlighting broad, national themes, there also was some evidence 
of the party attempting to target specific, particularly the less well-off, segments of 
the urban electorate, by promoting the PSL as a party which, as Aleksander 
Bentkowski put it, strongly believed in the need to "'take care of the fact that there are 
so many poor people" and ensure that "the 'social minimum' is enough for 
everyone. "64 Indeed, the party's ideological declaration stated that "although peasants 
are owners of land and the means of production, they derive their income primarily 
from worle' which "makes their interests converge with the interests of the social 
groups of hired employees - workers and the intelligentsia. " Consequently, the party 
"'recognises the solidarity of working people" and "the priority of work before 
capital. "' Some commentators, for example, cited PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak's 
public declaration of support for the threatened Gdansk Shipyard in June 1996 as one 
'Kadencja nowych dogwiadczefi odrodzonego Stronnictwa', Dziennik Ludowy. 23 November 1996. 
'Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe wobec wyzwafi stojqcych przed Polsk4', p59. 
Author interview with Aleksander Bentkowski, 4 March 1997. 
" 'Dlaczego warto glosowad na PSL'. 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
'Deklaracja Ideowa PSL', p13. 
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example of how the PSL was seeking to broaden its electoral appeal among the urban 
working class. " 
Finally, and overlapping in some respects with the UP's electoral strategy, the PSL 
also sought to portray itself as "a party of the 'golden centre" able to co-operate and 
form coalitions with ideological groupings on both the anti-communist 'right' and 
former communist 'left', thereby helping to ensure "stable government and limits on 
extremes" and acting as "the lifebelt of Polish democracy. ", As the 1996 PSL 
programme put, the party's centrism was rooted in the fact that it "represents a 
relatively poor electorate of worse perspectives, which together with the historically 
determined sensitivity of the peasant movement to social affairs, position on the role 
of the state and critical stance towards the extremes of liberal economic policy - 
means that our party is situated, effectively, on the left side in socio-economic 
affairs, "' while the party's "attitude to the Church and religion, respect for private 
ownership, sensitivity to the threats to our national interest, together with an 
electorate of smallholders - means that we can recognise ourselves as a centrist 
option. "19 
The most radical attempt to fundamentally alter the party's electoral strategy was the 
idea of transforming the PSL from an agrarian party into a modem, West European 
Christian democratic people's party - which was floated as a possibility by a number 
of commentators following the virtual exclusion of right-wing parties from the Polish 
parliament after the 1993 elections. " For various reasons this realignment on the 
Polish centre-right did not transpire and, as one PSL leader who was sympathetic to 
the case for such a transformation put it in 1997, "during the last four years we went 
backwards on this road. "' Quite apart from the fact that the PSL's economic 
programme was considerably more left-wing than that of any West European 
Christian democratic party, many of the party's leaders were also reluctant to adopt a 
too overtly pro-clerical stance and identify so unambiguously with the Catholic 
Church hierarchy. " Moreover, the right was simply too well entrenched among a 
large section of the Polish electorate, as most of the 35% of voters who voted for 
parties which did not secure parliamentary representation in 1993 had supported 
" E. K. Czaczkowska, 'PSL szuka rekompensaty w mie9cie', Rzeczpospofita. 21 June 1996. 
" 'Dlaczego warto glosowa6 na PSL'. 
"' 'Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe wobec wyzwafi stojqcych przed Polsk4', pp62-63. 
69 See, for example: K. Naszkowska and Z. Mikolejko, 'Wszyscy chlopi Pana Boga: Czy PSL stanie 
siq polsk4 chadecjq? ', Gazeta Wyborcza. 22-23 October 1993 
'0 PSL Warsaw Provincial Chairman Janusz Piechocifiski cited in interview with M. Lizut, 'Sami 
jestegmy sobie wini', Gazeta Wyborcza. 24 September 1997. 
71 See, for example the interview with PSL Supreme Council Chairman J6zef Zych in J. Paradowska 
and A. Checko. 'Jqzyk czynow', Polityka. 18 December 1993 
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right-wing parties and electoral coalitions. Indeed, the fact that the PSL found itself in 
coalition with the SLD, together with the increasing polarisation of the Polish 
political scene between the anti-communist right and post-communist left, made it 
extremely difficult for the party to develop a close relationship either with the Church 
hierarchy or with potential co-partners on the Christian democratic right emerging 
from within the Solidarity tradition. 
The 1997 parliament= election campaign 
While all of the parties and groupings surveyed attempted to target certain segments 
of the electorate during the September 1997 parliamentary election campaign, they 
did so within the overall framework of broadly based appeals directed to voters as a 
whole. Setting out his grouping's election campaign strategy, SLD Election 
Campaign Staffs Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, argued that while 
"you can talk about certain electoral preferences ... at the level of electoral tactice' 
in 
terms of targeting young people, women, retirees and pensioners and rural voters, 
"the programme, as such, cannot prefer one social grouping at the expense of others. 
We have to put forward a certain vision of the economy and a vision of society -a 
vision of political life as a whole ... The programme, as a whole, was addressed to all 
socio-economic groups. "71 Indeed, while the SLD's 1997 election programme linked 
the grouping with the "best traditions of the Polish left and European social 
democracy" - and, thereby, stressed the fact that it was "particularly sensitive to the 
problems of those who are benefiting from economic growth to a lesser extent that 
other groups or are paying a greater price for the changes that others" - it also made 
it clear that the SLD represented the "interests of various social groups. "" 
Consequently, as one of the SLD's chief election strategists Marek Borowski put it, 
while "as a centre-left grouping one of our fundamental values is caring for those 
people who, to a greater. extent than others, have borne the costs of the changes", the 
SLD was "not a class party. We also understand the interests of business. " In other 
words, the SLD sought to "harmonise the necessity of continuing economic reforms, 
economic integration with Europe, with social awareness, with fighting poverty and 
unemployment, with aiming to ensure that the widest possible social groups 
participate in the benefits of systemic transformation. "" 
Author interview with Dariusz Klimaszewski, 21 November 1997. 
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Consequently, the SLD ran a broadly-based campaign build around the twin themes 
of "We Kept Our Word7 and "A Good Today, A Better Tomorrow" and focused 
mainly on underlining the pragmatism, competence and purported achievements of 
the outgoing SLD-led coalition government from which, they argued, everyone had 
benefited and would continue to benefit. As SLD strategist Marek Borowski put it, 
"WE KEPT OUR WORD ... we have four years of government behind us, which every 
objective observer assesses as GOOD YEARS FOR POLAND. " The SLD had a 
"realistic programme based on our experience" which contained "a guarantee of 
economic growth" and a "clear social emphasis"' which showed that it could "combine 
faiffiffilness to our programmatic principles with operating effectively and an ability 
to reach SENSIBLE CONTROMISES. "" (capitals in original) 
However, the SLD campaign also contained a second, more emotive strand based on 
contrasting its own 'competence' and 'pragmatism' with the right's 'extremism' and 
'irresponsibility'. One SLD election leaflet, for example, contained two columns, one 
outlining the left's achievements and the other listing the potential threats posed by 
the right including: "interference by the Church hierarchy in politics", "strikes and 
social unrest", "outlawing abortion", "dividing people into better and worse", "social 
divisions", a "fall in production", "continuing growth in the number ofjoblesS" and 
an "endless war at the top". According to Marek Borowski the SLD was "a formation 
of reasonable and moderate people... WE AVOID EXTREMES", which rejected 
"utopias, dangerous radicalism or revolutionary bloody-mindednesS" and sought to 
"DEFEAT OUR RIVALS, BUT NOT DESTROY THEM", compared with the right 
whom he described as "a chaotic coalition of defeated 'couch' parties ... formed to 
remove someone from office. "' `(capitals in original) An important aspect of this was 
the recurring SdRP/SLD theme of supporting "the secularity of the state" and treating 
"all people equally regardless of their 'worldview' confessions"" which meant that, as 
Borowski put it, "the SLD speaks out against the Church hierarchy's statements 
which are not in line with respecting pluralism, toleration, respece' and in favour of 
"the aspirations of women to independently decide their own fate" which included 
their right "to conscious motherhood. "s 
This second strand also involved a subtle but unmistakable pitch to the SLD's core 
electorate of beneficiaries from the communist regime by stressing the grouping's 
opposition to "dividing Poles into better or worse, 'real' and 'not real"' and respect 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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"for the generations which rebuilt Poland after the destruction of the Second World 
War. "' As Borowski put it, while the SLD "condemned the crimes-and recognised 
the system as ineffective" they were not ... permanent yesterday's men"' and rejected 
attempts by the right to "force us to condemn everything that was good in a bad 
system, what was creative and advantageous to the country and its citizens" and "cut 
ourselves off from the achievements of millions of Poles who honorably lived 
through and worked the best years of their lives during the period of People's 
Poland. "' 
AWS's 1997 election campaign also involved, as its Election Campaign Staff 
Secretary Andzrej Anusz put it, "certain accents, things related to electoral techniques 
which emphasised ... groups which we tried to get to" and at whom "special and 
specific elements of the campaign" were directed. " The clearest example of this was 
probably AWS's attempt to target younger voters which, for example, involved a 
number of well-known Polish rock musicians declaring their support for AWS and 
performing special promotional concerts or appearing in its TV election broadcasts. " 
Overall, however, the AWS campaign was, like the SLD's, directed "very broadly ... to 
the full spectrum of society"" or, as AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski put it, "to all 
people in Poland, given its effects will affect everyone. We are convinced that 
everyone can find something very specific and attractive. The overall effects, 
however, will improve the situation for everyone in Poland ... nobody, for sure, will 
be 
disappointed ... everyone benefits and not specific groups. "" 
However, unlike the SLD campaign which sought to convince Poles that their 
government had produced a booming economy, AWS attempted to draw attention 
away from economic policies - on which it was internally divided - and ran what was 
essentially an ideological campaign particularly focusing on a rather amorphous set of 
traditional moral-cultural 'values' associated with breaking with the communist past, 
the family and patriotism - and underpinned by the slogan: "Always: Poland, 
Freedom, the Family. " The AWS election programme, for example, called for a 
"State built on the patriotic and Christian values" which have "defined our national 
identity for one-thousand years" together with the need to "finally ... break with the 
"' Dobre DzU - Lepsze Jutro. " 'Dlaczego warto glosowad na SLDT 
" Author interview with Andrzej Anusz, AWS Election Campaign Staff Secretary, 24th November 
1997. 
'See, for example: 'Gwiazdy kampanii AWS', Gazeta Wyborcza, 6nSeptember 1997. 
Author interview with Andrzej Anusz, 24 November 1997. 
Cited in interview with B. Warkowska, K. Bien and K. Gottesman. 'Walczymy o wladzq, aby 
znaczn4 czq96 tej wladzy oddaV, Rzeczpospofita, 19 August 1997. 
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communist past; not allow for the blurring the differences between truth, lies, good 
and evil. " The programme also placed a very strong emphasis on the family as "the 
foundation of society, within which the person is brought up and develops" and called 
for the state to "create the social and economic conditions for encouraging the 
family's harmonious functioning. "" 
An important strand of the AWS's campaign was its successful attempt to identify 
with the symbolism of, and build up a certain nostalgia for, the original Solidarity 
opposition movement. Examples of this included the similarity between the AWS and 
Solidarity logos and the presentation of '21 programmatic tasks' on the anniversary of 
the signing of the August 1980 agreements when the then communist authorities 
agreed to the striking coastal workers '21 demands' which, in turn, led to the 
formation of the original Solidarity trade union. Such activities, together with other 
slogans that invoked the idea of 'finishing the Solidarity revolution', also involved a 
clear attempt to draw an analogy between the new spirit of right-wing 'political unity' 
represented by the formation of AWS and the 'societal unity' which had characterised 
Solidarity's previous anti-communist struggles in 1980-81 and 1989. This became the 
over-arching theme of AWS's entire campaign strategy. "' According to one AWS 
leader Bronislaw Komorowski, for example, AWS had begun "the great task of re- 
building the unity of the Solidarity camp, opening up the possibility of co-operation 
between its specific elemen&' and "stood as a symbol of overcoming the effects of 
the break up of, and conflict within, the Solidarity camp. "" Similarly, AWS leader 
Marian Krzaklewski argued that, as "the one realistic alternative to the SLY', AWS 
opened up the possibility for "the people of 'August"' to "lead our country into the 
new century ... Together once again in Solidarity, we can given Poland new 
laws ... Let's 
be together again. "' 
The ROP's 1997 election campaign was also underpinned by a similar, although 
much less well-conceived, ideological strand. Specific appeals directed at the ROP's 
supposed socio-economic 'target' electorates of small businessmen and the less well- 
off - which were evident in the party's earlier campaigning initiatives such as its 
economically populist 'Contract with Poland' or its campaign against foreign 
supermarkets - did not really materialise in the course of the campaign proper. Rather, 
the ROP developed themes that were broadly similar to AWS's, albeit with a slightly 
" AWS. Program Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnoie. Warsaw. 1997. 
"See, for example: '21 zadaii dla Polski', Rzeczpospolita, I Sept. 1997; 'Wielke Obietnice', Gazeta 
Wyborcza, I Sept. 1997; and M. Krzaklewski. '21 punkt6w w XXI wiek', Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 Sept. 
1997. 
B. Komorowski. 'Dlaczego Warto Glosowad na AWST, Gazeta Wyborcza. 18 August 1997. 
'21 punkt6w w XXI wiek' 
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higher emotional temperature and stronger emphasis on the its party leaders' patriotic 
and anti-communist credentials. According to the ROP Election Campaign Staffs 
Press Spokesman Jan Polkowski, for example, the political and economic transition 
"should not be the responsibility of people of immoral compromises" and required 
"serious, determined politicians for whom the national interest is the basis of their 
public activities and not simply one among many phrases. " The ROP's leaders were, 
"free from whatever accusations. Our trade mark is the word 'honesty'. Their 
biographies speak more than the most passionate declarations thrown around during 
the course of an election campaign. "89 
The ROP did recognise that it could not, as the party's Election Campaign Staffs 
Secretary Wcjciech WIodarczyk put it, simply "hold on to our permanent 
electorate ... the 'independence-patriotic' one and anti-communist one"and 
had to 
broaden its appeal. Consequently, as the campaign developed, the party attempted to 
both 'soften' its image and place greater emphasis on socio-economic issues - 
although not with the objective of attracting any specific socio-economic group. One 
ROP election leaflet, for example, consisted of a series of general policy slogans such 
as: "more police on the streets - fewer behind desks", "universal health care according 
to modem models"', "lower taxes and insurance collected effectively", "more jobs in 
more efficient fu-ms", "an end to unfair foreign competition", "a universal house- 
building programme as the propeller of the Polish economy", "education bonds for 
every child" and "modem retirement fimds guaranteed by the state" and contained no 
mention of de-communisation or settling scores with the past except for one reference 
to "more money for the lowest pensions - less for the communist nomenklatura's high 
pensions". However, as ROP radicals subsequently claimed with some justification, 
the decision to present a more 'moderate' image simply meant that the ROP came 
across as a less credible 'AWS Mark 2' and, thereby, failed to provide a clear 
alternative around which it could have mobilised even its supposed core, radical anti- 
communist electorate. "' 
The UW also ran their 1997 election campaign on a programme which, according to 
party leader Leszek Balcerowicz, "considering things objectively meets everybody's 
need: e"I on the basis that, as National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki put it, "directing 
"' J. Polkowski. 'Dlaczego, Warto Glosowad na Ruch Odbudowy Polski? ' Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 
August 1997. 
Author interview, 27th November 1997. 
See, for example: P. Smolefiski. 'Rytaulne szukanie winnych po klqsce' Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 
September 1997. 
92 Cited in interview with B. Wawrzewska, P. Aleksandrowicz and K. Gottesman. 'Najchqtniej 
widzimy koalicjq Polski posierpniowef, Rzeczpospofita, 18 September 1997. 
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yourself exclusively to certain groups means that other interest groups are put off. We 
didn't want to do this. "" Consequently, the UW placed considerable emphasis on the 
party's moderation and its leaders' competence and ability. According to one UW 
leader Bronislaw Geremek, for example, the party "wants to be a party of the centre" 
and "to be clear precisely in its rejection of all extremism, fanaticism, hatreds or 
ideological doctrinalness. "" Similarly, writing in the introduction to the UW election 
programme, Balccrowicz stressed that it was "a grouping which brings together tested 
people who understand the burden of responsibility, who consistently, prudently and 
securely are in a position to complete the construction of the Third Republic. "" The 
UW also made a tactical decision to appeal, as Andrzej Potocki put it, to people 
"who ... have an anti-communist outlook .. who have reservations about the 
SLD 
relating to the past, its method of governing" by highlighting its party leaders' roots 
in the Solidarity opposition movement and indicating its preference for a coalition 
with another 'post-Solidarity' party - the rationale for which will become clear when 
we examine the UW electorate's ideological profile. " 
However, above all - and in marked contrast to ideological and moral-cultural themes 
which underpinned the AWS and ROP campaigns - the UW's appeal was rooted in 
the supposed benefits that would accrue from the implementation of the party's 
economic reform programme. According to Balcerowicz, for example, the UW's 
campaign was "mainly addressed" at those "people who believe that the (post-1989 
economic) changes should be completed. "" Indeed, in many ways the UW did appear 
to be at least attempting to operationalise the concept of a 'pro-reform alliance' by 
developing a election campaign strategy aimed specifically at mobilising the socio- 
economic groups which were the most obvious 'natural' supporters of and 
beneficiaries from economic reform - albeit within a broad overall fi-amework. As 
Balcerowicz put it, " we are aware that our propositions more easily attract some, and 
find it difficult to attract others ... Our programme is addressed mainly at these people. 
The principal task of the Freedom Union in these elections and the next is to mobilise 
these people who want to finish reforms .... Young people ... (and) people connected 
with the new economy ... not just owners, but many employees who function in the 
new economy. "" Similarly, according to the head of the party's Election Campaign 
Staffs Pawel Piskorski, the party "sought our 'target group' mainly among young 
" Author interview, 26th November 1997. 
"' B. Geremek. 'Dlaczego warto glosowad na Uniq Wolno6ci', Gazeta Wyborcza, 23-24 August 1997. 
UW. Wolnoic. Bezpieczefistwo. Rozw6j. Program Unii Wolnoici. Warsaw. 1997. 
Author interview, 26 November 1997. See also: 'Najchqtniej widzimy koalicjq Polski 
posierpniowej'. 
'Najchqtniej widzimy koalicjq Polski posierpniowej' 
Ibid. 
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people, better educated, having an economically stable situation, from large and 
medium-sized towns 99 and designed the party's election programme specifically to 
"reach some segment of this group of the electorate" together with a "youthful, open, 
dynamic" campaign aimed specifically at attract younger voters. 19 
The UP also ran a campaign focused primarily on socio-economic themes and, to 
some extent, attempted to appeal to particular segments of the electorate. However, 
while the UWs strategy was geared towards targeting and mobilising the actual and 
potential 'winners' from liberal economic reforms, the UP's 1997 campaign, based on 
the slogan "You Deserve Better", was directed, primarily, at the less well-off. Setting 
out the party's election campaign strategy the head of the UP's Election Staffs Piotr 
Marciniak explained that while "we didn't give up our attempt to gain a section of the 
intelligentsia electorate" the main emphasis was on trying to "broaden our influence 
in this 'plebeian' milieu ... poor people, those who were poorly situated 
in society. This 
was the main addressant. "100 Consequently the UP emphasised that, as its National 
Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz put it, its "specialty" was "a left-wing, social democratic 
vision of Poland, not just sovereign and democratic, which many other groupings 
want, but also just - caring to ensure equal chances and suitable conditions 
for all its 
citizens. " According to Nalqcz, "the UP believes that further dynamic growth must be 
linked with caring for the interests of ordinary people ... we decidedly wish 
to link 
economic growth with the just distribution of its benefits. """ 
However, as with the aforementioned parties and groupings, the Up's electoral appeal 
was not directed exclusively at the poorer sections of the electorate and it ran its 
socio-economic themes alongside broader messages which sought to present the party 
as honest and uncorrupted and highlight its role as a force for political moderation. 
The party's 1997 election programme, for example, argued that the UP had "a 
philosophy of moderation and implementing changes in an evolutionary way 91) and 
underlined the need for measures which it felt would encourage the honest conduct of 
politics and "increase people's trust in the democratic system and the state" such as "a 
law tightly separating public affairs from economics; politicians assets and incomes 
should be open, political parties can't be financed by businessmen. ""' As a corollary, 
the UP sought to position itself as a 'centre' party on the question of attitudes towards 
the communist past able, as National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz put it, "to unite not 
to divide people" and "the only formation of Polish political scene which succeeded 
Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
" Author interview, 19 November 1997. 
T. Nalqcz. 'DIaczego warto glosowad na Uniq Pracy? ', Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 August 1997. 
101 UP. Polska talde dla Ciebie. Warsaw. 1997. 
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in constructing something beyond the historical divisions of the 'PRL-world' and the 
'Solidarity-world'. 9'103 
As expected, it was the PSL which ran an election campaign most clearly aimed at 
securing the support one specific socio-economic segment of the electorate. Indeed, 
many of the party's internal and external post-mortems focused on its image as a 
dclass' party exclusively concerned with the interests of those employed in the 
agricultural sector and its concomitant failure to develop a broader, more 'national' 
character to its electoral appeal. '" As one of the party's key election strategists, and 
subsequent leader, Jaroslaw Kalinowksi acknowledged, "we allowed ourselves, 
mainly through our own fault, to be categorised as a 'class party'... because we also 
took upon ourselves the role of a trade union ... As a party we should express our views 
on the most important issues, such as the stabilisation. of production and the growth of 
incomes, and not concern ourselves (solely) with the price of specific agricultural 
products. ""' 
In its defence, party strategists, such as PSL programmatic director Jan Wypych, 
argued that the party "didn't prevent anyone from voting PSL" and had run a "multi- 
faceted" election campaign based on a broader programme which covered all the 
major national issues., " Certainly, in its literature and media campaign"' the party 
did, as many PSL election strategists had urged, attempt to develop a number of 
broader campaign themes such as the need to reduce Poland's trade deficit 
(particularly in foodstuffs) and its opposition to the sale of Polish land to foreigners 
and the creation of a third tier of local government. However, although these, and 
other, broader issues were raised during the course of the campaign the greatest 
emphasis was placed, as in previous PSL campaigns, on attracting the votes, and 
representing the interests, of people living in rural areas, particularly peasant farmers. 
Even Jan Wypych admitted that, "the campaign was, in one way, directed mainly at 
the countryside and, to some significant degree, at farmers ... We were aware that the 
main electorate would probably lie in the countryside and most appeals were directed 
at rural residents. ""' In one PSL campaign leaflet, for example, the section headed 
"Whom do we serve? " began "we are open to everyone - for those in the countryside 
as well as in towns" but went on to emphasise that "we will not forget our roots" and 
'0' 'Dlaczego warto glosowad na Uniq Pracy? ' 
104 See, for example: E. K. Czaczkowska. 'Pqkniqte spoiwo', Rzeczpospolita, 23 September 1997. 
" Cited in interview with E. K. Czaczkowska. 'Sq granice r6inorodno9ci', Rzeczpospolita, 15 
October 1997. 
116 Author interview with Jan Wypych, 24 November 1997. 
'0' The PSL was the one party which did not produce a specific 1997 election programme. 
Author interview, 24 November 1997. 
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that the PSL was "a peasantist movement ... Serving the countryside and peasants is 
our first challenge. " 
PgM electoral profile 
As Table 4.1 shows, the preliminary, and often crude, attempts by the parties and 
groupings surveyed to defme and 'target' their 'core' electorates were not really - 
with one significant and one partial exception - reflected in their 1997 socio- 
economic and occupational electoral profiles. As hypothesised, the party with the 
clearest concentration of support in a particular socio-economic segment - in the 
countryside and particularly among those employed in the agricultural sector - was 
the PSL. In 1997, for example, the PSL won 37.9% of the vote among farmers and 
17% of the rural electorate compared with its average of 7.3 1%. On the other hand, in 
every other occupational group - with the exception of workers (6.5%), housewives 
(7.0%) and the unemployed (7.0%) - the PSL's support was substantially below 
average. The substantially higher levels of PSL support among the least well- 
educated (12.8%) than those with a higher education (2.8%) was, it may be assumed, 
simply a reflection of the educational profile of the rural electorate. As Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 show, a similar pattern of support was also evident in the socio-economic profile 
of. those voters who supported the party's 1995 presidential candidate Waldemar 
Pawlak and of the PSL electorate in the 1993 parliamentary elections - although, in 
the case of the latter there was also above average support for the party among older 
voters and vice versa. 
The PSL's image as a 'class party' concerned almost exclusively with issues relating 
to agriculture and the countryside was also reflected in other polling evidence. As 
Table 4.4 shows, for example, the Institute for the Research of Public Opinion 
(OBOP) found that as many as 72% of voters felt that the PSL programme best 
represented the interests of farmers. Indeed, in spite of the party's efforts to develop a 
broader electoral appeal, the PSL's 1997 level of support outside rural areas was 
derisory - 4% in small and medium-sized towns and only 0.9% in the larger cities - 
and its electorate was, if anything, more geographically concentrated than in 1993 
when the party managed to win 9.4% of the vote in small and medium sized towns 
compared with its 15.4% average. 
Moreover, there was also evidence that even the PSL's 'core' rural/agricultural 
electorate appeared to be 'de-aligning' as the distribution of party support among 
rural voters, and even farmers, became more diverse. In 1997, for example, although 
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the PSL remained the most popular party among farmers, its share of the vote fell by 
an above-average 12.4%, and the party actually finished third behind AWS and the 
SLD among rural voters as a whole. This confirmed a trend which was already 
evident in the 1995 presidential elections when its candidate Pawlak won the support 
of less than 10% of the rural electorate and even finished third among farmers behind 
the SLD candidate Aleksander Kwagniewski and the main right-wing candidate Lech 
Walqsa. Indeed, it is worth bearing in mind that a PSL rural 'monopoly', as such, 
never really existed and even in 1993, for example, 28.7% of rural voters and 24% of 
farmers voted for the parties which went on to form AWS; while KwaAniewski's 
electoral profile demonstrated the size of the SLD's potential base among rural voters. 
However, while, as noted above, many PSL election post-mortems focused on the 
party's failure to develop a broader electoral appeal, the main cause of its 1997 defeat 
probably lay not so much in its faulty electoral strategy per se as in what many of its 
potential supporters perceived to be its argumentative and irresponsible style of 
politics and, critically, its inability to deliver for this rural/agricultural electorate. In 
April 1997, for example, the Centre for Social Opinion Research (CBOS) found that 
respondents cited the fact that the party paid inadequate attention towards its own 
electorate (13%), placed party interests ahead of societal interests (including the 
interests of farmers and rural areas) (12%), failed to deliver on their election promises 
(6%), demagoguery (61/o) and ineffectiveness (5%) as the party's main negative 
features rather than concentrating exclusively on the problems of the countryside at 
the expense of the rest of society (7%). '" Clearly, while the PSL's rural/agricultural 
electorate appeared to value the fact that the party placed a high priority on defending 
their interests, it was also critical of its actual performance in this respect. In other 
words, the 1997 election results seemed to confirm that, rather than representing some 
kind of 'iron' electorate that simply voted for the PSL as 'their' representatives in a 
disciplined fashion, Polish rural-agricultural voters were, like their urban 
counterparts, also influenced by factors such as perceived competence and 
effectiveness. 
Table 4.1 also shows - although to a much lesser extent than in the case of the PSL - 
some concentration of support within the 1997 UW electorate, particularly among 
those socio-economic groups which the party had identified and targeted as 
representing the core of its 'pro-refonn' alliance. There was, for example, clearly 
higher than average (13.3 7%) support for the UW among: younger voters (18.6%), 
residents of larger towns and cities ( 18.4%), the better educated (25.1 %), students 
CBOS. Wizerunki Ugrupowah Politycznych. Warsaw. April 1997. 
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(22.3%) and the more financially secure occupational groups such as specialists 
(24.8%), managers (21.2%), and businessmen (19.2%) compared with poorer groups 
such as farmers (2.5%), retirees (7.5%), workers (7.6%) and the unemployed (8.1 %). 
The fact that, as Table 2 shows, the UW's 1995 presidential candidate Jacek Kuron"s 
distribution of support was similar but much less pronounced - much lower among 
businessment, for example - indicated that the UW had made considerable progress in 
terms of defining and targeting its 'core' electorate. Indeed, as Table 4.4 shows, the 
party was cited as best representing the interests of the intelligentsia (by 33% of 
respondents), large private and international firms (19% each), small businessmen 
(15%) and political elites (13%) - although, surprisingly, only 11% of respondents 
felt that the UW best represented the interests of young people. "' 
Interestingly, other research which revealed that the reasons cited for voting for the 
UW related, above all, to the party leaders' ability, competence and moderation, 
suggested a more heterogeneous pattern of electoral support. CBOS, for example 
found in March 1996 found that respondents drew attention to "the presence of many 
people of high competence and authority in the party" and the UW's "honesty, 
credibility, responsibility and common sense" as the party's strongest features, "' 
while in April 1997 the UW's "strongest trump card is ... its leaders and politicians, 
above all their intellectual potential, knowledge and competence. "' I' Similarly, a 
December 1996 OBOP survey found that respondents identified the UW's most 
important positive features as: its experienced leaders (26% - rising to 44% among 
UW voters), the presence of expert and competent politicians in its ranks (19% rising 
to 36%) and the party's moderation (17% and 36% respectively). "' These findings do 
not, however, necessarily preclude a growing tendency for the UW's 'target' 
electorate to identify the party as the best representing 'their' interests. This is partly 
due to the likelihood of 'successful' people wanting to vote for people 'like 
themselves', but mainly because, as the head of the UW's Election Staffs Pawel 
Piskorski accurately pointed out, "by underlining our competence to govern and the 
fact that we are in a position to introduce a certain number of reforms then, 
immediately, by using such slogans you are targeting yourself towards certain groups 
for whom this is in any way important ... Not poor workers in small towns ... You have 
to reach these people through specific language: higher wages, higher pensions .... In 
"' A December 1996 OBOP survey, however, showed that this figure increased to IS% among young 
people themselves. See: OBOP. Spoleczne wizerunkipartUpolitycznych. Warsaw. December 1996. 
... CBOS. Polskie Partie Polityczne. Warsaw. March 1996. 
Wizerunki Ugrupowaii Politycznyc. 
Spoleczne wizerunki partii politycznych 
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other words ... positioning the UW as good for everybody because it will govern well 
is (effectively) directing your message to a certain section of the electorate. "' " 
However, no clear trend or obvious pattern of support was evident in the 1997 socio- 
economic electoral profiles of any of the four other parties and groupings surveyed. 
As Table 4.1 shows, with the exception of slightly higher than average (27.13%) 
support among voters aged 50-59 (32.2%), managers (33.8%), office workers (3 1 %) 
and retirees (32.3%) and below average support among voters aged 30-39 (20.8%), 
rural voters (20.3%), the least well-educated (21.3%), specialists (21.4%), 
housewives (2 1.0%) and farmers (12.7%), the distribution of the SLD electorate 
displayed only minimal variations between various socio-economic and occupation 
groups. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal a similarly heterogeneous electoral profile for the 
SLD's 1995 presidential candidate Kwas'niewski and (expect for a higher level of 
support among the better educated) in the distribution of SLD voters in the 1993 
parliamentary elections. 
In other words, in spite of 'targeting' these various groups during the election 
campaign, the SLD's increase in its share of the vote among women (+3.61/o), young 
people Oust under 7%) and rural voters (+51/o) was not noticeably higher than the its 
6.7% increase overall, and its total share of the vote in each of these categories was 
actually below its national average (25.6%, 22.4% - with students on 23.9% - and 
20.3% respectively). Only retirees and pensioners - among whom the SLD increased 
its share by 9.5% to 32.3% - could be deemed an example of successftil targeting. 
Moreover, in spite of positioning itself as a 'centre-left' and" social-democratic' party 
and placing a high priority on social welfare issues and the needs of the least well-off, 
the SLD had almost as large a base of support among businessmen (22%) as it did 
among workers (261/6) and the unemployed (25.4%). Similarly, as Table 4 shows, as 
many or more voters felt that the SLD represented the interests of political elites 
(28%), the directors of large state firms (26%), overseas firms (16%) and private 
businessmen in large companies (14%) as they did ordinary people (250/6), retirees 
and pensioners (16%), workers (14%) and the unemployed (10%). 
Except for a slightly higher than average (33.83%) level of support among voters 
with an occupational (3 8.1 %) or basic education (37.9%) and slightly lower support 
among those with a higher education (27.7%), the AWS electorate was also 
distributed fairly evenly with no significant differences of support on the basis of age, 
sex, place of residence or among most occupational groups. The only exceptions were 
Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
138 
above average support housewives (39.6%) and, as might be expected with a political 
grouping based primarily on a trade union, workers (40.3%) and lower support 
among managers (26.9%). However, this, together with evidence set out in Table 4 
showing a tendency for a substantial number of voters to perceive AWS as the most 
effective representative of workers (40%), the unemployed (18%) and ordinary 
people (22%), did not prevent this grouping from winning the highest share of the 
vote among businessmen (32.7%). Indeed, as Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show, although it is 
impossible to make precise comparisons, AWS's electoral profile was even more 
heterogeneous than the broadly analogous Lech Walqsa electorate in the first round of 
the 1995 presidential elections or that of the main parties which went on to form 
AWS at the 1993 parliamentary elections. In other words, while 'targeting' the youth 
vote may not have achieved a noticeably higher than average AWS vote among either 
young people as a whole (32.3%) or students (29.7%), it did make at least ensure that 
its electoral profile was less skewed towards older voters than was the case with 
previous right-wing voting blocs. 
The variations in the distribution of the 1997 ROP electorate, and that of its founder 
and leader Jan Olszewski in the 1995 presidential elections, were also too small to 
identify any kind of pattern of support in particular socio-economic groups. The 
party's targeting of the economically disadvantaged, for example, appeared to make 
no difference to the ROP's distribution of support, with the party enjoying only 
fractionally lower levels of support among higher-eaming specialists (5.4%) and 
white-collar office workers (5.1 %) than among workers as a whole (6.30/o), retirees 
(4.7%) and the unemployed (6.0%); and the same share of the vote among voters with 
a higher (4.8%) as with only a basic education (4.6%). Similarly, ROP's attempts to 
attract small and medium-sized-businessmen appeared to have had only a minor 
impact with very slightly higher than average (5.56%) level of support among 
businessmen (6.9%) and, while there was no separate data for voting patterns among 
small businessmen only, as Table 4.4 shows, only 6% of voters felt that the ROP best 
represented the interests of this segment of the electorate. 
Similarly, in spite of the fact that its 1997 campaign was based on targeting what it 
termed the "plebeian electorate", the UP actually obtained below average (4.74%) 
support among retirees (3.6%) and only a slightly higher proportion of the vote 
among workers (5.5%) than it did among managers (4.4%), specialists (4.9%) or even 
businessmen (4.5%). Only unemployed voters (7.7%) identified with the UP to a 
slightly greater extent than other socio-economic groups. Indeed, compared with the 
socio-economic profile of its 1993 electorate - when, as Table 4.3 shows, the UP 
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enjoyed significantly higher than average support among the better educated, urban 
intelligentsia, white collar workers and students and significantly lower support 
among farmers, rural voters and the less well-educated - the party's base of support 
became, if anything, more heterogeneous and less clearly defined. In other words, the 
UP electorate only became more 'plebeian' in the sense that the party had lost a 
sufficiently large proportion of its more economically-secure voters to ensure that any 
previous disparities in its distribution of support had disappeared! 
Given that these heterogeneous electoral profiles indicated that the SLD, AWS, ROP 
and UP electorates did not appear to be rooted in any subjectively felt socio-economic 
interests, what were the key determinants which determined their bases of support and 
by which their voters could be characterised? 
The SLD and AWS electorates appeared to be differentiated Principally by their 
respective supporters' attitudes to particular ideological, historical and moral-cultural 
issues. Ibe first factor distinguishing the SLD and AWS electorates was their 
ideological self-placement on the 'left-right' spectrum. As Table 4.5 shows, 60% of 
SLD voters identified their political views as left-wing, 22% as centrist and only 3% 
as right-wing; and on a left-right scale ranging from 1-7, SLD voters were easily the 
most left-wing with a mean score of 2.7. Meanwhile, 68% of AWS voters identified 
with the right of the political spectrum, 16% saw their views as centrist and only 2% 
as left-wing, with a mean score of 5.6. Similarly, as Table 4.6 shows, a CBOS poll 
taken three weeks prior to the 1997 election indicated that 61% of left wing voters 
and 42% of right wing voters said they would be voting for the SLD and AWS, 
respectively, compared with their national averages of 22% and 21%. In this context 
the terms 'left' and 'right' were generally understood to refer more to a set of 
ideological and moral-cultural attitudes - which were, in turn, often rooted in, and 
derived from, different assessments of the communist past - rather than to attitudes to 
a number of socio-economic issues - which is the sense in which these ten-ns 
generally function in the Western political science literature. As Pankowski put it, in 
the context of post-communist Poland: 
"... the left is associated, primarily, with the political forces emerging from that 
(communist) system, and the right is discerned, above all, as all kinds of opposition 
towards the then political order. The Poles think that the left are those who defined 
themselves as such during the years of the PRL's existence and that in the Third 
Republic this role is now fulfilled by their direct heirs. In the last few years new 
mental constructs - although derivatives, in fact, from these kind of associations - 
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have been overlaiden onto these classifications... In 1993 the parliamentary 
opposition (primarily the SLD) was defined as 'left-wing', given that it was in 
opposition to the 'right-wing' Solidarity governments... the current (SLD-led) 
government is identified with the 'left', while the 'right' is the current opposition, 
particularly the extra-parliamentary one (primarily AWS). "" 
Detailed attitudinal research undertaken by CBOS in run up to the 1993 election, for 
example, showed that SLD voters were no more 'left-wing' than others when it came 
to their attitudes to economic policy issues such: income inequality, state-guaranteed 
ftill-employment, welfare-dependency or state intervention in the economy. The only 
economic issues on which SLD voters' views were markedly more left-wing than 
those of other parties were in their opposition to privatisation and the closure of 
unprofitable enterprises which, according to CBOS, was rooted in both an inclination 
"to assess the PRL's achievements in terms of the country's industrialisation" and a 
historical hangover revealed by the "similarity between the opinions of SLD voters 
and the views of PZPR members at the beginning of the 1980s" who generally had 
more liberal views on most aspects of economic policy than society as a whole with 
the exception of privatisation - given that the then communist government's liberal 
economic reform programme did not include changes in ownership structures. "' At 
the same time, although equally detailed and systematic data on AWS voters' 
attitudes was not available, "' a March 1997 CBOS survey revealed that, in spite of 
placing themselves on the right of the political spectrum, AWS supporters were 
particularly attracted by the grouping's "social sensitivity, caring about ordinary 
people, about the poorest, pensioners and retirees"' "-a finding, to some extent, borne 
out by the figures in Table 4 (cited above) which revealed that many voters identified 
AWS as best representative of relatively less well-off and more economically insecure 
socio-economic groups. 
Incidentally, it is worth noting that, as Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show, 43% of UW voters 
located themselves on the right of the political spectrum, 35% as centrists and only 
19% as left-wing; and 14% and 13% of right-wing and centrist voters respectively 
declared their intention to vote for the UW compared with its national average of 10% 
"' K. Pankowski. 'Lewicowo96-Prawicowo§6: deklaracje polityczne Polak6w 1990-1997', in L. 
Kolarska-Bobi6ska, and R. Markowski, eds. Prognozy i Wybory: Polska Demokracja '95. Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1997. pp69-108 (76-77). See also: K. Skarzyfiska, 'W cudzych butach', 
PoU4*a. 15 April 1995. 
CBOS. Wyborcy Zwycifskich Partii. Warsaw. December 1993. 
Indeed, in the absence of more detailed attitudinal research data, all the conclusions draw here 
with respect to the AWS electorate are, of necessity, more tentative than those relating to the SLD. 
Spoleczne wizerunki pardi politycznych. 
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and only 3% of left-wing voters. This pattern of ideological self-placement, together 
with the tendency of Polish voters to identify the terms left and right primarily in 
relation to attitudes towards the communist past and derivative factors, helps to 
explain the UWs tactical decision during the 1997 election campaign to stress its 
Solidarity heritage and express a preference for a coalition with a party or grouping 
originating within from the democratic opposition. I" 
Given the centrality of attitudes towards the past in determining left-right self- 
placement, a second major factor distinguishing the SLD and AWS electorates was 
evidence of past political affiliations with the communist PZPR or membership of 
trade unions of a communist lineage (such as the OPZZ federation) on the one hand, 
or identification with the Solidarity movement and the democratic opposition on the 
other. Based on data collected in October 1992, Markowski and Toka, for example, 
discovered that membership of an OPZZ-affiliated union and former membership of 
the PZPR increased the probability of a respondent voting for the SLD by 36% and 
13% respectively; "" while an April 1997 CBOS survey found that 58% of those who 
belonged to the PZPR in 1989 and 49% of those who were members of the 
communist-sanctioned 'branch' trade unions rather than Solidarity in 1981 intended 
to vote SLD compared with the grouping's national average of 22%. "' In the same 
survey CBOS also found that 45% of voters who had belonged to Solidarity in 1981 
said that they intended to vote AWS compared with its national average of 24%. "' 
Incidentally, the fact that a section of the SLD electorate viewed their support for this 
grouping mainly in terms of defending what they saw as the 'achievements of the 
PRL' - which, in many cases, was directly linked to defending their own actions and 
6personal biographies' - meant that their support for the SLD was, in one sense, 
linked with defending a particular set of 'interests'. A former communist-era security 
service functionary who risked losing the privileges which accompanied ex- 
combatant status, for example, had a clear economic 'interest' in supporting the SLD. 
Although such 'interests' were not easily identifiable among the general socio- 
"9 This was an extremely wise decision and probably helped to persuade a number of 'soft' AWS 
voters who had reservations about this grouping's internal and programmatic coherence to vote UW, 
as well as protecting the party's own 'soft' right flank against defections to AWS among voters 
whose first priority was to remove the SLD and who were concerned that the party would be tempted 
to make a 'historic compromise' and form a coalition with the ex-communists. A March 1997 CBOS 
poll, for example, showed that 30% of UW voters had AWS as their second choice compared with 
only 6% who chose the SLD. See: CBOS. Elektoraty pardi politycznych i moiliwodci ýprzeplywu' 
mit! dzy nimi. Warsaw. March 1997. 
"0 R. Markowski and G. Toka. 'Left Turn in Poland and Hungary Five Years After the Collapse of 
Communism' in Sisyphus. Social Studies. Vol I (IX). 1993. pp75-99 (8 1). 
121 Elektoratypartii politycznych i mo2liwoici ýprzeplyww'miqdzy nimi 
122 Ibid. 
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economic classifications, it was possible to find some evidence in the 'small print' of 
the survey data that pointed towards a degree of overlap between support for the SLD 
and certain occupational groups which one may assume identified more closely with 
the previous regime. In June 1994, for example, OBOP found that 49% of soldiers 
and policemen supported the SLD compared with its national average of 22%. "' 
Similarly, as Table 2 shows, as many as 64.8% of voters employed in the uniformed 
services voted for SLD candidate Kwagniewski in the first round of the 1995 
presidential elections compared with his national average of 35.11%. Moreover, there 
was also some evidence given that a section of its electorate associated the SLD with 
the defence of their 'personal biographies', this also provided the grouping with a 
relatively loyal and stable electoral 'core' electorate compared with other parties. A 
December 1993 CBOS survey, for example, found that SLD supporters were more 
likely than others to make the effort to vote even if they thought their party had no 
chance of winning. ", 
In addition to different attitudes towards the communist past, moral-cultural issues 
more generally - particularly a voter's level of participation in religious services and 
their attitudes towards the related issues of abortion and the role of the Catholic 
Church in politics and public life - were another important basis for left-right self- 
identification and, therefore, a third important factor characterising the SLD and 
AWS electorates. "' Markowski and Toka, for example, found that in October 1992 
willingness to vote for the SLD was "stronger among individuals not related at all, or 
only loosely related, to the Church and religion", with the likelihood of a voter 
supporting this grouping being 8% lower among those attending weekly Church 
services and 5-6% higher among those who supported abortion rights"' and went on 
to argue that "non-economic issues" such as the role of Catholic Church "played a 
more significant role ... in the growth of support for the SLD" in the run up to the 1993 
elections than an increase in support for "any 'leftist' socio-economic ideology. ""' A 
December 1993 CBOS survey also found SLD voters more likely to agree that: the 
Church had too great an influence, women should have the right to an abortion "at 
their own requese", pupils and their parents should have a "genuinely free choice" on 
121 OBOP. Parlie polityczne i ich sympatycy. Warsaw. July 1994. 
134 W bo Zi ki hp rtii y My wyc VS Ca 
Indeed, according to Miroslawa Grabowska the degree of religiosity is the single, most important 
crude indicator of left-right positioning and "it is easier to foresee left and right on the 'clerical 
question' than on any other. " Partie polityczne, p38; See also: Ka-Lok K. Chan, 'Religion and 
Politics in Post-Communist Poland', Paper prepared for PSA Specialist Group Conference on 
Communist and Postcommunist Politics, 8 February 1997, pp 15-16. 
" 'Left Turn in Poland and Hungary Five Years After the Collapse of Communism', p8 1. 
... Ibid. p85. 
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the question of participation in religious lessons at school and that priests should not 
seek to influence voting behaviour. "' 
The AWS's electorate, on the other hand, appeared to be characterised by a more 
traditionalist approach to moral-cultural issues and a much higher degree of 
religiosity. Indeed, as Table 4.7 shows, in terms of the relationship between 
participation in religious services and levels of party support, the SLD and AWS 
electorates were almost mirror images of each other. 45% of voters who never 
attended religious services and 34% of those who only attended sporadically declared 
their support for the SLD compared with its average of 22%, 17% of those who 
attended weekly and only 5% of regular attendees. AWS, on the other hand, won the 
support of 36% of frequent attendees and 25% of weekly attendees compared with its 
21% average, 12% of those who attended sporadically, only 8% of those who never 
attended. Similarly, an April 1997 CBOS survey found that 54% of those who never 
participated in religious services said that the SLD represented their interests and 
views compared with only 29% who said AWS did; while only 15% of regular 
participants felt that the SLD represented their interests compared with 58% who said 
that AWS did. 129 
So if the SLD and AWS electorates were distinguished primarily by their ideological 
self-placement - which was itself largely a derivative of attitudes towards the 
communist past and moral-cultural issues - what were the bases of support and key 
distinguishing features of the ROP and UP electorates? Given that the ROP itself 
identified the party's core supporters as the "patriotic, anti-communist and 
independence-orientated ulan'ski electorate" - the radical hard core of what, in Polish 
terms, was the right-wing of the political spectrum - one might have expected this to 
be reflected in their voters' ideological self-placement. However, although many ROP 
supporters may, indeed, have been ideologically or patriotically motivated and, as 
Table 4.5 shows, 58% of them declared themselves be right-wing, 32% centrist and 
5% left-wing with a mean left-right rating of 5.2, the analogous figures for AWS 
voters (as noted above 68%, 16%, 2% and 5.6) indicated that this ulanski electorate 
was certainly not unique to the ROP and that, if anything, AWS supporters were even 
more right-wing. Indeed, a March 1997 CBOS survey showed that only 6% of voters 
who belonged to Solidarity in 1981 intended to vote for the ROP - the same figure as 
its national average - and that while 18% of ROP voters were former Solidarity 
members so were 17% of the UP's and even 15% of the SLD's! "' Nor, as Table 4.7 
Wyborcy Zwycivskich Pardi. 
CBOS. Spoleczne Zaplecze Partii Politycznych. Warsaw. April 1997. 
"0 Elektoraty pardi politycznych i modiwoici ýprzeptywu'miqdzy nimi. 
144 
shows, did there seem to be any clear link between religiosity and support for the 
ROP. Although only 2% of voters who never attended religious services intended to 
vote for the party compared with its national average of 5%, the other figures varied 
little between frequent attenders (4%), weekly attenders (5%) and occasional 
attenders (4%). 
The only variable which seemed to particularly distinguish the ROP electorate was its 
particularly intense degree level of identification which the party's leader, Jan 
Olszewski. As a result of his short lived government's tough anti-communist stance, 
Olszewski was seen as an honest, trustworthy and uncompromised figure among a 
section of the right-wing, anti-communist electorate compared with other politicians 
who failed to live up to their expectations. "' An April 1997 CBOS survey, for 
example, found that among ROP voters Olszewski scored more than 80% in 13 out of 
20 categories of positive leadership qualities and that the party's supporters rated him 
37% higher on average than voters as whole. "' Similarly, a December 1996 OBOP 
survey revealed that the most positive characteristics which voters associated with 
ROP tended to be those which the party's own supporters identified with Olszewski 
himself* honesty (15% rising to 40% among ROP voters), determination (15% and 
25% respectively) and credibility in terms of fulfilling promises (12% and 29%). "' 
The UP's electoral profile was probably the most difficult of the six to categorise and 
account for. Not only was the party's electoral strategy not reflected in any 
disproportionate level of support among poorer segments of the electorate (with the 
partial exception of the unemployed) but, in spite of the party's unambiguous self- 
definition as 'left-wing', there was no equally clear pattern of ideological self- 
placement among its own supporters. While a December 1993 CBOS survey found 
that UP voters could be characterised by a slight tendency to define their views as 
left-wing - although "nothing like as significant as in the case of the SLY"" - as 
Table 4.5 shows, by December 1996 its electorate was almost equally divided with: 
30% identifying their views as left-wing, 30% right-wing and 25% centrist. This 
scattering of ideological preferences and dissonance between the party's and its 
electorate's ideological self-placements highlighted the difficulties which the UP 
"' The contrast with Lech Walqsa, for example, is particularly striking - exemplified by the series of 
interviews by his disillusioned supporters co-edited by ROP's future Press Spokesman Jacek Kurski. 
See: J. Kurski and P. Semka. Lewy Czenvcowy. Warsaw: Editions Spotkania. 1992. 
132 CBOS. Poilrety Lider6w Opozycji. Warsaw. April 1997. The one exception was his "willingness 
to compromise" -a quality which only 49% of ROP voters felt he possessed - although, as CBOS 
pointed out, "even this may be assessed as much as a quality as a fault among ROP supporters who 
don't themselves necessarily value these qualities (willingness to compromise) unambiguously. " 
"' Spoleczne wizerunki partii politycznych. 
... Wyborcy Zwycieskich PartiL 
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faced in communicating a distinctive message. Given that, as noted above, attitudes 
towards the communist past functioned as one of the key determinants of left-right 
self-placements among Polish voters, the UP's preferred strategy of positioning itself 
as a 'left-wing' party (which it undoubtedly was in terms of socio-economic policy) 
also gave the impression that it was 'pro-communist', thereby contradicting the 
party's attempts to a adopt a 'centrist' position on the 'historical' issue. 
Moreover, there was also no particular evidence to suggest that, whatever their self- 
placements, UP voters were objectively particularly more 'left-wing' than average on 
either socio-economic or moral-cultural issues. In December 1993, for example, 
CBOS found their views on economic policy were somewhat ambiguous and 
internally incoherent: with a UP voter more likely than average to support active 
government intervention in the economy and oppose state-guaranteed full 
employment. Although UP voters showed above average support for women's 
abortion rights and opposition to priests attempting to influence voting behaviour, 
they did so to nothing like the same extent as SLD voters. "' Indeed, as Table 4.7 
shows, while only 2% of frequent attendees at religious services intended to vote UP 
compared with 8% of sporadic worshippers, the figures for those who attended 
weekly (4%), several times and month (5%) and never (5%) were virtually the same 
as the party's average (5%). 
Nor, as in the case of the ROP, did the party leader's 'charismatic' qualities account 
for an otherwise heterogeneous and random pattern of electoral support. Indeed, an 
April 1997 CBOS survey revealed a relatively lukewarm assessment of UP leader 
Ryszard Bugaj's leadership qualities with his ratings among the party's own 
supporters only 7% higher than among the electorate as a whole. Indeed, in some 
categories - ability to work with others and compromise, modesty and intelligence - 
they were even slightly lower, which - together with the high number of respondents 
who simply had no assessment of Bugaj's leadership - led CBOS to conclude that, 
"UP supporters identity with their party leader to a lesser extent than supporters of 
other formations. "136 
Rather UP voters appeared to be motivated by social awareness and sensitivity arising 
from a "a certain community of ideas on the question of customs of behaviour rather 
than political and economic opinions" which "have their roots, in urban liberal 
culture. ""' A March 1996 CBOS survey, for example, found that, although they 
Ibid. 
Portrety Liderdw Opozycji. 
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rarely defined it as a 'left-wing' party, 37% of UP supporters were, above all, 
attracted to the idea that it was "the representative of the interests of a defined social 
group, particularly those who were materially worse-off: workers, pensioners, poor 
people, 'those who have the least'. ""' Similarly, in April 1997 CBOS found that the 
UP was "regarded as a 'social' party, defending the interests of working people ('It 
functions like a trade union, not a party'), pensioners and retirees, poor people, 
aiming to ensure better living and working conditions, reducing unemployment, 
reducing taxes for the least well-off - generally speaking as the spokesman of the idea 
of social justice and a welfare state" and its supporters were attracted by a programme 
"in which the need for the state to support the weakest groups was stressed, together 
with care for the defence of workers interests. ""' This was also reflected in the fact 
that, as Table 4.4 shows, a relatively high proportion of voters believed that the UP 
best represented the interests of social groups such as workers (16%) and the 
unemployed (18%). Similarly, a December 1996 OBOP survey showed that voters 
identified the party's most positive qualities as the fact that it: meant well for ordinary 
people (20%), wanted to fulfill its election promises (16% rising to 31% among UP 
voters), was moderate and avoided extremism (15% and 33% respectively) and that 
its leaders' were honest (14% and 31 %). In other words, UP voters appeared to be 
attracted by the idea that it was, as they saw it, an honest party which sought to 
represent the interests of the poorest and least well-off groups in society without 
resorting to populism or demagoguery. Given that this was not reflected in relatively 
higher levels of support among these segments of electorate themselves, it may be 
assumed that many of the UP's voters were motivated by altruism and an objective 
desire for policies likely to produce social cohesion than a perceived need to defend a 
set of subjectively-felt socio-economic interests. 
The role of pq. M leaders 
The 1997 parliamentary election sent out a fairly ambiguous message on the role 
played by party leaders in Polish electoral politics, with only two of the six parties 
and groupings surveyed - the UW and ROP - running campaigns which focused 
heavily on their leader's real or imagined qualities. In the case of the SdRP/SLD, for 
example, an April 1997 CBOS survey found "evidence of the lack of a clear leader 
and striking personality among this grouping's key figures. "'O Indeed, this grouping's 
lack of a single, charismatic leader - and concomitant decision to project a 'collective 
leadership' team - was subsequently acknowledged by party strategists as very 
"' Polskie Partie Polityczne. 
Wizerunki Ugrupowah Politycznych. 
Ibid. 
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damaging to the grouping's internal cohesion and an important reason factor 
contributing to its poor 1997 campaign. According to SLD Election Staffs Press 
Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, "if there is not a leader then there is 
not a typical campaign that can end in success ... Five leaders equals no leader. No 
leader equals no campaign! ""' AWS also, as its Election Staffs Secretary Andrzej 
Anusz put it, "consciously adopted the formula that we are not promoting the leader, 
that this is not a presidential-type campaign, but this is a programmatic campaign" 
and the grouping's (albeit unquestioned) leader Marian Krzaklewski shared the 
limelight with other key party and Solidarity trade union personalities. "' 
Similarly, rather than simply focusing on its leader Waldemar Pawlak, the PSL also 
promoted other key party figures. Outlining the its 1997 campaign strategy, PSL 
National Press Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski stressed that while "obviously the 
leader is the leader ... there will be an additional three of four colleagues who are 
members of the government who ought to be projected-in the mass media ... You 
(also) have to create a 'Cabinet' of twenty or so people so that people know that it is 
not just Pawlak but also other people whom its worth trusting and for whom its worth 
voting. """ The head of the UP Election Staffs Piotr Marciniak also admitted that his 
party "didn't succeed in doing what is the worldwide tendency in contemporary 
election campaigns: that there is a great deal of dependence by the party on the 
leader .. that he pulls the party along. 
" Rather, the UP "undertook the conception that 
we are going to run on the party name and on the fact that we have many leaders and 
they are all equal. ""' 
The main reason why these four parties and groupings adopted such electoral 
strategies was the fairly obvious one that, as Table 4.8 shows, none of their leaders 
could particularly be regarded as electoral assets - or 'electoral locomotives' in the 
Polish parlance. The most extreme example of this was SdRP Chairman J6zef Oleksy 
who, as leader of the SLD's main component, would have seemed a natural figure to 
spearhead its 1997 election campaign. Oleksy was, however, elected SdRP leader 
largely as an act of public solidarity in the wake of his forced resignation from the 
premiership following spying allegations in January 1996, rather than on the basis of 
his broader 'electability'. On the contrary, although the spying allegations were never 
proven, Oleksy's public credibility never recovered and, as Table 8 shows, he began 
1997 with only 23 % of voters regarding his leadership positively and a -5 1% net 
Author interview, 21 November 1997. 
Author interview, 24 November 1997. 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
Author interview, 19 November 1997. 
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approval rating and by the end of the election campaign these figures had only 
improved marginally to 28% and -41% respectively. A possible alternative leader, 
the popular SLD Election Committee Chairman Wlodzmierz Cimoszewicz, who 
succeeded Oleksy as SLD premier and began the year with a healthy 54% of voters 
regarding him positively and a +10% net approval rating, was too much of an 
individualist and, in the event, proved surprisingly accident prone during the election 
campaign. Most significantly, he suffered a huge (12%) slump in his personal 
popularity in August when he criticised the victims of floods which hit many parts of 
Southern and Western Poland that month for failing to take out private insurance and, 
in spite of a slight recovery, he continued to make further errors"' and finished the 
campaign with approval figures of 44% and -9%. 
The PSL, UP and AWS leaders also suffered from poor opinion poll ratings. The 
PSL's Waldemar Pawlak, for example, began 1997 with 43% of voters regarding his 
leadership positively and a net approval rating of -I I%, which fell steadily to 34% 
and -29% by the end of the campaign. Even the party's own electoral strategists such 
as National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski recognised that, 'Tawlak doesn't 
come over well on TV... connects badly with the media and is poorly regarded and, in 
my view, doesn't always express his thoughts too clearly. "141 Similarly, UP leader 
Ryszard Bugaj began the year with only 33% regarding him positively and a- 16% net 
approval rating falling to 30% and -27% by the end of the campaign; and the head of 
the UP Election Staffs Piotr Marciniak also acknowledged that even their own 
research revealed that "our leader's popularity was worse than the party's" which - 
together with the fact that "he is not an elastic person and we didn't see any chance of 
changing him" - meant that, although the idea of running on a collective leadership 
"was a worse concept ... we didn't have any alternative. ""' 
Although AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski improved his ratings slightly during the 
course of 1997, probably boosted by the overall success of the AWS campaign, by the 
end of the year only a relatively modest 43% of voters viewed his leadership 
positively and his net approval rating was -8%. Even AWS Election Staffs Secretary 
Andrzej Anusz acknowledged that there simply "wasn't such a possibility to run a 
campaign around Marian Krzaklewski because ... a section of people who support 
AWS are not at this stage yet. Marian has not been involved in politics for that many 
"'s Such as when, for example, he cited security service intelligence reports to support a claim that 
Western investors where fearful of an AWS victory. See: To wywiad wie o obawach Zachodu', 
Rzeczpospofita, 18 September 1997. 
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years. "119 Indeed, an April 1997 CBOS survey found that the AWS leader was 
"regarded, above all, through the prism of his union activity and to a lesser extent in 
the role of a successful politician" and that while, no doubt in acknowledgment of his 
undisputed achievement in uniting the Polish right, the majority of respondents 
considered him dynamic and energetic, he was also felt to be: unpredictable, guided 
by the interests of his grouping rather than the good of the country, prone to emotion, 
immodest and stubborn. 149 
Apart from the obvious fact that Krzaklewski was not the grouping's greatest 
electoral asset, AWS also avoided running a leader-orientated campaign for the 
tactical reason of re-inforcing its 'unity' theme by promoting the grouping as a 'team' 
in which Krzaklewski was only the 'co-ordinator' and, thereby, demonstrating its 
breadth of support. According to AWS National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek, for 
example, "a large number of options ... exist within AWS ... a large role 
is played by the 
leaders and other persons who are important in the groupings which comprise 
AWS ... We are a broad coalition. 
""" Similarly, Election Staffs Secretary Andrzej 
Anusz argued they wanted to run "a campaign in which it was possible to show the 
unity of AWS" and that focusing mainly or exclusively on Krzaklewlski "would, of 
course, have shut us off from various milieu. ""' 
The only party which chose consciously to project and focus on its party leader in an 
'American-style', presidential-type campaign was the UW. According to the head of 
the UW Election Staffs Pawel Piskorski, "we used fifteen people in our campaign but 
with a very clear and unambiguous accent on Leszek Balcerowicz ... So when 
it came 
to the exposition of a figurehead and a symbol associating the party with a person, 
this was a campaign saying: Teszek Balcerowicz equals the Freedom Union'. "' The 
party's programme was, for example, repackaged and re-launched as the 'Second 
Balcerowicz Plan', harking back to the pioneering economic reforms which the 
eponymous UW leader introduced as Polish Finance Minister in the early 1990s. "' 
This was a risky strategy given Balcerowicz's rather detached and academic media 
style and his previous role as a lightning conductor for popular discontent. The 
gamble, however, paid off - partly because the party's private polling research 
revealed that, for all his historical 'baggage, Balcerowicz was also viewed as a 
competent and trustworthy leader and capable of actually 'delivering' reform; or, as 
"" Author interview, 24 November 1997. 
149 Potirety Lider6w Opozycji. 
Author interview, 4 June 1997. 
Author interview, 24 November 1997. 
... Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
See: 'Siedem kluczy: Drugi plan Balcerowicz', Rzeczpospolita, 10 September 1997. 
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Piskorksi put it, "the person who most reached our 'target group'... who best 
symbolised those things which we wanted to say to our electorate. ""' This was 
confirmed by an April 1997 CBOS survey which found that "What marks out Leszek 
Balcerowicz among the politicians surveyed and, at the same, plays the greatest role 
in creating his social perception, are undoubtedly his intellectual qualities. " He was 
regarded by a substantial majority of voters from all parties as intelligent (76%), 
knowledgeable and able (70%), a "balanced person, not prone to emotion" (63%), 
energetic and dynamic (62%) and effective (58%). "' 
More broadly, UW party strategists felt that projecting a party leader successfully was 
becoming an increasingly unavoidable aspect of Polish electoral politics. According 
to UW Press Spokesman Andzrej Potocki, for example, "the party leader is obviously 
the party's 'calling card' and so needs to be attractive. Its important to improve his 
image, ensure that his personal ratings are high. "" Consequently, Potocki, and other 
UW strategists, criticised those parties and groupings who passively accepted the idea 
"that leaders hinder rather than help. This was their mistake because you have to 
carve out an image for your leader and not rely exclusively on the one already carved 
out. ""' Balcerowicz was, therefore, 'repackaged' as a warmer and more relaxed 
inn n personality - "less like an expert and more folksy, " as Potocki put it"' - beg i gin. 
February 1997 with a bravura performance in a high profile television debate with the 
SdRP leader JOZef Oleksy. As Table 8 shows, during the last few weeks of the 
election campaign Balcerowicz succeeded in increasing his positive and net approval 
ratings from 42% and -11% in July to 55% and +16% in October. 
The only other party which ran a campaign whose objective was, above all, to project 
its party leader was Jan Olszewski's ROP. According to the head of the ROP's 
Election Staffs Wojciech WIodarczyk, Olszewski's image featured in all the party's 
campaign literature, posters, leaflets and massive 'mobile billboards' which were 
pulled along by taxis in all the major Polish towns; and only a throat illness, rather 
than strategic choice, limited his involvement in the electronic media campaign to 
"when it was essential. ""' However, unlike the UW campaign - in which Balcerowicz 
was heavily promoted because he was felt to embody particular qualities which made 
him attractive to certain potential UW voters - the focus on Olszewski was related 
more to the aforementioned intensity of commitment which he attracted among the 
Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
Portrety Lider6w Opozycji. 
Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
15' Author interview, 25 November 1997. 
Ibid. 
Author interview, 27 November 1997. 
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party's existing supporters. '" As ROP Election Staffs Spokesman Jan Polkowski put 
it, "all of ROP's constructive characteristics are, to some extent, personified in the 
personality of the leader ... Jan Olszewski is not just the embodiment of the 
independence tradition in its modern sense. He is also distinguished by characteristics 
so rarely found in politicians: honesty, consistency, courage ... he is the one politician 
symbolising CHANGE. ""' (capitals in original) On other hand, although this intense 
commitment to their leader may have led ROP strategists to delude themselves into 
believing that this translated into broader support among the electorate as a whole, 
there was no clear evidence of Olszewski's capacity as a broader electoral asset. On 
the contrary, as Table 4.8 shows, only 39% of voters viewed Olszewski's leadership 
positively in February 1997, with a net approval rating of - 15%, and these figures 
actually fell to 35% and -23% duing the course of the campaign. 
Conclusion 
There was, therefore, some evidence that all the parties and groupings surveyed had 
attempted to defme their 'core' electorates and, at the very least, to nuance their 
electoral appeals to attract particular socio-economic groups. Nevertheless, as 
hypothesised, most of them based their electoral strategies primarily on mobilising 
loose electoral constituencies either by highlighting their supposed competence, 
ability, moderation and trustworthiness or by appealing to socially heterogeneous 
'ideological' electorates on the basis of moral-cultural issues rather than attempting to 
appeal mainly or exclusively to particular socio-economic 'interests'. This finding 
was confirmed by an examination of party strategies during the 1997 parliamentary 
elections, although there were clearly differences of emphasis: with the UW and UP 
campaigns the most targeted and focused on socio-economic issues, while ideological 
and moral-cultural themes predominated in the AWS and ROP campaigns, and the 
SLD campaign combined elements of the two. 
Moreover, these various attempts to define and target 'core' electorates do not 
necessarily contradict the general conclusion that most parties and groupings more 
closely resembled the contemporary catch-all/electoral-professionaI party than the 
traditional mass party model in terms of their electoral strategies. Firstly, because the 
high level of organisational and electoral instability which characterised post- 
communist Polish politics meant that most parties were only really in the preliminary, 
"" Opinion pollsters noted a clear tendency for the party's support to increase when the ROP leader's 
name was included in the survey. See, for example: R. Wr6bel. 'Bez wiqkszych zmian', 
Rzeczpospofita. 28 June 1996. 
""Dlaczego Warto Glosowa6 na Ruch Odbudowy PolskiT 
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and extremely tentative, stages of defining these 'core' electorates. Secondly, and 
more importantly, because in practice no party ever attempts to literally 'catch-all' 
and, as Panebianco put it, the catch-all/electoral-professionaI party model "was not an 
organisation whose electoral following was so heterogeneous as to represent the 
whole social spectrumý' because "no party could ever maintain such a position (since 
no party could ever afford to completely lose its identity vis-a-vis competing 
organisations). "Ill 
An analysis of these five parties' 1997 electoral profiles also revealed that even when 
parties attempted to direct and target their electoral appeals at particular socio- 
economic groups, this was not, with the partial exception of the UW, reflected in 
substantially higher than average levels of support within that segment of the 
electorate. In other words, given that there were no significant variations in most of 
their patterns of support in terms of voters' sex, age, place of residence, education or 
occupation, their bases of support did not appear to rooted in any particular socio- 
economic 'interests'. Indeed, survey evidence indicated that - particularly in the cases 
of the SdRP/SLD and AWS - support for a given party was generally determined by 
ideological self-placement, which was itself a function of attitudes towards the past 
and moral-cultural rather than socio-economic issues. This suggested both that, as 
hypothesised, the new socio-economic 'interests' which have been emerging as a 
result of the post-1989 economic transformation had not yet crystallised sufficiently 
for them to act as a major influence on voting behaviour and that broad electoral 
appeals which cut across socio-economic classes were, indeed, likely to be the most 
effective means of mobilsing electoral support in post-communist Poland at this stage 
of the political and economic transition. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to draw a number of important distinctions between the 
electoral strategies pursued by the Western catch-all/electoral-professionaI parties and 
the emerging political parties of post-communist Poland. The most important 
difference was that while the former were mass working class or confessional parties 
with a pre-existing base of support engaged in a process of broadening out to a wider 
clientele, the latter are attempting to develop such a 'core' electorate in the first place. 
In other words, Polish parties are following a very different developmental path to 
Western catch-all/electoral-professional parties in terms of the evolution of their 
electoral strategies: with broad electoral appeals aimed at loose and unstructured 
constituencies being developed at the same time as (or even prior to) tentative 
attempts to define distinct 'core' electoral constituencies. Moreover, although, in line 
'62 Political Parties: Organisation and Power, p263. 
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with the catch-all/electoral-professional model, most Polish party electoral strategies 
were based on appealing to 'opinion' rather than 'interest' electorates, there was little 
evidence of the 'de-ideologisation' of party politics - and concomitant focus on non- 
divisive, non-contentious issues and the competence of party leaders - which was an 
important feature of the contemporary Western party models. On the contrary, the 
emerging Polish party system appeared to be characterised by electoral strategies 
based in large measure on appeals to such 'ideological' electorates. 
Indeed, one of the more surprising features of the party electoral strategies, 
highlighted by the 1997 parliamentary election campaign, was the relative lack of 
focus on party leaders, contrary to both recent Western developments and the 
hypothcsiscd characteristics of post-communist politics. One explanation for this may 
be that, while the varying degrees of emphases which parties placed on promoting 
their leaders suggested that most of them were sophisticated enough to rcalisc when 
they were an electoral asset or liability, most of them were also, clearly, not yet at the 
stage when 'clcctability' had become one of, if not the, main criteria for leadership 
selection. Three of the six party leaders surveyed - the UP's Ryszard Bugaj, ROP's 
Jan Olszcwski and AWS's Marian Krzaklcwski - held their positions largely as a 
result of the instrumental role which they played in their party or grouping's 
formation rather because of any demonstrable vote-winning qualities. J6zef Oleksy 
emerged as SdRP leader as an act of intra-party solidarity and defiance against what 
the party claimed was an anti-communist witchunt, and in spite of the fact that he was 
one of party's greatest electoral liabilities. Similarly, although there was a period 
when Waldemar Pawlak was a vote-winner for the PSL, with the slump in his 
personal popularity which followed the fall of his government in February 1995, he 
only retained his position due to skillftil intra-party maneuvering. Nor, indeed, with 
the notable exception of the UW, were parties as yet sufficiently conscious of the 
importance, or even possibility, of 'packaging' or 're-packaging' a party leader in 
order to highlight his strengths and minimise his weaknesses in the eyes of the 
party's 'target' electorate. This relative lack of 'leader-orientation' - in terms of 
electoral politics, at least - may, however, only be a conjunctural phenomenon as 
parties and groupings begin to copy the UW's successful model of 'selling 
Balcerowicz' and as the requirements of mass electronic news media increasingly 
personalise, or 'Americanise', party politics in Poland - as they have in most Western 
democracies. 
As hypothesised, the one significant exception to this general pattern of broad 
electoral appeals aimed at loose constituencies - and the only party which bore at least 
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a superficial resemblance to mass party model in terms of electoral strategy and bases 
of support- was the PSL. The PSL defined its 'core' electorate as, and targeted its 
electoral appeal principally at, the large proportion of the Polish population which 
had worked in peasant small-holdings even throughout the communist era and which, 
therefore, provided the party with a 'natural' socio-economic base. Given the steady 
and increasingly inevitable decline in the size of the Polish agricultural sector - 
together with the fact that, as the 1997 parliamentary elections revealed, the 
agricultural/rural electorate was much more 'open' than many commentators had 
assumed - there was evidence that even the PSL was attempting to broaden the basis 
of its appeal to encompass rural communities as a whole and even, more ambitiously, 
sections of the urban electorate. Nevertheless, whatever rhetoric the party may have 
used about broadening the party's electoral base, as the 1997 parliamentary election 
campaign showed, there was still a general tendency for the PSL not to stray too far 
into unfamiliar territory and away from what it saw as its 'safest' electoral ground. As 
one Polish commentator accurately put when summing up the mentality of PSL 
strategists, the party "has an electorate which is maybe not the largest but is certain" 
and which "it will never exchange for a larger but less certain one. ""' Moreover, 
whatever intentions the PSL may have had of winning over a broader electorate it 
conspicuously failed to do so and, if anything, became more concentrated in its 
shrinking rural/agricultural base. 
"' M. Janicki, Tawlak i jego driiiyna: Na czym polega sila PSL', Polityka, 12 November 1994. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. - 
PARTIESAS MEMBERSHIP ORGANISA TIONS 
We have seen from our examination of the relationship between the new Polish 
parties and their electorates that they are likely to develop on the basis of weak 
political cleavage structures. But these cleavages, which proved so important in the 
stabilisation of west European party systems, were not solely based on divisions in 
socio-economic characteristics or in ascriptive identities. They also derived, in part at 
least, from the anchoring created by organisational. networks which, as Mair put it, 
when underpinned by strong and enduring collective social and political identities 
"effectively segmented many of the electorates into relatively stable and closed 
partisan blocs. "' Consequently, having examined what kind of electorates they were 
seeking to attract, this chapter goes on to consider the precise nature of the links 
between the new Polish parties and their electorates, particularly whether or not they 
sought to recruit their voters as party members or encapsulate them in ancillary 
organisations. 2 
a. 
Each successive model of contemporary party organisation related to a different stage 
in the development of parties as membership organisations and conception of the role 
of party members in campaigning activities? Given its limited social base and the fact 
that it paid little attention to the need for campaigning, the membership of the cadre 
party was small, elitist and almost entirely made up of leaders, and the nature of party 
activity was largely irrelevah As Duverger put it, a cadre party consisted of little 
more than "the grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting 
campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates ... If we define a member as 
one who signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his 
subscription, then cadre parties have no members. "' The mass party, on the other 
hand, was the logical response to the challenge of mobilising support among the 
newly enfranchised working class electorates - with the party seen as the agency of 
linkage between the state and the activated citizenry. According to this model, 
electoral competition was primarily about mobilisation rather than conversion and the 
key requirement for a successftil party was to increase the level of commitment of 
' "at is different about post-communist party systems? p 15 
2 Organisational units aimed at specific segments the party's supporters that have a direct overlap 
with the party's structures such as women's and youth sections. 
' 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', 
pp5-28. 
'Political Parties: 77ieir Organisation and Activities in the Modem State. pp63-64. 
156 
those already pre-disposed to offer it support (that is, members of its 'natural' 
constituency) by turning supporters into members. Consequently, the mass party was 
characterised by a large and homogeneous enrolled membership organised in formal 
structures; with membership being a logical consequence of one's social and political 
identity. Members were also viewed as potentially valuable electoral assets, with the 
nature of campaigning highly labour intensive as mass parties made up in quantity 
and collective action what they lacked in individual patronage by pooling large 
numbers of small fmancial contributions and organising volunteers. 
Moreover, mass parties were distinguished from cadre parties as much by their 
aspiration to enrol as wide a segment of their supporters as possible as by their sheer 
size or, as Scarrow put it, "by their strategic goals and formal enrolment procedures, 
but not (necessarily) by their success in implementing these strategies. "' Indeed, as 
well as seeking to enrol them, mass parties also attempted to encapsulate their 
supporters by developing networks of ancillary organisations that sought to fulfil a 
wide range of social ftmctions by, for example, providing their members with 
information, insurance, union representation and other educational and social 
activities. Thus the mass party provided itself with mechanisms for both mobilising 
its supporters and insulating them from alternative infiuences. As Katz put it, "the 
continued cohesion of social groups provided a solid basis for a virtual party 
monopoly on political linkage; parties represented coherent programmes (in a social if 
not necessarily a logical or ideological sense) and were supported by a variety of 
ancillary organisations that could effectively encapsulate supporters in a socially and 
politically homogeneous and all-embracing network. "6 
Given that they appeared to be a successful response to the challenge of winning 
votes in the era of the mass franchise the mass party approach was widely imitated 
and membership parties became, as Scarrow put it, "one of the most distinctive and 
most successful forms of political organisation in the Twentieth Century. " However, 
over time the strong social settlements and unified political sub-cultures which had 
underpinned mass parties began to decline and a much looser and more discontinuous 
pattern of party-electorate relations began to develop - with voters coming to view 
party membership as progressively less attractive and mass parties as increasingly 
anachronistic. Consequently, writers such as Kirchheimer and Panebianco began to 
argue that, as mass parties lost their competitive advantage, party leaders and 
Parties and their Members. p 19. 
R. S. Katz, 'Party as linkage: A vestigial ftinciton?, in European Journal ofPolitical Research. Vol 
18.1990. ppl43-161 (144). 
7 Parties and their Members. p 1. 
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strategists would also increasingly lose interest in recruiting and encapsulating mass 
members and develop catch-all organisational strategies, based on much looser 
relationships with their electorates, to accompany their catch-all electoral strategies. " 
Party membership remained necessary in the catch-all/electoral-professional model - 
at least in its early stages when the continued prevalence of the mass party made it 
convenient for party leaders to at least maintain the appearance of, and claim to 
represent and be accountable to, a mass organisation. Indeed, the character of the 
membership was actually more heterogeneous as the catch-all/electoral-professional 
party opened its ranks to a wider range of supporters and recruited on the basis of 
policy agreement rather than social identity. However, in reality party membership 
became increasingly marginal to an individual's identity and the rank-and-file party 
member's role was downgraded to something of a historical relic. While they 
continued to draw on members as a source of finance and a channel of 
communication with the electorate, catch-all/electoral-professionaI parties also began 
to shift towards a more capital intensive campaigning approach and (as discussed in 
the chapter on the party machine) leant increasingly heavily on professional 
organisations rather than enrolled volunteers. 
Moreover, while catch-all/electoral-professionaI parties still enrolled members they 
no longer seriously attempted to encapsulate them by developing networks of 
ancillary organisations. This process was accompanied by an increased emphasis on 
working a wider variety of interest groups with much weaker and less regular party 
ties. The loosening of ties with particular segments of society meant that parties no 
longer played a unique role in either aggregating and presenting demands from civil 
society or defending policy decisions to the public and generating support for 
governments and political systems. As Katz and Mair put it, catch-all/electoral- 
professional parties were "less the agents of civil society acting on, and penetrating, 
the state, and are rather more like brokers between civil society and the state, with the 
party in government. "g 
Although catch-all/electoral-professionaI parties inherited (and maintained at least a 
rhetorical commitment to) a membership base from mass parties, subsequent 
sociological and technological changes (discussed in greater detail below) meant that 
parties found it even more difficult to maintain previous levels of enrolment and 
' See: 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems'; Political Parties: Organisation and 
Power.. pp263-269. 
9 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p 13. 
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commitment and rendered membership parties "an increasingly imperilled species. "" 
In Katz and Mair's cartel party model, therefore, the character of party membership 
changed to the extent that, although they may still have continued to make a valuable 
contribution to party life in a number of ways (discussed below), there was a much 
greater emphasis on party members as individuals rather than as an organised body 
and the distinction between members and non-members was increasingly blurred as 
parties invited all 'supporters' to participate in party activities and decisions. 
Consequently, as Katz and Mair put it, "it becomes possible to imagine a party that 
manages all of its business from a single central headquarters and which simply 
subdivides its mailing list by constituency, region or town when particular sets of 
candidates have to be selected or when sub-national policies have to be approved. "" 
Although, as we saw in the previous chapter, the cartel model involved some 
reversion to idea of parties attempting to define and segment their electorates, the 
inherently looser relationship between parties and their members threatened to change 
the very character of the party as an agency of linkage from being an element of civil 
society to being part of the state apparatus. In the cartel party model, therefore, citizen 
control was exercised on parties as elements of the state's ruling structure rather than 
through parties as agencies of linkage for particular groups in civil society with 
demand articulation becoming, to an even greater extent, the province of interest 
organisations. Consequently, as Mair put it, parties moved "from an earlier, post- 
suffrage stage (the classic 'mass party' phase) in which they represented the interests 
of civil society vis-a-vis the state, to a stage in which they acted almost as 
independent brokers between state and civil society (the classic 'catch-all party 
phase) ... to a new and more recent stage, 
in which they actually move closer to 
becoming part of the state, and remain at quite a remove from civil society. 9"2 The 
balance of linkage, therefore, shifted that so that "no longer simple brokers between 
civil society and the state, the parties now become absorbed by the state. From having 
first assumed the role of trustees, and then later of delegates, and then later again, in 
the heyday of the catch-all party, of entrepreneurs, parties have now become semi- 
state agencies. "" 
This general decline in parties as mass membership organisations, and in the levels of 
participation and involvement in party activity was, it was argued, inevitable and 
rooted in a shift in the balance of costs and benefits which made party membership 
Parties and their Members. p 1. 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p2l. 
'Party Organisation', p8. 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'. p 16. 
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less attractive for both party leaders and ordinary citizens. Consequently, the 
developments which account for the decline of the mass membership party could be 
divided into divided into what Scarrow terms 'supply side' and 'demand side' factors 
relating, respectively, to the changing calculations made by potential party members 
and leaders. " 
Supply-side arguments emphasised the growing importance of factors that made 
citizens less likely to join political parties so that even where party leaders continued 
to invest resources in enrolling members their efforts were likely to meet with 
diminishing returns. 
Firstly, as noted in the previous chapter on parties and their electorates, the 
sociological changes which accompanied and gave rise to the catch-all/electoral- 
professional party model (increased material well-being, more widespread and 
comprehensive education and the development of mass culture and communications) 
created more fluid and heterogeneous societies. This breakdown in the communal ties 
which had formed the basis for party cohesion led to a concomitant weakening of the 
sociological ties between individuals and parties and, thereby, reduced the pool of 
committed partisans on which they could draw on in order to recruit members. " 
Secondly, parties had fewer incentives to offer their potential members either, to use 
Panebianco's distinction, collective benefits (identification with the organisation, its 
cause or with the other participants' political and social goals) or selective benefits 
(the promise of access to power, status or material benefits). " In terms of collective 
incentives, the decline in party identification and centrality of the party to an 
individual's life meant that it was less likely to be viewed as a potential source of the 
socio-pyschic rewards derived from companionship with like-minded citizens or 
through the performance of some kind of civic duty. Similarly, the expansion of the 
leisure industries, state education and the mass media in all the established Western 
democracies significantly reduced the comparative value of party membership as a 
provider of such services. In terms of selective benefits, the reform of administrative 
procedures made it more difficult for parties to attract members through the promise 
of privileged access to public employment or treatment at the hands of state officials, 
Parties and their Members, p6. 
On the demand side, this process of political de-alignment also meant that, confronted with an 
increasingly unstable and volatile electorate, parties were forced to devote an increased share of their 
resources to winning over and retaining segments of the electorate at large, rather than attracting and 
retaining members. 
'6 Political Parties: Organisation and Power. pp9- 10. 
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while the post-war expansion of the welfare state reduced the value of the personal 
material rewards or other party-linked benefits. 
Thirdly, the success of the welfare state and the expansion of mass education also 
created a new generation of citizens who were not satisfied with the fairly limited, 
marginal and indirect forms of participation that parties traditionally offered to their 
ordinary, rank-and-file ordinary members. At the same time, citizens turned 
increasingly to alternative (and apparently superior) channels for influencing and 
participating in the policy process such as the increasingly wide variety of single issue 
interest groups, new social movements and other alternative organisations (with 
which they were more likely to find themselves in full agreement on a narrower range 
of concerns) or to the mass media. " 
Demand-side arguments, on the other hand, highlighted the reasons why party leaders 
were no longer willing to invest resources into developing and maintaining mass 
membership organisations. Such calculations represented what may be defined as a 
party's 'organisational strategy', which Scarrow distinguishes from its 'electoral 
strategy' thus: 
"Party's organisational strategies are distinct from their electoral strategies, though 
the latter may well influence the former. For a vote-seeking party the electoral 
strategy is a plan for winning votes from specific segments of the electorate. In 
contrast, its organisational strategy is a plan for optimising the use of available 
resources in order to promote the realisation of the electoral strategy ... A party's 
organisational. strategy at least implicitly ranks the value of different resources 
(money, members etc) and it assesses how each type of resource can most usefully be 
deployed. An organisational strategy also incorporates judgements about the prices to 
be paid for each type of resource. "" 
According to demand-side explanations, therefore, party leaders modified their 
organisational strategies because they began to consider enrolled members as 
increasingly more a liability than an efficient vote-winning tool. 
Firstly, as we saw in the previous chapter on the party machine, new communications 
technologies such as computer-aided direct mail, opinion polls and particularly 
television offered party leaders alternative means of direct communication with the 
" This was, of course, re-inforced to some extent by the increasing tendency of parties to loosen their 
links even with those interest groups with whom they had previously enjoyed close ties. 
's Parties and their Members. p49. 
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citizenry and, thereby, enabled them to employ small and efficient teams of 
professional organisers to perform many of the campaigning tasks traditionally 
entrusted to larger pools of volunteers drawn from the enrolled party membership. 
This increasingly capital intensive approach to political campaigning meant that party 
leaders came to view organised members as a comparatively worthless electoral asset 
and an organisational strategy based on their recruitment and retention as a 
comparatively inefficient use of their resources. 
Secondly, the relatively high costs involved in utilising these new campaign tools 
meant that parties could no longer rely on members as their sole, or even principal, 
means of financial support and had to seek out other sources of funding. Indeed, the 
increasingly widespread provision of state party funding (discussed in greater detail in 
the chapter on parties and the state) provided parties with an alternative source of 
income, enabling (or even encouraging) them not to invest in membership enrolment. 
Thirdly, even if party strategists may have considered them to be of some residual 
value, it was argued that members imposed other costs that led parties to seek to 
reduce their organisational dependence on them. Quite apart from the material costs 
of recruiting and servicing members, together with the provision of non-political 
selective benefits, they also imposed programmatic costs that constrained the party 
leadership's room for manoeuvre. According to some demand-side theorists, such as 
May, leaders were motivated primarily by the desire for electoral success - and, 
thereby, more likely to adopt a more moderate policy stance - while party members 
were generally inspired to join a party by ideological concerns, drawn from the most 
extreme ideological segment of the party's supporters and, therefore, had a tendency 
to demand policy commitments based on doctrinal purity. 19 In other words, far from 
representing an electoral asset, the party's core activists actually diminished a party's 
electoral prospects. 
Taken together, it was argued that these supply side and demand side factors meant 
that party leaders had fewer reasons for wishing to recruit members and found it 
increasingly difficult to attract them even if they wanted to. However, although these 
arguments may seem compelling they have been challenged on both empirical and 
theoretical grounds. In the first place, the scale of the decline should not be 
exaggerated and, as Mair points out, empirical research on the actual levels of party 
membership levels in Western democracies suggested that "the most important 
decline in levels of party membership has been that which has occurred in relative 
See, for example: 'Opinion Structure of Political Parties'. 
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terms" (emphasis added) with the growth in enrolment simply failing to keep pace 
with the expansion of national electorates. 10 
Moreover, there were also both counter-arguments why party strategists need not 
necessarily completely ignore or marginalise the importance of large formally 
enrolled memberships and counter-examples of cases where party strategists still 
considered them to be of some value. " Firstly, parties may have continued to consider 
members as a means of boosting their legitimacy and find electoral value in at least 
maintaining the image of a mass party. They may, therefore, have continued to recruit 
even completely inactive members in order to present themselves as popular 
organisations with significant societal roots and controlled by ordinary citizens rather 
than purely comprising professional politicians. Secondly, in spite of the fact that 
party leaders had alternative campaigning techniques and networks of communication 
at their disposal, members could still be regarded as an important organisational 
resource in a number of ways. As well as continuing to provide a residually useful 
depository of free labour during and between election campaigns, they also offered: a 
potential source of new and innovatory ideas to improve policies and make party 
practices more effective, an (albeit limited) channel of communication reflecting 
public concerns and, most significantly, as Mair points out, they fulfilled an essential 
role as "warm bodies which can occupy official positions" continuing to act as the 
principal mechanism for parties to identify, recruit and place their personnel in key 
national and local state offices. " Thirdly, in spite of the widespread introduction of 
state party funding, members' subscriptions and donations still constituted an 
important, albeit declining, source of party revenue for many parties. 23 Fourthly, 
commentators have put forward both theoretical and empirical arguments in support 
of the notion that rank-and-file party members and activists were also motivated by 
'office-seeking' goals and did not, therefore, therefore impose excessive 
programmatic costs on party leaders. " 
So what kind of relationship between parties and their members might we expect to 
see developing in post-communist Poland? 
'Party Organisation'. p4. 
For a useful theoretical discussion of the relative costs and benefits of enrolling party members 
from the party strategists' perspective, see: Parties and their Members. pp27-5 1. 
22 'Party Organisation'. p14. 
23 Ironically, as Katz points out, one result of the introduction of state party funding was to allow 
membership subscription levels not to be increased in line with inflation, thereby reducing a potential 
monetary supply-side barrier to membership. 'Party as Linkage', p 156. 
2' See: ' May's Law of Curvilinear Disparity Revisited'. 
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Given that (as we saw in the previous chapter on parties and the electorates) most of 
the new Polish parties have developed relatively loose and unstructured electoral 
constituencies which are not rooted in any particular socio-economic interest, we 
might also hypothesise that the nature of these links will be very weak with parties 
engaging in only minimal attempts to organise their electorates. In other words the 
new Polish parties are likely to develop in line with the more recent models ofparty 
organisation with a weak membership base, low levels of local implantation and, 
consequently, much less grounded in civil society than Western parties were in the 
early stages ofparty development. There are a number of reasons why we might 
expect Polish parties to develop in this way: some generic to modem democracies, 
others rooted in the specifics of post-communist Eastern European politics. 
On the demand-side, there was little incentive for Polish party leaders to invest time 
and resources into recruiting mass memberships and developing local organisational 
networks. 
Firstly, most of the new parties were top-down organisations which originated in 
parliament or at an elite level - "internally created' to use Duverger's terminology" - 
and, as Mair points out, "like all such parties they are either less likely, or find it 
difficult, to establish a strong organisational network at mass level. ""' For sure, there 
did, at first sight, appear to be a number of "externally-created" parties (which 
developed mass, extra-parliamentary organisations as a base to secure parliamentary 
representation and government office) such as those which emerged from within the 
Solidarity movement. However, as noted in chapter one, the various 'post-Solidarity' 
parties were formed mainly on the basis of divisions within its parliamentary and 
leadership elites rather than from within the mass movement and should, therefore, be 
regarded principally as parliamentary manifestations. " It is also true that many West 
European parties which subsequently evolved into mass parties also began within 
parliament and built up grassroots; organisations in response to challenges from their 
externally-created opponents. " But for this process to develop in post-communist 
Poland would require externally-created opponents to challenge the existing 
internally-created parties by building strong popular organisations and, thereby, 
offering a competing model of party organisation which encouraged the latter to 
imitate this approach. 
25 See: Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modern State. pxxiii-xxxvii. 
26 9%at is different about post-communist party systems? p 12. 
" Indeed, also as noted in chapter one, the fact that the break up of the Solidarity movement in 1990 
was referred to as the 'war at the top' illustrted its elite-based character. 
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Secondly, in line with recent developments in Western democracies, the mass media 
were likely to provide the main channel of communications between parties and the 
electorate and the prospect of access to it was likely to diminish the utility of party 
membership and local organisation as the key instruments for spreading the parties' 
message. 
Tbirdly, also in line with Western developments, the financial costs of low party 
membership levels were likely to be easily offset by state party funding - the principle 
of which was quickly established in all recent cases of democratisation. " 
Fourthly, however valuable they may have perceived members to be in terms of 
providing political legitimacy (or even as an additional organisational resource), it 
may have been as unappealing to the new Polish party leaders (who in many cases 
were also the founders of their parties) to construct mass membership structures 
which could develop into sources of internal opposition or conflict as it was to their 
counterparts in Western democracies. Moreover, as Mair points out, while party 
membership remained an important factor in the organisational strategies of many 
Western parties in spite of the potential danger of rank-and-file militancy simply 
because they inherited mass organisations from an earlier organisational era, the new 
post-communist East European parties may have considered building up a mass 
membershipfrom scratch more trouble than it is worth. 19 
Fifthly, in a self-reinforcing process, the fact that most of the new party leaders were 
pre-occupied with the tasks of economic and political transformation left them little 
time to focus on party development; while the lack of a substantial organised presence 
on the ground was, in turn, likely to have made them feel even more dependent on 
their role in parliament and state institutions for their legitimacy and even less 
inclined to orientate themselves towards civil society. 
At the same time there were also supply side factors likely to make Polish citizens 
reluctant to join the new parties; some of them, once again, specific to post- 
communist Eastern Europe and others part of more secular trends. 
Firstly, the fact that (as we saw in the previous chapter on parties and their 
electorates) communist regimes attempted to atomise society, together with the social 
upheavals created by the economic transition, meant that socio-economic interests 
See: Funding Democratization. 
U%at is different about post-communist party systems? p 15. 
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were only slowly and tentatively crystallising and partisan preferences remained 
relatively unstructured. Consequently, the level of party identification in post- 
communist Poland was likely to have been every lower than in established Western 
democracies which, as noted above, were also characterised by 'de-alignment' and 
increasingly weak party-electorate linkages. 
Secondly, given the communist party's role as a one-way transmission belt from the 
leadership to the masses and its association with forty years of repressive, one-party 
rule, it was unlikely that Polish citizens would quickly develop an appreciation of 
parties as agencies of two-way linkage and popular representation. Moreover, given 
that the primary motivation for party membership in communist Poland was - 
individual career advancement, it was likely that its popular stereotype as a shamefill 
activity to be frowned upon by most decent people would be carried forward into the 
post-communist period. Indeed, the communist legacy of a lack of civic education 
and enforced ideological mobilisation was likely not only likely to make people 
reluctant to identify themselves with parties, but also to discredit the entire notion of 
'politics' itself in the eyes of large sections of a population with no experience of 
thinking in democratic and political categories. " 
Thirdly, Polish parties had even fewer incentives for enrolment and participation to 
offer their prospective members than their Western counterparts. The socio-economic 
factors which made it increasingly difficult for parties in Western democracies to 
attract potential members were all, to some extent, likely to be relevant in post- 
communist Poland, particularly the lack of privileged access to employment or any 
other direct material benefits (except from the patronage which flowed from the 
relatively small number of state political appointments at national and local level). 
The scope for this was, obviously, much more limited following the abolition of the 
nomenklatura system which linked all key public appointments to communist party 
membership. Indeed, given the tiny number of paid party functionaries (discussed in 
more detail in the chapter on the party machine) even the possibility making a career 
as a party official was much more limited than during the communist period when the 
PZPR and its satellites employed extensive local and national bureaucracies. 
Fourthly, the dislocation and uncertainty caused by the effects of economic transition 
was also likely to make Polish citizens focus more on their personal and family lives 
which, in a relatively atomised society, were probably viewed as more effective 
30 A factor no doubt exacerbated by the lack of an unambiguous democratic tradition from the inter- 
war Polish Republic which citizens could draw on. 
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means of achieving material security than time and effort invested in collective, civic- 
orientated activities such as party membership. Consequently, those people who 
joined parties were likely to be, as one Polish sociologist put it, "really convinced 
about these organisations and, in some ideological way, overcome their day-to-day 
conditions and hardships and try to get involved in party activity. "' Given that this 
phenomenon was linked as much to economic insecurity - which affected all but a 
tiny segment of the population - as to increased poverty and unemployment, this 
particular factor was likely to have been equally applicable to both 'winners' and 
'losers' from the economic transition. 
Fifthly, the popular impression of post-communist Polish politics as fractious and 
obsessed with petty, personality-based squabbles (to some extent inevitable given the 
relative inexperience of those who were participating in democratic party politics for 
the first time) was also likely to discourage identification with, and involvement in, 
party politics. 
For similar reasons, the new Polish parties are as unlikely to attempt to organise and 
encapsulate segments of the electorate by developing ancillary organisations as they 
are to enrol individual members. Rather they are more likely to act as 'brokers'or 
even 'semi-state agencies' organising their relationships with civil society through 
interest organisations with whom they enjoy only a loose relationship. As noted 
above, citizens in Western democracies have increasingly turned to other channels to 
articulate their political interests. Although, given the general weakness of civil 
society in post-communist Eastern Europe, such organisations are likely to remain 
weak and under-developed for some time, commentators such as Kopecky have 
argued that "the dynamics of their development, linked to the speed and depth of the 
on-going social and political changes, make me wary of ascribing to the political 
parties an eventually hegemonic role in the representation of civil society. "' 
Just as the decline in the levels and significance of party membership in Western 
democracies should not be exaggerated, we can also expect the new Polish parties to 
organise some organisational structures on the ground; if only to provide them with 
political legitimacy and a means of candidate recruitment. Nevertheless, we might 
also hypothesise that these parties' local branches will befocussed on fuUilling a set 
offairly narrow organisational tasks and electoralfunctions rather than acting as 
" Author interview with Professor Mirslawa Grabowska, Institute of Sociology, University of 
Warsaw, June 5 1997. 
'Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe', p518. 
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catalysts for broader and on-going grassroots campaigning activities within civil 
society. 
Finally, as with the other aspects of party organisation examined in previous chapters 
we might also hypothesise that there is likely to be a difference between those 
completely 'newparties built upfrom scratch following the collapse of communism 
and emergence of multi-party politics in 1989 and SdRP and the PSL which emerged 
as 'successors'to the ruling communistparty and itsformer allies and, therefore, had 
a longer organisational. continuity. The latter are likely to have retained, in relative 
terms at least, higher levels of membership and more developed local organisational 
networks from their party activities during the previous communist period and, 
therefore, will display a closer resemblance to the mass party model than the 
completely 'new' parties. 
In order to test these hypotheses this chapter examines a number of aspects relating to 
the development of the new Polish parties as membership organisations. 
Firstly, overall party membership figures are considered together with the level of 
local implantation among the five individual member-based parties included in our 
sample (SdRP, the PSL, UW, UP and ROP) in order to compare both the 'successor' 
and 'new' parties and the Polish totals with those in other European democracies. 
Secondly, the question of to what extent the new Polish parties have attempted to 
encapsulate their electorates by developing networks of ancillary organisations is 
examined together with the related issue of the party-interest group relations. 
Thirdly, the role and function of local party structures in the five individual member- 
based parties surveyed is examined to determine whether they were active and vibrant 
organisations, organically linked to their local communities and having an ongoing 
input into their party's policy and decision-making processes, or whether they were 
characterised by a more passive, electorally-driven and locally-focussed pattern of 
activity. 
Fourthly, if, as hypothesised, the new Polish parties had (with partial exceptions of 
the two 'successors') weak individual and collective membership bases together with 
low levels of local implantation the question of why they developed such 
organisational structures and found it so difficult to enrol members is considered. This 
section examines both demand side explanations - the priorities which the new parties 
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assigned to recruiting members and developing local networks in their organisational. 
strategies - and supply-side factors: the incentives and impediments to citizens 
joining parties in post-communist Poland. In other words, consideration is given as to 
whether the parties' (hypothesised) failure to assemble large, formally enrolled 
membership organisations was the result of the fact that they were simply not 
interested in recruiting members, Polish voters were not interested in joining them, or 
if (as hypothesised) both of these factors were in some way relevant. 
While it is relatively straightforward to identify parties' policy preferences (given that 
they regularly endorse written programmes) and there is also an 'official story' set out 
in party Statutes about how parties should function and how the internal distribution 
of power should operate, organisational strategy is not always so easy to locate. 
Indeed, in many ways, this issue highlights the general difficulties of studying 
internal party structure and organisation (discussed at greater length in the 
introduction) given that, Polish parties (in common with most others) rarely (if ever) 
explicitly and consciously set out their organisational strategies in official documents 
or in ways that left any traces in party archives - and probably equally rarely in 
internally party documents. Consequently, this chapter is based almost exclusively on 
interviews with key party officials in the five individual member-based parties 
surveyed which - while they often contained high levels of wishful thinking and 
propaganda - where generally a more revealing source than the occasional party 
documents that addressed this issue. 
Pggy membership and local implantation 
Although accurate membership figures were extremely difficult to obtain and claimed 
totals should be treated with extreme caution, the new Polish parties could be divided 
into three broad categories. 
Firstly, the two 'successor' parties whose membership figures, as Table 5.1 shows, 
dwarfed those of the completely new parties that emerged since 1989. Easily the 
largest party in pure numerical terms was the PSL, which claimed between 150- 
200,000 members and was clearly the direct beneficiary of a substantial 
organisational. inheritance from the communist satellite ZSL. " The 530,00 ZSL 
members simply had to indicate a willingness to continue as members of the 'new' 
" According to one commentator membership it had, in fact, fallen to around 120,000 by 1998. See: 
M. Janicki, 'Szkola przekuwania', Polityka. 8 August 1998. 
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party of whom about 100,000 initially did so. " The second largest party was the 
communist successor SdRP (60,000) which also benefited from such an inheritance, 
albeit a much smaller one: at the time of its dissolution in January 1990 the PZPR had 
approximately 2,000,0000 members of whom only 3 0,000 opted to join the new 
party. 35 
Secondly, the comparatively larger new parties which claimed more than 10,000 
members. The largest of these, RS AWS (30,000), was established in October 1997 to 
eventually replace the Solidarity trade union as the main component of the AWS 
coalition (discussed further below). Although larger than any other 'post-Solidarity' 
formation, RS AWS still fell some way short of matching the successors (not to 
mention its own initial, extremely optimistic projections) and it is too early at this 
stage to make any firm judgements about how the party will develop given that, at the 
time of writing, it had not even staged its first national Congress (scheduled for 
January 1999). The other significant parties in this category were: the KPEiR 
(27,000), the AWS-affiliated SKL (15,000), and the UW (14,000). At its peak the 
ROP had claimed 28,000 members but following the dramatic split in the wake of the 
1997 parliamentary elections this was reduced to 15,000 in 1998. Similarly, the 
AWS-affiliated PC and KPN had both once been substantial parties (claiming 40,000 
and 35,000 members respectively)" but were also the victims of successive and 
damaging splits which reduced their membership totals (or those of their two 
successors in the KPN's case) to approximately 10,000. This category also included a 
cluster of other smaller parties with between 3- 10,000 members including: the AWS 
affiliated ZChN (6,000), PChD (4,000) and RdR (3,000); Antoni Macierewicz! s RKN 
(7,000); Lech Walqsa's ChDIIIRP (6,000); the UP (which, in spite being the fourth 
largest parliamentary grouping in the 1993-97 parliament claimed only 3,500 
members); the PSL-PL and the UPR (3,000). 
Thirdly, although a new Party Law introduced in 1997 drastically reduced the total, 
there were (at the time of writing) still approximately 65 officially registered parties 
in Poland" and, consequently, there was also a substantial cluster of even smaller 
parties with less than 3,000 members. Some of them - such as the AWS-affiliated 
Ruch STU and SLD-affiliated PPS - played a minor but nonetheless significant role 
" First the Polish Peasant Party (Reborn) (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Odrodzone]: PSL[O]) and 
then, after June 1990, the 'new' PSL. Author interview with Janusz Gmitruk, 17 June 1997. 
Figures supplied by SdRP national headquarters, February 1997. 
See: B. Mazur, 'Kanapy na Szaniec', Wprost, 26 April 1992; and 'Models of Party Development 
and Questions of State Dependence in Poland', p600. 
" 'Mniej partii', Rzeczpospolita, 14 April 1998. The provisions of the 1997 Party Law are discussed 
in greater detail in chapter six. 
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in Polish politics, but the vast majority were irrelevant and little more than 'couch 
parties' (to use the Polish parlance) numbering less than 1,000 members. " 
A reasonable estimate of the total number of Poles who were party members in 
Poland was, therefore, approximately 400-450,000, or no more than 1.5% of the 
Polish electorate. " As Table 5.2 shows this was one of the lowest levels of party 
membership in Europe and even lower than the comparable post-communist 
democracies of the Czech Republic (6.4%), Slovakia (3.1 %) and Hungary (2.5%) and 
even these figures should be treated with extreme caution and were likely to have 
exaggerated Polish party membership levels. Firstly, Polish parties rarely made any 
efforts to distinguish between the number of 'paper' and 'paid up' members (most 
party headquarters surveyed claimed that membership records were not kept in this 
form). For example, in May 1996 it was revealed that there was a disparity of 8,000 
between the ROP's 'paper' and 'paid up' figures, "' while one Polish commentator 
claimed that only 10% of the PSL's claimed 200,000 members had actually paid 
subscriptions. " Secondly, these figures were based on the parties' own claims and 
there was obviously a natural tendency to exaggerate the totals. The fact that, of the 
five individual member-based parties surveyed, only the two numerically smallest 
(the UW and UP) supplied detailed breakdowns of their membership figures in each 
province suggested that all the other totals were likely to have been massaged 
upwards. Thirdly, in some cases the lack of accurate data may also have been the 
result of the parties' own internal organisational weakness and inability to collect and 
update their figures on a regular basis. As SdRP's head of organisation Maciej Porqba 
candidly admitted "during the initial years we had to become involved in other 
matters" and "counting ourselves" was considered a low organisational priority 
compared with the more pressing tasks of basic party development and preparation 
for election campaigns. " The lack of accurate membership data also, of course, made 
it difficult to make any meaningful temporal comparisons and analyse membership 
trends. 
Partie kanapowe - so called because their members could all fit on to one couch! 
Based on a total of 28,409,054 Poles registered to vote in the 1997 Polish parliamentary elections 
(Rzeczpospolita, 2 October 1997). This figure was broadly in line with Mair (See: glat is different 
about post-communist party systems? p14) and Lewis's ( Party Structure and Organization in East- 
Central Europe. p, 15) estimates of 1.5% and 1.3% respectively and the PBS estimate of 3%. See: R. 
Wr6bel, 'Partie niepopulame ale potrzebne' Rzeczpospolita, 2 August 1993 and 'Bezpartyjni i nie 
reprezentowani', Rzeczpospolita, 1/2 April 1995. The 1995 figure was actually 6%, although this 
included 3% who said that they were members of the Solidarity trade union which PBS also counted 
as a party. 
`0 See: 'ROP chce z 'Solidamokiq', Rzeczpospolita, 20 May 1996. 
" See: 2ycie Warszawy, 7 October 1996 cited in K. Urbaniak, 'Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe - miqdzy 
rz4dem a opozycjq' in Wybory '97. pp108-132 (121). 
Author interview with Maciej Porqba, 28 February 1998. 
171 
Moreover, these raw national membership totals did not properly reflect the full 
extent of the 'successor' parties' superiority in terms of local implantation. One way 
of measuring this was to consider the number of basic organisational units in each of 
the five individual member-based parties surveyed. " At the time this research was 
undertaken all five had at least two tiers of local organisation. Firstly, at the 
provincial level of the 49 administrative units (wojew6dztwa) into which the Polish 
state was then divided - although party organisations at this tier were referred to as 
regions (regiony) by the UW and districts (okrqgi) by the UP and ROP. Secondly, the 
basic unit of local organisation known as the circle (kolo) in SdRP, the PSL, UW and 
UP (comprising at least five members) and the cell (ogniwo) in the ROP (with at least 
seven members and five cells required to establish a district organisation). "' The total 
number of basic organisational units provided a broad indication of each party's level 
of local implantation, with the PSL (I 1,000)"I and SdRP (2,500)"' having 
considerably more than the ROP (900-950), the UW (400) and the UP (200). "' 
However, it is important to note that circles and cells varied enormously in both size 
and territorial coverage. The UW, UP, ROP and (especially) SdRP often had more 
than one circle or cell organised in a large town which covered the area of one local 
government district, known as a commune (gmina). At the time this research was 
undertaken the 2,475 communes were the basic administrative unit and sub-provincial 
tier of Polish local government and varied considerably in size; with the 142 urban 
communes analogous to just one larger town or city, while the 2,333 rural communes 
often covered just a number of small villages. " Moreover, the PSL circle was a sub- 
43 It is important to bear in mind that these figures for local implantation did not include any of the 
AWS affiliated individual member-based parties. As Table 5.1 shows most of these did not have a 
particularly high overall membership level and, therefore, were unlikely to detract from the general 
findings about levels of implantation among the 'new' parties. The only excpetion here was likely to 
the be the nascent RS AWS which was still at a formative stage when this research was undertaken 
and was likely to enyoy a higher level of local implantation than any of the other 'new' parties 
Ntlierto. 
4 See: Statut Socjaldemokracji Rzeczpospolitej Polski; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe: Statut; Statut 
Unii Wolnogci; UP. Statut Unii Pracy; Ruch Odbudowy Polski: Statut. As noted in chapter two, the 
1998 local government reforms are likely to bring about substantial changes in these party structures 
with the replacement of the 49 old provinces with 16 new ones. 
's 10,473 according to the most recent published figures for 199 1. See: See: Sprawozdanie z 
dziatalnoici w1adz naczelnych PSL za okres od Nadzwyczajnego Kongresu do Iff Kongresu PSL p23 
4' 2,587 according to figures published in 1991. See: 'Start wyborczy po I Konwencji SdRP', 
Rzeczpospolita, 21 May 1991. 
"The exact figures were 387 for U`W and 204 for UP - supplied by the parties' national headquarters, 
February 1997. Indeed, the UP only had local party organisation at district level in 34 out of 49 
provinces. 
"' The 1998 local government reforms also introduced an additional, intermediate tier of 272 
boroughs (powiats) which are also likely to bring about another re-organisation of local party 
structures. 
172 
communal unit of organisation, usually based on a single village with each commune 
board (zarzqd gminny) encompassing three to five local circles. "' A more accurate 
way of measuring each party's level of local implantation, therefore, was to consider 
the percentage of communes in which each party had some kind of organisational 
structures. 
Unfortunately, the PSL was the only party which had an a separate tier of party 
organisation at the commune level and, therefore, kept national data on this claiming 
local structures in approximately 2,100 communes (85%). " In order to make cross- 
party comparisons it was, therefore, necessary to draw on local research conducted in 
four provinces in April-June 1997. As well as confirming the 'successor' parties 
superiority in terms of raw membership figures and highlighting how the number of 
basic organisational units in a given province was only a very rough measure of 'local 
implantation' (SdRP, for example, had up to four circles in one urban commune), as 
Table 5.3 shows, this local research revealed just how striking the 'successor' parties' 
organisational superiority was in this respect. For example, these figures illustrated 
the true extent to which the PSL was the only party with a wcll-developed 
organisational network in rural areas: with local implantation in 79% of the 
communes across the four provinces (ranging from 59% in Gdansk to 100% in 
Plock), broadly in line with figures claimed by national PSL officials. " They also 
highlighted the fact that although SdRP was, as one national official put it, "by 
nature, an urban party"" (in Gdaiisk province, for example, it had 250 members in 
urban Gdynia and only 30 in rural KoS'Cierzyna), the party also had some organisation 
in small towns as well, averaging 65% local implantation (from 50% in Plock to 80% 
in Rzcsz6w). The UW (13%) and the UP (8%), on the other hand, were almost 
exclusively urban in character and tended to be concentrated in the main provincial 
and other larger towns, confirming UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational. Affairs 
Wojciech Borowik view that his party existed "typically in large towns, sometimes in 
smaller towns ... but 
in rural areas, in reality, we don't have circles. "" 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that SdRP also had approximately 500 regional 
councils (rady regionalne) which corresponded, broadly speaking, to the then defunct 
"'In exceptional cases a single circle could be empowered to function as the commune board. 
"Information supplied by PSL party headquarters, February 1997. The last published figure was 
1,943 communes in 199 1. See: Sprawozdanie z dzialalnos'ci w1adz naczeinych PSL za okres od 
Nadzwyczajnego Kongresu do III Kongresu PSL. p23 
"The PSL has claimed that 35% of Polish villages had some kind of PSL local branch. PSL. Sto Lat 
Ruch Ludowego. Warsaw. 1995. p 24 
Author interview with Maciej Porqba, 28 February 1997. 
Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
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(although, since October 1998, revived) intermediate borough (powiat) tier"' of local 
administration in which several communes were clustered around a medium-sized 
town. Although these councils were intended to act simply as informal, co-ordinating 
bodies, in fact they ensured that SdRP had some kind of sub-provincial organisational 
network even in those communes where there were no local circles organised. 
Interestingly, local research also revealed that AWS (which, at the time of writing, 
did not have any policy-making structures below provincial level) also had a sub- 
provincial structure based on the old borough towns which co-ordinated a network of 
organisers covering almost every commune thereby also ensuring a defacto 100% 
level of local implantation. 
As Table 5.3 also shows, the notable exception to this general pattern was the ROP's 
local organisation in the RzeszOw province, whose 700 members and 60% 
implantation rate were comparable to that of the two 'successor' parties. As an 
'externally-created' party the ROP was, of course, denied access to the state resources 
which the four 'parliamentary' parties (SdRP, PSL, UW and UP) enjoyed (discussed 
at greater length in the chapter on parties and the state) and, therefore, had a mass 
party-type strategy of building from the 'bottom-up' virtually forced upon it. " The 
ROP RzeszOW Provincial Chairman very much reflected this organisational ethos and 
argued that he was "never happy with an elitist approach to building a party" and 
"always thought you had to build local structures. "' However, the Rzeszow 
experience was not replicated in any of the other three provinces surveyed, where the 
party's local implantation levels of 11- 18% were on a par with those of the other 
4new' parties, suggesting that it may have been the result of exceptional and 
specifically local factors. Indeed, another local ROP official caimed the party had 
reached a recruitment ceiling and that "whoever was going to join the party did so a 
long time ago ... There will not 
be an enormous increase in the number of members. "" 
Pagy ancillM organisations and interest moup relations 
In addition to low party membership and local implantation levels, there was also, as 
hypothesised, very little evidence that the parties' surveyed had attempted to 
encapsulate their voters by developing networks of ancillary organisations. The party 
youth sections ranged in size from only 300 in the case of the UP, " 1000 in the ROP 
Although soon to be revived. See Note 50. 
See: 'Olszewski tworzy partiq', Rzeczpospolita, 28 February 1996. 
Author interview with Andrzej Kucharski, 20 April 1997. 
Author interview with Zdislaw Dumowski, 28 April 1997. 
UP. Unia Pracy. Informator. Warsaw. undated. p6. 
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Youth Fedcration" to 2,500 in the SdRP Youth Federationr and the UW's 
Association of Young Democrats. " SdRP, the UW and UP also had ecological 
sections and (together with the PSL) a women's section - although these seemed to 
operate more as loose networks of contacts than formal local and national structures. " 
Indeed, there was some hostility to the idea of considering even these bodies as the 
kind of party ancillary organisations associated with the mass party model - or party 
'annexes' (przybud6wki) in the Polish parlance. " 
Of the parties surveyed only the PSL appeared to come close to pursuing a variant of 
the mass party approach by performing what it saw as a more organic role and 
penetrating deeply into the rural and agricultural communities which it sought to 
represent. PSL Executive Office Director Marian Zalewski, for example, argued that 
66as a party we are more of a social movement operating from below, something more 
than just a party organisation" and the party's 1995 programmatic declaration stated 
explicitly that "as a result of adopting a mass party character, the PSL does not wish 
to limit the remit of its activity only to the sphere of the strictly political, but also 
wishes to undertake activities within the party and in the wider circles of peasantist 
movement activities in the field of education, together with artistic and scientific 
culture - in line with its one hundred year tradition. " It continued, "the PSL wishes to 
participate not just in political rivalry over gaining participation in the organs of state 
government, but also wishes to fulfil the role of a co-participant in forming solutions 
to the different problems of the everyday lives of a wide circle of society and a co- 
organiser in meeting social needs in the educational and cultural spheres. "" Similarly, 
PSL Vice-President Janusz Dobrosz argued that the party reflected the traditions of 
the peasant movement that "political parties don't focus themselves exclusively on 
'16 
activities which are sensu stricto party political. 
One local PSL official, for example, drew attention to the fact that local party 
organisations in his province were involved in supporting "co-operative banking, 
farming organisations, the local Fanning Chamber, the Volunteer Fire Brigades, 
Figures supplied by ROP party headquarters, February 1997. 
Figures supplied by SdRP party headquarers, February 1997. 
Figures supplied by UW party headquarters, February 1997. The PSL youth section was still in the 
process of formation at the time this research was undertaken. 
" Author interviews with: Maciej Porqba, 28 February 1997; Miroslaw Czech, 19 February 1997; and 
Wojciech Borowik, 19 February 1997. 
See: 'SLD - co to takiego', Rzeczpospofita, 20 September 1993. 
Author interview, 6 March 1997. 
'Uchwala Prograrnowa IV Kongresu PSL' in PSL. 0 Kszallowanie Szans Rozwoju d1a Polski: 
Dokumenty Programowe. Warsaw. 1995. pp50-99 (96). 
" Kancelaria Seimu. Sprawozdanie Stenpgraficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z 
dniach 28,29 lutego iI marca 1996 Warsaw. 1996. p 183. 
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organising the Rural Youth Movement, producing a monthly newspaper and various 
other cultural activities such as the harvest festival and peasant Holy Days. "" Another 
commentator noted how PSL activists "willingly talk about their activism within the 
realms of so-called organic work - for example - running village farmers' wives 
circles, helping village libraries, helping in specific matters like building schools, 
cultural institutes, playing fields. "' Similarly, PSL Programmatic Director Jan 
Wypych argued that a local party circle meeting was often "the starting point for a 
wider group of people to turn up in the village and then it turns into a celebratory 
meeting of the community. "69 
An important aspect of this was the party's attempt to root itself more firmly in rural 
communities by developing links with a wider network of social and cultural 
organisations including: the Union of Rural Youth (Zwi4zek Mlodzieiy Wiejskiej: 
ZMW), the National Union of Agricultural Circles and Organisations (Krajowy 
Zwiqzek K61ek i Organizacji Rolniczych: KZKiOR), the Rural Housewives Circles 
(Kolo Gospodyn' Wiejskich: KGW), the Union of Volunteer Fire Brigades (Zwiqzek 
Ochotniczych Strai Poiamych: ZOSP) together with rural sports clubs and 
educational associations. In 1997, for example, the PSL established a 37,000-stong 
National Organisation of Village Administrators" and even considered setting up a 
specifically rural teachers' union, the Union of Peasantist Teachers. " This partly arose 
from the fact that the number of people involved in any kind of civic activity in a 
small village was extremely small and there was likely to be considerable overlap 
between membership of the PSL and any local social and cultural organisations. 
At one point the ROP also appeared to be displaying mass party characteristics in 
terms of developing of ancillary structures, although nowhere near to the same extent 
as the PSL. As we shall see, all the parties and groupings surveyed developed 
networks of 'partner' organisations, primarily as a means of mobilising particular 
electoral constituencies. However, the ROP attempted to draw a number of these 
partners - business organisations, veterans and so-called 'patriotic' societies, other 
political parties and groupings and (perhaps most significantly) the Solidarity 
Individual Farmers' trade union - more closely into the party's orbit by establishing a 
Committee of Organisational Associated with the ROP (Komitet Organizacji 
Zrzeszonych z ROPem: KOZzR) which enjoyed formal representation in party 
Author interview with Jan Bury, President, PSL Rzesz6w Provincial Board, 18 June 1997. 
See: M. Usidus, 'PSL - trzecia chlopska droga', Rzeczpospolifa, 18 January 1993. 
Author interview, 20 February 1997. 
Author interview with Marian Zalewski, II March 1997. 
See: 'PSL zabiega o nauczycilei', Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 March 1997; and 'Brak miejsca na nowy 
zwiqzek' Rzeczpospolita. 18 March 1997. 
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decision-making structures. " Even more ambitiously, in August 1996 the ROP 
established the Polish Economic Alliance (Polskie Przymierze Gospodarcze: PPG) as 
an ancillary organisation for organising small and medium-sized businessmen, 
craftsmen and shopkeepers and quite explicitly "not just a structure to meet electoral 
requirements. " 
However, even these two exceptions were more apparent than real. None of the 
various rural organisations with whom the PSL co-operated were in any way formally 
represented within, or formally linked to, the party other than on the basis of 
parliamentary electoral pacts concluded at national level in 1991 and local level in 
1993 and 1997. ZMW Chairman Karol Dobrowolski may, for example, have argued 
that "the PSL is the only organised political strength functioning in the countryside 
and caring about the interests of the countryside" and that his organisation "must be 
united with the PSL by an ideological-programmatic union. "" However, while the 
ZMW's 1996 Congress also resolved that, while they regarded the PSL as "our 
political representative with whom we share ideals and a values system, with whom 
we are united by certain common aims, " it was not "and don't want to be the 'youth 
section' of this, or any other, party ... We want to be a programmatically, politically 
and organisationally independent Union of young rural generations. We want to 
organise our co-operation with the PSL today and in the future on the basis of 
partnership and respect for the Union's identity. "" Another example of this was the 
fact that the KZKiOR agricultural circles President and Vice-President actually stood 
as SLD candidates in the 1997 parliamentary elections. " Indeed, PSL Supreme 
Council Vice-Chairman Roman Jagielin'ski openly complained that the party's 
contacts with all the main rural organisations (except for the ZOSP) had 
deteriorated. " 
Moreover, with the exception of the one million-strong ZOSP, most of these rural 
organisations were actually relatively weak institutions and, arguably, greater 
beneficiaries from the partnerships than the PSL was. A May 1994 OBOP survey, for 
example, revealed that 60% of rural voters trusted the PSL but only 36% trusted the 
" See: 'Stowarzyszeni z ROP', Rzeczpospolita. 27 August 1996; and ROP. Komitet Organizacji 
Stowarzyszonych z Ruchem Odbudowy Polski: Regulamin. Warsaw. 1996. 
71 'Przymierze Gospodarcze dla 3 mln firm', Rzeczpospolita. 9 August 1996. 
7' K. Ner6, 'VII Krajowy Zjazd ZMW: Chcemy partnerskiej wsp6lpracy z Polskim Stronnictwen 
Ludowym', LYziennik Ludowy. 22 November 1996. 
" Ibid. 
16 See: 'Walka o glosy wsi', Rzeczpospolita. 14 July 1997. 
17 See: R. Jagielifiski, 'Anatomia klqski', Wprost. 26 October 1997. The PSL President Waldemar 
Pawlak was also the National President of the ZOSP at that time. 
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KMOR. " As one Polish commentator put it, "the old pre-war PSL passed a lot of its 
'power' down to organisations like the agricultural circles, the Union of Rural Youth 
which ran social clubs in the villages, and women's organisations organised courses 
in cookery, needlework for farmers' wives. This was kind of social activity tied in 
with all aspects of people's lives. " As result of sociological changes such as the 
expansion of the leisure industry and proliferation of television and video, those 
people living in rural areas "tend to do more home-centred activities" and "these 
social organisations don't really function in the way they should ... There is no longer 
an appeal directed at the whole of people's lives. "" At the same time, the PSL proved 
no more capable than any of the other parties surveyed of developing substantial 
ancillary structures and the party's Programmatic Director Jan Wypych argued that 
the party's youth, women's and ex-combatant sections were "not significant 
organisations. "80 
Similarly, in spite of earlier impressions, it was soon evident that neither the ROP's 
network of associated groups nor the PPG were intended to act as ancillary 
organisations; in the normal sense and that both were established primarily for 
electoral and fundraising purposes. According to ROP National Secretary Wcjciech 
Wlodarczyk, for example, the KOZzR was "an autonomous structure"' and its 
procedural rules stated that its members retained their "full subjectivity and identity - 
the principle of autonomy of each specific Organisation is recognised. "" Similarly, 
ROP Chairman Jan Olszewski stressed that he "didn't want the PPG to be regarded as 
some kind of party annexe'll and Wojciech Wlodarczyk pointed out that it was "not 
officially represented within the ROP's structures ... We have plenipotentiaries within 
our provincial structures responsible for the PPG and this is a contact but there is, 
however, no direct involvement. ""' It was also questionable precisely how much 
benefit the ROP actually derived from their association with these organisations. It 
was widely felt that the Solidarity farmers' union, for example, played an 
insignificant role in mobilising support for the party among in rural communitiee, 
and local officials suggested that the PPG had only between 30-40 members in each 
province. "' 
7' OBOP. Mieszkahcy wsi o instyucjach. Warsaw. May 1994. 
Author interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, 26 June 1997. 
Author interview with Jan Wypych, 20 February 1997. 
Author interview, 14 February 1997. 
See: Komitet Organizacji Stowarzyszonych z Ruchem Odbudowy Polski: Regulamin. 
'Drobni przedsiqbiorcy lqczq siq', Rzeczpospolita, 18 November 1996. 
Author interview, 14 February 1997. 
See: 'Waka o glosy wsi'. 
Author interview with ROP local officials in Gdafisk, Jelenia G6ra, Plock and Rzesz6w, April-May 
1997. 
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As hypothesised, therefore, the new Polish parties were more interested in working 
through interest groups as a means of linkage with civil society than attempting to 
develop networks of ancillary structures linked directly to their party organisations. 
The relationship between the new parties and emerging interest organisations in post- 
communist Poland is, of course, a topic worthy of separate and much more detailed 
examination. However, preliminary indications appeared to confmn that Polish 
parties have developed very loose and informal relationships with a fairly wide range 
of organisations rather than attempting to enrol them as collective members or Ving 
themselves too closely and formally to any one particular interest group. 
The very loose relationship between SdRP and its electoral coalition partners in the 
SLD was a case in point. As SdRP's 1997 programme put it, the party attached "great 
importance to co-operating with trade unions, to co-operating with democratic 
women's' organisations" and supported "varied forms of organisation by people of 
the left. "" Consequently, the SLD was established in the run up to the 1991 
parliamentary elections as a "political structure integrating parties, trade unions, 
social organisations and unorganised people connected with the social democratic 
ideas ofjustice and social equality, "' initially composed ofl7 organisations, but 
expanded to 27 in 1993 and 33 in 1997. In addition to SdRP, the SLD comprised: 
trade unions, other smaller parties and political groupings, ex-communist youth and 
student organisations, women's organisations, ethnic minority groupings, former 
communist veterans' organisations, pensioners' groupings, and (after 1997) even a 
Christian organisation, virtually all of whom had their roots in, and emerged from, 
organisations which had existed during the communist era. (A full list of SLD 
members in 1997 is set out as in Appendix 1. ) 
Apart from SdRP - which was the driving force in terms of providing the SLD with 
both political direction and organisational underpinning - the most significant of 
these was the OPZZ trade union federation which, following the loosening of martial 
law restrictions in 1984, had been the only legal trade union organisation functioning 
during the late communist era with 3,000,000 members organised in 14,500 
workplace commissions. Of the 208 SLD Sejm deputies and Senators elected in 1993, 
73 were SdRP members and 61 were from the OPZZ. The other 22 SLD affiliates 
which secured parliamentary representation included only 16 deputies from the Polish 
Union of Teachers (Zwiqzek Nauczycieli Polskich: ZNP), 6 each from the Union of 
" Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej. 
" Tak Dalej Bye Nie Musi. 
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Socialist Youth and Students (Zrzeszenie Socjalistycznych Mlodzieiy Polskiej: 
ZSW) and Democratic Union of Women (Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet: DUK) and 
three from the PPS. '9 
However, in spite of SdRP's defacto hegemony, the SLD was actually based on a 
very loose partnership between the party and its allies. Firstly, the SLD only existed 
in the formal sense as either an election committee convened in order to run specific 
campaigns (and terminated immediately after the financial accounts were settled) or, 
between elections, as a Parliamentary Club comprising Sejrn deputies and Senators 
elected on the SLD ticket. Secondly, the SLD's component elements were completely 
independent and in no way organisationally subordinate to SdRP. Indeed, in line with 
the catch-alilelectoral-professionaI model, the party used SLD members as a means of 
legitimising itself and building support among various milieu rather than as mass 
party-type ancillary organisations and they, in turn, underlined the fact that they were 
no longer party 'annexes'. For example, in order to re-build its credibility, the ZSNIP 
went going to great pains "to depart from its image as a party vassal from the times of 
the Polish People's Republic. " 
Thirdly, although floated from time to time, " the various explicit attempts to 
transform the SLD into a more coherent institutional structure came to nothing. In 
April 1996, for example, key SdRP and SLD strategist Marek Borowski argued that 
the "SLD formula can't last forever" and that its component organisations should be 
transformed into a single party on the grounds that "a unitary party is easier to operate 
- it forms a programme and electoral lists which it invites other groupings to join. 
"' 
However, the reactions from Borowski's party colleagues ranged from lukewarm to 
hostile exemplified by SLD Parliamentary Club Spokesman Andrzej Urbaniczyk who 
defended the current arrangement on the grounds that "we are more effective and 
more attractive to people who prefer to identify with movements ... the SLD formula 
has is not yet exhausted. "" 
The UP mainly focussed on attempting to build stronger relations with the trade union 
movement whom it saw as its "natural partner and ally, "" particularly those unions 
" A. Materska-Sosnowska, 'Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - perspektywa pozostanie u. w1adzy czy 
przejgcia do opozycji' in Wybory97. pp151-179 (159). By 1996 the number of SdRP deputies and 
Senators had increased to 120. See: E. Olczyk, 'SLD nie moie trwa6 wiecznie: Rozmowa z poslem 
Markiem Borowskim', Rzeczpospofita. 9 April 1996. 
See: J. Kluzik-Rotkowska and A. Zawlocka, 'Szkoly Walki', Wprost. 10 November 1996. 
See: M. Janicki, 'Kto rzqdzi SLD', Polityka. 14 September 1996. 
" 'SLD nie moie trwa6 wiecznie'. 
" Cited in A. Nowakowska. ' Sojusz i jego dru2yna'. Gazeta Wyborcza, II April 1996. 
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not aligned with the Solidarity trade union and the OPZZ federations (or with these 
organisations' local branches or affiliates). However, the UP's relations with its 
putative trade union allies were, if anything, even weaker than SdRP's with the OPZZ 
(and its affiliates). The party's formal links were organised through a rather loose 
Trade Union Forum while, according to its Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs 
WqJciech Borowik, in terms of day-to-day contacts "there isn't such a mechanism 
where they can affiliate to our party. Only things like ... agreements that we signed 
during the election ... We have a lot of candidates from the unions. 
"" In 1997, for 
example, the UP signed national or local electoral agreements with five trade union 
organisations either at national level or through their local affiliates. 9' This kind of 
relationship was justified in the UP's 1995 programme on the grounds that while "the 
same interests and expectations lie at the root of our activity" the "method of 
achieving them is different. The natural form of a political party's activity is in the 
sphere of public power, trade unions - on the other hand - in business and their 
relations with the state and private employers. " Indeed the party placed great 
emphasis on the importance of maintaining a certain distance and autonomy between 
parties and interest groups and the fact that its "openness to civic activism 
cannot ... develop into forming political annexes. 
"91 
On the other hand, as one element of its electoral strategy of constructing an alliance 
of potential supporters of market reforms, the UW attempted to forge links with its 
potential allies in the business community organised in bodies such as such as the 
Polish Business Council, Confederation of Polish Employers and the Business Centre 
Club. Although the party was quite successful - and established a loosely organised 
Economic Forum specifically to draw entrepreneurs into the party" - once again this 
relationship was characterised principally by, as UW National Spokesman Andrzej 
Potocki put it, "going to the leading business organisations and asking them to 
support the programme" rather than attempting to set up ancillary organisations to 
encapsulate this milieu. " Indeed, the UW's difficulties in developing firm links with 
their putative business allies also highlighted the fact that, as discussed in the previous 
chapter on parties and their electorates, many of the emerging socio-economic groups 
in post-communist Poland, such as entrepreneurs, had still not properly crystallised - 
both objectively as a distinct electoral segments or subjectively in terms perceptions 
of their own interests - and were, therefore, weakly articulated and poorly organised. 
Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
See: 'UP do wybor6w ze zwiqzkami', Rzeczpospolita, 13 August 1997. 
U Progu AM WI eku. 
98 See: Towstalo Forum Gospodarcze Unii Wolno9ci', Rzeczpospolita, 7 April 1997. 
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Andrzej Potocki, for example, complained that "business voters are the most 
irrational voters. This is a group that sometimes votes completely against its own 
interests - for those who increase taxes, increase inflation. "" Similarly, according to 
one Polish commentator, while 50% of all Polish workers were trade union members, 
less than 1% of family businesses and private investors were organised in business 
associations and those that did exist had "little political meaning ... the same people 
often appear and only vary by separate personnel configurations or names" and 
"remind one more of groups of friends than organised political forces, possessing 
coherent programmatic postulates and that is how party politicians regard them. ""' 
At the same time, the UP's problems in developing a significant base of support 
among trade unions arose partly from the fact that both the major union federations 
were already very closely aligned with the SLD and AWS groupings and, therefore, 
highlighted another significant feature of party-interest group relations in post- 
communist Poland: the blurring of distinctions and confusion of roles and functions. 
On the one hand, there were clear examples of parties which behaved more like 
interest groups; the most obvious one being the PSL. Commenting on the results of 
the 1997 parliamentary election, for example, PSL President Jaroslaw Kalinowski 
argued that it "stuck to us that we also took on the role of a trade union upon 
ourselves""' and according to one local PSL official "many people in the countryside 
view the PSL as some kind of trade union that looks after their political, economic 
and business interests. ""' Similarly, the two pensioners parties which contested the 
1997 elections were also examples of parties which were established with the 
objective of representing one specific and narrow socio-economic segment within the 
political and parliamentary arena. "' On the other hand, as the political activities of 
the OPZZ and Solidarity trade union federations show, there were also examples of 
some interest groups behaving more like parties. 
The most interesting case study of this blurring of roles was that of the Solidarity 
trade union's sponsorship of, and subsequent relationship with, AWS. Superficially, 
apart from the obvious differences of political orientation, AWS appeared to bear a 
fairly close resemblance to the SLD. It was a broad grouping comprising a range of 
Ibid. 
R. Herbut, 'Polityczna Reprezentacja Interes6w SocjaInych i Ekonomicznych'in A. Antoszewski, 
ed. Ewolucja Polskiego Systemu Politycznego po 1989 roku w Swietle Komparystycznej Teofii 
Polityki. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskeigo. 1994. ppl72-201 (195). 
'0' Cited in interview with E. K. Czaczkowska. 'S4 granice r6inorodno6ci', Rzeczpospolita, 15 
October 1997. 
'0' Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997. 
104 See, for example: W. Staszewski and P WroAski, 'Siwa Sila', Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 March 1997. 
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political parties and groupings, trade unions, youth, ex-combatants, Catholic and so- 
called 'patriotic' organisations, coalitions of right-wing local government activists 
and research institutes and foundations. (For a complete list of AWS members at the 
1997 election see Appendix 2). Moreover, AWS also developed (initially at least) as a 
fairly loose and temporary structure formed specifically as an election committee (and 
subsequently as a Parliamentary Club) with collective rather than individual 
members. However, unlike the SLD - where the hegemonic role was played by SdRP, 
a political party sensu stricto that used the alliance as a mechanism for building 
political support among various milieu - AWS was organised around an interest 
group, the Solidarity trade union, to which the affiliated parties were clearly 
subordinate. 
AWS leaders justified this arrangement on three grounds. Firstly, because, as AWS 
and Solidarity trade union Chairman Marian Krzaklewski put it, "the (political and 
economic) system in Poland is in a transitional phase. That's why the role of trade 
unions which, after all, stood as the cause of these changes, must be a specific one. ""' 
Elaborating on this another Polish commentator argued that "trade unions have a 
different role to play, different ftinctions in Poland than trade unions in countries with 
a stabilised capitalist system ... The Anglo-Saxon model, in which trade unions are 
only the partners of business and not of the state, although logical, may be unrealistic 
in Poland. "'" Secondly, because, as the same commentator put it "independent trade 
unions played a great role in retaining independence and re-building democracy in 
our country's history. Solidarity in the 1980s and 1990s had to think, above all, in the 
categories of the state interest and not just in the interest of employees. ""' Similarly, 
Jaroslaw Kaczyn'ski, the leader of the AWS-affiliated PC argued that "if it was a 
different trade union then the price would be too high. However, we're talking about 
Solidarity which has played a great role - not just in Poland ... Attempts to 
form a large 
right-wing formation without the union will not succeed. "1011 Marian Krzaklewski also 
argued that Solidarity could not be considered an 'ordinary' trade union because it 
was "still as much a social movement as a trade union. That is the reality and it this 
which is our current role - an institution around which various political forces, social 
movements, associations integrate. "'" Thirdly, the fragmentation and weakness of the 
various parties on the Polish right made, as Solidarity and AWS Mazowszc regional 
leader Maciej Jankowski put it, this continued "state of existing on the borders 
Akcja Wyborcza SolidarnoiJ. 
K. Mularczyk, 'Minimum to demokracja i wolny rynek', Rzczeczpospolita, 20 November 1996. 
Ibid. 
'0' Cited in interview with W. Zaluska. in Trzywr0cmy moralny lad', Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 
November 1996. 
Cited in interview with J. Paradowska, Tremia za akcjq', Polityka, 5 October 1996. 
183 
between a union and a political party ... necessary. 
"' 11 According to Marian 
Krzaklewski, "if political parties are not in a state to force the process in a way that is 
in accord with the intentions of the revolution ... then the Solidarity union 
(must) 
remain a social movement. It remains the 'emergency exit. '... opposition parties have 
not proved themselves in comparison with the communists. They are not in a state to 
fight the post-communists. "' II 
At the time of writing, the question of AWS's future organisational form remained 
unresolved. On the one hand, there was widespread recognition that the current 
arrangement was unsustainable and that, as Marian Krzaklewski put it, "when the 
political scene in Poland crystallises (so that) the anti-communist, non-communist 
parties will have an advantage in the balance of forces - we (Solidarity) will withdraw 
remaining a professional trade union. ""' Similarly, AWS Election Campaign Staffs 
Secretary Andrzej Anusz argued that although "when it comes to an election 
campaign then these unionists will naturally activate themselves ... keeping the trade 
union on full 'stand by, fully mobilised over four years, over a whole term from one 
election to another is impossible. This is a trade union, it has other functions. ", " 
Originally it was intended that, after the 1997 elections, AWS would, as Krzaklewski 
put it, "remove the union's current political obligations from ie' and "stand as the 
political representative of the whole social movement, which is today gathered around 
Solidarity and transform itself into a political coalition and ideally into one party. "' " 
Indeed, Krzaklewski continually emphasised during the 1997 campaign that "we have 
to begin building a strong, well organised efficient grouping being the political 
representative of those movements and social structures which today, co-found AWS" 
which would "allow the Solidarity movement and the associations involved in AWS 
to better share out that which is political, that which is union and that which is 
social. ""' 
Subsequently, however, a consensus appeared to develop around the idea of turning 
AWS into a federation with the Solidarity trade union's hegemonic role being 
replaced by the a new union-based political party RS AWS. According to AWS Vice- 
Chairman and Solidarity Gdansk regional Chairman Jacek Rybicki the union would 
be linked to the new party by both a "programmatic contract" and "initially, a union 
"' Cited in interview with J. Paradowska, 'Pospolite ruszenie', Polityka, 29 June 1996. 
"'AkcjaWyborczaSo1idarnoSL4. 
112 Ibid. 
"' Author interview, 24 November 1997. 
114 Cited in 'Premia za akcjq'. 
"' Cited in A. Anusz, R. Mossakowski, P. Oldak and P. Siczek. eds. ABC Akcji Wyborczei 
Solidamoge. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Fulmen Poland. 1997. p165. 
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of personnel at the highest levels" although "in practice they will be independent 
organisations" and "at this point, the union will leave the stricte political stage and it 
will concentrate on activities of a union character. "iL" However, it is still questionable 
both how successful the new party will be and to what extent the Solidarity trade 
union will be content to move aside for it and disappear from the political arena. By 
December 1997, for example, the initial concept had been modified so that the new 
party's adoption of Solidarity's political functions would take place in phasesLI1 and, 
significantly, although Solidarity originally allowed Krzaklewski to combine the 
union and party leaderships for one year, when the union's 1998 Congress forced him 
to choose, it was the union chairmanship that he retained.! -" 
The role and functions of local pM bmnches 
Local research on the five individual member-based parties revealed a varied pattern 
of activism and frequency of meetings of their local branches - particularly between 
urban and rural areas. SdRP circles in Plock and Jelenia Gora provinces, for example, 
met "not less than once a montlO '9 and while the majority of urban circles in 
Rzesz6w province met monthly, those in rural areas only did so "as required ... The 
Chairman does a 'phone round because some important political event is approaching 
and this needs to be discussed. ""' UW circles met monthly in Rzesz6w province'lland 
fortnightly in Jelenia G6ra (with one cell holding weekly 'open' meetings)"' while 
ROP cells in Rzeszow, Jelenia G6ra and Gdansk provinces all met at least once a 
month (some twice and others weekly). "' In Plock, however, while their boards 
(zarzqdy ogniwa) often met two or three times a week, the actual ROP cells only met 
6roccasionally, depending on the initiative of the local leader. """ Similarly, although 
the UP Statute stipulated that local circles had to meet at least once every two 
months, 12-1 local research revealed a much less regular pattern exemplified by one 
local UP official's comments that "if people want to meet, if they have subjects to 
discuss, then they meet. "126 
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Although party leaders often paid lip-service to their role in the policy-making 
process, local circles and cells were generally fairly informal and discursive bodies 
whose main function was to fulfil certain basic organisational tasks such as 
registering members. For example, while UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech 
argued that local circles were the "basic life of the party, ""' according to the party 
Statute they were actually quite loosely organised bodies which didnt require a 
quorian for decision-making and whose activities were open to all party sympathisers 
not just members. "' Similarly, while, according to UP Vice-Chairman for 
Organisational Affairs Wo ciech Borowik, local circles had "both statutory and 
discursive functions ... they select leaders, collect membership subscriptions ... when 
there are consultations we consult them, when we need their opinion on a particular 
matter then we gather their opinions""' and the party Statute stipulated that they were 
also supposed to "pass resolutions on all matters relating to the matters of the circles" 
and "put forward proposals and postulates" to the UP leadership, "' local research 
revealed a much more sporadic pattern of activities. 
According to the PSL Statute, local circles had an even more informal character with 
their meetings convened "as the need arises" by the circle's board (zarzqd kola) and 
being "devoted to discussing current issues, having the general character of an 
educational meeting. " Elected once every four years, the circle board was responsible 
for undertaking any day-to-day organisational activities "which are required to further 
the realisation of the party's programme and statute" and implementing decisions 
taken by the party leadership. "' According to PSL Programmatic Director Jan 
Wypych "in certain rural areas, where there are very specific tasks to undertake in a 
particular village, here a circle exists and can initiate things ... In urban areas activities 
are more 'political. ' There they don't deal with tasks such as building a water-supply 
or road... These circles exist rather more as a centre for registering members and the 
possibility of contact during the course of an election campaign, rather than on the 
"132 basis of ongoing party activities. 
The SdRP and ROP Statutes did not actually say anything about how often their local 
circles and cells were supposed to meet, nor what their powers, responsibilities and 
functions were. However, according to SdRP head of organisation Maciej Porqba they 
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were responsible for "the party's day-to-day activities ... together with collecting 
membership subscriptions, checking evidence of party membership cards. ""' 
Similarly, according to ROP National Secretary Wojciech VAodarczyk the party's 
local cells had "primarily organisational tasks. A cell has to organise meetings, collect 
subscriptions, prepare polling station agents .. If there is no ROP organisation in a 
neighbouring commune then they take responsible for ensuring that a ROP cell is 
formed there: they are plenipotentiaries for neighbouring areas. ""' 
Moreover, local party activity was almost completely dominated by election 
campaigns and driven by the requirements of the electoral calendar. According to 
PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych, for example, "a sizeable number of our 
members become personally involved in the course of local and national 
elections ... these people are the 'arms and 
legs' of our campaign and I think that they 
(local party structures) operate to such a rhythm of life. ""' Similarly, SdRP head of 
organisation Maciej Porqba commented that "Poland has the misfortune that there is 
practically no year without elections" and that "during these periods circles arc more 
of an electoral structure ... there is no such thing as a cycle of 
debates and meetings. ""' 
Drawing analogies with the USA, UP National Press Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz 
compared Polish local party structures to ... empty bottles' which are filled up during 
the period of election campaigns. ""' 
Local research confirmed this pattern of largely election-orientated activity. When 
asked to describe their main activities, local party officials invariably cited those 
associated with election campaigning: collecting signatures in support of candidates, 
nominating party members to serve on local electoral commissions and as counting 
agents and distributing campaign literature. As one local SdRP official put it 
"elections are the almost permanent activity of our local circles and members. ""' A 
local PSL official also argued that local organisations, "activate themselves at election 
time" and that "the level of our members 'activism' is measured through the prism of 
elections and how, in a given area, they succeed in encouraging voters to support the 
PSL! '" Similarly, when asked to outline party activities in between election 
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campaigns a local UW official responded that "there is some kind of election in 
"140 Poland every year" and "when one finishes we begin preparations for the next. 
Rather optimistically, some national officials suggested that their local branches were 
engaged in a more ongoing and regular pattern of grassroots campaigning. UW 
General Secretary Miroslaw Czech, for example, claimed that his party's local circles 
were "responsible for organising local events, linking up with local foundations, local 
campaigns and actions ... those actions, which help the citizenry. In those communities 
where they are functioning, I would say that our party structures are one of the most 
active. "" I However, other party leaders were more candid and a February 1996 UP 
National Council resolution, for example, acknowledged that "the party as a whole 
has not undertaken any meaningftil actions, and our local cells rarely undertake local 
initiatives. ""' Indeed, local research suggested that local campaigning which did not 
relate directly the electoral cycle was very much the exception - particularly outside 
the main provincial towns where local media and parliamentarians (who tended to 
provide the focus for most activities) were based. One local UW official, for example, 
argued that "even if a party leader goes to a medium-sized town, the local media are 
unlikely to travel there and nothing will come of it. ""' This pattern was confirmed by 
a 1993 PBS survey which found that two thirds of respondents had not seen any 
evidence of party activity in their local area in the period immediately prior to that 
year's parliamentary election campaign, with the proportion rising significantly 
among those living in small-towns and villages. "" 
At the time this research was undertaken, the only real exception to the general 
pattern appeared to be the ROP which had, from the outset, placed much greater 
emphasis on securing member involvement in nationally-initiated and co-ordinated 
campaigns. According to ROP National Press Spokesman Jacek Kurski, for example, 
"(in June 1996) we undertook a campaign to distribute two million copies of the 
'Contract with Poland', our programme ... to personally give it to people outside 
churches. We are now proceeding with a campaign to send the draft 'Citizen's' 
Constitution to every parish priest in the country: 10,000 churches in 8,000 
parishes. ""' Local research in April-May 1997 also revealed that ROP cells in all four 
provinces surveyed were actively engaged in a national campaign to collect signatures 
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protesting against the Polish parliament's draft constitution. Each district was set a 
target number to collect and it was claimed that the party nationally collected 520,000 
signatures in total and distributed over 4 million leaflets calling on the public to reject 
the draft. "' 
Undoubtedly such activity was partly a reflection of the ROP's founding ethos of 
building the party's organisational structures from the 'bottom-up'. Although the 
constitution petition had no practical chance of succeeding in its declared objective, 
party Chairman Jan Olszewski had, according to one local ROP official, insisted that 
all ROP local structures participated in this campaign as a way of "building up the 
party's image, checking what grassroots support we had, and if we were in a state to 
implement such an activity. ""' However, the ROP's apparently higher level of local 
activism was probably also due to the fact that, quite simply, the initial wave of 
enthusiasm surrounding the party's formation in the aftermath of Olszewski's 
relatively strong performance in the November 1995 presidential elections was 
sustained long enough for it overlap with the run-up to the September 1997 
parliamentary campaign. Indeed, disappointment at the party's poor showing in these 
elections, together with the subsequent party split, certainly appeared to have led to a 
sharp fall in visible grassroots campaigning activity by ROP activists. 
Apart from their involvement in election campaigns, the other main focus of party 
activity at this level was the local commune council. In the PSL, for example, party 
activities were increasingly orientated towards the commune board given that, as PSL 
programmatic director Jan Wypych, put it "there are elections to the commune 
council and there is something you can relate to. ""' Indeed, one local PSL official, 
described sub-communal local circles as "something of a relic ... given that a single 
village can't do much on its own" and argued that the circle was slowly being 
replaced as the party's basic organisational unit by the commune board. "' Similarly, 
according to UW General Secretary Miroslaw Czech a local circle "Worked well" 
when it was "strongly rooted in their local communities and tried to operate from the 
level of the local estate to the town authorities. ""' ROP National Secretary Wojciech 
Wlodarczyk also argued that "they (local cells) obviously have programmatic tasks 
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but they relate - above all - to local self-government affairs because this is a lower 
tier. "", 
Indeed, local research revealed that the presence of a local councillor seemed to play 
a crucial role in determining the level of party activity (and even sustainability) at this 
level. Tables 5.4 and 5.5, which show the number of councillors each of the five 
individual member-based parties surveyed claimed in the whole country and in each 
of the four provinces in February 1997, reveal a close correlation between the number 
of councillors and the number of party members, local branches and level of local 
implantation. "' PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych, for example, argued that 
the level of local activity generally depended on "how many people there are, who 
have been recommended by that body who are fulfilling various functions - 
councillors, w6jts etc ... because if there are more of them then there is real 
communication with the decision-making tier. There is some kind of participation in 
the affairs of government. If this exists then the (local) circle's life is different 
because that person can then introduce these issues. ""' Similarly, SdRP head of 
organisation Maciej Porqba argued that, following the party's success in the 1994 
local elections, "in every circle there is a councillor among the party's sympathisers 
and this councillor puts various issues before the circle" so that local politics was now 
the main focus of many local circle's activities. "' 
On the other hand, the absence of local councillors meant that circles and cells had no 
natural focus for their activities between election campaigns. The fact that, for 
example, UW councillors were only to be found in the larger towns and the UP had 
virtually no local government representation in the four provinces surveyed helped to 
explain why these parties were unable to develop and sustain branches in smaller 
towns and rural areas. As one local UP official put it "if we had some sort of success 
in the local elections the circle would stand as a natural base for a group of 
councillors" whereas without any councillors his party didn't "have the possibility to 
give our circles any meaningful activities to undertake. ""' 
Demand side factors: pany organisational strategies 
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According to one approach the explanation for the Polish parties weakness as 
membership organisations and the fact that local party structures only really came to 
life during election campaigns was to be found on the demand side: in their 
organisational strategies. Writing in 1993 Polish sociologist Krzeminski exemplified 
this approach, arguing that: 
"A striking characteristic of Polish political life is the lack of concern which Polish 
politicians show about the development of their own parties. Many of them were 
formed from small opposition groupings, although they succeeded in gaining 
numerous 'bridgeheads' for themselves across the whole country. To the surprise of 
observers-sociologists in the course of the last two years ... from the time of the 
previous election campaign, these parties have (actually) lost branches and influence 
rather than strengthening their territorial organisation. Party life has shifted to 
Warsaw and (is) concentrated around Sejm deputies without anything else. ""' 
Nevertheless, as hypothesised, officials from all five individual member-based parties 
surveyed had not completely discounted the significance of developing a party 
membership base and at least some basic organisational networks. In other words, 
they all rejected the model of a purely 'electoral' party, an 'empty vessel' that only 
came to life during election campaigns. At one point after its 1993 parliamentary 
election success there were reports, for example, that certain SdRP leaders wanted to 
change the "formula of party activity ... transforming it into an electoral party, 
activating members around elections - parliamentary, presidential or local - (which it 
was felt was) the inevitable future of all political parties, particularly governing 
ones. ""' SdRP Presidium member Jerzy Jaskierna, for example, argued that "the 
future was not just not with mass parties but also with (any kind of) active parties, 
organisations where members meet regularly. Today the main task is perfecting the 
programme", while the party's General Secretary Jerzy Szmajdzin'ski argued that 
local SdRP party structures were increasingly regarded mainly as a subsidiary to the 
SLD Parliamentary Club. "" However, although (as we saw) election-orientated 
activity was the main focus for most SdRP local branches, the party did not transform 
itself thus because, as the party's head of organisation Maciej Porqba put it, it was felt 
that "the best programmes, the strongest slogans, the best advisers are of no use 
unless you can implement them. Someone has to go out and put that poster on that 
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lamppost, organise that meeting, bring the sound equipment, put up the lectern, rustle 
up some sausages and beer. Someone has to do this! Physically! ""' 
Similarly, PSL Programmatic Director Jan Wypych argued that "there are no costs 
only advantages"' to recruiting new members because "the party grows and, to some 
extent, the intellectual and popular potential increases and, therefore, the actual 
organisational potential increases. ""' Indeed, there were even certain overtly mass 
party elements to the PSL's approach and most party officials stressed that the party's 
membership base and territorial strength were critical to its overall organisational 
strategy. For example, according to the PSL Parliamentary Club Vice-Chairman 
Janusz Piechocin'ski "a party which gives up attempting to gain new members and 
pretends that everything can be sorted out from the position of paper electoral 
programmes, television appearances and writing newspaper articles is (operating 
under) an illusion. ""' Similarly, PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski 
argued that the fact that the party had a local circle in almost every commune was 
"very important and we attach a great deal of importance to it and our leaders, our 
provincial board presidents, realise this. As a matter of fact, I now see the provincial 
board presidents taking a great deal of care to ensure that structures should be 
convened even in those communes where there aren't formally registered PSL 
structures. ""' 
There was even some evidence of party development playing a role in the strategic 
thinking of national officials from the 'new' parties with a considerably weaker 
membership base. For example, as part of his platform for the UW leadership in 1995 
Leszek Balcerowicz: called for the development of a "growing network of active and 
committed members""' while, more explicitly, the party's General Secretary 
Miroslaw Czech argued that "if it comes to building our party's structures, developing 
the membership base and the structural base of our party so that we have as many 
local circles and members as possible, then this is a priority, absolutely yes. There is 
no such thing as a party without members and the more members a party has the more 
effectively it can endeavour to realise its objectives and gain wider support. The role 
of members and local structures is of absolutely basic importance for the IJW. 1"164 
Similarly, according to ROP National Secretary WqJciech WIodarczyk, "the 
participation of ROP members in the party's activities ... means that we 
have a certain 
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indicator of our support. This is very important. These are people who have declared 
themselves to be our supporters ... The greater the number of members in the localities 
then the less likely the party is to be affected by various conflicts because conflicts 
most often occur among leaders - whether it is in the provinces or at the national 
level. The more people there are at the base who support the programme and the 
leadership, the stronger the party's structure. ""' 
However, while officials from most parties at least paid lip-service to the importance 
of membership recruitment and party development they tended to emphasise the 
purely organisational advantages and only the PSL and ROP highlighted the 
importance of a mass membership as a means of rooting their parties more firmly in 
their electorates. The PSL's 1995 programmatic resolution, for example, argued that 
"as the expression of the interests of the broadly understood layer working in the 
countryside and the towns, the Polish Peasant Party is and wishes to remain a mass 
party. For in this lies one of the principal sources of its potential strength. Similarly, 
the PSL rejects the neo-liberal vision of the party based mainly on a narrow circle of 
professional politicians and a bureaucratic apparatus, whose main task is obtaining 
power and representing above all the interests of the most prosperous and narrow 
social groups. ""' (emphasis in original) PSL Parliamentary Club Vice-Chairman 
Janusz Piechocin'ski also argued that while "from the point of view of elections the 
number of members was not decisive" and that "cadre parties may be sufficient ... for 
discharging the functions of governmene' this was "too little for contacts with society, 
ftilfilling social expectations. ""' Similarly, according to PSL Vice-President Janusz 
Dobrosz "the role of a party does not confine itself solely to the organisational and 
ideological preparation of the act of election ... A party shapes views and opinions, 
should lead wide-ranging and long-term political educational activities, which are so 
often lacking in Polish social practice. """ 
The ROP also maintained at least a rhetorical commitment to developing a mass 
membership base as a means of bringing the party closer to its social base, one of the 
few 'new' parties in post-communist Poland to have done so explicitly. ROP's 1997 
parliamentary election campaign spokesman Jan Polkowski, for example, argued that 
the party was "aware of the basic mistake made by practically every political party in 
Poland: complete disengagement from society. Polish politicians have the feeling of 
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having a mission, they form elitist associations of an expert character, whose aim is to 
modernise the country. However, this can't be done in spite of the people. Being with 
the people, verifying concepts formulated within the quiet of an office is not 
populism, but ... a politician's duty. As a grouping, which wants to change the country, 
ROP began by changing the universally binding style of conducting politics. We are a 
mass movement. ""' 
Indeed, both PSL and ROP officials ascribed a critical role to members and local 
branches in their parties' communication strategies. In the PSL's case this stemmed 
from the party's lingering suspicion of the Warsaw-dominated mass media which 
they felt simply did not understand the requirements of the PSL's rural electorate. 
According to one PSL official, for example, the party 1997 parliamentary election 
campaign "concentrated on local areas and local meetings with voters" a 
characteristic, which arose from "the specifics of the party and its mainly rural 
electorate. ""' Similarly, PSL National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski argued 
that when it came to communication with the general public the party's members and 
local branches were a "necessity" because "the PSL has never had access to the 
media" and "only through this method can we reach people. " According to 
Bentkowski the PSL "always had to depend only on our organisational structure and 
direct access to our electorate and experience shows that the PSL will be strong when 
it has a broadly built-up organisational structure in local areas. ""' 
On the other hand, as an 'externally-created' party - and, therefore, excluded from 
both the resources and access to media coverage which flowed from parliamentary 
representation (discussed in greater detail in the next chapter on parties and the state) 
- the ROP also attempted to develop a 'bottom up' communications strategy which, 
as noted earlier, included activities such as mass petitions and distributing the party 
programme outside Sunday church services. For example, ROP Chairman Jan 
Olszewski argued that "we have to carry out agitation in the workplaces, in the 
neighbourhood communities. Alongside a local network, we have to build networks 
in various milieu. " According to Olszewski the party had to "treble its ranks" and 
"reach people through our own means" because its only access to the mass media was 
that guaranteed by the electoral law "and, therefore, marginal. ""' Similarly, ROP 
National Spokesman Jacek Kurski argued that the party attached "a great deal of 
importance to party members and local organisations in our communications strategy 
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because ... given that we don't have a particular opportunity in the public media which 
shows us through a distorted mirror ... we are condemned to trying to win people over 
directly ... at the base ... In terms of our communication strategy, we attach 40% 
importance to our structures and 60% to the media. ""' 
However, party members and local structures played a much less significant role in 
the communication strategies of the other individual member-based parties surveyed. 
For example, according to SdRP National Spokesman Dariusz Klimaszewski, 
although local branches did "fulfil a function in the role of communication with 
society" the party did not "define some kind of a greater or smaller role - the 
emphases in this area are evenly divided. ""' Indeed, the UW and UP placed much 
greater emphasis on the mass media to get their parties' message across. According to 
UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki "80% of (our) success is based on the mass 
media and maybe 20% on local activities ... it is absolutely basic. What you find out 
about political activities you find out through the TV, radio, newspapers and all our 
activities are geared towards the notion of existing in every communications 
medium. " Even the UW's contacts with the local media were organised centrally and, 
according to Potocki, "we pass it all on to local news agencies and papers from 
Warsaw because at the local level it depends too on the strength of the local 
organisation and can involve them in too much effort. """ Similarly, UW General 
Secretary Miroslaw Czech argued that even the Western "mass party is currently 
undergoing a crisis from number of points of view - mainly from the fact that the 
means of reaching the electorate ... have markedly changed. There are now many such 
sources ... the mass media 
have markedly expanded and developed. The notion of 
communication with specific groups has undergone a process of far-reaching change 
and the means of organising within society are various. From this point of view, 
obviously, in Poland there probably won't be a similar situation as there is in the 
West, where even comparatively small parties have hundreds of thousands of 
members. ""' Even UP leaders who felt that they had extremely unfavourable access 
to the mass media, did not consider using local membership structures as a realistic 
alternative because, according to UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz, "in 
practical terms, we don't have the means to set up our own channels of 
communication ... So, in practice, when it comes to communication with society we are 
confined to what appears and is said about UP in the mass media. ""' 
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Moreover, there was little evidence among any of the five individual member-based 
parties surveyed (with the possible exception of the ROP) of any particular emphasis 
on actually developing party membership and local structures. On the contrary, most 
of them generally considered the existence of a wider network of 'sympathisers' (who 
could be mobilised on specific occasions such as elections) as much more important 
than large ranks of formally enrolled members. For example, SdRP - which saw its 
members and local branches as having played an important role in the party's 
electoral success - did not have an organisational strategy aimed at recruiting more 
members. This was, in part, a conscious attempt to demonstrate that it was not, as 
SdRP's head of organisation Maciej Porqba put it, "a mono-party like the PZPR 
which needed to demonstrate its strength by the numbers it had. This is not a first and 
most basic priority. In the structure of the PZPR the number of members was an 
indication of the strength of the party. Here it is not like that. We try and make sure 
that the party has representatives from particular social groups like women and young 
people. But there is no such thing as, let us call it, the notion of 'building the party at 
any price. ' If someone doesn't want to join then there is no attempt to try and 
convince them that if they don't sign up there will be problems, as it once was the 
case. This doesn't exist anymore. """ 
Similarly, in spite of its conscious projection of itself as a mass party, the consensus 
among PSL strategists was that present membership and local implantation levels 
were sufficient and the party had, what its programmatic director Jan Wypych 
referred to as, a "natural" strategy towards party development. While "without doubt, 
the party has to see, in its activities, the need to develop the number of members and, 
obviously, in those places were people indicate a willingness, are interested in joining 
and where these people are known to party members, we don't reject them or turn 
them away" there was "no great pressure to, broaden the ranks of our membership at 
any cost. We don't go around saying to people 'Sign up to the party' and we are not 
"179 particularly pushing anyone. 
With varying degrees of emphasis the UW and UP also adopted essentially passive 
approaches to party development. UW officials paid lip service to the notion of 
increasing party membership, while simultaneously being pessimistic about the 
prospects of achieving such an objective (because of supply side factors - discussed 
below). The UP, on the other hand, was perhaps the most extreme case among the 
Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
Author interview, 20 February 1997. 
196 
parties surveyed of an almost conscious rejection of the need to enrol members. For 
example, UP Chairman Ryszard Bugaj made it clear from the outset that his party was 
not attempting to develop a mass membership organisation numbering tens of 
thousands of members: partly on the basis of the (self-fulfilling) argument that the UP 
lacked the financial resources to set up a nation-wide party organisation, but also 
citing supply-side factors relating to the historical obsolescence of mass parties. "' 
However, the UP clearly never had any intention of even attempting to develop a 
mass membership for the reason that, as the party's Vice-Chairman for Organisational 
Affairs Wojciech Borowik put it, "the ability to involve your sympathisers at times 
which are decisive or strategic" was more important than "forming fictional 
structures. " Echoing party National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz's "empty bottles" 
analogy, Borowik argued that a party's organisational capacity was "not a question of 
how many members there are. We don't have many members nor do we have our 
structures in the whole of the country ... However, during the election they (party 
sympathisers) will definitely be there in the whole country, in every province. "191 
Indeed none of the parties surveyed (not even the ROP with its commitment to 
placing party members at the core of its organisational and communication strategies) 
had undertaken a centrally-organised membership recruitment campaign or even had 
any explicit national party development strategy - exemplified by UP Vice-Chairman 
for Organisational Affairs Wojciech Borowik's attitude that "the only (UP) national 
strategy that exists is in the kind of image which we are trying to put across in the 
media. "' 82 Summing up the general approach to party development, SdRPs head of 
organisation Maciej Porqba argued that "building local structures and recruiting new 
members takes place at the circle level. Circles have the responsibility for winning 
over new members. This is a task for structures at the lowest level. "' Local research 
revealed, however, that this decentralised approach to membership recruitment was 
matched by an unwillingness on the part of most local branches to undertake any kind 
of pro-active recruitment activities for themselves. For example, one local SdRP 
official argued that his party didn't "place such a great emphasis on increasing the 
size of the membership" because they were "more interested in developing as wide a 
range of political sympathisers as possible" who could be mobilised during an 
"'See: E. Olczyk, 'Socjaldemokracja po polsku', Rzeczpospolita, 19 June 1992. 
"' Author interview, 3 March 1998. As an example of this Borowik cited the UP's ability to collect 
more than 100,000 signatures in the space of ten days in support of the party's candidate in the 1995 
presidential elections. An interesting choice given that PSL officials also cited their ability to swiftly 
collect signatures for their 1995 presidential candidate as evidence of the importance of the opposite! 
"' Ibid. 
... Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
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election campaign. "' Similarly, one local ROP official from the same province 
commented (regretftilly) that most of the 'new' parties in his area were content to 
"operate on the philosophy that you only need a small elite of 3040 people in a 
province, which don't cost much time or money to keep going and only come to life 
just before every election. ""' 
Supply side factors: popular attitudes to partie 
However, although demand side factors were undoubtedly important, the explanation 
for the new Polish parties' weakness as membership organisations was not to be found 
solely in the lack of value which party leaders placed on party development. Other 
important factors included the extremely modest head office capabilities which all the 
parties had at that disposal (discussed in greater detail in the chapter on the party 
machine) which effectively precluded both the organisation of national membership 
recruitment campaigns and the provision of any meaningful back-up to support local 
initiatives. Even more significantly, as UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki 
argued, "a cadre party is not, at the end of the day, a deliberate choice""" given that 
there was little sign that most Poles were actually interested in seeking out and joining 
the new parties. The same August 1993 PBS survey which estimated that only 3% of 
Poles were party members also revealed, for example, that only 10% of them had ever 
approached (or even considered approaching) one of the parties operating in their 
area 197 and there was no shortage of evidence from both polling data and interviews 
with local and national party officials to support all the hypothesised supply side 
barriers to party enrolment in post-communist Poland. 1's 
Firstly, the level of party identification among Polish citizens did indeed appear to be 
very low. As Table 5.6 shows, comparative data revealed that Poles had one of the 
lowest level of party identification of any voters in post-communist Eastern Europe 
(181/6). ' Most Polish research suggested that (on average and depending on the 
Author interview with Kazimierz W6jcik, 22 April 1997. 
Author interview with Andrzej Kucharski, 20 April 1997. 
'Partia masowa czy kadrowa'. 
"' See: Tartie niepopularne ale potrzebne'. 
"" While it is possible to discern general patterns from this data, it is more difficult to 'track' this 
kind of data temporally. Firstly, it comes from a number of different polling organisations asking 
slightly different questions not repeated over a regular time period. Secondly, some it was obtained 
indirectly from newspaper articles rather than from the polling organisations themselves and did not, 
therefore, always contain information on the number of 'don't knows', whether or not these were 
excluded and on the overall margins of error. 
"' More recent data suggested that 18% of Poles identified with a political party compared with 41% 
of Romanians, 39% of Hungarians and 22% of Slovenians. See: R. Rose and W. Mishler, 'Negative 
and Positive Party Identification in Post-Communist Countries', Electoral Studies. Vol 17 No 2. 
1998. pp217-234 (222). 
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precise question asked) 60-70% of Poles did not feel strong ties with any of the 
parties nor did they feel their interests were being represented by them. A July 1993 
Demoskop survey, for example, found that 49% of respondents disagreed with the 
statement that "there are political parties in our country which you can say represent 
your interests and the interests of people like you, " while only 35% agreed and 15% 
said they did not know. "I Asking a slightly different question an August 1993 
Demoskop survey found that 59% disagreed with the statement that parties properly 
represented "local interests, " while only 30% agreed (and 54% disagreed) with the 
statement that "thanks to political parties people of various interests can agree with 
each other""' and, by February 1994, Demoskop found that the number of Poles who 
believed that there was no political party that represented their interests up to 63% 
against 27%. "' Similarly, a September 1994 OBOP survey found that 83% of 
respondents agreed (61% strongly) with the statement that "nothing links me with the 
current so-called political class" while only 11% disagreed. "' This pattern was 
confirmed by a series of PBS surveys in 1995-96, the most recent of which in March 
1996 also found that 58% of Poles felt their interests were not being represented by 
any of the current political groupings while only 38% felt that they were. "" 
However, there was also some evidence that the level of party identification in Poland 
had gradually increased as the political system began to stabilise and consolidate. As 
Table 4.4 shows, a June 1997 OBOP survey, asking a slightly different question, 
revealed a somewhat higher perception of parties as representatives of specific social 
groups. Indeed, a March 1998 CBOS survey found that only 13% of respondents said 
that they did not feet that there was a party which (even to a minimal degree) 
represented to their interests, while 45% said that theyfully identified with at least 
one party. "' This gradual increase in party identification was probably partly 
explained by the emergence of AWS in June 1996 which may have provided a more 
substantial point of reference than any previous party or grouping for the large 
segment of the Polish electorate on the right of the political spectrum that clearly 
identified with the Solidarity tradition. 
"" See: 'Wyborcy bez swojej partii' 
"'See: Tartie niepopularne ale niepotrzebne'and 'Dzialacze bez zaplecza'. 
"2 See: 'Dla kogo te partie', Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 February 1994 
'9' OBOP. Czy Polacy sq wyalienowani politycznie? Warsaw. September 1994. 
114 See: R. Wrobel, 'Wyborca slabo reprezentowany', Rzeczpospolita, 6 March 1996. See also: 
'Bezpartyjni i nie reprezentowani, Rzeczpospolita, 1/2 April 1995; and 'W poszukiwaniu swojej 
partii', Rzeczpospofita, 23/24 September 1995. 
'9' CBOS. Reprezenatatynnoic' Pariii Politycznych. Warsaw. April 1998. 
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Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Table 4.4 also shows that approximately half of 
those surveyed by OBOP in June 1997 still did not know which party best represented 
the interests of young people (46%), women (46%), private businessmen (45%) and 
managers of large firms (47%) and around one third in the case of ordinary people 
(3 1 %), the unemployed (3 5%), the intelligentsia (32%) and so-called 'budgetary 
sphere' workers employed in the public services (36%). Moreover, the 45% of 'party 
identifiers' in CBOS's March 1998 survey comprised only 28% of respondents who 
fully identified a single party while 17% felt that their interests or views were 
represented by two or more parties - suggesting that while overall party identification 
may have been increasing the level of commitment to specific parties remained fairly 
shallow. "" 
Secondly, the communist legacy also appeared to have created an extremely negative 
image of the notion of 'party membership' among Polish citizens. Indeed, in 1994 
only 8% of Poles expressed confidence in parties which, as Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show, 
was an extremely low rating even in comparison with the rest of post-communist 
Eastern Europe and made them easily the least trusted institution in post-communist 
Poland. However, while many Poles may have considered parties as an'evil'the 
majority of them continued to regarded them as a 'necessary' one. A December 1991 
CBOS survey, for example, found that 70% agreed (30% strongly) with the statement 
that "political parties are necessary in Poland" while only 12% disagreed"' and an 
August 1993 PBS survey revealed that 77% of respondents agreed (43% strongly) 
that "Poland needs political parties"' while only 16% disagreed (6% strongly). "' 
Moreover, as in the case of increasing party identification, hostility towards parties 
appeared to be gradually weakening as the political and economic transition gathered 
pace. The number of Poles who expressed a preference for a single-party over a 
multi-party system fell from 31% in 1992 to 23% in 1994199 and a July 1994 OBOP 
survey also found 60% of Poles against limiting the rights of opposition parties to 
criticise the government (27% strongly) and only 33% in favour (9% strongly). " 
Nevertheless, most Poles continued to hold very negative views about those people 
that actually joined and became involved in parties. For example, the same December 
1991 CBOS survey which found most Poles accepting their necessity also found that 
... Ibid. 
197 CBOS. Opinia publiczna o miejscu 1 roli partii w systemie politycznym. Warsaw. December 199 1. 
'98 See: 'Partie niepopularne ale potrzebne. 
'99 F. Plasser and P. Ulram, 'Measuring Political Culture in East-Central Europe: Political Trust and 
System Support' in F. Plasser, and A. Pribersky, eds. Political Culture in East-Central Europe. 
Aldershot: Avebury. 1996. p22. 
'00 OBOP. Opinie o demokracji i allernatywnychformach rztldzenia, July 1994. Warsaw. 
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51% of respondents felt party activists were primarily motivated by a desire to gain 
power rather than act as a representative of civil society and, altogether, 63% of 
respondents ascribed this and other 'subjective' motives as the most important ones. 
Only 25% of respondents felt that party activists were motivated by 'objective' (or 
"pro-societal') motives such as the desire to further the interests of the country as 
whole (14%) or those of various social groups (I I %). " Similarly, the July 1994 
OBOP survey revealed that 87% of Poles agreed (45% strongly) with the statement 
that "whatever they might say, politicians are only really after their own career" while 
only 9% disagreed (1% strongly). Even 53% agreed (24% strongly) and only 37% 
disagreed (8% strongly) that "political parties are not necessary for anyone but their 
activists. "" A December 1996 OBOP survey also found that, when asked to 
characterise Polish parties as a whole, most respondents cited overwhelmingly 
negative features such as: conflict and argumentativeness (46%), unreliability (37%) 
and the dishonesty of their leaders (3 1 %). Interestingly, however, when asked about 
specijlc parties, rather than parties per se, respondents' assessments improved 
markedly and five out of the six parties and groupings surveyed were ascribed slightly 
more positive than negative features and the sixth (the ROP) was felt to have more or 
less the same number of both. 203 
These findings were reflected in the views of both national and local officials from 
the five individual member-based parties surveyed who also, quite spontaneously, 
drew attention to the way that the communist legacy had, in their opinion, discredited 
not just all parties but also the very notion of political activism Per se and, thereby, 
acted as a significant supply side barrier towards enrolment. For example, explaining 
his own party's inability to recruit a significant number of members, UW General 
Secretary Miroslaw Czech argued that "after the communist period Polish society has 
a quite strong aversion to membership of a party. The very word 'party' and the 
notion of belonging to a party has bad associations ... and 
is regarded as untrustworthy 
by a section of society, a very large section of society. "104 Similarly, one local UW 
official felt that "in Poland the word 'party' or even 'politics' evinces a very negative 
reaction, "'O' while an UP official also said that "the very sound of the word party 
creates a picture of untrustworthiness. "106 
Opinia publiczna o miejscu i roli pardi w systemie politycznym kraju. 
Opinie o demokracji i alfematywnychfonnach rzqdzenia. 
Spoleczne wizerunki pa? fii politycznych. 
Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
Author interview with Alina Piefikowska, 13 June 1997. 
Author interview with Pawel W6jcik, Chairman, UP Plock Local Circle, 28 April 1997. 
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Thirdly, interviews with local and national officials also suggested that the new Polish 
parties did not have a great deal to offer their potential members in terms of 
incentives for participation. Using Panebianco's typology, officials from all five 
individual member-based parties surveyed overwhelmingly identified collective rather 
than selective incentives as the primary motivation of those who had actually 
enrolled. The most important of these was general identification with the party's 
programme or ideology. One local UW official, for example, argued that "the 
Freedom Union takes a centrist position and people with moderate, calm views who 
want to have an influence on events so that the country avoids extremes, look to the 
UW to fulfil their expectations, "" while another said people joined her party because 
they "had reached a certain level of consciousness" and wanted to support a 
"programme which had some kind of basis in reality. ""' A local UP official said that 
people joined his party because "our programme recognises the need to help weaker 
people"'" while another argued that they were attracted by its "moderation with a 
dose of agitation for a social market economy. "" A local ROP official claimed that 
"people who never previously fought the 'commies' in an open fashion see the 
possibility that this is an organisation where they can fulfil some sort of obligation 
and will be made welcome. "" 
An important element in the case of SdRP was the fact that a large proportion of its 
members strongly identified with the pre- 1989 period and that it was perceived to be 
the only party prepared to defend at least some aspects of communist rule. It was 
estimated that approximately half of SdRP members were formerly in the PZPF, 1` 
although the proportion was thought to be even higher among party activists and 
leaders. "' One local SdRP official, for example, argued that "there is a group of 
people who are characterised by a certain sentiment for the pasf' and that they saw 
SdRP as a party which "breaks from the past in dishonourable matters, but doesn't 
completely tear away from, and values people's achievements during, this period. "" 
Another former PZPR official said that she became active in SdRP because, "they 
(Solidarity) took away my entire biography. It was decided that everything I had done 
2" Author interview with Ryszard Grot, 6 June 1998. 
2" Author interview with Alina Piefikowska, 13 June 1998. 
2"' Author interview with Ryszard Wajszczak, 28 April 1997. 
Author interview with Wlodzimierz Stec, 21 April 1997. 
Author interview with Danuta Makowska, 14 May 1997. 
See: M. Janicki, 'Oskariona partia', Polityka, 3 February 1997. 
213 For example, Grabowska and Szawiel found that 80% of delegates to the SdPP's 1993 Congress 
were former PZPR members. See: M. Grabowska and T. Szawiel. Anatomia elit politycznych: Partie 
polityczne wpostkomunistycznej PoIsce 1991-93. Warsaw: Instytut Socjologii, Uniwersytetu 
Warszawskiego. 1993. p 189. 
Author interview with Kazimierz W6jcik, 22 April 1997. 
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for Poland was bad. They took everything away from me and told me I was a 
& commie', a 'red cobweb', a thief" '" However, local SdRP officials were also 
careftil to distinguish this (albeit significant) section of the party's membership from a 
younger, "more ideologically conscious group" which, they claimed, was more 
"attracted to the idea of social democracy" than by sentiment for the communist 
past. "' While recognising that "undoubtedly there was an element of people joining 
from the old PZPR structures, " SdRP head of organisation Maciej Porqba also pointed 
out that "at the moment when the PZPR fell apart it had close to two million people 
and when we were formed and the PZPR was wound up in 1990 we had 30,000. So 
its not that these structures appeared suddenly, they had to be rebuilt. ""' 
The highest level of identification with the party as an organisation appeared to exist 
among members of the PSL whose professed roots in the values and traditions of the 
peasant movement were often seen as very important motives for enrolment. This 
identification with a certain value system was often re-inforced by family connections 
with the pre-communist peasant movement and, as one local PSL official put it, the 
idea of "maintaining the proud traditions and memories of our ancestors. ""' Another 
local PSL official, for example, argued that "the PSL is a very 'generational' party. 
My father and grandfather were both peasantists and this has a very important 
meaning. No other party in Poland has such a generational nucleus. "119 It was 
estimated that approximately 80-85% of PSL members were previously in the ZSL, "' 
an organisational continuity which PSL's National Director Marian Zalewksi 
defended by distinguishing between the former satellite party as an institution (which, 
he acknowledged) may have been compromised by its association with the communist 
regime and those ordinary members whose "families have been in the peasant 
movement from generation to generation" and which "represented ... a bastion 
in 
defence of the culture, traditions and religion of the Polish countryside. "21' The PSL 
was also the only party for whom the benefits of personal inter-action within a 
collective body were seen as significant motives for joining. This may have been a 
reflection of the specific rural environment in which (according to the statistics on 
local party implantation cited above) the PSL enjoyed a virtual organisational 
monopoly - given that, as noted above, the range of social and cultural activities was 
"s Author interview with SdRP Jelenia G6ra Local Circle Chairman, 5 May 1997. 
"" Author interview with Kazimierz W6jcki, 22 April 1997. 
2" Author interview, 28 February 1997. 
2" Author interview with Henryk Kisielewski, PSL Plock Provicial Board Vice-Chairman, 30 April 
1997. 
Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997. 
' Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, Polityka, 10 February 1996. 
Author interview, II March 1998. 
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much more limited in such communities giving the party much greater scope to fulfil 
social as well as purely political functions. 
Some national officials, particularly in the UW, claimed that selective incentives did 
play some role in encouraging potential supporters to enrol. For example, attempting 
to turn the party's low membership base into a virtue, UW National Spokesman 
Andrzej Potocki argued that "an advantage of having an organisation the size of the 
UW is that the road between members and party leaders appears to be fairly short and 
a career attractive. You can be a party member and seriously think about standing in 
the parliamentary elections in your community. Such individual considerations are 
probably more important in the Union than in any other party ... I meet more and more 
people for whom making a career at their level is what attracts them. """' ROP Main 
Board Secretary Wojciech Wlodarczyk also argued that people joined his party both 
"because they support the party's ideas, but also because they want to become 
involved, " with membership offering the possibility of such involvement through 
"carrying forward their activities into the parliamentary arena or in local government 
bodies" or "a position in the administration. "223 
However, these views were not reflected by local party officials who argued that, 
even where they did exist, selective incentives were very much a secondary 
consideration and related more to a willingness make a career in politics or achieve 
some kind of social status or rank rather than the prospect of some direct material 
benefits. One local SdRP official, for example, argued there was a "smaller" group of 
members who were "seeking positions as councillors, ""' while another said that there 
was a "section of members (who) also have some kind of healthy aspiration to 
advance in the administrative hierarchy. "" A local ROP official also acknowledged 
that "there are some people who link working for the party with their hopes for some 
sort of personal advance but this is not a large group of people. ", " Similarly, a local 
PSL official argued that "career reasons"' were only really an important factor among 
young people who joined the party in order to "make certain contacts, friendships, 
which will help them to make a career in government or make some money. "227 Direct 
payments for undertaking party activities were never openly cited as motives for 
enrolment. Although, as one local SdRP official put it, "some older people who have 
lived through the communist period still remember the time when certain jobs or 
2" Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
... Author interview, 14 February 1997. 
2" Author interview with Stanislaw Kosznik, 12 May 1997. 
22' Author interview with Leszek Majewski, 29 April 1997. 
22' Author interview with Danuta Makowska, 14 May 1997. 
227 Author interview with Jan Bury, 18 June 1997. 
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positions could only be obtained through the 'party recommendation', ", " a PSL 
official reflected the more widely held view that "there is nothing to be gained 
financially from membership of the party because no one pays you for anything ... You 
have to spend your own time and money in order to do party work. 
"229 
Clearly, it was difficult to neatly compartmentalise the reasons why any particular 
individual joined a Polish party and any package of incentives was a complex one. 
For example, a farmer who joined the PSL may not have derived any explicit or 
direct material benefits as a result of having done so but, given that (as noted above) 
many Poles viewed the party as an organisation mainly representing the interests of 
those employed in the agricultural sector, he may have been motivated by a belief that 
he would benefit materially from the implementation of the party's programme. 
Moreover, from a methodological point of view, it is important to bear in mind that 
these data involved members having motives ascribed to them by party officials who, 
inevitably, tended to cite those they saw as more 'worthy. ' More definitive 
judgements on why people join political parties in post-communist Poland can only 
really be made on the basis of more detailed research involving a more representative 
sample of party members themselves; and even then, as one local UW official pointed 
it, "the desire to make some kind of a profit and good contacts certainly exists but it's 
not articulated by the members. ""' Nonetheless, even accepting those caveats, the 
general pattern identified by party officials - of collective incentives prevailing over 
selective ones as the key motive for participation - was likely to be an accurate one. 
This finding was also confirmed by Pankowski's January 1996 survey of local party 
officials from nine parties and groupings (including the five individual member-based 
parties surveyed) which concluded that "the willingness to make a career, not to 
mention individual interests, was assessed very negatively and this type of motivation, 
if not directly discredited, was placed well down the list of motivations as a so-called 
necessary evil. "" 
Consequently, the fact that selective benefits were so rarely cited implied that parties 
were perceived to have little specific to offer their potential members - with the 
partial exception of the involvement in a rural social network which flowed from PSL 
membership. Moreover, the fact that so few local officials cited advancing the 
interests of a particular socio-economic group as a motivating factor also appeared to 
confirm that both individual consciousness of objective socio-economic interests and 
" Ibid. 
Author interview with Henryk Kisielewski, 30 April 1997. 
"' Author interview with Ryszard Grot, 6 May 1998. 
... Polityka i partie polityczne w oczach dzialaczy partyjnych szczebla lokalnego. p2-3 
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the identification of parties as vehicles for advancing them were low (although, as 
noted above, this may - to some extent - have been implicit in the notion of an 
individual joining a party because they 'supported its programme'). 
Fourthly, party officials also lent support to the idea that the uncertainty and 
insecurity created by the economic transition meant that even those Polish citizens 
who took an interest in public affairs were more focussed on securing individual and 
personal goals and that such individual efforts were viewed as a more effective means 
of achieving material security than time invested in civic activities such as parties. At 
the most basic level, according to the then leader of (ftiture AWS affiliate) the PK 
Aleksander Hall the standard of living simply did not allow the majority of Poles to 
pay party membership subscriptions regularly. "' More fundamentally, given the 
prevalence of collective over selective incentives, most party officials deduced that 
members were more likely to be drawn from the most ideologically or 
programmatically-driven segments of the population and were, according to UW 
General Secretary Miroslaw Czech, "the most active of the active ... a particular type 
of committed person . 
"233 Similarly, UP Vice-Chairman for Organisational Affairs 
WqJciech Borowik argued that "the time of voluntary activity has, for a certain time, 
been exhausted because people need to work, earn money and keep 
themselves ... People become 
involved either when they have the capability, the time 
or they have a direct interest in becoming involved. "234 
Finally, there was also some evidence to support the hypothesis that the behaviour of 
the new political class and its style of conducting politics were both factors in 
discouraging enrolment and participation in the new parties. The relative inexperience 
of those participating in democratic politics for the first time was re-inforced by an 
immature culture of political journalism which re-inforced the negative stereotype of 
politics as having little value and thereby (often unwittingly) encouraged many Poles 
to unload the frustrations and setbacks associated with systemic transformation onto 
the new parties. For example, some commentators noted that the Polish media had 
often failed to differentiate between the serious and the more frivolous and eccentric 
fringe groupings - particularly during the earlier phases of the emergence of the new 
party system. "' 
2" 'Partia masowa czy kadrowa' 
2'3 Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
"' Author interview, 19 February 1997. 
235 See, for example, Zubek's account of the coverage of the 1991 parliamentary elections in V. 
Zubek, 'The Fragmentation of Poland's Party System, ' Communist and Post-communist Studies, 26: 1. 
1993.47-71(59-61) 
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Conclusion 
As hypothesised, then, the new Polish parties had an extremely low membership base 
and their combined (probably inaccurately high) total represented one of the lowest 
levels in Europe. The PSL and SdRP were, also as hypothesised, partial exceptions in 
this respect and there was a particularly sharp contrast between these two 'successors' 
and three 'new' individual member-based parties surveyed in terms of local 
implantation. The PSL was the only party with a significant number of party branches 
in rural areas and SdRP, while mainly urban in character, also had an organisational 
network in smaller towns. Even the larger and better organised of the 'new' parties 
were tiny by Polish (and even more so by West European) standards with their local 
branches concentrated almost exclusively in the main provincial and other larger 
towns. 
The 'successor' parties relative superiority was, also as hypothesised, rooted at least 
partly in the organisational legacies which they inherited from the communist PZPR 
and its satellite ZSL. Although this needs to be kept in perspective (the PSL's and 
SdRP's 1997 memberships represented less than 40% of ZSL's and only 3% of 
PZPR's 1989 totals respectively) even this relatively modest inheritance allowed them 
to dwarf the 'new' parties. But the PSL also inherited some kind of pre-existing level 
of identification from its claim to represent a linkage with the pre-war traditions of 
the Polish peasant movement and, more importantly, from its ability to present itself 
as the representative of clear and well-defined rural (and, more specifically, 
agricultural) electorate. Moreover, given the PSL's virtual organisational monopoly 
in small towns and villages, where the scope for other social and cultural activities 
was more limited, it was the only party in a position to offer the social, collective 
benefits, which stemmed from personal inter-action. 
SdRP, on the other hand, provided a clear point of reference for those who identified 
positively with at least some aspects of the previous communist regime and who had a 
clear, personal interest in opposing 'de-communisation' in its broadest sense. 
Although this may have only applied to a relatively small segment of the electorate 
(and created other problems for the party by alienating potential new supporters who 
did not identify with this tradition), it also gave SdRP a relatively well defined pool 
of potential recruits. Hypothetically, it may be argued that a party which was able to 
claim an unambiguous continuity with the original Solidarity movement (which none 
of the 'post-Solidarity' parties had succeeded in doing hitherto) could also provide an 
equally clear reference point of reference for a section of the electorate on the centre- 
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right which identified with this tradition. Indeed, there were some indications, given 
its sponsorship by the Solidarity trade union (and, therefore, its ability to identify with 
the symbolism of, and represent an unbroken organisational linkage with, the original 
opposition movement) that the RS AWS may be the first 'new' party in post- 
communist Poland capable of developing a membership base and level of local 
implantation comparable to that of the 'successor' parties. However, at the time of 
writing, the party was still at the formative stage of its development. 
In addition to their low levels of membership and local implantation, there was also 
very little evidence (with the, somewhat misleading, exceptions of the PSL and, to a 
lesser extent, ROP) that the new Polish parties had attempted to encapsulate their 
supporters by developing networks of ancillary structures directly linked to their party 
organisations. Indeed, again as hypothesised, they appeared more interested in 
developing a looser and more informal set of relationships with a fairly wide range of 
organisations rather than attempting to enrol them as collective members or tying 
themselves too closely to any one particular interest group. Moreover, there was also 
some evidence of a blurring of distinctions and confusion of roles in relation to 
interest articulation and aggregation: with some parties (such as the PSL) behaving 
more like interest groups and some interest groups (such as the Solidarity and, to a 
lesser extent, OPZZ trade unions) behaving more like parties. 
Although the pattern of local activity varied, particularly between urban and rural 
areas, local party branches generally functioned as fairly loose and informal bodies 
primarily geared towards fulfilling certain local organisational tasks. Indeed, party 
life at this level was dominated by national and local election campaigns, with other 
campaigns a rarity, particularly outside the main provincial and other larger towns. 
The partial exception here was the ROP whose founding ethos placed a heavy 
emphasis on developing organisational structures from the 'bottom up' and 
nourishing them through ongoing grassroots campaigning - although the degree to 
which this ethos was reflected in local practice varied and, even where it did it exist, 
did not appear to be sustainable in the medium to long term. Local government 
provided the main focus for debate and activity in between election campaigns in the 
more active of the local circles and cells, with the presence or absence of a local 
councillor often the key factor in determining their vitality or even viability. 
The explanations for this pattern of low individual and collective membership, lack of 
ancillary organisations, weak local implantation and fairly passive, electorally- 
orientated basic party structures were to be found, as hypothesised, on both the 
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demand and supply sides. All the parties surveyed at least paid lip service to, and 
none of them completely dismissed, the notion of developing some kind of basic 
membership-based local structures. Indeed, the PSL and ROP both stressed, in 
rhetorical terms at least, the importance of membership in helping to root these parties 
in their electorates; and both of them assigned members an important role in their 
communication strategies. However, none of the parties surveyed had any kind of 
pro-active party development strategy nor had ever organised a national, centrally 
organised membership recruitment campaign. These functions were invariably 
devolved to local party officials who shared the national leaders view that looser 
networks of 'sympathisers' who could be mobilised at election times were as (if not 
more) effective than large, formally enrolled memberships. 
Moreover, although more detailed research was required to properly assess popular 
attitudes to parties, existing survey evidence suggested that even if parties had 
actively sought to recruit substantially more individual members, they would have 
found it extremely difficult to do so. While popular hostility to parties appearred to be 
gradually declining and party identification increasing, there was still a residual 
tendency to view the activities of parties and their activists very negatively. Both 
national and local officials (particularly from the 'new' parties) highlighted the 
enduring negative associations which bothparties, and even the very notion of 
&politics', still had for the majority of Poles as a result of forty years of one-party 
rule. These post-communist supply side factors helped to re-inforce the effects of 
more secular trends which had caused a relative decline in party membership in the 
more advanced Western democracies. For example, the prevalence of 'collective' 
over 'selective' motives among those who joined and became active in their parties 
(at least according to local officials) appeared to confirm the meagre potential 
rewards which were available to prospective members. The fact that most members 
appeared to be drawn from the most ideologically-committed segment of the 
population and were primarily motivated by an attachment to the party's programme 
and ideology also suggested that the effects of the economic transition led most Poles 
to seek material and job security through personal and individual, rather than through 
collective, channels. 
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CHAPTER SIX. - 
PA R TIES A ND THE S TA TE 
Having examined the relationship between parties and civil society - particularly the 
question of whether or not they attempt to encapsulate their supporters as party 
members or in ancillary organisations - this chapter considers the degree to which the 
new Polish parties orientate to, and are dependent upon, the state. Although it has 
tended to be either undervalued or completely ignored in most assessments of party 
organisational change, as in the case of the themes examined in the previous chapters, 
the changing relationship between parties and the state also corresponds to each 
successive model of party organisation. ' The nature of these changes has been 
particularly evident in the ways that parties have sought to procure financial and 
material resources and their main channels of communication with society have 
evolved. 
Operating under a limited franchise, cadre parties were financed primarily through 
personal contacts and their principal means of communication were inter-personal 
networks. The boundary between the state and the politically relevant civil society 
was, therefore, unclear. While the later, post-suffrage mass party also developed its 
own independent channels of communication (although obviously aimed at a much 
broader electorate) its main sources of finance were numerous small membership 
subscriptions and contributions together with the activities of collateral organisations 
such as party co-operatives and trade unions. Duverger, for example, regarded the 
changing system of party finances - which he characterised as replacing the "capitalist 
financing of electioneering by democratic financing" - as fundamental to the 
differences between cadre and mass parties and interpreted it as part of the broader 
process of democratisation and political change. ' The mass party, therefore, belonged 
to, and represented the interests of, the newly enfranchised segments of civil society 
vis-a-vis the state. 
In the catch-all/electoral professional model, political parties increasingly sought 
funding from a broader range of interest groups (and, to some extent, the state) rather 
than their own internally-generated resources and, as we saw in the chapter on the 
party machine, competed for access to non-party communication networks by 
utilising the services of external professional publicists and media experts with a 
See: 'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'. 
Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activities in the Modem State. P63. 
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much looser relationship to the party? This model, therefore, implied an erosion of 
the party-civil society linkage and, to some extent, foresaw the greater emphasis by 
parties on the state, with the latter offering the potential to compensate for the former. 
Thus, catch-all/electoral professional parties occupied the position of competing 
brokers between civil society and the state and, as Mair put it, had shifted "to a stage 
in which, in Downsian or Schumpeterian terms, they behaved more as competing 
teams of leaders. "' 
Katz and Mair carried forward this conception of contemporary parties increasingly 
seeking to anchor themselves in the state which, they argued, set the stage for the 
emergence of the cartel party as a new party type. ' They noted a series of social, 
cultural and political trends over the last two decades (outlined in greater detail in the 
introduction) which resulted in a general decline in the levels of involvement and 
participation, with membership and commitment generally failing to keep pace with 
the rapidly escalating costs of party activity. Consequently, parties were obliged to 
look elsewhere for their resources and, in this case, their actual or potential access to 
public office made it easy for them to turn to the state for the organisational resources 
required in order to maintain themselves. Katz and Maies cartel party was, therefore, 
characterised principally by an increasing orientation towards, and dependence upon, 
the state as an institutional support structure - both in terms of the legitimacy which 
public office conferred and the privileges, resources and benefits afforded by it. As 
the state became unquestionably more important for their persistence and survival, 
parties ceased to be significant linkages between the citizen and state and became, in 
effect, almost part of the state itself, 
This ever closer symbiosis between parties and the state could be observed in several 
ways: 
Firstly, given the significance of party funding highlighted in previous organisational 
models, it is important to note the state's increasingly important role in helping 
parties to secure, and oversee the regulation of, financial subventions; and material 
resources. While the pattern obviously varied from country to country, Katz and Mair 
found that state subventions often constituted an increasingly important source of 
party income and that this growth had "come to represent one of the most significant 
' See: 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems', p 190; and Political Parties: 
Organisation and Power. pp263-269. 
'Party Organisation', p8. 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy'. 
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changes to the environment within which parties act. "An important aspect of this, as 
noted in the chapter on the party machine, was the fact that parties increasingly drew 
on state resources to staff both their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
organisations. 
Secondly, very few, if any, parties still maintained their own partisan channels of 
communication (such as a party press or broadcasting system) and generally relied, 
almost exclusively, upon a combination of the independent printed, media, on the one 
hand, and electronic broadcast media networks on the other. Given that most of the 
latter were still publicly owned or controlled - and access to them regulated by the 
state and usually guaranteed to parties by law - they offered parties a resource that 
was previously inconceivable and meant that the manner and relative frequency with 
which parties could present their message depended, in large part, on rules and 
procedures devised and regulated by the state. 
Thirdly, there was also some evidence that party patronage exercised through the state 
offered an expanding, or at least increasingly obvious, source of selective benefits for 
party supporters, as parties were increasingly willing to utilise public honours of 
publicly-funded benefits to reward their supporters - although the evidence here was 
necessarily very sketchy. 
Fourthly, much of the character of contemporary party organisation and party life 
itself was increasingly shaped by pervasive party laws, particularly as parties were 
increasingly obliged to conform to new rules regarding the receipt of state 
subventions. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, the very structure of party 
organisations was often determined, in part at least, by the structure of the state itself, 
even to the extent that changes in the number of basic party units were sometimes 
simply a response to local government structural reform. 
It should be emphasised that the role of 'the state' in these various developments 
should not simply be characterised as an exogenous factor influencing party life. On 
the contrary, regardless of whether we are dealing with levels of state subventions, 
state regulation of media access, party laws or patronage, it is the parties themselves 
in their role as governors and legislators who were ultimately responsible for 
determining the rules which determined access to these resources and determined the 
framework within which they were allocated. Moreover, because, for example, state 
subventions or access to the electronic media were often tied to prior party 
' Ibid. p 15. 
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performance or position - whether defined in terms of electoral success or 
parliamentary representation - they generally helped to sustain existing parties while, 
at the same time, helping them to resist challenges from those on the margins and 
creating barriers to the emergence of 'new entrants'. Indeed, hypothetically, parties 
may become so dependent on continuous access to these resources that, winning or 
losing an election could - by determining the party's membership of this privileged 
circle of 'insiders'- affect a party's very political survival. Thus, as Katz and Mair put 
it, "the conditions become ideal for the formation of a cartel"7 and this pattern of 
increasing state dependence on the state was accompanied by inter-party collusion in 
the division of state resources in such a way that parties could be seen as laying the 
basis for their own mutual survival. 
Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, the particular method by which state 
resources are allocated between the three party 'faces' - particularly the question of 
whether they are allocated indirectly via the parliamentary fraction or directly to the 
party central office organisation or party on the ground - will also have implications 
for the internal distribution of power within party organisations themselves. Katz and 
Mair, for example, found the distribution of state resources to be an additional factor 
in helping to underpin the dominance of the party in public office over the party 
central office in the cartel party model. " 
So what kind of party-state relationship might we expect to see developing among the 
new parties in post-communist Poland? 
Firstly, a number of commentators have hypothesised that the growing emphasis on 
links with the state increasingly evident in Western democracies is likely to be 
replicated in the Polish - and, more generally, East European - experience .' Indeed, 
there are a number of reasons to assume that the newly emerging parties of Eastern 
Europe are, if anything, likely to be even more orientated towards the state than 
parties in Western democracies, particularly when they were at a similar stage of 
party development. The new parties are operating within a political culture where the 
state was a highly prominent feature of the political landscape and in which it may 
prove difficult to engender a sense of their being separate. " Moreover, despite the 
Ibid. p 17. 
'The Evolution of Party Organisations in Europe' p609. 
See: 'Developing Party Organisations in East-Central Europe'; 'Models of Party Development and 
Questions of State Development in Poland' p603; Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central 
Europe. p 15; Wiat is different about post-communist party systems? p 15. 
" The ruling communist parties were, of course, enmeshed in the state apparatus and enjoyed 
extensive (indeed, virtually unlimited) control over its resources, while the communist state was 
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substantial progress made in terms of privatisation, the state continued to play a 
prominent economic role throughout the region during the post-communist period. 
Indeed, although civil society appeared to assume a particularly important role in the 
ideology of the East European opposition movements which flourished at the end of 
the communist period, it went on to have much less political relevance as the new 
parties' political focus shifted to the tasks of economic transformation and political 
re-construction in which the state assumed much greater prominence and many of its 
potential leaders moved into the realms of party politics. Given the new parties' 
structural characteristics outlined in the previous chapter - the lack of a mass 
membership or any degree of social implantation together with the general weakness 
of their party organisation on the ground - it was natural that they should focus much 
of their attention on the state. Similarly, the fact that party leaders played - and, in 
many cases, continue to play -a central role in party development also seemed likely 
to incline them towards developing a closer relationship with the state. Finally, as 
noted in previous chapters, the principle of state support for new political parties - in 
terms of fmancial subsidies and guaranteed media access - was quickly established in 
almost all the recent cases of democratisation and was also, therefore, likely to be 
considerably more important in terms of party development than the resources 
derived from society. 
Secondly, given their hypothetical retention of some of the main strengths and 
structural features of the mass party model - such as a relatively strong membership 
base, well-developed local organisational networks and a robust financial and material 
base (in the post-communist context) - we might expect the 'successor' parties to be 
correspondingly less orientated towards the state than the 'new' parties which did not 
enjoy this organisational legacy. This was particularly likely to be the case with the 
PSL which, as previous chapters have shown, appeared to display more of the 
characteristics of the mass party, and a broadly greater orientation towards civil 
society, than any of the other parties or groupings surveyed. 
Thirdly, however striking the immediate similarities between the cartel party model 
and the new Polish parties may appear, we should also be cautious in taking these 
comparisons too far. In the first place, the accuracy of the model itself has been 
perceived to be the major agent of political repression and obstacle to democracy in Eastern Europe. 
Consequently, it may be argued that the new parties may be particularly anxious to distance 
themselves from such a legacy where party and state were inseparable. Indeed, as Lewis points out, 
"particular care was often taken in drafting legislation to separate new parties from the sources of 
administrative and economic power that have been a central part of the political establishment under 
the former regime. "'Party funding in post-communist east-central Europe', ppl39-140. 
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questioned' I and Katz and Mair have themselves cautioned against its general 
applicability and acknowledged that a party cartel is most likely to develop in those 
political cultures marked by a tradition of inter-party consensus and co-operation. " It 
is, therefore, much less likely to emerge in post-communist polities were the 
emotional temperature and levels of polarisation along the cleavage of attitudes 
towards the past are likely to be very high for some time to come and parties 
themselves remain internally fissiparous. More generally, as the three fully-free 
Polish parliamentary elections vividly illustrate, it is questionable whether the party 
system in Poland (or other parts of Eastern Europe for that matter) is developed or 
stable enough either for the key players to be clearly identified or for the likely 
members of a party cartel to agree on the shared political perspectives and mutual 
interests that are emphasised in that model. As Lewis points out, the essence of the 
cartel party model from the point of view of the voters lies in their ability to choose 
"from a fixed menu of prices" and it is precisely this fixed menu that is lacking in 
Poland and Eastern Europe more generally. " 
In order to test these hypotheses and, more generally, to examine the Polish parties' 
level of state orientation and dependence, this chapter, therefore, considers: firstly, 
what kind of state financial and material support they received compared with other, 
internally-generated sources of party funding; and, secondly, what kind of provisions 
were made by for state-guaranteed party access to the mass media. In both cases the 
questions of what kind of assistance parties actually received and what they believed 
should be the role of the state are examined - together with the broader issue of 
whether or not there was evidence of a pattern of inter-party collusion to create a 
'cartel' of privileged insiders. 
There are, of course, other important aspects of the party-state relationship which are 
worthy of consideration. The role of the state in providing parties with paid staff and 
organisational infi-astructure is considered separately and in greater detail in the 
chapter on the party machine, although the key findings are cited and incorporated 
into the general argument in this chapter as appropriate - particularly the fact that 
most party staff were attached to the parliamentary party, especially at local level, 
and therefore financed mainly or exclusively from state coffers. The role of party 
appointments to state bodies is also a key issue although, as Mair acknowledges, a 
" R. Koole, 'Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party' in Party 
Politics. Vol. 2 No. 4. pp507-523. 
'Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy', p 17. 
Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe, p 12 
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difficult one on which to obtain 'hard' data. " Moreover, although state patronage can 
obviously play a role in terms of providing an additional selective benefits for some 
party members, it does not relate directly to the specific and central issue under 
consideration: whether or not parties are drawing upon the state to substitute for their 
own, internally-generated organisational resources? Similarly, although the regulatory 
framework within which parties operate has become an increasingly important issue 
in Poland - and is referred to at various points in this chapter - it is also not of direct 
relevance to the main theme examined here of party dependence on, and expectations 
of, the state. Consequently, this chapter, focuses on the two key issues - party 
funding and media access - which are recurring themes in all the contemporary party 
models and which can be isolated and examined relatively easily. 
The state and pgM funding 
Although, until the passage of 1997 Party Law, direct and ongoing state party funding 
did not formally exist in Poland, there were certainly other forms of financial support 
that were made available from the state budget. The most significant of these were: 
the re-imbursement of election campaign expenses and the provision of diverse forms 
of support for parliamentary groupings, together with salaries, expenses and other 
material resources for individual parliamentarians. 
Until 1997, refunds for election expenses were the one possibility for financing 
political parties and groupings directly from the state budget. The 1993 Electoral Law 
introduced a major innovation into the Polish system of party finances; as a result of 
which certain election committees (and, therefore, Polish parties or coalitions of 
parties) received a one-off donation from the state budget to refund costs incurred 
during a parliamentary election campaign. These-refunds were only paid to those 
election committees able to secure parliamentary representation, in proportion to the 
total number of SqJm deputies and Senators elected from their candidates' lists - 
provided that they published a financial report of their campaign accounts within 
three months of the election day. The amount available for campaign refunds was set 
at 20% of the total expenditure assigned in the state budget to cover the costs of 
organising, preparing and conducting the election. " 
The financial role of the state in Poland certainly became evident after the 1993 
elections when every eligible party or political grouping received 14,500 new zloties 
'Party Organisation', pII 
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministr6w. 'Ustawa z dnia 28 maja 1993 - Ordynacja Wyborcza do 
Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polski, Dziennik Ustaw. No. 45: 205. Warsaw. 1993. 
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(the equivalent of $7,650) for every seat won in either of the two chambers. " 
Although the refund only went to those parties which won parliamentary seats, it was 
paid directly to party central offices via the electoral committees submitting the 
candidates' lists from which the Sejm deputies or Senators were elected. These were 
either single parties or groupings (as in the case of the PSL, UW, UP, KPN and 
BBWR) or electoral coalitions comprising a number of organisations (such as the 
SdRP-led SLD) which then divided the refund between their members. 
Moreover, as Table 6.1 shows, there were considerable variations in the amount paid 
to each of the groupings and while the victorious parties received significant sums of 
money and election refunds. By providing them with the possibility of earning funds 
to cover day-to-day political activities, these refunds, of course, further strengthened 
their position and augmented the relatively extensive organisational resources already 
at their command, while those parties with only a few parliamentarians barely 
covered the repayment of the loans they had taken out to finance their campaigns. " 
Indeed, ironically, the PSL, the sole grouping which (in other respects) displayed 
significant 'mass party' characteristics was one of the prime beneficiaries of 1993 
election campaign refunds with nearly 2.3 million zloties, while the SdRP - the other 
'successor' and next largest party in terms of membership - was (as the main 
component of the SLD) an even greater recipient with more 3 million. 
The other significant source of state financial support for Polish parties before 1997 
was the provision of various forms of support for parliamentary groupings, together 
with salaries, resources and expenses for parliamentarians. As noted in chapter three, 
a large part of the Polish parliamentary budget was used to help Sejrn deputies and 
Senators perform their parliamentary duties, both at national and constituency level. 
Parliamentary Clubs received standard monthly payments per deputy to finance their 
activities - which were reduced as the size of the fraction increased. "' Moreover, Sejm 
deputies and Senators also received: substantial allowances to run offices in their 
local electoral districts, essential office equipment supplied free by the Sejm and 
" All figures cited in this chapter are expressed in 'new' z1oties which came into circulation on 
January I st 1995 and were equivalent to 10,000 'old' zloties. 
"Although any surplus from the refund was supposed to be assigned for "publicly beneficial 
purposes" parties discovered various ways to circumvent this provision. The party could also, of 
course, also earn bank interest on any excess sums which could then, quite legally, be spent on stricte 
party activities. 
"Parliamentary parties' specialist and expert reports were largely paid for from these funds - although 
Sejm deputies and Senators who chaired parliamentary committees could also obtain additional sums 
which could, of course, be utilised indirectly for party purposes. 
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Senate Chancelleries, together with a general deputies' expense allowance and, in the 
case of 'professional' deputies, wages in the forin of a so-called ryczatt. " 
It is, of course, questionable whether or not all of these sums can be included within 
the broad definition of 'party funding'. Some of the salaries and expenses, for 
example, were intended as Sejm deputies and Senators' personal income, while 
parliamentary directives insisted that the office expense allowance should, in theory, 
"not be used to finance the activity of political parties, social organisations, 
foundations or charitable activity nor the activity of the parliamentary club"" and it 
was up to the individual parliamentarian, and not the parliamentary party leaderships, 
to decide how this particular allowance should be allocated. In practice, however it 
was extremely difficult to separate the two and parliamentary salaries and allowances 
were very closely linked with, and inevitably shaded into, the general question of 
parliamentary club and party funding in general . As we saw in the previous chapter, 
a portion of deputies and Senators often regularly passed on part of their salaries' and 
personal and office expense allowances for the needs of the parliamentary club as a 
whole, or even the party central office, as an established procedure. Similarly, given 
that many parliamentariares constituency surgeries often doubled up as local party 
offices and performed a crucial role in their local organisational infrastructure, it was 
often difficult to distinguish between the funds spent on constituency work and those 
used to promote local party activity. They should, therefore, properly be regarded as a 
defacto form of backdoor state financing for parties as a whole rather than for the 
individual parliamentarian. Indeed, as Table 6.2 shows, the total amount allocated to 
support the activities of (mostly party-based) parliamentary clubs, together with 
individual parliamentarians' allowances and expenses, should not be regarded as a 
form of marginal funding. " 
"'Although this term is, somewhat confusingly, also used sometimes simply to describe 
parliamentarians' office expense allowances. 
" Cited in A. van der Meer-Krok-Paszkowska and M. van den Muyzenberg. 'The Position of Parties 
in the Polish and Hungarian Parliaments', Paper prepared for the Fourth Workshop on 
'Transformation Processes in Eastern Europe', The Hague, February 1-2 1996. p8. 
2'Gebethner's calculation included: the financial resources passed on directly to the parliamentary 
clubs and circles themselves, Scjin deputies and Senators' personal expense allowances and the total 
amount allocated to parliamentary deputies to maintain their offices. Only the ryczatts - the lump- 
sums paid to 'professional' parliamentarians who had given up all paid employment to devote 
themselves to full-time parliamentary work was excluded, since these were supposed to substitute for 
income foregone. Even these calculations did not include the various services-in-kind enjoyed by 
Polish deputies and Senators - such as free public transport by land or air and the free use of hotel 
accommodation in Warsaw - which it was impossible to calculate the exact value of, 
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The 1997 Law on Political Parties introduced three significant changes to the Polish 
state party funding regime. " Firstly, it established a new system of regular donations 
(known as 'objective' donations - dotacje celowe) to be paid those election committees 
which specifically registered themselves as political parties (and not electoral 
coalitions) in addition to the one-off election refunds (henceforth known as 
'subjective' donations - dotacje podmiotowe) which continued to be paid to all eligible 
electoral committees on the basis of the number of seats won. Secondly, although the 
level of election refiinds and donations paid to each party was still determined by its 
electoral performance, the regular donations were paid in proportion to the number of 
votes obtained, and not the number of seats won. Thirdly, the regular donations were 
paid to all parties that won more than 3% of the votes "cast for all political parties' 
candidates' lists across the whole country" and not just those whose electoral 
committees crossed the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation. The overall 
budget for state subventions remained unchanged with the new regular donations 
accounting for 60% of the total, paid in four annual instalments: 40% in the first year 
and 20% in subsequent years (uprated in line with inflation). 
This new system of regular donations was accompanied by much greater financial 
transparency, with parties obliged to submit annual financial reports on "expenditure 
undertaken on their statutory objectives"" or face the risk of losing their entitlement 
to receive finther donations. Moreover, all parties - even those which didn't receive 
any election reftmds or state donations - also had to submit details of any donations to 
their Election Funds which were ten times greater than the forecast average public 
sector salary for that year, together with a more general set of financial accounts. 
Failure to do so could result in the party's Election Fund being frozen or its deletion 
from the official register of political parties, respectively. 
Following the 1997 parliamentary elections, the total amount allocated for all the 
election committees which qualified for refunds and regular donations was more than 
14 million new z1oties. As Table 6.3 shows, as electoral coalitions AWS and the SLD 
were not entitled to regular donations and only received one-off election refunds 
worth approximately 25,000 z1oties for each parliamentarian elected - with AWS 
earning 6.3 million and the SLD 4.8 million. Meanwhile, those election committees 
which registered as political parties shared a total of 2.725 million z1oties - 25,000 
zloties per parliamentary seat multiplied by the 109 seats won by the three political 
22 Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrow. 'Ustawa z dnia 27 czerwca 1997 o partiach politycznych', 
Dziennik Ustaw. No. 98: 604. Warszawa. 1997. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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parties which crossed the 5% threshold for parliamentary representation: the UW, 
PSL and ROP. These three parties also received one-off donations but only worth 
10,000 z1oties; per seat, having to share the remainder set aside for the regular, 
'subjective' donations with those parties which had not won any seats but still 
obtained more than 3% of the vote. Originally it was assumed (and was probably the 
intention of those who framed the legislation) that these regular donations were only 
payable to those parties which won more than 3% of the total number of votes cast for 
all election committees and that in 1997, therefore, only the UP (which won 4.74% of 
the votes) would be eligible among those parties which failed to cross the 5% 
threshold. However, it subsequently emerged that the 3% figure related only to the 
number of votes cast for election committees that were specifically registered as 
political parties without taking into account the votes cast for electoral coalitions such 
as AWS or the SLD. This made the defacto threshold for regular donations just over 
1% and meant that the two pensioners' parties which contested the 1997 elections - 
the KPEiR and the KPEiRRP who won 2.18% and 1.63% of the votes respectively - 
were also eligible. 
Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that the principle of transparency of funding was 
built into original 1990 Law on Political Parties, detailed information on Polish party 
funding was extremely patchy and, at the time of writing, only one of the six parties 
and groupings surveyed, the UP, made its accounts available to public scrutiny. 
Without access to more than one set of party accounts it was clearly impossible to 
make any definitive judgements as to how much importance each party attached to 
the various forms of state support compared with other, internally-generated sources 
of revenue. " Nonetheless it emerged from the UP's figures, set out in Table 6.4, that 
the party's 1993 election refund of 623,500 zloties constituted 83% of its entire 1994 
income. When the party's debts were paid off, bank interest on the remainder 
represented 64% of the party's income the following year - by far the largest item and 
more than twice the amount contributed by membership subscriptions and the levy of 
parliamentarians (which also, of course, represented another form of indirect state 
funding). Given its extremely low membership levels the UP was clearly likely to be 
one of the parties least able to generate significant resources internally. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to deduce on the basis of the UP's figures that election refunds, the 
various forms of material and financial support provided to parliamentary parties and 
the new system of regular state subventions played a critical role both in helping 
21ndeed, as one Polish commentator presciently pointed out, given that (before the passage of the 
1997 Party Law) all the various kinds of state financial support were directed not at parties a such 
"but various committees, alliances and parliamentary clubs", it was extremely difficult to discuss the 
finances of any actual individual party. See: 'Lewe Pieniqdze'. 
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parties to survive the single most expensive activity they were likely to be engaged in 
(the parliamentary election campaign) and, in most cases, providing them with some 
sort of secure financial base for their ongoing party activities. Over time, of course, 
the more rigorous requirements placed on parties to publish financial accounts arising 
from the 1997 Party Law should help us to properly assess the relative importance of 
state support - at least as far as identifiable sources of income, such as refunds and 
donations, are concerned. 
Moreover, both the very existence of various state subsidies and parliamentary 
allowances, together with the rules governing the way in which they were allocated, 
were likely to make the position of the party leadership - particularly the party in 
public office and individual parliamentarians - considerably more important and 
influential to the emphatic detriment of the party on the ground. Although it was the 
party central office which benefited from, and determined the allocation of, both 
election reftinds and the new regular donations, the generous and weakly controlled 
system of parliamentary allowances ensured that considerably larger state funds were, 
in fact, directed to the party in public office. As Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show, the four 
largest parliamentary parties received more than three times as much funding in this 
form in 1995, as their respective party central offices received in their entire one-off 
election refund for 1993. Given that, as noted above, these funds were often utilised 
to develop local or regional party structures, the long-term effect of this allocation of 
resources may be strengthen the links of the party in public office directly with the 
party on the ground, with the party central office being in less of a position to co- 
ordinate party activity from above - although this was partially mitigated by the 
considerable personnel overlap between the party central office and party in public 
office leaderships noted in previous chapters. 
Although perhaps no more so than in other countries, Polish citizens were generally 
extremely hostile to the concept of state party funding -a hostility no doubt re- 
inforced by their more general antipathy towards political parties as such which was, 
as noted in the previous chapter, to a large extent rooted in their specific experiences 
of the previous system. A November 1992 CBOS survey, for example, found only 2% 
of respondents agreeing that party activities should be funded from the state budget 
with the vast majority supporting internal sources of financing such as membership 
subscriptions and donations from sympathisers (58%) and the parties' own business 
and trading activities (23%). " Similarly, a more recent March 1998 PBS survey also 
revealed that 66% of respondents felt that parties should be self-financing - either 
26 CBOS- Partie Polityczne: Ich Finansowanie i Wyborcy. Warsaw. December 1992. 
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from membership subscriptions (66%) or their own trading activities (32%) - with 
only 8% supporting state funding. " Indeed, the same PBS survey even found 58% 
opposed to the more modest proposal that citizens should make a one zloty donation 
to the party of their choice as part of filing their annual tax returnsF" - although a 
March 1998 CBOS survey found public opinion to be more divided: with 48% in 
favour and 43% against (30% decisively rejecting the idea compared to 25% 
supporting it). " 
Nevertheless, although this may have encouraged Polish parties to articulate their 
views in a slightly more circumspect fashion, such public hostility was not reflected 
in the attitudes of Polish politicians themselves who consistently supported the 
introduction and expansion of state funding. The issue was first raised in the context 
of the debate on the 1993 electoral law when virtually every parliamentary fraction 
supported the introduction of the election refund. " Indeed, all six parties and 
groupings subsequently surveyed strongly believed that the state should play a 
continuing or greater role in funding political parties. 
The most enthusiastic supporters of greater state financial support were the PSL and 
UP, both of whom sponsored legislation to introduce regular subsidies in addition to 
the one-off election refunds which culminated in the passage of the 1997 Party Law. 
The PSL proposed that parties should be provided with annual state subsidies in 
proportion to the number of parliamentary seats they held. " The UP also supported 
broadening the basis of state support for political parties to include regular donations, 
although its proposals also envisaged provisions for: financial support during an 
election campaign to those committees registering national lists of candidates; the 
level of regular subsidies being determined by the number of votes and not the 
number of seats won; and a lowering of the threshold for state support to include non- 
parliamentary parties which secured at least 2% of the vote. 32 
Given its general organisational weakness - together with the fact that, at the time it 
put forward these proposals, the party faced the direct threat of exclusion from 
parliament - the UP's support for broadening the scope of party state funding was 
'0 naszej naiwnogei', Gazeta Wybor-cza. 7 May 1998. 
Ibid. 
29 CBOS. Zlot6wka d1a Patiff Politycznych. Warsaw. April 1998. 
3* See: E. K. Czaczkowska, 'Partie oczekujq na gest'. Rzeczpospolita. 6 April 1992; and E. 
Szemplifiska, 'Jaimuinicy: Z czego -+yjq partie'. Wprost. 22 March 1992. " Kancelaria Sejmu. Projekt Ustawy o Partiach Politycznych. Warsaw. 9 June 1995. 
32 Kancelaria Sejmu. Projekt UstaAy o Zmianie Ustawy o Partiach Politycznych. Warsaw. 22 
February 1996. 
222 
fairly predictable. However, given its relatively high membership levels and well 
developed organisation (by Polish standards at least) the PSL's enthusiasm for 
increasing the role of the state was rather more surprising. Nonetheless, the PSL's 
general level of organisational development was still relatively meagre compared with 
analogous parties in Western democracies and its membership probably comprised 
poorer, rural dwellers unable to provide the party with a solid financial base on which 
a robust party organisation - reflected in the fact that, as the figures set out in Tables 
6.1 and 6.3 show, the party spent relatively little on its 1993 and 1997 election 
campaigns compared with comparatively smaller membership parties such as the UW. 
Some commentators also suggested that the PSL's attitude towards state party funding 
was simply a reflection of its more generally state-orientated approach to politics 
which focused heavily on placing its supporters with positions in the state 
administration at every level. " 
Indeed, of all the parties and groupings surveyed it was the PSL which set out the 
case for direct state party funding most clearly and comprehensively. Firstly, the party 
argued that, although they may be unpopular, political parties were one of the main 
foundations of a democratic system and incurred certain unavoidable costs as a result 
of having to fulfil a number of essential functions. Consequently, given that weak and 
unstable parties were not in the broader public interest, the state had to accept some 
responsibility in helping to provide them with resources. As PSL Vice-President 
Janusz Dobrosz put it speaking in the Sejm debate on the 1997 Party Law, "political 
parties are currently one of the basic elements of public life, an essential cell in the 
process of representing state interests as well as performing the government of the 
state. Political parties have their specific functions and tasks, which they are not in a 
position to realise effectively without subventions. " Secondly, without a basic state- 
guaranteed minimum level of finances, parties inevitably began to operate like 
"businessmen chasing profits" and became pre-occupied with the identifying new 
sources of income. In other words, turning one of the traditional arguments against 
state funding of parties on its head, the PSL argued that, by relieving them of the 
burden of fundraising, state funding actually gave parties greater opportunities to 
concentrate on their other functions and involve themselves in broader civic 
activities. " Thirdly, according to Janusz Dobrosz, the provision of state subsidies 
"significantly limits the dependence of parties and politicians on the vested interests 
Author interview with Ewa Czaczkowska, 26 June 1997. 
Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej z dniach 28,29 
lutego iI marca 1996 Warszawa: Kancelaria Sejmu RP. 1996. p144. 
See, for example: Projekt Ustawy o Partiach Politycznych. p 14. 
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of various potential sponsors"' and "limits corruption and the influence of business, 
together with that of overseas funds, on the politics of the state. "' 
UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also argued that parties which were not 
funded by the state became indebted to their financial sponsors which could, in turn, 
lead to costly public policy implications for the state. According to Nalqcz, it was, 
therefore, "more cost-effective for the state budget, the ordinary Pole, the average 
taxpayer, to put aside certain modest amounts openly and clearly for financing 
political parties than leaving this sphere of obligation in the current actual grey 
zone. "" Indeed, if anything, the UP placed even greater emphasis on anti-corruption 
arguments and linked its proposals for increased state funding with a package of 
controls on party finances which would have ensured that: parties would no longer 
have been able to conduct business and trading activities except for those directly 
linked to their core political objectives (such as publishing); indebted parties would 
have been ineligible for state subsidies (a measure aimed particularly at SdRP); and 
all business donations to political parties would have been forbidden. " 
Both the SdRP/SLD and the UW also supported continuing and extending the scope 
of state party funding. Outlining his grouping's broad support for regular donations 
to party funds in addition to one-off election refunds, SLD Parliamentary Club 
spokesman and SdRP Presidium member Zbigniew Zaborowski argued that, 
"'extending the right of political parties to obtain subsidies for their statutory activities 
will increase the state budget deficit but I think that this deficit is in accord with the 
interests of society, enables the formation of a transparent, open system of financing 
political parties. " UW Parliamentary Club spokesman Jerzy Ciemnewski also 
supported extending the scope of state support and argued that "from the point of 
view of the current requirements of constructing a democratic system" the Up's 
proposals were "more appropriate given that they foresee the possibility of financing 
the activity... (of) those parties which did not enter parliament but obtained a given 
" Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28,29 
lutego iI marca 1996 p142. 
" Kancelaria Sejmu. Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne ze 110posiedzenia Sejmu Rzempospolitej Polskiej 
w dniach 24,25 i 26 czerwca 1997. Warsaw. 1997. p360. 
" Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28,29 
lutego iI marca 1996. p 144. 
39 Projekt Ustawy o Zmianie Ustawy o Paniach Politycznych. It was, somewhat ironically, the PSL's 
draft which contained the original proposal to delete parties from the official register if they failed to 
publish annual accounts; although the PSL did also envisage allowing all organisations, including 
businesses (other than those with foreign shareholdings), to continue to make political donations, and 
parties to hold shares in any companies except for those in which the government was also a 
shareholder. 
40 Sprawozdanie Stenograficzrie z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28,29 
lutego iI marca 1996 p145. 
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number of votes in the election"' - although he argued in favour of introducing a 3%, 
rather than a 2%, funding threshold. ' 1 
However, although both of these groupings were substantial beneficiaries of state 
funding, and supported the general principle of extending its scope, neither were as 
enthusiastic supporters of them as the PSL and UP. The SdRP/SLD, in particular, had 
to proceed extremely cautiously on this issue for a number of reasons, not least the 
fact that SdRP was engaged in an ongoing financial dispute with the State Treasury. "' 
Moreover, as the party which emerged as the successor to a hegemonic organisation 
enjoying virtually unlimited access to state funds, SdRP obviously had to distance 
itself somewhat from what may have been perceived as an excessively state- 
orientated model of party financial support. 
Of the six parties and groupings surveyed, the ROP and AWS had devoted the least 
attention to the issue of state party funding and not set out their policy in any clear 
and unambiguous way - for the fairly obvious reason that, as relatively new 
organisations, they were pre-occupied with developing a basic organisational 
structure and broader programmatic questions in the run up to the 1997 parliamentary 
elections. However, preliminary indications were that both groupings appeared to be 
generally supportive of state party funding in principle and their spokesmen echoed a 
number of the arguments used by other groupings relating to the contribution it could 
make to reducing corruption and helping parties to concentrate on their basic political 
functions (although it should be noted that they were often expressing their personal 
opinions rather than their grouping's settled policy). 
ROP Supreme Council Vice-Chairman and Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski was, for 
example, one of the main parliamentary sponsors of the campaign to introduce a one 
zloty annual levy of taxpayers to ftind parties. Speaking during the Senate debate on 
the 1997 Party Law, Romaszewski also argued that parties were ftindamental 
requirement for a democracy and that state subventions were justified on the grounds 
that, "parties that carry out business activities ... are a much greater threat to society 
than party finances from the budget in an open manner. "" Similarly, AWS National 
Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek argued that "it is the state that is responsible for 
` Ibid. p149. 
"'This was, as discussed in a previous chapter, rooted in the related issues of inherited debts from the 
former PZPR and the party's allegedly illegal acquisition and disposal of the former communist 
party's assets. 
"' Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne ze 101 posiedzenia Senatu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 4i5 
czerwca 1997. Warszawa: Kancelaria Senatu RP. 1997. p96. See also: 'Zlot6wka na politykq', 
Gazeta Wyborcza. 24 February 1998. 
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political cadres ... in reality it is politicians who then form governments, it is politicians 
who draft laws and it is politicians who are responsible for improving the lot of the 
people" and "the state ought to be concerned that these politicians are as well 
prepared as possible to ftilfil their mission. " Consequently, "straightforward state 
fmancing is, quite simply, the thing that is easiest to control" with "the state treasury 
undoubtedly ... (playing) ... a key role" and, according to Tywonek, the regular state 
donations envisaged in the 1997 Party Law being "a step in the right direction. "" 
As hypothesised, the provisions for, and parties' expectations of, state funding 
contained a mixed message in relation to the creation of a party cartel. In terms of 
providing financial support, Polish legislation certainly proved to be extremely 
advantageous to those parties which achieved electoral success. As Tables I and 3 
illustrate, the most successful parties in the 1993 and 1997 elections received a 
handsome financial premium for their electoral victories while the less successful - 
particularly those parties which did not secure parliamentary representation in 1993 - 
found themselves in a considerably worse situation. This financial premium was 
exaggerated by the adoption of an electoral system which, although proportional in 
theory, distinctly favoured the most successful parties in terms of parliamentary 
representation through: the application of a relatively high (in the context of the 
highly fragmented Polish party system) 5% threshold for representation in the SqJin 
(8% in the case of electoral coalitions); the use of the d'Hondt system to determine 
the final division of seats within the local electoral districts; allocation of additional 
seats from a national list only to those parties and groupings winning over 7% of the 
vote; and the creation of a larger number of smaller multi-member constituencies 
compared to the 1991 Electoral Law. This was, indeed, what happened in the 1993 
parliamentary election when the SLD and PSL won 20.4% and 15.4% of the votes but 
secured 37.7% and 29% of the seats respectively and, thereby, obtained much larger 
election refunds than they would have done purely on the basis of the number of votes 
won. At the same time, several parties and groupings fell just short of the 5% and 8% 
barriers and did not benefit at all from the election refund. This was exacerbated by 
the electoral system to the Senate, based on the simple majority principle in two or 
three member constituencies, which led to even greater distortions with the SLD and 
PSL winning 37% and 36% of the seats respectiVely. 45 
Moreover, the consequences of an electoral system which so clearly privileged the 
strongest parties were not confined solely to the issue of election refunds. The 
" Author interview, 4 June 1997. 
"'There were similar distortions in the 1997 Senate election, most notably the fact that AWS won 
5 1% of the seats on the basis of 33.83% national share of the vote. 
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various, extremely generous additional forms of funding for parliamentary clubs and 
individual parliamentarians provided those parties represented in parliament with a 
further obvious advantage over those which were excluded and, thereby, gave 
election winners a further premium for victory. 
On the other hand, the Polish party system was still relatively fluid and even the 
stringent post- 1993 party funding regime did not prevent the emergence of new 
entrants and 'freeze' the existing party system within the existing parliamentary 
configuration - as the subsequent formation and entry in parliament of both the ROP 
and AWS clearly illustrated (the latter, admittedly, under the aegis of the Solidarity 
trade union). Moreover, by actually reducing the threshold for party financial support 
to 3% - and, thereby, providing the lifeline of continued state funding to some parties 
which failed to secure parliamentary representation - in some respects the 1997 Party 
Law actually represented a step away from the creation of a party cartel. 
Indeed, some of new Laws sponsors explicitly justified its provisions for broadening 
access to state funding to include non-parliamentary parties on the grounds that it 
gave them a 'second chance' in what was still evidently a crystallising party system. 
There was, for example, undoubtedly an element of self-preservation that motivated 
the UP, one of the 1997 Law's main sponsors, which was concerned (correctly, as it 
turned out) that it would not be able to guarantee its own status as a member of the 
putative party cartel. "' UP National Spokesman Tomasz; Nalqcz, for example, argued 
that it "is difficult to demand that parties should only have the right to exist when they 
reach a mature age. I think that the law-maker's intention should also be to enable 
them to have a fair childhood and a period of maturation. "' UP Parliamentary Club 
Vice Chairman and party Presidium member Piotr Marciniak also felt that providing 
state financial support only to parliamentary parties "leads to a sharp contrast between 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties, makes the articulation of interests or 
poorly organised political milieu more difficult, makes the transformation and 
maturation of the political scene more difficult... "" Similarly UW Parliamentary Club 
spokesman Jerzy Ciemniewski argued in favour of the 1997 Law on the grounds that 
"financing parties which have not found themselves in parliament, but enjoy certain 
"The original proposal from the PSL - which was more confident about its ability to retain 
parliamentary representation - was that both regular donations and election refunds should be 
confined only to parliamentary parties in proportion to the number of seats won. This would, of 
course, have had the opposite effect of actually re-inforcing the position of the strongest parties and 
groupings. 
" Sprawozdanie Stenograjtczne z 74 posiedzenia Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w dniach 28,29 
lutego iI marca 1996 p144. 
Ibid. p 15 1. 
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social support does not close off the party system in its current shape and allows other 
parties the opportunity for development and participation in electoral battles. "' 
The state and pagy media access 
Parties in post-communist Poland were guaranteed a number of opportunities for 
access to the state broadcasting media: 
Firstly, since 1991 election committees (comprising, as noted above, single parties 
and groupings or electoral coalitions) were able to present their views in special 
broadcasts appearing in the fifteen days running up to election. According to the 
provisions set out in the 1993 Electoral Law, election committees which registered 
local candidates' lists in at least half of the fifty two electoral districts (and, therefore, 
qualified to register national candidates' lists) were guaranteed an equal share of the 
total amount allocated for free election broadcasts: 15 and 10 hours for Polish TV and 
30 and 15 hours for Polish Radio for national and regional programmes respectively. " 
In 1993, for example, this meant that each of the 15 election committees which 
registered a national list received an hour to present their views - which appeared in 
three daily 'blocs' of programmes on the main channel of Polish TV. " The 1993 Law 
also provided election committees with the opportunity to buy additional air-time on 
both public and private TV and radio at half the normal commercial rate although this 
could not exceed 15% of the total free air-time allocated to that grouping. " 
Secondly, media access for Polish politicians between elections was regulated by the 
1992 Law on Radio and TV which stipulated that "units of public radio and TV... 
(shall) enable political parties to present their position in crucial public matters. "" 
The provisions of this clause were implemented when the National TV and Radio 
Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji: KRRiTV - see below) issued a May 
1994 directive instructing Polish TV and Radio to produce weekly, 45-minute 
programmes (broadcast between 4pm-9pm) in which political parties and groupings 
which obtained at least 400,000 votes in the previous Sejm elections would have the 
opportunity to present their views directly, with the amount of air-time allocated to 
Ibid. p149. 
'Ustawa z dnia 28 maja 1993 - Ordynacja Wyborcza do Sejmu Rzeczpospolitej Polski' 
' 15 godzin zo. o. ', Gazeta Wyborcza. 18 August 1993. 
It was estimated in 1997 that a 30-second slot at peak viewing time (immediately after the main 
evening news bulletin) cost a party 96,000 zloties (before VAT). See: 'Maio chqtnych na drogq 
reklamq', Rzeczpospolita. 9 July 1997. 
" Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministr6w. 'Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1992 o Radiofonii i Telewizji', 
Dziennik Ustaw. No. 7: 34. Warsaw. 1993. 
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each being proportionate to the number of votes obtained. The air-time allocated to 
parties which united or divided after the elections was to be allotted to, or divided 
between, their successor parties or organisations. 11 Consequently, following lengthy 
negotiations between the TV authorities and the parties themselves, since September 
1994 a number of parties have had the opportunity of regular, guaranteed access to 
state-run TV by appearing in a weekly discussion programme called 'Forum'. " 
Initially thirteen parties and groupings comprised (or emerged from) the eleven 
election committees which obtained more than 400,000 votes in the 1993 
parliamentary election: the SLD, PSL, UD and KLD (which had merged to form the 
UW), UP, Catholic Electoral Action 'Fatherland' (which actually comprised four 
separate by parties: ZChN, PK, PChD and SLCh), KPN, BBWR, the Solidarity trade 
union, PC and UPR. 1' The number of programmes in which each party appeared was 
proportionate to the number of votes it had obtained in the previous election. For 
example, an SLD representative would appear in all twelve programmes in any given 
quarter while the UPR would only be represented twice - although even those parties 
which were not present for the studio discussion were allowed to record a 45-second 
statement on the subject under discussion that week. Following the 1997 
parliamentary elections only the six parties and groupings surveyed had obtained 
enough votes to appear on Forum. 
Thirdly, it is also worth noting that (in what may prove to a precedent for future pre- 
election periods) Polish TV organised a series of three hour-long one-to-one debates 
between the leaders of the six main parties and groupings in the run up to the 1997 
parliamentary election. The idea for this series of debates arose initially when, in 
February 1997, Polish TV agreed to allocate air-time for a one-off debate between 
SdRP Chairman J6zef Oleksy and UW Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz (at the latter's 
request). " However, following a wave of protests from other the other parties at their 
exclusion Polish TV decided to organise two additional debates involving the leaders 
of the other four main parties and groupings: Marian Krzaklewski (AWS) and 
" Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministr6w. 'Rozporzqdzenie Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji z dnia 
13 maja 1994r w sprawie trybu postqpowania w zwi4zku z przedstawieniern w programach 
publicznej radiofonii i telewizji stanowisk partii politycznych, zwiqzk6w zawodowych i zwi4zk6w 
pracodawc6w w wQzlowych sprawach publicznych', Dziennik Ustaw RR No. 74: 335.1994. Warsaw. 
Tolityka ekranowa', Gazeta Wyborcza. 12 September 1994. 
Of the fifteen election committees which registered national lists in 1993 only Self-Defence, Party 
X, the KdR and the PSL-PL were excluded from Forum. By the end of the parliament, of course, the 
KPN and BBWR had split and the Solidarity trade union, both KPNs (initially), one of the BBWRs, 
the PC and all the parties that comprised Catholic Electoral Action 'Fatherland' had formed AWS 
(and two of these - the PK and SLCh - had merged to form the SKL). 
'Balcerowicz i Oleksy wsp6lnie w TVP', Rzeczpospofita. II February 1997. 
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Ry, Szard Bugaj (UP) in April, and Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) and Jan Olszewski (ROP) 
in May. 58 
Although it is unclear to what extent the possibility of such instant media access could 
replace the need for parties to build up local organisational. and membership 
networks, its certainly provides us with an important difference to the earlier stages of 
party development in Western democracies - particularly given the fact that the two 
largest Polish broadcasting organisations, Polish TV and Radio, remained in state 
hands. However, although - as illustrated in the previous chapter on parties and their 
members - officials from all six parties and groupings surveyed emphasised that the 
mass media played a crucial role in their communication strategies, differences of 
emphasis were clearly evident in their attitudes towards the role of the state in helping 
parties to secure guaranteed media access. 
On the one hand, the PSL, UP and ROP were all enthusiastic supporters of a 
significant role for the state. According to the PSL programme, for example, the party 
supported the principle of "a constitutional and legal guarantee ... of equal participation 
in TV and radio informational programmes by representatives of political parties in 
proportion to their representation in society. "" Specifically, the PSL argued in favour 
of establishing a link between the number of votes won and a given party or 
grouping's level of media coverage. PSL National Spokesman Aleksander 
Bentkowski, for example, argued that, "access to these sources of mass 
communications can only be determined by ... parliamentary election results ... the three 
or four parties which secure the best election result should have access to the media" - 
although he held out the prospect of making exceptions if "in the meantime an 
unexpectedly strong party, other party should arise, such as AWS. " 
UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also felt that the state had "a fundamental 
role to play" in upholding "the principle of equal treatment of political parties in the 
public mass media" which, he argued, was "one of the conditions of developing 
democracy here in Poland. "' Similarly, ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski 
argued that "the role of the state ought to be to guarantee equal access, at the very 
least in public TV" as well as to "stabilise and guarantee pluralism" among privately 
5' See: 'Forma ±ywego dyskursu', Rzeczpospolita. II April 1997; and Tiderzy zgodnie rozstawieni', 
Rzeczpospolita. 16 April 1997. 
5' 'Program polityczny i spoleczno-gospodarczy PSL' in 0 Kktattowania R6wnych Szans d1a Polski. 
ppl7-45 (23). 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
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owned broadcasters. " The UP and ROP were, however, much less specific what 
precise principles should underpin such state intervention and determine which parties 
received how much access. The UP programme, for example, spoke rather vaguely of 
"formulating legal and political guarantees protecting the means of communication 
from etatisation and conimercialisation, "" while Tomasz Nalqcz simply argued that 
"there is a need for legislation on this in Poland ... (to ensure) equal treatment of the 
image of various political milieu in news programmes. 9964 
On the other hand, the SdRP/SLD, AWS and UW were all much less enthusiastic 
about - and, arguably, had a more sophisticated approach to - the state playing such a 
pro-active role in guaranteeing parties with media access. SdRP National Spokesman 
Dariusz Klimaszewski, for example, said that he was "not a supporter of giving too 
much guaranteed air time to political parties, of giving them their own 'space', ", 
while AWS National Spokesman Tomasz Tywonek also felt that programmes such as 
Forum were "horrendously unproductive because we have ... this kind of programme 
where a journalist asks a number of representatives of various political groupings, in 
turn, their opinion on some subject ... This is not ... a form of communication that would 
appeal to anybody. "' Consequently, SdRP/SLD and AWS policy statements tended to 
confine themselves to rather oblique promises to 'de-politicise' the publicly owned 
broadcasting media. The SdRP programme, for example, spoke simply of 
"guaranteeing freedom and pluralism in the Polish media"6'and Dariusz Klimaszewski 
argued that, "all I want is for our TV (reporting culture) to be how it is in England 
with more discussions of current affairs on their merits. " 61 Similarly, the AWS 
election programme stated that the grouping would "reform Polish TV and Polish 
Radio, transforming them into truly public, accurate and objective institutions" and 
"undertake activities to return pluralism in the media as well as raising their ethical 
level, "' while (echoing his SdRP/SLD counterpart) Tomasz Tywonek spoke of the 
need for "good professional journalistic work as an insurance against the influence of 
politics. "" 
Indeed, in some senses, the UW was actually quite hostile to the idea of the state 
providing parties with greater media access on the grounds that, given that the Polish 
" Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
61 UProgu M Wieku. p5. 
" Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
6' Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
66 Author interview, 4 June 1997. 
61 Program Socjaldemokracji Polskiej. 
" Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
'9 Program Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnole. 
7' Author interview, 4 June 1997. 
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media was already sufficiently open and pluralistic, state-guaranteed media access 
discriminated against those parties which had already developed an effective media 
strategies by themselves. According to UW National Spokesman Andrzej Potocki, for 
example, his party was actually "too satisfied" with the current provisions because, as 
he put it, the UW "don't need it and prefer to rely on our own resources. From the 
moment when you start to make special programmes, when parties participate, as of 
right, then this does not work to our advantage. We make our own contacts and are 
against these special types of programmes. " The UW, according to Potocki, wanted a 
situation in which the activities of the media were "natural, not directed" and, rather 
than making particular demands from the state, "would prefer the state to keep its 
hands, as far as possible, from the media. "" 
There were a number of possible explanations as to why the SdRP/SLD, UW and 
AWS did not call for the state to take a more pro-active role in helping parties to 
secure media access. For example, as in the case of the party funding issue, as a 
grouping with its roots in an organisation enjoying an effectively monopoly on all 
legal forms of mass communication, the SdRP/SLD was understandably very cautious 
about arguing openly for greater state intervention in the mass media. The most 
important reason, however, was probably the fact that, although most of the parties 
surveyed (except for the UW) complained that they the victims of negative media 
bias, as Table 6.5 showing the distribution of coverage on the main evening news in 
one month running up to the 1997 election, the SdRP/SLD, AWS and UW certainly 
appeared to enjoy more extensive news coverage and were, therefore, less likely to 
feel a lesser imperative to call for greater state intervention on their behalf. 
PSL, UP and ROP spokesmen suggested that the main explanation for their heavily 
circumscribed media access was the fact that they sought to defend socio-economic 
constituencies that were under-represented in, or promoted policies were not 
supported by, those in the higher echelons of Polish mass media. According to PSL 
National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski, for example, "the TV, radio and 
newspapers are all in the hands of people whose connections are with urban areas. 
They are less interested in rural milieu and smaller towns - they don't identify with 
this milieu to the smallest degree and its problems do not interest them. "" Similarly, 
according to UP National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz, "the TV is dominated by the 
SLD and the UW and it is very difficult for other groupings to get access to it ... it is 
preferential to certain groups and we are not in this circle" because "in attempting to 
" Author interview, 27 February 1997. 
7' Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
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represent the interests of underprivileged groups in many ways we threaten the well- 
offjournalistic circles. "" While there may well have been some truth in these 
allegations, there were probably other, more significant, factors which accounted for 
the disproportionate coverage. These factors related to each of the parties' relative 
proximities to government, and their respective abilities to exploit this proximity. 
Firstly, as in most countries, for fairly obvious reasons Polish journalists were 
generally more interested in communicating with, and providing exposure to, parties 
that either were, or (because of their high opinion poll ratings) faced the imminent 
prospect of being, in government. This was the case with SdRP/SLD, PSL, AWS and 
UW for most of the period that this research was undertaken. Smaller opposition 
parties, particularly if they were not represented in parliament, generally had to fight 
much harder to attract media attention and air time. The main exception here was the 
PSL which did not seem to be able to translate its proximity to power (nor, as we 
shall see, the fact that it was well represented in the bodies that controlled public TV 
and radio) into positive media coverage. This was partly due to the fact they were 
only junior coalition partners in the 1993-97 government, although a more significant 
factor was probably their own inability to develop an effective media strategy. 
According to one Polish commentator, for example, "the PSL does not like 
journalists, journalists don't like the PSL" because they "treat them as a means of 
informing society about the actions of the government ... not as a means of 
democratic 
control. "" Even the party's National Spokesman Aleksander Bentkowski admitted 
that "we are not very good at selling our information ... We don't know how to 
promote our achievements and we also don't know how to promote our leaders. Quite 
simply we lack professionalism in these activities. "" 
Secondly, it has also been argued that the SdRP/SLD, AWS and UW's 
disproportionately high media coverage may have been a reflection of the fact that the 
bodies which ran Polish broadcasting were controlled by individuals closely 
associated with these political groupings. This was, in turn, rooted in the 
aforementioned fact that these groupings either were (or, as in the case of AWS and 
UW, comprised parties that at one point had been) in government in contrast with, for 
example, the UP and ROP. ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, for example, 
complained that "we are also denied an equal chance because the 'court' which 
should act as the guarantor of equal access ... of parties to the media - the National 
" Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
" E. K. Czaczkowska, TSL nie lubi dziennikarzy: Dziennikarzy nie lubi4 PSL', Rzeczpospolita. 
February 1994. 
Author interview, 4 march 1997. 
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Radio and TV Council - does everything it can to deny us access, "" while UP 
National Spokesman Tomasz Nalqcz also stressed the fact that "we have never been a 
governing party which could place its supporters in the key positions in the public 
media. "" 
Given the general consensus that coverage in mainstream news and current affairs 
programmes was a much more significant means of communication than the various 
forms of guaranteed air-time - together with the predominant view that the level of 
coverage was determined, to a large extent, by party representation in the various 
councils and boards which ran Polish state broadcasting - it was not surprising that the 
issue of nominations to these bodies was the subject of an extremely sharp party 
political battle. Indeed, it is precisely on this issue of media control that Polish parties 
state-orientation was most clearly evident - even in the case of the three parties and 
groupings which did not particularly stress the role of the state in providing them with 
guaranteed media access. 
The 1992 Law on Radio and TV Broadcasting established a new legal fi-amework and 
elaborate organisational structure with the explicit objective of ensuring the 
independence of Polish state broadcasting and freeing it from direct interference by 
the government and political parties. " The main feature of the 1992 Law was the 
establishment of the nine-person KRRiTV to appoint the members and supervise the 
activities of the public TV and radio Supervisory Councils - together with allocating 
the licences for regional and private operators. Consisting of four members appointed 
by the SeJm, two by the Senate and three by the President, the KRRiTV was intended 
to be an independent and apolitical body with the initial appointees' terms of office 
lasting two, four or six years (all subsequent appointees served a full six-year term). 
The KRRiTV as a whole could only be dismissed if both chambers of the Polish 
parliament and the President rejected its annual report, while the nominating bodies 
could only replace 'their' representatives during their terms of office if they resigned, 
fell seriously ill or broke the law - and their dismissal had to be confMned by the 
Tribunal of State. " The Council was intended to comprise media experts rather than 
political nominees who would "guard freedom of speech in radio and TV, the 
independence of broadcasters and the interests of the audience, and ensure the open 
and pluralistic character of radio and TV. "90 
Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
Author interview, 3 March 1997. 
This was also reflected in its change of nomenclature from 'state' to 'public' broadcasting. 
The Constitutional Tribunal confirmed this proviso in 1994 after President Lech Walqsa dismissed 
two of 'his' KRRiTV nominees before their terms of office expired. 
'0 'Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia, 1992r o Radiofonii i Telewizji'. 
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The 1992 Law also established Polish TV and Radio as independent companies 
overseen by nine-member Supervisory Councils: with eight members elected by the 
KRRiTV and one appointed by the Finance Minister (representing the companies' 
sole shareholder, the state treasury) for a three-year term. These Supervisory 
Councils, in turn, elected Polish TV and Radio's 5-member boards of directors, also 
for three years. The Supervisory Councils could not (like the KRRiTV) be dismissed 
during their terms of office and were, in turn, the only bodies which could dismiss or 
suspend members of the Polish TV and Radio boards at any time, albeit with a 
qualified majority of votes. In other words, this elaborate structure was designed to 
introduce various 'barrier mechanisms' to protect Polish TV and Radio from direct 
political interference and to ensure that the personnel charged with the day-to-day 
running of Polish state broadcasting were not directly accountable to politicians. 
However, the practice turned out very differently from the theory and these 'barrier 
mechanisms' proved ineffective at preventing the politicisation of Polish public 
broadcasting. Polish parties attempted to gain control of these various broadcasting 
bodies and neither the KRRiTV nor Polish TV were free from political interference. 
In particular, the 1992 legislation was flawed: firstly, because KRRiTV members 
were all selected by overtly political bodies and, secondly, because it did not 
adequately foresee the possibility that active politicians would themselves attempt to 
become members of the various broadcasting councils and bodies. Consequently, the 
KRRiTV (which Polish politicians quickly discovered was the key to controlling state 
broadcasting) was, from the outset, dominated by individuals with very clear 
connections to particular parties and groupings and these party divisions were 
translated downwards to the appointments of the Supervisory Councils and boards so 
that Polish TV and Radio were, effectively, dominated by party appointees at every 
level. 
The first KRRiTV was appointed in March 1993 on the basis of overtly political 
criteria and the notion of 'de-politicisation' was interpreted as meaning simply that 
the appointees should attempt to reflect a broad cross-section of the parliamentary and 
party spectrum. Indeed, although subject to various political horsetrading as particular 
groupings sought to maximise their political influence, the initial appointees were 
quite politically diverse: the four SeJm representatives comprised one each from the 
UW progenitors the UD and KLD, the SLD and the RdR; " the two Senate appointees 
" At that time led by future ROP leader Jan Olszewski but subsequently to be one of founder 
members of AWS. 
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represented the PSL and ZChN; and the three presidential nominees were all 
associated with the post-Solidarity right and included one closely associated with the 
ZChN and one Solidarity trade union deputy. Although the majority were drawn from 
post-Solidarity formations of the centre and centre-right - and the ex-communist left, 
in particular, complained that it was under-represented - party political divisions 
within the KRRiTV were not to begin with so clearly defined and it tended to operate 
fairly harmoniously and consensually. Indeed, the initial debates centred on disputes 
between the KRRiTV itself and President Lech Walqsa rather than within its own 
ranks and, subsequently - when Walqsa dismissed two of his erstwhile supporters 
(including the first KRRiTV Chairman, Marek Markiewicz) - the 'original' Council 
members and 'new' presidential appointees, rather than on party political lines. " 
Gradually, however, the focus of debate began to shift towards to the issue of the 
balance of power within the KRRiTV itself and this, in turn, filtered through to the 
question of appointments to the broadcasting Supervisory Councils and boards. 
Following their successes in the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential elections, 
the SdRP/SLD and PSL began to gain the upper hand within the KRRiTV, with the 
first important changes occurring in April 1995 when these two groupings used their 
parliamentary majorities in both chambers to replace the RdR Sejm and ZChN Senate 
representatives with PSL and SLD nominees respectively. This produced a new party 
balance of two representatives each from the SdRP/SLD, PSL, UW and ZChN - 
together with one Walqsa-appointed independent. By 1997 - when President 
Alexander Kwagniewski replaced an outgoing Walqsa nominee with an SdRP/SLD 
supporter - the balance of power had shifted decisively enough to give the three 
SdRP/SLD and two PSL members a clear majority over the two members each from 
the UW and ZChN (which was now, of course, an AWS member). 
The SdRP/SLD and PSL's majority in the KRRiTV allowed them to progressively 
exert greater influence on, and change the composition of, the Polish TV and Radio 
Supervisory Councils and, eventually, their boards of directors. For example, through 
filling a number of vacancies, the SLD-PSL strengthened their position within the 
Polish TV Supervisory Council so that by March 1996 they were able (with the co- 
operation of UW nominees) to win over the two-thirds majority required to replace 
the right-wing President of Polish TV Wieslaw Walendziak with a PSL nominee, 
" Over issues such as: the appointment of the right-wing, but also young and independent-minded, 
Wieslaw Walendziak as the first head of the new Polish TV; and the granting of the first national 
private TV franchise to a company of which Walqsa disapproved. See, for example: B. 
Modrzejewska and A. Wielopolska, 'Trawnik przedwodniczqcego', Rzeczpospolita, 30 June 1994. 
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RYSzard Miazek. 11 By August 1997, when the original TV and Radio Supervisory 
Councils terms of office expired, the two parties used their KRRiTV majority to 
appoint seven of their supporters to the new nine-member bodies. " Finally, in June 
1998 the SdRP/SLD and PSL used these clear majorities on the Supervisory Councils 
to appoint four of their supporters to the new five-member Polish TV and radio 
management boards - including one of Kw9niewski's key 1995 presidential 
campaign advisers, Robert Kwiatkowski as the new Polish TV President - so that all 
three tiers of tiers controlling Polish state broadcasting were under their control. " 
Interestingly, given the fact that KRRiTV and Supervisory Council members could 
not be dismissed during their overlapping and differing terms of office there was a 
time-lag between the configuration of forces within these bodies and the balance of 
influence within the main institutions of the state: the parliament and presidency. In 
1993, for example, the SdRP/SLD and PSL parliamentary majority had to operate 
alongside a politically-hostile Polish TV and KRRiTV appointed by President Wal9sa 
and the previous parliament in which these parties were in a clear minority. In other 
words, they had to wait patiently before they could, firstly, secure a KRRiTV 
majority and then, secondly, for enough TV and Radio Supervisory Council and 
management board members to resign (or for their terms of office to expire) before 
they could re-fashion these bodies in their own image. By the time the SdRP/SLD- 
PSL 'take-overs' of public TV and radio were completed in June 1998, the post- 
Solidarity parties AWS and UW had secured majorities in both parliamentary 
chambers and the two 'successor' formations were once again in opposition. Instead 
of 'de-politicising' these bodies, therefore, the new arrangement has simply meant 
that any new government inherited a KRRiTV, Supervisory Councils and 
management boards dominated by supporters of the previous parliamentary majority 
which it was extremely difficult for them to remove. 
In terms of media access, then, the process of 'cartelisation' could be seen most 
clearly in parties various attempts to secure representation on, and exert control over, 
the bodies which ran state broadcasting. Arguably, this had an important impact on 
the party's overall level of media coverage especially in mainstream news and current 
affairs programmes. Given that these bodies were nominated by parties controlling 
either the presidency or majorities in parliament, they were, indeed, controlled by a 
very narrow circle of parties and groupings which were, or (at some point since the 
" On the shifting balance of forces within the Polish TV Supervisory Council see: K. Groblewski and 
G. Sieczkowski, 'Uklad sil w Radzie Nadzorczej TVP', Rzeczpospolita. I March 1996. 
See: 'Nowe rady nadzorcze', Rzeczpospolita. 8 August 1997. 
See: 'Robert Kwiatkowski prezesem telewizji', Rzeczpospolita. 27-28 June 1998. 
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passage of the new TV and Radio Law in December 1992) had been, represented in 
government or held the office of the presidency, namely: the SdRP/SLD, PSL, UW 
(through the LID and KLD) and AWS (through the ZChN). These broadcasting 
councils and boards appeared likely to remain in the hands of these four parties' and 
groupings' for the foreseeable future, with the PSL's influence set to gradually 
diminish given its reduced post- 1997 parliamentary representation. A good example 
of how even a relatively important party was excluded from the narrow circle 
controlling Polish state broadcasting was the UP which - in spite of being the fourth 
largest parliamentary party in 1993-97 and one of the six main parties and groupings 
throughout the entire period of the new broadcasting regime - never had even a single 
representative in either the KRRiTV or the TV and Radio Supervisory Councils or 
management boards. 
Similarly, access to the weekly Forum programme was restricted to those parties and 
groupings which had obtained at least 400,000 votes in the previous parliamentary 
elections and, therefore, discriminated against any significant new organisations, such 
as the ROP, which emerged subsequently and were not formed as a result of a split 
within (or merger between) existing parties which had crossed this threshold. Other 
obvious examples of the possible emergence of a party cartel were the fact that, as a 
result of changes introduced in the 1993 Electoral Law, guaranteed access to free TV 
and radio election broadcasts was restricted only to those election committees which 
registered national lists, " together with the decision to restrict the series of TV 
debates organised in the run up to the 1997 parliamentary elections to the leaders of 
only the six main parties and groupings. " 
Obviously, as party media strategists themselves pointed out, extensive and positive 
coverage in general news and current affairs programmes was a far more effective 
means of communication than specially allocated party programmes or slots. 
Nevertheless, the 'agenda-setting' value of, for example, the amount of time allotted 
to each party in the Forum programme and election broadcasts (or by dint of being 
one of the parties selected for the leader debates) should not be underestimated and 
was clearly illustrated by the efforts to which excluded parties went in order to secure 
access to these programmes. ROP National Spokesman Jacek Kurski, for example, 
expressed the fear that his party's exclusion from Forum would lead to further 
" Previously every electoral committee which registered a list in more than one electoral district was 
granted guaranteed free air-time. 
" The PSL's proposal that the overall level of party media access and coverage should broadly reflect 
a party's level of support in the previous elections would have discriminated even more radically 
against new entrants. 
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discrimination against his party because it would be taken as "a kind of signal to all 
the serious media in Poland ... that if they limit ROP's coverage then nothing will 
happen to them. It's a signal given by the KRRiTV in order to provide the rest of the 
media with an example. "" 
On the other hand, as in the case of state party funding, there were also several trends 
which pointed in the opposite direction. Access to Forum was not restricted solely to 
parliamentary parties and a number of parties and groupings which did not cross the 
threshold for parliamentary representation were also entitled to send representatives, 
namely: ZChN, PK, SLCh and the PChD as part of the 'Fatherland' Catholic 
Electoral Action coalition together with the PC, Solidarity trade union and the UPR. 
The fact that equal access to free election broadcasts was not confined to existing 
parliamentary parties also provided a certain amount of scope for new entrants to 
obtain guaranteed media coverage. In 1997, for example, five out of the ten election 
committees which registered national candidates' lists had not been formally 
organised as fractions within the previous parliament. 19 
As the contrasting fortunes of the ROP and AWS clearly illustrate, the distinction 
between completely new political groupings and those formed on the basis of existing 
parties - with an electoral track record, parliamentary representation and (particularly) 
previous membership of government - appeared to be an extremely significant one in 
this context. Formed outside parliament and virtually from scratch after the 1995 
presidential elections, the ROP had neither access to the Forum programme nor 
representation on any of the bodies controlling state broadcasting. AWS, on the other 
hand, was able to take advantage of the fact that it was based on several existing 
parties and groupings and, therefore, 'inherited' a number of sympathetic 
broadcasting council members together with access to Forum via AWS members such 
as the ZChN, SKL, PChD, PC, the Solidarity trade union, both KPNs and one of the 
BBWRs. 
Conclusion 
The overall pattern of party activity and attitudes, therefore, fitted broadly with our 
hypothesised projection that the new Polish parties would replicate the experience of 
" Author interview, 4 March 1997. 
89 These were: AWS (although it was, of course, based on some parties which had representation in 
the 1993-97 parliament such as the two KPNs, SKL and one of the BBWR factions), the ROP, the 
two pensioner parties and, the UPR. A sixth election committee, the BdP, was based largely on the 
rump of the BBWR grouping which was represented in the 1993-97 parliament, albeit minimally. 
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contemporary parties in Western democracies and display a higher level of 
dependence upon, and orientation towards, the state than civil society. All the main 
Polish parties and groupings surveyed believed that the state should play a continuing 
or greater role in providing them with financial support and both the level and scope 
of state fimding has, indeed, been progressively increased and extended. Although 
(with one notable exception) the lack of published accounts made it extremely 
difficult to tell exactly to what extent Polish parties were dependent upon such funds, 
the various kinds of state financial support - election refimds, subventions to 
parliamentary parties, parliamentary allowances and, since 1997, direct, regular party 
fimding - appeared to indicate that they were of prime and growing importance. 
Polish state TV and Radio offered parties various opportunities for access to free air- 
time both during election campaigns and between elections, although the parties 
surveyed placed varying degrees of emphasis on whether or not the state had a duty to 
provide such guaranteed media access and whether or not its scope should be 
broadened. Nevertheless, although all the parties and groupings surveyed expressed 
broad support for the notion of 'de-politicising' the media in theory, in practice even 
those parties which did not support the state playing a particularly pro-active role in 
guaranteeing media access, went to considerable lengths to influence the membership 
of the key bodies which controlled Polish state broadcasting. 
Interestingly, in spite of the obvious differences between them in terms of 
membership size and density of local implantation identified in the previous chapter, 
the distinction between 'successor' parties with their roots in the communist period 
and 'new' parties was, once again, not as helpful as hypothesised in identifying the 
varying levels of state-orientation. While it was not too surprising to find that the 
relatively small and organisationally weak UP was one of the most enthusiastic 
supporters of a very pro-active state role in providing parties with funding and media 
access, it was ironic that the PSL - arguably the party that bore the clearest 
resemblance to the mass party model in many other respects - was also one of the 
most state-orientated of those parties surveyed. On the other hand, the post-Solidarity 
UW was considerably less enthusiastic about greater state intervention and even fairly 
hostile to the notion of providing parties with state-guaranteed media access. 
There was also some evidence to support the notion that a party cartel might be 
emerging in post-communist Poland. Polish legislation certainly provided greater 
access to certain financial and material resources, the state media and representation 
on the bodies controlling Polish broadcasting to those parties which achieved the 
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greatest electoral success, parliamentary representation and, most significantly, 
membership of the government. This was exacerbated by an electoral system which 
discriminated heavily in favour of parties winning the largest percentage of votes in 
the allocation of parliamentary seats. The existing rules for state access to these 
resources also, to some extent, limited the scope for new entrants by discriminating 
against new parties which emerged in between elections, unless they were formed on 
the basis of existing parties with parliamentary representation and a parliamentary and 
government track record and, thereby, represented a clear move in the direction of 
creating precisely such a party cartel. 
Nevertheless, although Polish parties were generally in favour of broadening the 
scope of state support, they were not yet in favour of completely restricting access to 
it only to a narrow cartel of parties. There was still a general nervousness about and, 
consensus against, declaring unambiguously who was and who was not a member of 
the party cartel at this state of the development of the Polish party system -a 
nervousness which was felt particularly keenly among those parties, such as the UP, 
which operated on the margins of the 5% parliamentary threshold and were uncertain 
as to whether or not they cold sustain their 'insider' status. Access to programmes 
such as Forum was never limited solely to parliamentary parties and new entrants 
could secure free election broadcasts on an equal footing with established parties and 
groupings if they were able to register sufficient local candidates' lists. Indeed, the 
1997 Party Law actually lowered the threshold for state party funding to include non- 
parliamentary parties and was, if anything a step in the opposite direction: away from 
the formation of a party cartel. In other words, as hypothesised, the shared political 
perspectives and notions of how parties could collectively further mutual interests - 
which underpin the pattern of inter-party collusion emphasised in that model - have 
simply not been firmly enough established for a relatively stable party cartel to 
properly emerge, 
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CHAPTER SE VEN. - 
CONCLUSION 
A number of the features identified in the previous chapters obviously fit with 
Western developments and, in many ways, the new Polish parties do indeed seem to 
bear a much closer resemblance to the more recent catch-all, electoral-professional 
and cartel party models than to the traditional mass party model. Admittedly, an 
analysis based on the 'official story' did reveal much less concentration of power in 
the parliamentary leadership and a more significant role for party central office 
leaders and extra-parliamentary decision-making organs than hypothesised. Similarly, 
in formal terms intermediary bodies representing the organised party rank-and-file 
also appeared to play a much more significant role within the new Polish parties than 
anticipated, with the leaders of the provincial organisations emerging as important 
actors in all the parties formal and informal power structures. However, an analysis 
based on the 'real story' of how party institutions and power relations operated in 
practice revealed that the new parties' parliamentary and leadership elites played a 
more dominant and central role in their internal distribution of power than initially 
suggested by analyses based solely on the 'official story'. A large part of the 
explanation for this defacto leader or parliamentary domination was to be found in 
the fact that the incumbents of many formally separate party offices frequently 
overlapped, which also made it much more difficult to determine the precise locus of 
power within the new Polish parties. Moreover, this pattern of defacto leader- 
domination also functioned in a more subtle way related to phenomena which are 
increasingly common to all political parties functioning in modem, complex 
democracies and was, in many ways, simply a reflection of much greater rank-and- 
file interest in personnel or internal organisatioaril matters than in policy or 
programmatic development. Local-national relations were also, as hypothesised, 
characterised by a broadly 'stratarchic' distribution of power with the new parties' 
territorial structures granted a relatively high degree of autonomy in terms of local 
politics. 
The party bureaucracy was extremely weak, employing only a small number of paid 
staff and co-ordinating a modest local party 'machine'. The proportion of party 
employees attached to the party organisation in parliament was generally much larger 
than to the party central office. This pattern was particularly noticeable at the local 
level where there was substantial overlap in terms of 'parliamentary' and 'party' 
offices, staff and technical facilities. Indeed, the sheer weakness of the party central 
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office bureaucracies made it very difficult for any of these parties to effectively 
monitor and intervene in their local branches' day-to-day activities, even if they had 
the time or inclination to do so. 
While there was evidence that all the parties and groupings surveyed had made some 
attempt to define their 'core' electorates and, at the very least, nuance their electoral 
appeals to attract particular socio-economic groups, these were at an extremely 
preliminary and tentative stage. Most of them based their electoral strategies on 
mobilising loose and socially heterogeneous electoral constituencies. Indeed, even 
when parties attempted to direct and target their electoral appeals at particular socio- 
economic electoral constituencies this was generally not reflected in substantially 
higher levels of support within that segment of the electorate. Post-communist social 
structures were relatively 'flat' and the new socio-economic interests which have been 
emerging as a result of the post-1989 transformation have not yet crystallised 
sufficiently for them to act as a major influence on voting behaviour. Given that there 
were no significant variations in most of the parties' patterns of support in terms of 
age, sex, place of residence, education or occupation, their bases of support did not 
appear to be rooted in any particular socio-economic 'interests'. Consequently such 
broad electoral appeals cutting across socio-economic classes did indeed appear to be 
the most effective means of mobilising electoral support at this stage of the Polish 
political and economic transition. 
The new Polish parties had extremely low levels of local implantation and one of the 
lowest overall levels of party membership in Europe. There was also very little 
evidence that the new Polish parties were attempting to encapsulate their supporters 
by developing networks of ancilliary structures directly linked to their party 
organisations. Indeed, they appeared more interested in developing a looser and more 
informal set of relationships with a fairly wide range of interest groups than either 
attempting to enrol their supporters as collective members or tying themselves too 
closely to any particular organisation. Local party branches generally functioned as 
fairly passive and informal bodies Primarily geared towards fulfilling certain local 
organisational. tasks associated with national and local election campaigns; with local 
politics providing the main focus for debate and activity in between such campaigns. 
The explanations for these low levels of membership and social implanatation and 
patterns of local activism were to be found both in the parties' organisational 
strategies and in the reluctance of Polish citizens to join the new parties. None of 
them had any kind of pro-active party development strategy geared towards 
supporting the creation and mobilisation of mass membership organisations. Party 
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leaders generally valued the mass media as a more effective means of appealing to 
voters than large numbers of formally enrolled members. Both the national and local 
elites (on whom the burden of membership recruitment generally fell) believed that 
drawing looser networks of 'sympathisers' who could be mobilised at election times 
more closely into their parties' orbit was more effective than enrolling them as party 
members. Moreover, even if party strategists had perceived there to be a link between 
the mass membership-based party and electoral success, and had actively sought to 
recruit substantially more individual members on this basis, survey evidence of 
popular attitudes towards parties suggested that the prospects of them actually doing 
so were extremely slim. 
Lacking a mass memberhip and any degree of local or societal implantation, the new 
Polish parties displayed a concomitant high level of dependence upon, and interest in 
exploiting, the resources provided by the state in terms of both party funding and 
media access and control - particularly compared to West European parties at a 
similar stage of party development. The widespread practice of state financial 
support, particularly that channelled through the parliamentary party, appeared to be 
of prime importance to all parties and both its level and scope have been 
progressively increased and extended. Even those parties which did not support the 
state's playing a particularly pro-active role in guaranteeing party media access went 
to considerable lengths to influence the membership of the key bodies which 
controlled the Polish media, particularly state broadcasting. There was also some 
evidence pointing to the emergence of a party cartel in post-communist Poland. Polish 
legislation certainly provided greater access to certain financial and material resources 
and representation on key media bodies to those parties which achieved the greatest 
electoral success. Indeed, parliamentary representation and access to government 
were absolutely critical to a party's very survival. This was exacerbated by an 
electoral system which discriminated heavily in favour of the largest parties and the 
fact that the existing rules for state support, to some extent, limited the scope for new 
entrants by discriminating against new parties which emerged in between elections 
apart form those based on parties with existing parliamentary representation. 
However, the distinction between the 'successor' and completely 'new' party families 
was not necessarily as striking, or helpful as an analytical tool in identifying 
variations, as hypothesised. Both SdRP/SLD and the PSL certainly bore a closer 
resemblance to the mass party model in terms of relatively high levels of 
membership, density of local implantation and more developed local organisatioanl 
infrastructure and technical facilities. In the case of the latter they were matched only 
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by AWS which was able to draw on the Solidarity trade union's sizeable network of 
local offices and staff. Indeed, there was a particularly sharp contrast between the two 
'successors' and the 'new' parties in terms of their local implantation, with the PSL 
the only party with a significant rur4l base and the the new parties concentrated 
almost exclusively in the main provincial and other larger towns. This relative 
superiority was rooted partly in the organisational legacies intherited from their 
predecessors, although their ability to provide clear points of reference to specific 
segments of the electorate was probably also significant in this respect. This was 
particularly true in the case of the PSL, whose organisational monopoly in rural areas 
(where social and cultural activities were more limited) gave the party greater scope 
for offering its members collective benefits associated with personal inter-action. On 
the other hand, organisational inheritance was, at best, only a secondary factor in 
terms of local infrastructure and the successors' relative superiority in this area was 
more a function of the fact that, at the time the research was undertaken, these were 
the two parties with the largest parliamentary representation and concomitant access 
to local deputies' and Senators' office facilities. 
In other areas it was only really the PSL which displayed significantly more mass 
party characteristics. For example, both SdRP parliamentarians vis-a-vis the party 
central office and the party central office vis-a-vis party members enjoyed a high 
level of autonomy - due to the fact that the party operated within the framework of a 
broader SLD parliamentary fraction and election committee which involved the party 
leadership elites negotating personnel and programmatic matters with its coalition 
partners. The PSL parliamentary fraction was, on the other hand, perceived as simply 
a vehicle for organising the party's work within the parliamentary forum and 
implementing decisions taken by the party's extra-parliamentary organs. Similarly, 
the PSL was the only party where the bureaucracy attached to the party central office 
was more significant than that attached to the parliamentary party - although the 
overlap between leadership personnel of these two bodies made this less distinction a 
less meaningful one. Perhaps most strikingly, the PSL was the one significant 
exception to the general pattern of broad electoral appeals aimed at loose 
constituencies and the only party which bore at least a superficial resemblance to the 
mass party model in terms of electoral strategy and bases of support. The PSL defiried 
its 'core' electorate in class terms, and targeted its electoral appeal primarily at, the 
large proportion of the Polish population which had worked in peasant small-holdings 
even throughout the communist era and which, therefore, provided the party with a 
snatural' socio-economic base. Although there was some evidence of the PSL 
attempting to broaden its base of support, there was a general tendency not to stray 
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too far into unfamiliar territory and most survey evidence suggested that these 
attempts had failed and that its base was, if anything, becoming even more 
concentrated among rural and agricultural voters. The PSL was also the only party 
surveyed that appeared to come close to attempting to root itself more firmly in the 
agricultural communities which it sought to represent by developing links with a wide 
range of rural social and cultural organisations. 
Indeed, in some areas the mass party analogy simply did not apply even in the case of 
the PSL. An examination of internal power relations as they operated in reality 
revealed that the PSL actually vested its party central office leadership with 
considerably more power and autonomy than formal accounts suggested. None of the 
rural organisations with whom the PSL aligned itself was formally represented 
within, or linked to, the party other than on the basis of parliamentary electoral pacts 
and it was no more succesful than the others at developing ancilliary structures such 
as youth and women's organisations. Indeed, the PSL was actually one of the most 
enthusiastic supporters of state support for parties and, in this respect at least, actually 
bore a much closer resemblance to the cartel model than most of the 'new' parties. 
These observations point to the need for a number of important caveats and 
qualifications to be placed on this general conclusion that the new Polish parties bore 
a closer resemblance to the more recent Western party models. They also raise 
broader questions about the overall applicability of, and dangers of transplanting, 
these party models which were developed to analyse West European democracies 
wholesale into the post-communist Polish context as some analysts have attempted to 
do. Nalewajko, for example, posits "a tendency for the cartel party to dominate" the 
new Polish party system, ' while Olson suggests that the emerging party type in post- 
communist Eastern Europe is a hybrid "cadre-catch-all party" with a "broad diffuse 
electoral appeal in a 'catch-all party' pattern" combined with a "cadre structure"' of "a 
few active leaders. "' Indeed, Olson has even suggested that parties in post-communist 
Eastern Europe are actually a more advanced and developed version of the Western 
contemporary party models and that "the West is joining the East rather than the other 
way around. "' 
' Protopartie i protosystem? p219. 
2 D. M. Olson, 'Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central 
Europe', Political Studies. Vol. 46 No 3.1998. pp432-464 (445). 
' D. M. Olson, 'Review of P. Lewis, ed. "Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe"', 
Party Politics. Vol 4 No 2.1997. pp270-271 (270). 
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Firstly, while there may be a number of important simil&ics there arc also 
significant differences and the comparisons between the new Polish parties and 
contemporary Western developments should not be overdrawn. There was virtually 
no evidence of the leadership elites employing cartel party-typc circumventionist 
strategies of appcalling directly to the mass of party members in order to by-pass 
intermediary bodies representing the organised party on the ground. To describe the 
pattern of local-national relations as 'stratarchic' or wholly based on 'mutual 
autonomy' would probably be an exaggeration given that all party central offices 
retained, to a greater or lesser extent, certain reserve powers to intervene in local 
party affairs when these bodies actions were felt to be in conflict with the interests of 
the party as a whole, as in the case of parliamentary candidate selection. 
While there was some evidence of the increasing use of external experts, advisers and 
consultants much of this was motivated by political, and sometimes personal, 
sympathies and provided on a voluntary rather than a paid, contractual basis. 
Consequently, it was not really accurate or even appropriate to draw analogies with 
the 'professionalisation' posited in the electoral-professional and cartel party models. 
Partly because of a residual hostility towards, and suspicion of (particularly Western) 
professional communication advisers, but mainly due to the parties' chronic lack of 
resources and extremely weak financial bases, there was no realistic prospect for the 
foreseeable future that such external 'professionals' as the parties did utilise would 
somehow develop as a substitute for the weak party central office bureaucracies as 
envisaged in these models. 
Although, in line with contemporary Western developments, most Polish parties' 
electoral strategies were based on appealing to socially heterogeneous 'opinion' rather 
than 'interest' electorates, there was little evidence of the 'de-ideologisation' of party 
politics and concomitant focus on non-divisive, non-contentious 'valence' issues and 
the competence of leaders which was also an important feature of both the catch- 
all/electoral-professional and cartel party models. On the contrary, Polish politics 
appeared to be characterised precisely by party strategies based in large measure on 
appealling to such 'ideological' electorates. Electoral strategies were often rooted in 
appeals to, and party electorates were defined in terms of, moral-cultural or 
ideological values and categories rather than on the basis of competence and policy- 
effectiveness. Particularly in the case of the two largest electoral blocs, the 
SdRP/SLD and AWS, support for a given party was generally determined by 
ideological self-placement which was itself mainly a derivative of attitudes towards 
the past and moral-cultural rather than socio-economic issues. Indeed, one of the 
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more surprising features of the the new parties' electoral strategies, highlighted by the 
1997 parliamentary election campaign, was the relative lack of focus on party leaders, 
contrary to both recent Western developments and the hypothesised characteristics of 
post-communist politics. This may, of course, only be a conjunctural phenomena. As 
parties begin increasingly to copy succesfal models and adapt to meet the 
requirements of the mass electronic news media, we may well see the increasing 
personalisation or 'Americanisation' evident in most advanced Western democracies 
developing as an increasingly important feature of Polish party and electoral politics 
as well. 
While it was possible to identify some evidence pointing to the emergence of a party 
cartel, there was still a general nervousness about, and consensus against, declaring 
unambiguously who was and who was not a member of the cartel at this stage of 
Polish party system development and restricting access to state support only to this 
narrow group. This was exemplified by the provisions of the 1997 Party Law which 
actually lowered the threshold for state party funding to include non-parliametnary 
parties. Given that the new party systems are still relatively undeveloped and the 
parties themselves are of an unstable, and often transient character, the shared 
political perspectives and notions of how parties could collectively further mutual 
interests, which underpin the pattern of inter-party collusion emphasised in that 
model, have simply not been firmly enough established for a relatively stable party 
cartel to properly emerge. As Lewis points out, "the essence of democracy in this 
conception, according to the authors of the cartel model, lies in the 'ability of voters 
to choose from a fixed menu of political parties'. It is precisely this fixed menu that is 
lacking for very obvious reasons in East-Central Europe. " 
Secondly, another key issue to bear in mind when considering the difference between 
the new Polish parties and parties in more established democracies is that of path 
dependency. The contemporary catch-all/electoral professional and cartel party 
models were designed principally to analyse party change: the transformation of well- 
established existing parties rather than, as is the case in post-communist Eastern 
Europe, the emergence and development of completely new ones. Western catch- 
all/electoral-professional and cartel parties inherited both pre-existing decision- 
making structures which they they were attempting to adapt, a sizeable party 
bureaucracy and membership on to which they were attempting to graft an increased 
utilisation of professionals with looser attachments to the party, and an existing 
electoral base which they were attempting to broaden out. The new Polish ones have 
Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe. p 12 
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not inherited this initial resource, membership and organisational base, and level of 
party identification which Western parties accumulated through having operated in a 
competitive electoral environment over many years. While the new catch- 
all/electoral-professional parties in Western democracies were formerly mass working 
class or confessional parties with a pre-existing base of support engaged in a process 
of broadening out to a wider clientele, the new Polish were attempting to develop 
such a 'core' electorate in the first place. On the other hand, the new Polish parties 
have much greater access to the state than Western parties at an analogous stage in 
party development. Even Olson, who draws strong parallels between parties in post- 
communist Eastern Europe and contemporary Western models, acknowledges that 
"party development in Central Europe is not so much emulating as by-passing the 
developmental life cycle of West European parties. "' The fact that the new Polish 
parties are following a different developmental path means that these are not simply 
straight transplants of Western models and that it is impossible to, as Olson puts it, 
"leapfrog directly into the mass communications video age"6without evolving into 
something qualitatively different. 
Thirdly, it is also possible to identify certain features which appear to be unique to the 
new post-communist Polish parties and where they are taking a clearly different form 
than established Western parties. The single, most striking of these was the fact that 
while, in terms of the 'official story', most of the individual member-based parties 
have very similar structures and modes of internal decision-making and 
representation, there were various organisational forms encompassed by the term 
Gpolitical party' which is, therefore, an extremely fluid one in the post-communist 
context. While many Western political scientists have attempted to defte what 
exactly we mean by, and identify the properties that are unique to, a political party, 
this is a far from academic question in the post-communist Poland. Numerous ad hoc 
coalitions and electoral alliances have emerged, most notably AWS and the SLD, 
which contain various different parties and groupings. Some of these were simply 
temporary electoral expedients, others also existed as party formations in parliament 
or in local councils, although not necessarily always comprising the same 
configuration of parties and groupings which competed together in the elections, 
while others still had separate organisational and decision-making structures operating 
in parallel with their component parties. 
'Review of P. Lewis, ed. "Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe"'. p270. 
'Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe'. 
p445. 
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Moreover, the boundaries between parties and interest groups in post-communist 
Poland appeared to be extremely porous. Polish trade unions contested elections, 
secured parliamentary representation, played a role in helping to form and bring down 
governments, developed wide ranging political programmes, and emerged as 
significant political players in their own right meeting many of the criteria and 
functions formally ascribed to political parties sensu soicto. This was particularly true 
in the case of Solidarity but also, to a lesser extent, the OPZZ federation and others. 
This confusion of roles in relation to interest articulation and aggregation was also 
reflected in the fact that some parties, most notably the PSL, behaved more like 
interest groups. 
Nonetheless, although it is possible to highlight particularly striking structural and 
organisational features in the new Polish parties this is not to say that they represent, 
some kind of a new and unique post-communist model of party organisation. This is 
partly because even if such a new model were emerging (which it is far from clear 
that it is) it would not be possible to identify it solely on the basis of single country 
study. There are clearly valid questions to be raised about how far it is possible to 
generalise on the basis of the Polish experience alone and more definitive judgements 
on this question await further comparative work in other parts of post-communist 
Eastern Europe that will build on the findings of this research. Even more 
significantly, given the aforementioned instability, immaturity and evolutionary 
nature of both the party systems and parties themselves, it is quite simply too early to 
draw such firm conclusions. As even the brief survey of party formation and 
development in post-communist Poland set out in chapter one shows, many parties 
which at one stage appeared to enjoy relatively favourable prospects for development 
looked far weaker just a year or two later, the shifting kaleidoscope of parties and 
groupings on the Polish right being the prime example. As Olson has accurately 
pointed out, "the topic of party political organisation in the post-communist countries 
is a moving target. "7 
Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that, as pointed out in chapter one, these 
contemporary Western party models are themselves ideal-types. Moreover, there are 
always various types of party existing alongside each other at the same time, some of 
which clearly deviate from the dominant party type, and these models are not, nor 
should they be, used slavishly even in the Western literature. Consequently, while 
they are extremely useful as analytical tools in terms of highlighting and helping us to 
understand some of the new parties' structural and organisational features, it is 
7, Review of P. Lewis, ed. "Party Structure and Organisation in East-Central Europe"'. p27 1. 
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important to avoid transplanting these models wholesale into the different conditions 
of post-communist Eastern Europe or of drawing too direct comparisons or analogies 
on the basis of similarities in only one or two structural features. 
On the basis of the findings of this research, it is, therefore, certainly possible to 
conclude that although the Polish party system is consolidating and stabilising and 
that the new Polish parties are both strong at the level of state institutions and appear 
capable of fulfilling their role in terms of structuring elections, institutions and 
recruiting elites. However, given their close resemblance in many important respects 
to the more recent catch-all/electoral-professionaI and cartel party models they are 
also developing as remote and somewhat distant institutions, weak at the societal 
level. The nature of the links between parties and their electorates are, and are likely 
to remain, fairly shallow and, consequently, they are likely to be much less effective 
in terms of articulating and aggregating societal interests and even less successful in 
mobilising the citizenry and integrating them into the political process. Although it is 
not the intention of this research to consider normatively which is the 'best' type of 
party structure and organisation, the evolution of the new Polish parties along these 
lines - orientated towards the state with leaders responsive to electorates but not 
geared towards securing democratic participation by citizens - is clearly of 
considerable potential significance to the kind of democracy which is developing in 
post-communist Poland. Consequently, the danger remains that any apparent party 
system consolidation at the level of state institutions will remain somewhat illusory 
and that the process of democratisation in post-communist Poland will remain 
vulnerable to the kind of 'anti-party' backlash that we have witnessed in the more 
established West European democracies. 
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Appendix I- Parties and organizations in the Democratic Left Alliance. 
Mqy 1997 
Bielarussian Socio-Cultural Fellowship 
Democratic Union of Women 
Federation of Metal, Electrical and Machine Industry Workplace Union Organisation 
-'Metalworkers' 
Federation of Polish Higher and Scientific Schools Teaching Unions 
Federation of Health Service Employees Trade Unions 
Federation of Polish State Railways Employees Trade Unions 
Federation of Light Industry Employees Trade Unions 
National Council of Left-wing Veterans' 
National Representation of Retirees and Pensioners 
Supreme Co-operative Council 
New Democracy 
All-Poland Agreement of Trade Unions 
Labour Party 
Polish Socialist Party 
Polish Green Party 
Polish Union of Retirees, Pensioners and Invalids 
Movement of Working People 
Independent European Initiative INIE1 
Social democracy of the Polish Republic 
'Generations' Association 
Association of Poles Injured by the Third Reich 
'Watchtower' Polish Home Association 
Secular Culture Fellowship 
Fellowship of the Friends of Social Sciences 
Christian-Social Union 
Polish Students Association 
Polish Teachers' Union 
Union of Polish Socialist Youth 
'Builders' Trade Union 
Trade Union of Miners in Poland 
Copper Industry Employees Trade Union 
Trade Union of Farming Workers in the Republic of Poland 
Polish People's Army Trade Union 
Source: A. Materska-Sosnowska, 'Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - perspektywa 
pozostania u w1adzy czy przejgcia do opozycji' in S. Gebethner, ed. Wybory '97. - 
Partie i Programy Wyborcze. Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy ELIPSA. 1997. pp 15 1- 
179(154). 
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Appendix 2- Parties and organizations in Solidarijy Electoral Action. 
March 1997 
Solidarity trade union 
Centre Agreement 
Christian National Union 
Confederation for an Independent Poland-Patriotic Camp 
Polish Federation of Catholic Families 
Movement of One Hundred 
Conservative-Peasant Party 
Confederation for an Independent Poland 
Solidarity Electoral Action Youth Committee 
Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Alliance 
National League 
Party of Christian Democrats 
Movement for the Republic-Patriotic Camp 
Lech Walqsa Institute 
'Solid in the Elections' Movement 
Non-party Bloc for the Support of Reforms 
Party of Polish Democracy 
Christian Democratic-Labour Party 
New Poland 
'Kontra' trade union 
Conservative Coalition 
Polish Patriotic Movement 
Polish Borderlands Party 
Confederation of Republicans 
Centre Agreement-Integration Initiative 
Polish Unity 
National Right 
Party of Real Politics 
Polish Western Union 
Polish Forum 
Polish Ecological Party of Greens 
'Rola' Movement of Peasant-Agrarian Options 
Safe Poland Foundation 
Polish Patriotic Forum 
Party of the National Alliance 
Catholic Laity Union 
'Victoria' Party 
National Conference of Citizens' Committees 
Independent Students' Union 
Solidarity Individual Farmers' Union-Agreement for Solidarity Electoral Action 
Source: ABC Akcji Wyborczej Solidamoie. Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Fulmen 
Poland. 1997. 
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Table 1.1: November/December 1990 Presidential election 
Votes % 
First round: 
Lcch Walqsa 6,569,889 39.96 
Stanislaw TymiAski 3,797,605 23.10 
Tadcusz Mazowiecki 2,973,264 18.08 
_WIodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz 1,514,025 9.21 
Roman Bartoszczc (PSL) 1,176,175 7.15 
Lcszck Moczulski (KPN) 411,516 2.50 
Second round: 
Lcch Walqsa 10,622,698 74.75 
LStanislaw TymiAski 3,683,098 25.25 
Sourcc: J. Raciborski. Polskie IVybory ZachowanieKybormego spoleczefistwa 
polskiego 1989-1995. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowc 'Scholar'. 1997. 
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Table 1.2: October 1991 Parliamentary election to the Seim 
Party Votes % Seats 
Democratic Union (UD) 13829051 12.31 62 
Democratic Lcfl Alliance (SLD) 
_1,344,820 
11.98 60 
Catholic Elcctoml Action (WAK) 980,304 8.73 49 
Centrc Agrcement (PC) 977,344 8.71 441 
Polish Pcasant Party (PSL) 972,952 8.67 48 
Confcdcmtion for an Indcpcndent Poland (KPN) 841,738 7.50 46 
Liberal Dcmocmtic Congress (KLD) 839,978 7.48 37 
Pcasant Agrccmcnt (PL) 1 613,6261 5.461 28 
Solidarity (NSZZS') 1 566,553 1 5.05 27 1 
Polish Bccr Lovcrs' Party (PPPP) 1 367,1061 3.271 161 
I Source: J. Raciborski. Polskie IV), bory. - Zachowanie wyborczego spole=enshva 
polfkiego 1989-1995. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowc 'Scholar'. 1997. 
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Table 1.3: September 1993 Parliamentary election to the Se*m 
Party Votes % Seats 
Above the threshold: 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 2815,169 20.41 171 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 2,124,367 15.40 132 
Democratic Union (UD) 1,460,957 10.59 74 
Labour Union (UP) 1,005,004 7.28 41 
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 795,487 5.77 22 
Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR) 746,653 5.41 16 
Below the threshold: 
Catholic Electoral Committee 'Fatherland' 901 878,445 6.37 
Solidarity 676,334 4.90 
Centre Agreement (PC) 609,973 4.42 
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) 550,578 3.99 
Union of Real Politics (UPR) 438,559 3.18 
Self-Defence 383,967 2.78 
Party X 377,480 1 2.74 1 
Coalition for the Republic (KdR) 371,923 1 2.70 1 
Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement (PSL-PL) 327,085 1 2.37 1 
Source: S. Gebethner, ed. Wyboryparlamentarne 1991 i 1993 apolska scena 
politymna. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1995. p20. 
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Table 1.4: November 1995 Presidential election 
Votes % 
First round: 
Aleksander Kwagniewski (SLD) 6,275,670 35.11 
Lech Walqsa 5,917,328 33.11 
Jacek Kuron' (UW) 1,646,946 9.22 
Jan Olszewski 1,225,453 6.86 
Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) 770,419 _ 4.31 
Tadeusz Zielifiski (UP) 631,432 3.53 
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz (ZChN) 492,628 2.76 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke (UPR) 428,969 2.40 
Andrzej Lepper (Self-Defence) 235,797 1.32 
Second round: 
Aleksander Kw9niewski (SLD) 1 9,704,439 1 51.72 
Lech Walqsa 1 9,058,176 1 48.289 
Source: I Raciborski. Polskie Wybory: Zachowanie wyborczego spoleczenistwa 
polskiego 1989-1995. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 'Scholar. 1997. 
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Table 1.5: September 1997 Parliametnary election results for the 
Seim 
Above the threshold: Votes % Seats 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 4,427,373 33.83 201 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 3,551,224 27.13 164 
Freedom Union (UW) 1,749,518 13.37 60 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 956,184 7.31 27 
Movement for Poland's Reconstruction (ROP) 727,072 5.561 6 
Below the threshold: 
Labour Union (UP) 620,611 4.74 
National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (KPEiR) 284,826 2.181 
Union of the Republic Right (UPR) 266,317 2.03 
National greement of Retirees and Pensioners (KPEiRRP) 212,826 1.63 
Christian Democratic-Bloc for Poland (ChD-BdP) 178.395 1.36 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 2 October 1997. 
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Table 2.1: Proportion of parliamentarians in 'narrow' oar 
leadership 
February 1997 May 1998 
SdRP 100% 100% 
PSL 88% 25% 
uw 86% 100% 
UP 83% Not applicable 
AWS Not applicable 80% 
ROP Not applicable 25% 
Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters, Parliamentary Club 
Offices, Sejm and Senate Chancelleries. 
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Table 2.2: Proportion of partiamentarians in vartv executives 
February 1997 May 1998 
SdRP' 92% 90% 
PSL 69% 19% 
-UW 
75% 90% 
up, 76% Not applicable 
AWS Not applicable 86% 
ROP Not applicable 22% 
Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters, Parliamentary Club 
Offices, Sejm and Senate Chancelleries. 
The figures for the Central Executive Committee were 44% and 42% respectively. 
The February 1997 figure for the Executive Committee was 44%. 
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Table 2.3: Proportion of Parliamentary Club Presidium members on 
]2artv executives, June 1997 
Proportion 
SdRP 38% 
PSL 36% 
uw 75% 
up 41% 
Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters and Parliamentary Club 
Offices, June 1997. 
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Table 2.4 - Proportion of parliamentarians in Partv national Councils 
February 1997 May 1998 
SdRP 52%' 50%2 
PSL 49% 15% 
uw 28% 32% 
UP 40% Not applicable 
AWS Not applicable Not available 
ROP Not applicable 7% 
Sources: Documents supplied to author by party headquarters, Parliamentary Club 
Offices, Sejm and Senate Chancelleries. 
' Estimate based on figure supplied by Maciej Porqba, SdRP head of party 
organisation, author interview, 28th February 1997. 
2 Estimate based on figure quoted in E. Olczyk, 'Leszek Miller nowym 
przewodniczqcym', Rzeczpospolita. 8th December 1997. 
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Table 3.1: Number of staff emploved in Partv central offices and 
Parliamentarv Club offices (full-time equivalent), June 1997 
Party central offlce Parliamentary Club office 
SdRP/SLD 4 25 
PSL 20 17 
uw 10 15 
UP 1.5 10 
ROP 3 Not applicable 
Source: Information supplied by party headquarters and Parliamentary Club offices, 
June 1997. 
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Table 3.2: Local vartv omanisational infrastructure in Gdafisk, 
Jelenia G6ra, Plock and Rzesz6w, April 1997 
Gdafisk: 
SdRP PSL uw UP ROP AWS 
Offices 9 11 6 2 11 10 
Telephones 9 11 5 2 2 10 
Faxes 1 2 2 1 1 10 
Paid staff 0 2.5 1 1 0 6 
Computers 1 2 2 1 0 4 
Photocopiers 1 2 2 1 0 to 
Cars 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Jelenia G6ra: 
SdR, P PSL uw UP ROP AWS 
Offices 14 11 3 3 4 6 
Telephones 14 7 3 1 3 6 
Faxes 2 1 2 1 0 3 
Paid staff I I 1 0 0 
Computers 4 1 1 0 5 
Photocopiers 1 2 1 1 6 
Cars 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Plock: 
SdRP PSL' uw UP ROP AWS 
Offices 5 7 3 4 4 5 
Telephones 5 10 1 4 2 5 
Faxes 0 2 1 0 0 1 
Paid staff 0.5 6 1 0 0 1 
Computers 0 5 1 0 0 1 
Photocopiers 0 5 0 0 0 3 
Cars 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rzesz6w: 
SdRP PSL uw UP ROP AWS 
Offices 7 7 2 1 7 8 
Telephones 4 7 2 1 7 8 
Faxes 3 2 2 0 4 3 
Paid staff 1 7 1 0.5 0 0 
Computers 1 2 1 0 1 6 
Photocopiers 1 3 1 0 1 5 
Cars 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Source: Information supplied by local party officials, April-June 1997 
' These included party facilities of I local office, 2 telephones, I fax, 2 paid employees, I computer 
and I photocopier plus an estimate of local parliamentary facilities based on information in: 
Kancelaria Seimu. Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, II Kadencja: Biura Poselskie. Warsaw: 
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1995. 
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Table 3.3: Total number of Se*m deputies offices, 1995 
'Basic' offices 'Branch' offices Staff 
SLD (SdRP)' 164(76) 477(251) 478(235) 
PSL 128 147 287 
uw 72 84 153 
UP 38 81 127 
Total 402 789 1065 
Source: Kancelaria Sejmu. Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, II Kadencja: Biura 
Poselskie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe. 1995. 
'These figures are based on 1993 data on the number of SLD Sejm deputies who 
acknowledged SdRP party members and, given that this figure increased from 70 to 
over 100 during the course of the 1993-97 parliament, certainly underestimates the 
numbers of offices and staff attached to SdRP parliamentarians. 
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Table 3.4: Total number of Senators' offices, 1996 
'Basic' offices 'Branch' offices 
SLD' 37 1 
PSL 35 6 
uw 7 0 
Total 79 7,7 
Source: Lista Senator6w III Kadencji z Adresami Biur Senatorskich. Warsaw: 
Kancelaria Senatu. 1996 
'Separate figures for SdRP Senators are not available. 
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Table 4.1 - Sevtember 1997 Parliamentarv election votine pafterns 
AWS SLD uw PSL ROP UP 
Voting by sex 
Men 31.8 27.5 13.0 7.8 5.9 4.3 
Women 36.0 25.6 14.3 5.8 4.7 5.2 
Voting by age 
18-29 32.3 22.4 18.6 6.3 5.6 5.1 
30-39 35.6 20.8 15.9 8.8 5.9 5.2 
40-49 32.4 29.2 13.1 7.3 5.5 5.5 
50-59 31.9 32.9 9.4 6.2 5.1 4.0 
60+ 36.4 30.3 8.2 5.4 4.5 3.1 
Voting by place of residence 
Villages 35.2 20.3 6.7 17.0 5.9 4.2 
Towns 32.0 30.5 14.4 4.0 5.1 4.9 
Cities 33.6 29.0 18.4 0.9 5.1 4.9 
Voting by education 
Primary 37.9 21.3 4.4 12.9 4.6 4.2 
Vocational 38.1 24.2 7.2 10.1 6.0 4.9 
Secondary 33.1 29.5 13.4 5.8 5.5 5.0 
Higher 27.7 27.2 25.1 2.8 4.8 4.4 
Voting by occupation 
Managers 26.9 33.8 21.2 4.3 3.5 4.4 
Specialists 32.7 21.4 24.8 2.9 5.4 4.9 
Businessmen 34.2 22.0 19.2 4.0 6.9 4.5 
Farmers 30.4 12.7 2.5 37.9 5.7 2.5 
Workers 40.3 26.0 7.6 6.5 6.3 5.5 
Office workers 32.7 31.0 14.5 4.5 5.1 6.2 
Service workers 36.8 26.7 14.3 4.9 5.8 4.2 
Retired 34.2 32.2 7.5 4.5 4.7 3.6 
Housewives 39.6 21.0 12.3 7.0 4.3 3.9 
Students 29.7 23.9 22.3 3.7 5.3 5.5 
Unemployed 36.8 25.4 8.1 7.0 6.0 7.7 
Average 33.83 27.13 13.37 7.31 5.56 4.74 
Source: Figures supplied to author by Institute for Public Opinion Research (OBOP), 
November 1997. 
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Table 4.2: November 1995 Presidential election 
First round voting jDafterns 
Kwas'niewski Walqsa Kuron Olszewski Pawlak 
Voting by sex 
Male 34.4 
Female 33.4 
Voting by age 
18-29 32.7 
30-39 32.7 
40-49 37.8 
50-59 34.7 
60+ 30.4 
Voting by place of residence 
Villages 33.6 
Towns 36.7 
Cities 31.4 
Voting by education 
Primary 31.0 
Vocational 35.1 
Secondary 35.9 
Higher 30.2 
Voting by occupation 
Managers 38.8 
Specialists 27.2 
Businessmen 27.9 
Farmers 30.2 
Workers 35.6 
Office workers 37.4 
Service workers 35.4 
Uniformed 64.8 
services 
Retired 33.8 
Housewives 32.7 
Students 29.3 
Unemployed 38.0 
Average 35.11 
32.1 9.8 7.7 4.1 
34.0 10.6 6.4 3.3 
29.0 12.8 6.0 3.2 
31.9 10.8 7.5 4.0 
30.6 9.7 7.7 3.5 
36.9 8.3 7.6 3.2 
43.0 7.0 6.7 5.2 
33.6 6.3 7.2 9.7 
31.9 10.9 7.1 1.2 
33.5 13.4 7.0 0.5 
40.0 6.8 5.8 8.5 
36.6 7.0 7.1 4.4 
31.5 9.6 7.5 2.7 
25.0 19.0 7.2 1.3 
26.8 12.4 7.2 1.9 
28.3 19.7 7.6 1.2 
39.0 9.5 7.0 1.4 
31.0 3.0 6.9 21.3 
35.5 7.1 8.6 2.9 
28.8 10.9 8.1 1.8 
35.1 9.8 5.7 1.7 
16.2 6.0 4.2 1.4 
39.8 7.5 6.3 3.9 
38.2 7.4 5.2 5.7 
26.1 17.6 6.0 1.5 
28.0 10.8 6.4 4.4 
33.11 9.21 6.86 4.31 
Source: OBOP exit poll cited in: J. Raciborski, Polskie Wybory., Zachowanie 
Spofeczenistwa Polskiego w Latach 1989-1995. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
"Scholar". 1997. p9l. 
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Table 4.3: September 1993 Parliamentarv election volUnLy pafterns 
SLD PSL Iml UP KdR2 AWS3 
Voting by sex 
Male 22.0 16.6 13.1 6.0 2.9 28.2 
Female 18.8 14.4 16.1 8.5 2.5 30.0 
Voting by age 
18-25 16.6 12.8 19.4 7.6 2.3 26.8 
26-35 16.7 15.1 16.3 8.2 2.4 28.8 
36-45 24.7 14.6 12.7 8.8 2.3 26.7 
46-60 24.2 15.0 11.5 7.5 2.8 29.8 
60+ 18.1 18.9 14.8 4.3 3.6 33.7 
Voting by place of residence 
Villages 15.3 29.4 8.7 4.0 2.5 28.7 
Towns 24.7 9.4 15.4 7.9 2.7 28.9 
Cities 22.7 3.6 21.0 10.7 3.0 30.0 
Voting by education 
Primary 13.6 
Basic vocational 18.3 
Middle 23.3 
Post- 16 22.3 
Higher 24.3 
Voting by occupation 
Self-employed 17.5 
Intelligentsia 23.7 
Farmers 8.2 
Workers 19.6 
Office workers 26.0 
Retired 22.7 
Housewives 16.7 
Students 15.3 
Average 20.4 
28.5 7.3 3.7 2.4 33.1 
17.9 9.0 6.1 2.6 32.6 
12.3 15.0 8.3 3.0 28.8 
8.2 22.5 9.4 2.3 26.5 
6.5 27.3 10.0 2.9 21.7 
9.0 19.9 6.3 3.1 29.3 
6.6 26.7 10.6 3.0 22.5 
51.8 3.2 1.7 2.1 24.0 
14.2 8.6 7.2 2.5 33.4 
10.2 15.0 10.7 2.4 27.4 
14.2 14.3 5.2 3.3 32.8 
17.9 11,5 6.5 2.0 23.8 
9.4 27.2 9.1 2.9 26.9 
15.4 14.6 7.3 2.7 29.2 
Source: OBOP exit poll cited inf T. Zukowski, 'Wybory '93: kto na kogo glosowal', 
Przeglid Spolemny. Vol 20.1994. pp3-32. 
' Combined votes for Democratic Union (UD) and Liberal Democratic Congress 
(KLD). 
The Coalition for the Republic (KdR) was led by future ROP leader, Jan Olszewski. 
Combined votes for the 'Fatherland' Catholic Election Committee (KKW'O'), 
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), Non-party Bloc for the Support of 
Reforms (BBWR), Centre Agreement (PC) and Polish Peasant Party-Peasant 
Agreement (PSL-PL). 
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Table 4.4: Parties and groul2ings best represeting socio-economic 
imoups. Julv 1997 
AWS SLD UW PSL ROP Up Don't know 
Workers 40 14 - 16 20 
Farmers - - 72 - 16 Retired' 4 7 - - 2 18 
Budgetary sphere 9 21 17 - 36 
Intelligentsia - 12 33 32 
Young people 10 16 11 - 46 
Women 
- 
10 16 8 9 46 
Unemployed 22 10 - 18 35 
Religious believers' 22 - 2 - 20 
Political elites - 28 13 - 39 
Ordinary people 15 25 - - - 31 
Small businesses 6 9 15 6 7 45 
Large businesses - 14 19 - - 47 
State firin directors 26 9 52 
Large foreign finns 16 13 58 
Source: OBOP. Czye interesy reprezentujq partie polityczne? Warsaw. July 1997. 
. 11.3 
' These figures were distorted by the temporary emergence of what proved to be the 
electorally insignificant National Party of Pensioners and Retirees (KPEiR) which 
was cited by 66% of respondents as the best representatives of retirees interests. More 
accurate figures are probably those in OBOP's analogous December 1996 survey 
taken before the emergence of the KPEiR: AWS (16%), UP (15%), SLD (12%) and 
Don't know (37%). 
2 Again the figures are distorted by the ephemeral Non-party Bloc for the Support of 
Reforms-Christian National Democratic 'Bloc for Poland' (BBWR-ChDN 'BdP') 
which was cited by 48% of respondents. The more accurate December 1996 figures 
were: AWS (39%), ROP (10%) and Don't know (32%). 
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Table 4.5: Partv supporters' ideolodcal self-viacement, 
November 1996 
Left 
(1-3) 
Centre 
(4) 
Right 
(5-7) 
Don't 
know 
Average 
SLD 60 22 3 15 2.7 
UP 30 25 30 16 4.1 
PSL 27 . 28 30 16 4.2 
uw 19 35 43 4 4.4 
ROP 5 32 58 5 5.2 
AWS 2 16 68 14 5.6 
Source: CBOS. Potoczne Rozumienie Prawicowos'd i Lewicowoici - Strukturalizacja 
Sceny Politycznej. Warsaw. December 1996. 
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Table 4.6: Voting intentions according to ideological self-placement, 
AuLyust/September 1997 
Left Centre Right Average 
SLD 61 22 4 22 
AWS 2 10 42 21 
uw 3 13 14 10 
PSL 8 13 5 8 
ROP 2 2 9 5 
UP 6 7 3 5 
Others 3 13 11 11 
Don't know 15 1 20 1 12 1 191 
Source: CBOS. Wybory Parlamentarne '97 - Preferencje na trzy tygodnie przed 
dniem glosowania. Warsaw. September 1997 
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Table 4.7: Votine intentions accordini! to Church aftendance, 
Auimst/September 1997 
SLD AWS uw PSL ROP UP 
Several times a week 5 36 8 4 4 2 
Weekly 17 25 8 9 5 4 
Several times a month 20 19 10 8 5 5 
Several times a year 34 12 13 7 61 8 
Never 45 8 17 1 51 2 5 
Average 22 21 10 8 15 5 
Source: CBOS. WyboryParlamentarne '97- Preferencje na trzy tygodnieprzed 
dniem glosowania. Warsaw. September 1997 
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Table 4.8: Partv leader positive (and net approval) ratings, 
Februarv-October 1997 
February May July Au gust October 
Cimoszewicz 54 (+10) 50 (+2) 51 (+6) 39( -20) 44(-9) Pawlak 43 (-Il) 40 (-18) 40 (-16) 38( -22) 34(-29) 
Balcerowicz 40 (-13) 41 (-13) 42(-9) 42( -Il) 55(+16) 
Olszewski 39 (-15) 38 (-17) 38 (-16) 39( -18) 35(-23) 
Krzaklewski 38 (-17) 37 (-21) 38 (-18) 37( -21) 43(-8) 
Bugaj 33 (-16). 33 (-16) 33 (-15) 35( -16) 30(-27) 
Oleksy 23 (-52)1 29 (-40)1 28 (-40)1 26( -45)1 28(-41)1 
Source: Wprost, 16 Febmary 1997,4 May 1997,20 July 1997,17 August 1997,19 
October 1997. 
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Table 5.1: Total number of vartv members claimed 
Members 
PSL 150,000 (1998) 
SdRP 60,000 (1997) 
RS AWS 30,000 (1998) 
KPEiR 27,000 (1997) 
ROP 15,000 (1998) 
SKL 15,000 (1998) 
uw 14,000 (1998) 
KPN 10,000 (1998) 
KPN-OP 10,000 (1998) 
PC 10,000 (1998) 
ChDIIIRP 6,000 (1994) 
ZChN 6,000 (1998) 
PChD 4,000 (1998) 
UP 3,500 (1997) 
PSL-PL 3,500 (1998) 
UPR 3,000 (1998) 
RdR 3,000 (1994) 
Source: Various newspaper articles and figures supplied by national party 
headquarters. 
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Table 5.2: Party membership as a percentage of the electorate, 
1989-1992 
Country Party Membership 
Austria 21.8 
Sweden 21.2 
Norway 13.5 
Finland 12.9 
Italy 9.7 
Belgium 9.2 
Denmark 6.5 
Ireland 5.3 
Portugal 4.9 
Gennany 4.2 
Spain 4.0 
United Kingdom 3.3 
Slovakia 3.1 
Netherlands 2.9 
Hungary 2.5 
Czech Republic 1.8 
France 1.7 
Poland 1.4 
Source: All figures except for Poland (author's estimate) are taken from: P. Mair, 
What is different about post-communist party systems? 1996. Glasgow: University of 
Strathclyde. p14. 
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Table 5.3: Partv membership, basic or2anisational units and local 
implantation in Gdafisk, Jelenia G6ra, Plock and Rzesz6w, 
April 1997 
Gdaiisk: 
SdRP PSL uw UP ROP 
Members 1200 2400 500 120 500 
Circles/cells Not available 185 14 4 10 
Implantation 71% 59% 17% 6% 11% 
Jelenia G6ra: 
SdRP PSL uw UP ROP 
Members 540 1680 120-150 150 214 
Circles/cells 58 Not available 6 4 8 
Implantation 55% 80% 15% 10% 18% 
Plock: 
SdRP PSL uw UP ROP 
Members 620 3000 120 127 206 
Circles/cells 24 150 4 4 6 
Umplantation 50% 100% 8% 8% 13% 
Rzesz6w: 
SdRP PSL uw UP ROP 
Members 700 2000 120 50 700 
Circles/cells 40 70-85 5 4 26 
Implantation 
a- 
80% 85% 9% 6% 60% 
Source: Figures supplied by local party officials, April-June 1997. 
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Table 5.4: Total number of local councilors, March 1997 
Party Councilors 
SLD 5,500 
PSL 10,000 
uw 1,000 
UP 200 
ROP 500 
Source: Figures supplied by national party headquarters, March 1997. 
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Table 5.5: Total number of local councillors in Gdafisk, Jelenia G6ra. 
Plock and Rzesz6w, April 1997 
SLD PSL uw UP ROP 
Gdansk 70-80 160 45 4 2 
Jelenia G6ra 120 200 20 7 2 
Plock 60-70 400 30 6 3 
Rzesz6w 80 250 20 0 10-20 
Source: Figures supplied by local party officials, April-June 1997. 
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Table 5.6: Comparative levels of party identification 
1993 1994 1995 
West Germany 63 
East Germany 48 
Austria 49 
Romania 41 
Hungary 22 39 
Czech Republic 36 38 
Slovak Republic 31 30 
Russia 25 
Slovenia 22 
Poland 15 18 
Source: 1993 and 1994 figures take from F. Plasser and P. Ulram, 'Measuring 
Political Culture in East Central Europe. Political Trust and System Support' in F. 
Plasser and A. Pribersky. eds. Political Culture in East Central Europe. Aldershot: 
Avebury. 1996. pp 3-33(19). 1995 figures from R. Rose and W. Mishler, 'Negative 
and Positive Party Identification in Post-Communist Countries', Electoral Studies. 
Vol 17 No. 2.1998. pp217-234 (222). 
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Table 5.7: Comparative confidence in parties, 1994 
Level of confidence 
Czech Republic 24 
Former East Germany 181 
Slovak Republic 15 
Russia 14 
Hungary II 
Poland 8 
Source: F. Plasser and P. Ulram, 'Measuring Political Culture in East Central Europe. 
Political Trust and System Support' in F. Plasser and A. Pribersky. eds. Political 
Culture in East Central Europe. Aldershot: Avebury. 1996.1996. pp 3-33(17-18). 
' 1993 figure. 
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Table 5.8: Confidence in Polish institutions (1994) 
Institution Level of confidence 
Army 59 
Police 41 
Churches 36 
Courts 34 
Mass media 34 
Govemment 25 
Parliament 24 
Public administration 24 
President 19 
Solidarity 14 
OPZZ 13 
Parties 8 
Source: F. Plasser and P. Ulram, 'Measuring Political Culture in East Central Europe. 
Political Trust and System Support' in F. Plasser and A. Pribersky. eds. Political 
Culture in East Central Europe. Aldershot: Avebury. 1996. pp 3-33 (16). 
283 
Table 6.1: 1993 State Election Refunds 
(Figures in new zloties) 
Party/grouping Expenditure Income' Parliamentarians Refund 
SdRP/SLD 1,870,000 1,787,000 208 3,016,000 
PSL 1,488,700 1,491,300 _ 168 2,436,000 
UD (UW) 2,047,900 1,954,200 78 1,131,000 
UP 362,200 336,300 43 623,500 
KPN 841,300 504,800 22 319,000 
BBWR 1,504,000 1,442,300 18 261,000 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 21 November 1996. 
I The PSL, UD and BBWR's income included bank credits and other loans or credits 
of 657,300,1,153,300 and 270,000 which obviously needed to be taken into account 
when considering the net profit or loss which each of these grouping's made on the 
election campaign after receipt of the election refund. See: P. G. Lewis and R-Gortat, 
'Models of Party Development and Questions of State Dependence in Poland', Party 
Politics. Vol. I No. 4. pp599-608 (606). 
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Table 6.2: 1995 Total State Fundine of Parliamentarv Clubs/Circles 
. 
Club/circle Parliamentarians Amount in new zloties 
_SdRP/SLD 
204 9,792,000 
PSL 165 7,920,000 
uw 78 3,744,000 
UP 39 1,872,000 
KPN 16 768,000 
BBV, rR 15 720,000 
Solidarity trade union 10 480,000 
Source: S. Gebethner, 'Problem Finansowania Partii Politycznych a System 
Wyborczy w PoIsce w Latach 90' in F. Ryszka, et al. eds. Histotia - Idee - Polityka. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. 1995. pp425-434 (43 1). 
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Table 6.3: 1997 Election Refunds and Donations 
(Figures in new zloties) 
Party/grouping Expenditure Income Seats Refunds Donations 
AWS 11,100,000 9,300,000 252 6,300,000 
SdRP/SLD 9,300,000 9,300,000 172 4,800,000 
Uw 7,600,000 6,700,000 68 680,000 630,000 
PSL 3,500,000 3,300,000 30 300,000 340,000 
ROP 1,900,000 1,750,000 11 110,000 260,000 
UP 973,000 993,000 220,000 
KPEiR 513,000 475,000 100,000 
KPEiR RP 123,000 105,000 80,000 
Sources: Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 December 1997 and Rzeczpospolita, 23 December 
1997. 
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Table 6.4: Labour Union Income, 1993-95 
(Figures in new zloties) 
Source 1993 1994 1995 
Members/parliamentarians 5,800 35,900 52,600 
Election candidates 59,900 
Election refund 623,500 
Donations 1 13,400 1 1,700 12,200 
Bank interest 1 87,200 115,600 
Total 79,000 1 748,200 180,500 
Source: P. G. Lewis, 'Party funding in post-communist east-central Europe' in P. 
Burnell and A. Ware. eds. Funding Democratization. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 1998. ppl37-157 (139). 
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Table 6.5: Party coverage on main evening news, May 1997 
Party/grouping News coverage 
SLD 5 minutes 20 seconds 
AWS 4 minutes 4 seconds 
uw 3 minutes 52 seconds 
PSL 2 minutes 58 seconds 
ROP I minute 15 seconds 
UP I minute 10 seconds 
Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 June 1997 
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